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Chapter 1: Introduction. 
1. The Incomplete Rejuvenation of Britain’s Trade Union Movement, and Parallels 
between the ‘New Economy’ and British Agriculture. 
From the 1970s onwards, Britain’s weakened trade unions have attempted a 
rejuvenation of their orientations and strategies: chiefly in order to appeal to and 
represent precarity-prone workers in a more satisfactory manner than they had before. 
However, this rejuvenation process has occurred in a piecemeal and uncoordinated 
manner: orientations have only shifted partially, and certain rejuvenatory strategies 
have been far from effective.  
An interwoven process has occurred alongside, and helped necessitate, this 
attempted rejuvenation: Britain’s urban labour markets have become increasingly 
‘ruralised’. That is to say, the British economy has been fundamentally restructured, 
and urban industrial relations in the ‘New Economy’ have come to increasingly 
resemble those long found in British agriculture. Britain’s Farmworkers’ Union has 
had to contend with ‘new economic’ institutional conditions – namely the norms of 
small-employee firms and interpersonal and/or triangular relations between employers 
and workers – for an extended period of time.1 It is therefore reasonable to assume 
that, from 1970 onwards, the Farmworker’s Union would have utilised those 
orientations and strategies adopted by Britain’s urban unions during their rejuvenation 
processes, but in a more systematic, coherent and effective manner, and from an 
earlier date.  
To interrogate this assumption I pose the following research question: in terms 
of form and effectiveness, how differentiated have the orientations and strategies of 
the Farmworkers’ Union been, with regards to precarity-prone workers, when 
compared to the wider Trade Union Movement, and why? 
 
2. Operationalising the Research Question: the Shape of the Thesis to Come.  
 
I raise a series of sub-questions in order to unpack this principle research question: 
 
i) Exactly what parallels are there between the operating environment of the 
New Economy and the traditional operating conditions found in Britain’s 
agricultural sector?  
ii) How does one define ‘precarity-prone workers’, ‘union orientation’, and 
‘union strategy’? 
iii) From what academic perspective, and with what methodologies, will I conduct 
via? 
iv) What are the spatial and temporal limitations of this thesis? 
v) What sources shall I utilise? 
 
The preceding five questions are addressed in this introductory chapter. 
Subsequently, three further sub-questions are asked. Namely: 
 
vi)  What orientations and strategies have the Farmworkers’ Union, and the 
wider Trade Union Movement, employed with regards to precarity-prone 
workers? 
                                                
1 The Farmworkers’ Union is properly introduced in a brief intermediary section of this thesis, found 
between chapters two and three. 
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vii)  What causal mechanisms have been responsible for producing said 
orientations and strategies? 
viii) How effective have said strategies been in securing the Farmworkers’ 
Union’s, and the wider Trade Union Movement’s, desired orientational 
goals, and why? 
 
 These questions are asked of the hegemonic mainstream Movement in chapter 
two, and regarding the Farmworkers’ Union’s actions in a variety of operational 
domains in chapters three through to six. Following the gathering of this information, 
this thesis’ principle research question is answered in chapter seven. Likewise chapter 
seven considers the implications of this analysis for: 
 
ix) The Farmworkers’ Union itself. 
x) The wider British Movement. 
xi) A trade union movement operating in a differentiated national economy, 
namely the Netherlands. 
 
 A summary of this thesis’ finding, suggestions for further research and some 
personal concluding remarks are presented in chapter eight. 
 
3. Britain’s New Economy, Labour Precarity, and the Ruralisation of Urban Labour 
Relations. 
 
 This section details Britain’s transition, from the 1970s onwards, to the 
proverbial New Economy. I discuss how such a transition has affected Britain’s urban 
labour relations, and provide a new analytical perspective on the matter: by 
demonstrating how post-1970 economic restructurings can be thought of as the 
ruralisation of Britain’s urban labour relations. In the process I introduce theories 
regarding ‘labour precarity’, to be utilised throughout this thesis.   
 In the early 1970s the Post-War economic expansions enjoyed by many 
industrial nations began to slow, stagnate and then recede. One had to look to the 
1920s to find a comparable era of international economic instability.2 Contingent 
events, such as the Oil Shocks, exacerbated international volatility and rampant 
inflation,3 while international product-market competition intensified due to the 
emergence of the New Industrial Economies and the increased, unchecked influence 
of Multi-National Corporations.4 In the ethereal name of globalisation, Keynesian 
economic orthodoxies came to be rejected.5 Coinciding with these trends, new 
technologies – of micro-processing and management methodologies – led to the 
eclipse of Fordist production techniques: product markets came to be increasingly 
differentiated and segmented; production-line processes were replaced by 
decentralised production and, vitally for this thesis, the super-massive factories and 
relatively homogenised labour forces of Fordism gave way to smaller, normally 
                                                
2 Jelle Visser, “European Trade Unions: the Transition Years”. In: Anthony Ferner and Richard 
Hyman. New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994, pp. 80-107, 
pg. 82. 
3 Richard Hyman, “Economic Restructuring, Market Liberalism and the Future National Industrial 
Relations System”. In: Ferner and Hyman. New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations, pg. 8. 
4 Visser, European Trade Unions: the Transistion Years, pg. 96; Paul Marginson and Keith Sisson, 
“The Management of Employees”. In: P. Marginson, P.K. Edwards, R. Martin, J. Purcell, K. Sisson, 
Beyond the Workplace, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988, pg. 80-122.  
5 Chris Tilly and Charles Tilly, Work Under Capitalism. Boulder, Westview Press, 1998, pg. 40. 
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privately-owned firms.6 Through such processes, numerous sectors of Britain’s 
economy came to be fundamentally restructured along ‘Post-Fordist’ operating 
principles.  
 Of course systems of production are not monolithically evolutionary: different 
modes of production coexist side by side in the economy at any one time. One can 
even question the validity of the term ‘Fordism’ being applied to the hegemonic 
operating systems of Inter- and immediate Post-War economies: actual production-
line Fordism occurred in only a limited number of firms during the mode of 
production’s apparent height-of-influence, and even in these firms only a minority of 
workers were directly engaged in such operating procedures.7 It is best to interpret the 
pre-1970s hegemony of Fordism as an allegorically concept, describing a mode of 
production that balanced a high degree of alienation and lack of skill development 
with a job-for-life and the security of a living wage.8 Alternatively, Post-Fordism can 
be defined as the absolute prioritising of ‘flexibility’ within a firm9: all that had 
remained stubbornly solid finally succumbed, so as to melt into air.10 
 One cannot locate a ‘typical’ worker in Britain’s New Economy: instead there 
has been a significant disaggregation of interests and positions within the working and 
middle classes.11 This is due to the fact that ‘flexibility’ can be taken to mean many 
things with reference to labour: remit enlargement, effort intensification, and cost 
controls are all wont to be conflated under the catch all term.12 Instead, New Economy 
workers can be differentiated by the degree of contingency in their position and by 
their occupational status and market power13: a freelance ITC consultant is likely to 
have a radically different experience in the workplace then a subcontracted cleaner on 
a zero-hours contract.14 Making sense of this differentiation, Atkinson suggests that 
one paradigm to rise in New Economies has been that of the “flexible firm”15: here, a 
core group, of permanently employed skilled workers and managers, enjoys a 
strengthening of contractual commitments, while a secondary peripheral group is 
                                                
6 Tony J. Watson, Sociology, Work and Industry: Third Edition, London: Routledge, 1993, pg. 334; cf. 
Mancur Olson, The Rise and Fall of Nations, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982; Phil 
Blackburn, Rod Coombs and Kenneth Green, Technology, Economic Growth and the Labour Process. 
London: Macmillan, 1985. 
7 Keith Grint, The Sociology of Work, London: Polity Press, 1992, pg. 302. 
8 For thorough appraisals of Post-Fordist production, cf. Paul Hirst and Jonathan Zeitlin, “Flexible 
Specialization Versus Post-Fordism Theory: Evidence and Policy Implications”. In: Economy and 
Society, 1991, 20(1), pg. 1-156. 
9 Cf. Michael Piore and Charles Sable, The Second Industrial Divide, New York: Basic Books, 1984. 
10 Cf. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and 
Company, 1908. 
11 Richard Hyman, “Trade Unions and the Disaggregation of the Working Class”. In: Mario Regini 
(ed.), The Future of Labour Movements, London: Sage, 1992, pg. 150-169. 
12 Watson, Sociology, Work and Industry, pg. 346; Ben Rogaly, “Intensification of Workplace Regimes 
in British Horticulture: The Role of Migrant Workers”. In: Population, Space and Place, 2008, 14, pg. 
497-510. 
13 Cf. Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore “The Business of Contingent Work: Growth and Restructuring in 
Chicago’s Temporary Employment Industry”. In: Work, Employment and Society, 1998, 12(4), pg. 
655-674. 
14 Sjoerd Goslinga and Magnus Sverke, “Atypical Work and Trade Union Membership: Union 
Attitudes and Union Turnover Intention Among Traditional versus Atypically Employed Union 
Members”. In: Economic and Industrial Democracy, 2003, 24, pg. 290-312; Christopher Forde and 
Robert MacKenzie, “Getting the Mix Right: The Use of Employment Contract Alternatives in the UK 
Construction Industry”. In: Personnel Review, 2007, 36(4), pg. 549-563. 
15 John Atkinson, Flexibility, Uncertainty and Manpower Management, IMS Report No. 89, Brighton: 
Institute of Manpower Studies, 1984; John Atkinson, “Flexibility or Fragmentation? The United 
Kingdom Labour Market in the Eighties”. In: Labour and Society, 1987, 12(1), pp. 87-105. 
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expanded and deflated at will, in response to environmental contingencies and peaks 
and troughs in production cycles.16  
 Those workers in periphery, contingent groups, with low occupational status 
and market power, have experienced a reversal of the “decommodification” of labour 
that supposedly occurred in the Inter- and immediate Post-War Eras.17 Work, for 
many, has become ‘non-standard’,18 in the sense that contractual relations no longer 
match the Fordist norms found in urban labour relations before the 1970s-initiated 
restructuring of the economy. Part-time employment, temporary contracting, 
temporary agency working, ‘bogus’ self-employment and subcontracting have become 
increasingly normalised in many areas of the economy. Indeed, in 2013 Britain is the 
only major European economy to have no far-reaching regulations that prevent or 
restrict the use of particular forms of non-standard contract.19 
Regarding part-time employment: the proportion of Britain’s workforce on 
less than 30 hours per week increased from 21% in 1981 to 26.5% in 2000, making it 
one of the highest figures in Europe.20  Regarding temporary contracting: the 
proportion of temporary fixed-term jobs in the economy rose from 4% of all full-time 
equivalent positions in 1981 to 8% in 2000, a relatively low figure by international 
comparisons, but significant nonetheless.21 Regarding agency work: a subgroup of the 
temporary labour force to have grown exponentially in Britain’s New Economy has 
been those workers supplied through private employment agencies. Unlike temporary 
labour in general, Britain has experienced a high growth of temporary agency work by 
international comparisons. The exact number of workers employed through 
employment agencies in the UK during the 2000s has been highly debated, with 
somewhere between 260,000 and 1.25 million workers a day being employed in such 
organisations. Regardless of this confusion, the matured industry has undoubtedly 
grown to be of massive influence in the UK: the industry staffed 10,000 offices across 
the UK as of 2008 – compared to 4,200 in the Netherlands, while the penetration rate 
of UK agency staff had been among the highest in Europe throughout the previous 
decade, at 4.5% in 2006 – compared to 2.5% in the Netherlands, with the mean 
average rate for the entirety of the EU being 1.8% in that year.22 Indeed, by 2006 the 
UK employment agency industry was the largest of its kind in Europe, partly due to 
the fact that the regulatory context governing the industry’s operation was relatively 
limited compared to other EU members, and that same year 12%, of businesses had 
                                                
16 Cf. Catherine Hakim, “Core and Periphery in Employers' Workforce Strategies: Evidence from the 
1987 E.L.U.S. Survey”. In: Work, Employment and Society, 1990 4(2) for further discussions regarding 
core/periphery theories. 
17 Cf. Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick, “European Trade Unions and Atypical Workers”. In: Industrial 
Relations Journal, 2011, 42(3), pg. 293-310; Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990. 
18 Patrick McGovern, Deborah Smeaton and Stephen Hill, “Bad Jobs in Britain: Non-standard 
Employment and Job Quality”. In: Work and Occupations 2004, 31, pp. 225-249. 
19 Compare Britain with Spain, for example, which has long had statutorily regulations preventing the 
use of temporary contracts in replacing permanent jobs: the only stipulations of the sort in Britain 
prevent the explicit use of temporary agency work as a strike breaking force. Cf. Ibid. 
20 Cf. McGovern, Smeaton and Hill, Bad Jobs in Britain; Hans-Peter Blossfeld and Catherine Hakim, 
Between Equalization and Marginalization: Women Working Part-Time in Europe and the United 
States of America, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
21 Cf. McGovern, Smeaton and Hill, Bad Jobs in Britain; Alison Booth, Juan Dolado and Jeff Frank, 
“Introduction: Symposium on Temporary Work”. In: The Economic Journal, 2002, 112, pg. 189-213. 
22 N.B The penetration rate of agency work describes the number of full-time equivalent agency 
workers in relation to the total workforce of a country on any one day. 
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used agency work in some form.23 Regarding ‘self-employed’ workers: 7% of the 
labour force was categorized as self-employed in 1980; this figure had risen to 11.6% 
by 2000. Clear evidence suggests that much of this increased self-employment is 
‘bogus’, in the extent that many self-employed workers continue to work within 
hierarchical organisations, particularly in the construction industry, and their self-
employed status merely denotes a informalisation and relaxation of contractual 
commitments, in their de facto employer’s favour.24 Finally, regarding subcontracting: 
in 2010, 80% of businesses had subcontracted part of their business, often to an 
employment agency, signifying a fundamental restructuring of the methods by which 
firms fulfilled their labour requirements in the New Economy.25 From the above we 
can see that in the New Economy, non-standard work has become fully normalised.  
As mentioned, a vital development in Britain’s New Economy has been the 
increasing heterogeneity of the workforce. Ever greater proportions of traditionally 
socio-economically disenfranchised groups can be found in the workplace, most 
notably in the tertiary, service sectors: female and migrant labour being prime 
examples.26 It is notable that such groups have found themselves overly concentrated 
                                                
23 Cf. Raymond-Pierre Bodin, Wide-ranging Forms of Work and Employment in Europe: Review and 
Challenges for the Players, Annecy: The Future of Work, Employment and Social Protection 
Conference, 2001; OECD, Employment Outlook 1999, Paris: OECD, 1999; European Trade Union 
Institution, Survey of Legislation on Temporary Agency Work, Brussels: ETUI, 2000; Peter Nolan and 
Gary Slater, “The Labour Market: History, Structure and Prospects”. In: Peter Edwards (ed.), Industrial 
Relations: Theory and Practice, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, pg. 63 Goslinga and Sverke, Atypical Work 
and Trade Union Membership; Pernicka 2005; Edmund Heery, “The Trade Union Response to Agency 
Labour in Britain”. In: Industrial Relations Journal, 2004, 35(5), pp. 435-450; International Federation 
of Temporary Work Businesses, Rationale of Agency Work: European Labour Suppliers and 
Demanders’ Motives to Engage in Agency Work, Rotterdam: ECORYS-NEI, 2002, pg. 21; Jan Druker 
and Celia Stanworth, “Partnerships and the Private Recruitment Sector”. In: Human Resources 
Management Journal, 2001, 11(2), pp. 72-89, pg. 74; Neil Millward, Mark Stevens, David Smart and 
W.R. Hawes, Workplace Industrial Relations in Transition, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1992, 
pg. 47; Keith Sisson and Paul Marginson, “Management: Systems, Structures and Strategy”. In: 
Edwards (ed.), Industrial Relations, pg. 167; International Federation of Temporary Work Businesses, 
Agency Work’s Key Indicators: Penetration Rate of Agency Work, Rotterdam: ECORYS-NEI, 2006; 
Trades Union Congress Commission on Vulnerable Employment (TUC CoVE), Hard Work, Hidden 
Lives, London: TUC, 2008, pg. 184; Mick Wilkinson, New Labour, the Gangmasters Licensing 
Authority and the Woefully Inadequate Protection of Migrant Workers in the UK, Hull: University of 
Hull Research Paper, 2010, pg. 5; European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions, Temporary Agency Work in an Enlarged European Union, Dublin: EFILWC, 2006; 
Edmund Heery, Hazel Conley, Rick Delbridge and Paul Stewart, Beyond the Enterprise? Trade unions 
and the Representation of Contingent Workers, Leeds: University of Leeds, 2000; Donald Storrie, 
Temporary Agency Work in the European Union, Dublin: EFILWC, 2002, pg. 1; Kate Purcell and John 
Purcell, “Insourcing, Outsourcing and the Growth of Contingent Labour as Evidence of Flexible 
Employment Strategies”. In Rodger Blanpain (ed.). Non-standard Work and Industrial Relations, The 
Hague: Kluwer, 1999, pp. 163–181; Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 
Agency Working in the UK: A Review of the Evidence, London: BERR, 2008; Jamie Peck, Nik 
Theodore and Kevin Ward, “Constructing Markets for Temporary Labour: Employment Liberalization 
and the Internationalization of the Staffing Industry”. In: Global Networks, 2005, 5(1), pp. 3-26. 
24 Cf. McGovern, Smeaton and Hill, Bad Jobs in Britain; TUC CoVE, Hard Work, Hidden Lives. 
25 TUC CoVE, Hard Work, Hidden Lives, pg. 5 
26 Torben Krings, Organised Labour and Migration in the ‘Global Age’: A Comparative Analysis of 
Trade Union Responses to Migrant Labour in Austria, Germany, Ireland and the UK, Dublin: Dublin 
City University PhD Thesis, 2010; International Labour Organisation, Policies and Regulations to 
Combat Precarious Employment, Geneva: ILO, 2011; Leah Vosko, “Less Than Adequate: Regulating 
Temporary Agency Work in the EU in the Face of an Internal Market in Services”. In: Cambridge 
Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 2009, 2, pp. 395-411, pg. 399; Sally Dench, Jennifer 
Hurstfield, Darcy Hill and Karen Akroyd, Employer’s Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, London: 
The Home Office, 2006; Robert MacKenzie and Christopher Forde, “The Rhetoric of the ‘Good 
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in the employment relations as described above: for example, the otherwise laudable 
feminisation of the workforce has been, in practice, concentrated in these non-
standard employment relations, so while females rose from composing 42% of the 
total workforce in 1980 to 47.3% in 2000, by this latter year 81.6% of all part-time 
workers were female.27  
While the workforce of the New Economy is radically heterogeneous, non-
standard employment arrangements of this type are prone to be of an insecure nature, 
with no guarantee of continuous employment. Magnifying this insecurity, a series of 
common law decisions in the 1970s through to 2010s has meant that many non-
standard labourers employed by new economic firms are considered as workers, 
rather than employees, in the eyes of the law.28 For workers, protections against 
insecurity, such as holiday pay, maternity leave and safeguards against unfair 
dismissal, have been seen as absent according to common law, as is the freedom of 
association, which combined help to hinder the propagation of exploitative working 
conditions.29  
Additionally, the New Economy has seen a lengthening and complication of 
supply-chains. This has allowed for the unchecked proliferation of worker 
exploitation30: many British employment laws require the identification of a single 
employer for action is to be taken, and these are often lacking in the triangular 
employment relations that typical much work in the New Economy. 31 Other norms 
can be found in these non-standard contractual relations: for one, non-standard 
workers have been disproportionally exposed to physical and economic risk factors in 
comparison to full-time, permanently employed workers.32 Take temporary contract 
work, for example: it has been shown that workers on contracts of limited duration, in 
the UK,33 and across Europe,34 receive less pay and enjoy lower levels of job 
satisfaction than full-time, open-ended employees. Moreover, evidence shows that 
non-standard jobs are ill-suited stepping-stones for workers seeking full-time 
                                                                                                                                       
Worker’ Versus the Realities of Employers’ Use and the Experiences of Migrant Workers”. In: Work, 
Employment and Society, 2009, 231, pg. 142–159; Jon Dolvik and Jeremy Waddington, “Private Sector 
Services: Challenges to European Trade Unions”. In: Transfer, 2002, 8, pp. 356-376, pg. 376. 
27 Cf. McGovern, Smeaton and Hill, Bad Jobs in Britain.  
28 Nicola Countouris and Rachel Horton, “The Temporary Agency Work Directive: Another Broken 
Promise?”. In: ILJ, 2009, pp. 329-338, pg. 329. 
29 Indeed for many low-waged workers in the UK, legal protections are strictly limited to statutory 
health and safety legislation, European Union directives and, since 1998, the National Minimum Wage. 
Cf. Bob Hepple, Rights at Work: Global, European and British Perspectives, London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2005; International Labour Organisation, Policies and Regulations to Combat Precarious 
Employment; International Labour Organisation, Report of the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations: General Survey Concerning Employment 
Instruments, Geneva: ILO, 2010.  
30 Bridget Anderson and Ben Rogaly, Forced Labour and Migration to the UK, Oxford: Compas, 2005. 
31 Vosko, Less Than Adequate. 
32 J. Benach, D. Gimeno, and F.G. Benavides, Types of Employment and Health in the European 
Union, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2002, pg. 1-2; 
Storrie, Temporary Agency Work in the European Union, pg. 43. 
33 Booth, Dolado and Frank, Introduction: Symposium on Temporary Work; Alison Booth, Marco 
Fransesconi and Jeff Frank, “Temporary Jobs: Stepping Stones or Dead Ends?. In: The Economic 
Journal, 2002, 112, pg. 189-213; Wilj Arulampalam, Alison Booth and Mark Bryan, “Training in 
Europe”. In: Journal of the European Economic Association 2004, 2(3), pp. 346-360. 
34 OECD, Employment Outlook 2002, Paris: OECD, 2002; Lawrence Kahn, “The Impact of 
Employment Protection Mandates on Demographic Temporary Employment Patterns: International 
Microeconomic Evidence”. In: The Economic Journal, 2007, 117(521), pp. 333–356; Arulampalam et 
al., Training in Europe. 
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employment35: non-standard workers are susceptible to being ‘locked’ into such 
employment relations on a long-term basis. 
 
A well-established literature has taken such aspects of work to produce models 
of employment relations based on a spectrum of precarity. The concept of precarious 
employment encompasses notions of job instability and insecurity, a lack of 
employment protections, and a relationship’s propensity to include aspects of 
pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary exploitation. The following model has been 
operationalised throughout this thesis to define and assess ‘precarious work’ and 
‘precarity-prone workers’.36 
A burgeoning body of work has identified a number of common indicators of 
precarious employment relationships. A labour relationship that includes some or all 
of the following features can be said to be particularly precarious. Such features listed 
below rarely, if ever, exist in isolation, and intertwine with one another to produce 
situations of precarious employment.37 
 
a) Violence (including sexual and threatened violence) and/or physical 
danger.  
b) Coercions to work, such as debt-bondage (economic) or the retention of 
identity documents (extra-economic). 
Economic and extra-economic coercions prevent workers from leaving 
unsatisfactory labour relations by economic, physical and/or psychological means. 
c) Endemic over- or under-employment and/or job insecurity. 
In addition to the well documented health effects of overwork,38 over-
employment represents a degradation of a worker’s work/life balance: preventing 
                                                
35 Booth, Dolado, and Frank, Introduction: Symposium on Temporary Work; Booth, Fransesconi and 
Frank, Temporary Jobs. 
36 Gerry Rodgers and Janine Rodgers, Precarious Jobs in Labour Market Regulation: The Growth of 
Atypical Employment in Western Europe, Brussels: International Institute of Labour Studies, 1989; 
Bridgit Anderson, “Migration, Immigration Controls and the Fashioning of Precarious Workers”. In: 
Work, Employment, Sociology, 2010, 24, pp. 300-19; Edna Bonacich, “Class and Race under 
Neoliberal Globalization: Whither (Or Wither) the Labor Movement?”. In: Contemporary Sociology, 
2008, 37, pp. 1-4; International Labour Organisation, Policies and Regulations to Combat Precarious 
Employment.  
37 This model was principally adapted from the following sources: Anderson and Rogaly, Forced 
Labour and Migration to the UK; Wilkinson, New Labour, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority and 
the Woefully Inadequate Protection of Migrant Workers in the UK; International Labour Organisation, 
Policies and Regulations to Combat Precarious Employment; TUC CoVE, Hard Work, Hidden Lives. 
N.B In Britain the terms ‘precarious work’ and ‘precarious workers’ have been used interchangeable 
with ‘vulnerable work’ and ‘vulnerable workers’. This thesis heeds the advice of Anderson and uses the 
term ‘precarious work’, as the use of the alternative risks confining affected workers to the realm of 
victimhood, denying their agency and decision making processes. In fact I have gone further, and 
utilise my own term, precarity-prone workers when desribing individuals, so as not to attribute 
precarity as being the intrinsic property of those affected, but of the employment relationship. Cf. 
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workers from anticipating, and planning for, the future,39 and developing social 
interactions with the wider community which could otherwise be utilised to avoid 
precarious employment in the future.40 ‘Precarious work’ also describes relations 
typified by underemployment and/or job insecurity, where workers are unsure as to 
whether their de jure or de facto contracts will be extended in the short and long-term. 
Such uncertainty puts both economic and physical strain on the worker, again unable 
to adequately plan for their future,41 which again forces workers to accept further 
precarious work in the short-term, further binding labourers to employers. 
d) The enforced ‘provision’ of accommodation by employers, often 
substandard in nature.  
The merging of the labour and housing markets extends control over workers 
from the workplace into their nominally private lives, and increases the inherent risks 
associated with leaving ones’ job: one faces the short-term loss of both income and 
home rather than ‘simply’ ones income. Resultantly, employers can bind workers into 
indecent labour relations with the usage of tied-housing.42 In addition tied-workers 
can be more easily compelled to work excessive hours,43 further affecting their 
work/life balance and mental and physical wellbeing.  
e) Low-wages, the withholding of wages and/or unwarranted wage 
deductions or reductions. 
 In addition to low hourly pay rates, workers in precarious employment can 
lose their wages in enforced ‘transactions’ with their employers and/or interested third 
parties. Low-waged work produces insecurity: employees unsure of their ability to 
make ends meet are more likely to enter and remain in precarious and exploitable 
labour relations, due to fear of underemployment and poverty.  
f) Lengthened and ambiguous supply-chains, and/or the presence of triangular 
employment relations.  
Subcontracting increases levels of job precarity: insecurity increases as 
supply-chains lengthen and ambiguous employment relations between subcontractors, 
franchisers and agencies come into being.44 When it is difficult to determine who 
precisely is employing whom, exploitative labour relations are born as the employer 
and labour user’s moral, and legal, “responsibility” towards employees is perceptively 
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subcontracted into oblivion.45 
g) Isolation from the community at large. 
 Isolation can be experienced economically and socially, physically and 
mentally. Such isolation is an aspect of precarious employment, but also acts as a 
force propelling workers towards further precarious employment in the future.
 From the above factors, it should be clear that the cornerstone of precarious 
employment is found in the form of overdependence, which binds labourers to 
employers. When workers depend not on personal networks and symmetrical power 
relations, but on employers and labour users “for food and shelter, access to health 
care (and) information about their rights”, they are forced to lower their position in the 
labour market, leaving themselves poorly paid, insecure and unprotected as a result46: 
forced to make themselves more “flexible” in the new economic parlance of organised 
capital.47 Amalgamating the above factors, this thesis utilises the Trades Union 
Congress’ definition of vulnerable employment in order to define a precarious labour 
relation: being one that “places people at risk of continuing poverty and injustice 
resulting from an imbalance of power in the employer-worker relationship”.48 
With such overdependencies being observed in numerous contemporary 
studies, certain jobs in trans-national new economies – those particularly prone to 
producing precarious labour relations – have been described in a number of 
disparaging ways: the New Economy accordingly represents “3D employment”, being 
‘Dangerous, Dirty and Degrading’49; or else the “Brazilianization of the West”.50 The 
authors of such sentiments rightly locate a number of common precarity-producing 
trends in new economies: shorter and more easily terminable contracts; and more 
unclear, informal and insecure employment relations as examples.51 In Britain, these 
systemic features have become particularly apparent in several key, generally low-
waged industries: notably the construction, contract cleaning and residential care 
sectors.52  
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These sectors, having expanded rapidly in recent decades, share a number of 
common base characteristics: all operate in highly competitive markets with 
accordingly strong pressures on capital to reduce costs and increase productivity.53 
Likewise, in each labour tends to represent a high proportion of total operating costs,54 
and work is often location and time-specific, requiring labour, rather than capital 
mobility.55  
Further structural similarities, that help to produce overdependence on the part 
of labourers, group these precarity-producing sectors together. For one, low-waged 
industries in Britain’s Post-Fordist New Economy have come to be highly fragmented. 
Since 1970 large firms – those employing 1000 worker or more – have largely 
retreated from the economy, while small-employer firms – those employing 100 or 
less – have risen in number substantially.56 While this trend has been felt 
internationally, the effects in Britain have been particular accentuated: as an example, 
Britain’s temporary agency sector, which has a strong presence in all the sectors 
mentioned above, is “very fragmented” by international standards – whereas the 
largest five temporary agency firms in the Netherlands accounted for 69% of the total 
market as of 2009, Britain’s top five accounted for just 20%, and of Britain’s 6500 
recruitment businesses that year, 65% consisted of just one office, and 53% employed 
just 2-5 full-time staff members57  
 A further general development in these new economic sectors has been the 
flattening of authority structures, that has come hand-in-hand with the general 
reduction in the division of labour that has occurred58: in contrast to the highly 
bureaucratised and impersonal authority structures of Fordism, workers have came to 
work in close-proximity with managers on the allegorical shop-floor. This has led to a 
re-personalisation of labour relations, with workers forced to maintain apparently 
cordial relations with employers, regardless of work conditions, for fear of dismissal. 
Further diverging Post-Fordist employment models from the previous Fordist 
hegemony, an informalisation of employment relations has occurred, with greater 
proportions of the workforce being paid beyond the oversight of the State59: worker 
vulnerabilities have been further compounded by the growth of the grey and black 
markets of the New Economy, where even legislatively enforced employment rights 
have proved difficult to secure.60  
Hand-in-hand with such patterns, the aforementioned new economic sectors 
share the ignoble characterisation of low union penetration, again differentiating them 
from their Fordist forebears. As such sectors have grown in size, the British 
Movement has shrunk: in 1983 just under 50% of Britain’s workforce was unionised, 
by 2002 this figure had declined to 31%, with this number falling, at a less precipitous 
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rate, ever since.61  
Due to these apparent oddities, these sectors, or at least, their standard 
employment relations, are perceptively ‘New’ according to multiple voices in the 
literature, as in differentiated from the immediate Post-War Era. While construction 
workers are hardly a new addition to the national economy, it’s an academic truism 
that across much of Western Europe the “European social model” of capitalist 
production decommodified labour in the Pre- and immediate Post-War Eras, placing 
restrictions on Capital’s ability to hire and fire without reason and due course.62 
Academics, making temporal comparisons, suggest that these low-waged sectors of 
the New Economy have become increasingly reminiscent of Victorian labour markets: 
relationships commoditised or ‘Victorianised’ in a manner unseen since the 
Nineteenth Century.63  
Such voices ignore idiosyncratic niches of the economy where labour relations 
stubbornly refused to decommodify before and during the Post-War Era. Britain’s 
agricultural sector is one such idiosyncratic niche. Non-standard, particularly 
precarity-prone work, substantially differentiated from the single-employer, open-
ended, wage-only paradigm of Fordism, was endemic in British agriculture from the 
birth of capitalism, as it was across the economy as a whole. Indeed, it has been well 
argued that certain aspects of agricultural production have historically prohibited the 
usage of “free waged labour” deemed typical of modern capitalism: unlike a Fordist 
production line, agriculture consists of an excess of production over labour time. 
Crops need to mature, calves need to gestate: accordingly agricultural labourers, if 
utilised as a “regularised”, waged, workforce would find themselves underemployed 
on both a seasonal and daily basis, diminishing the potential for capitalist profit.64 
Time and place dependencies, much like those found in the contemporary New 
Economy, historically discouraged a decommodification of agricultural labour. 
Accordingly, a notion that agricultural production had an anti-capitalist 
flavour was once rife within agrarian studies: in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries it was normal to claim that agriculture had “a much different complexion 
than that found in industry proper”.65 Marx saw family farmers, unable to fully 
capitalise their mode of production,66 as a doomed class of petty producers, who 
would sink into the proletariat unable to compete with modern industry.67 In the face 
of this prophesized subsumption, some later Marxian theorists romanticised the 
continued existence of small-scale, family-owned farms, treating them as a new rural 
proletariat.68 Others cited their continued existence to be the product of a noble ‘self-
exploitation’ by and of farmers.69 However such theories treated ‘the farm’ as a self-
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contained unit of analysis, and ignored how proto-capitalist agrarians utilised 
unwaged, highly exploitative, patriarchal controls over women and youths, repeatedly 
across time and space, in order to satisfy labour requirements unattainable from a 
regularised workforce.70  
 An alternative, and/or supplyment, to this unwaged exploitation of rural 
women and youths can, and has, been found in the form of the employment of a 
nominally waged, but purposefully precariatised workforce. So long as that labour is 
prevented from demanding stable and predictable employment patterns, agriculture 
has been capable of utilising a capitalist mode of production: however a marginalised, 
and therefore controllable, waged labour force is required. Agricultural labourers, in 
Britain and elsewhere, have historically found themselves performing monotonous 
and strenuous jobs71 for which they are overqualified72 and underpaid.73 In order for 
this to be achieved, capitalised-agriculture has, throughout time and space, utilised as 
a principle labour reserve proletarians further discriminated against due to inequalities 
arising from their ethnicity, age, citizenship status and/or gender.74 Precarity then 
seems to be an inbuilt historical function of agricultural production.  
 We can see such reliance in the experiences of rural migrant labour, often 
readily exploitable due to migrants’ often tenuous residency statuses. Migrant labour 
has been perceived as vital to Britain’s rural industries for a substantial period of time: 
agricultural employers regarded sojourners as “indispensable” in the middle of the 
1800s.75 Likewise, in 2006, an extensive survey found agricultural employers 
unequivocally reliant on migrant workers. In other low-waged Post-Fordist sectors, 
notably the construction, hospitality, care and cleaning industries, employers were 
found to utilise migrant labour en mass. However employers in these sectors believed 
vacant positions could be filled by native workers if need be. In contrast, many 
employers in agrarian industries argued their businesses simply could not survive 
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without migrant labour.76 In this same survey, agriculture was the only industrial 
sector in Britain where over half of employers reported a definite preference for 
migrant work over ‘native’ labour.77 From this evidence, clear parallels can be seen 
between the agricultural sector and those totemic sectors of the New Economy, 
themselves disproportionately drawing from readily exploitable labour reserves.  
While never an easy profession, agricultural work became more precarious in 
the 1830s, when industrialisation meant that the cottage industries, that had previously 
supplied rural families with secondary sources of income, wound down. Concurrently, 
the New Poor Laws of 1834 had a major effect on precarity: new legislation 
encouraged the extension of the purposefully grim workhouse system into the rural 
environment, and at the same time ceased all outdoor relief: facing the fields or the 
workhouses, agricultural labour reserves expanded, despite the fact that the industrial 
revolution was by this point in full swing. This pushed down rural wages and 
conditions across the country.78 Resultantly, by the 1860s “low-wages, oppression, 
overcrowded cottages and hovels, disease and the workhouse at the end – these were 
the general lots of (Britain’s) rural worker”.79 
 Clearly, Victorian agricultural work was a depressing experience. However, 
clearly differentiating British agriculture from other sectors of the economy is the fact 
that the heralded decommodification of labour relationships never gained dominance 
in the agricultural sector in the Twentieth Century. The workhouse aside, such 
features quoted above remained a constant feature of agriculture right up till the 
1970s,80 and indeed beyond. Focussing only on basic wages, farmworkers have 
“always been a prominent feature on (Britain’s) landscape of low-pay”81: 
governmental studies of rural environments found that in the 1860s entire families, 
including children as young as five, had to work the land in order to earn a rural 
household’s living wage82; likewise, prior to WWI the farmworkers’ average weekly 
wage, worked over an abnormally long 58 hours week, put the industry firmly at the 
bottom of Britain’s low-pay league83; while in 1969 the National Board of Prices and 
Incomes found farmworkers “by a fair margin the lowest paid body of workers of 
significant size in the country”.84 Wages have remained low since the 1970s, with 
farmworkers being consistently poor “in that they lack the resources to obtain the 
types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities 
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which are customary or are at least widely encouraged or approved in the society to 
which they belong”85: so that in 1982, 40% of adult male farmworkers, and greater 
numbers of females and youths, were paid below the European Social Charter’s Fair 
Remuneration Rate.86  
 Exacerbating this poor take-home pay is the fact that agricultural workers have 
long lived in villages typified by a proportional lack of the social amenities enjoyed 
by urban populations.87 During the height of the post-1970s economic restructurings, 
rural amenities, notably centres for legal and employment advice, remained under-
resourced compared to urban geographies,88 and further deteriorated in quality due to 
several decades of governmental cuts.89 Adding salt to the wound, this under-
resourced environment has been considerably, and consistently, more expensive to 
live in than urban environments over the past century.90 These factors negatively 
affected agricultural workers’ social wages, and susceptibility to precarity, throughout 
the Twentieth Century: underserved by amenities and affordable public transport, 
agricultural workers’ physical isolation from the wider society was maintained, and 
geographically bound workers to the potentially precarious employment relations they 
entered in these areas.91 
Clearly, particularly precarious labour relations have remained the agricultural 
norm throughout the entirety of the Twentieth Century,92 while they have only 
recently been reoccurring en mass in certain sectors of the New Economy. Over the 
last four decades capital has attempted, with remarkable success, to eliminate 
agriculture’s excesses of production time with the use of biotechnology.93 Growing 
seasons have been augmented, and overall production time requirements have been 
gradually falling in line with labour time requirements. However, agriculture’s 
precarity and overdependencies failed to decline as a result of this 
Critically, for the purpose of this thesis, personalised relations between 
employer and employee, now common in the New Economy, were standard in 
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agriculture throughout the Twentieth Century.94 Not only have employment relations 
remained consistently personal, they have remained consistently personal on small-
sized farms/firms, in terms of revenue and workforce. In 1982, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) found +70% of the agriculture workforce 
worked in firms of four persons or less,95 while the rebranded Department of the 
Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) found in 2011 that 88% of the 
agricultural workforce worked with less than five full-time colleagues.96 Likewise, 
Small companies with annual turnovers of less than £100,000 made up the majority of 
firms in the industry as late as 2004.97 The fact that, when favourable economic 
circumstances have allowed, small-scale farmers with close contacts with employees 
have experienced higher turnovers of staff than larger farms implies that this 
proximity has not been to the farmworkers’ favour.98 Another parallel between the 
traditional agricultural environment and the contemporary New Economy can be seen 
in the fact that long topping-up of agriculture’s full-time workforce has been a highly 
insecure, casual and seasonal workforce, often employed in tri-partite triangular 
contractual relationships highly reminiscent of new economic non-standard 
contracts.99  
Farmworkers discussing their labour relations in 1981 could just as easily be 
describing the situation of a contract cleaner living in agency-provided 
accommodation in the 2000s: “you live next door to the boss (or manager) and you 
see him every day of the week. It’s not like being in a big factory where you don’t 
know who your boss is and you go home at 5 o’clock and switch off… it’s like having 
a row with your wife or children. You can’t be at each other all the time. You’ve got 
to be quite nice to them”; “if you put a farm worker into a factory… he immediately 
adopts a much more militant attitude than the one he had on the farm the week 
before”.100 Likewise Joan Maynard, of the Farmworkers’ Union, could easily be 
describing a ‘self-employed’ Twenty-First Century construction worker when she 
stereotypes a typical agricultural labour relation on a small in the mid-Twentieth 
Century: where close and flattened working relations left farmworkers “lack(ing) the 
feeling of strength, solidarity and confidence which numbers bring. The boss is not 
some remote figure it is easy to dislike; he is the man who works beside you most 
days of the week”.101 I therefore posit that, in recent decades, numerous sectors of 
Britain’s New Economy have become increasingly reminiscent not only of Victorian 
labour markets, but also British agriculture, where low-pay, insecurity, isolation and 
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personalised employment relations have been operating standards since the 
Nineteenth Century al least102. 
 
The insecurities that such environmental factors have produced and 
maintained have had a notable effect on the nature of organised labour found in 
Britain’s rural environment. Despite the continuation of poverty wages, Britain’s 
agricultural workforce, in the latter Twentieth and early Twenty-First centuries alike, 
generally “does not strike, has no restrictive practices, and does not watch the 
clock”103: personalised and/or triangular employment relations, spread over a large 
numbers of small firms, have produced difficulties in developing voluntary collective 
bargaining and other hegemonic Post-War forms of collective labour organisation. 
Chapter two of this thesis demonstrates that a breakdown in the efficiency of these 
hegemonic Post-War operating strategies has plagued the urban Trade Union 
Movement from the 1970s onwards, this breakdown having been caused by a cocktail 
of related processes104: as is now the case in the New Economy, as has been the case 
in agriculture for a significantly longer period of time. 
Internationally, academics and union strategists who subscribe to the notion 
that transitioning to the New Economy represents the Victorianisation, or temporal 
back-shifting, of labour relations have suggested national trade union movements 
need to resuscitate forms of action long since marginalised to the fringes of 
Labourism as part of their rejuvenation processes105: unions struggling to survive in 
the operational paradigms of new economies have been told to look backwards in 
order to go forwards. However, observations of temporally distant periods may hinder 
adequate assessments of the causal mechanisms behind, and effectiveness of, such 
identified rejuvenatory orientations and strategies. Instead of looking back to the 
orientations and strategies of unions operating in a temporally distant period’s pre-
Fordist operating environment, it is possible to look at those margins of the economy 
where labour relations stubbornly refused to decommodify. Perhaps unions operating 
in these environments never needed to undergo a rejuvenation of their orientations 
and strategies, as the Movement’s Post-War operating norms may never have 
achieved hegemonic status.  
 To build on this, a final parallel between the Farmworkers’ Union’s traditional 
operating environment and those now inhabited by the urban wing of the Movement 
can be found in the fact that rural human geographies, traditional dominated by landed 
and farming interests,106 long-ago produced a socio-political environment hostile to 
trade unionism, much similar to those environments produced in the New Economy as 
the result of the decades of anti-union governmental policies seen since the 1970s.107  
This is not to say the agricultural sector is identical to certain new economic 
sectors, only back-shifted in time: while numerous sectors have exponentially grown 
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in size since the 1970s, agriculture has been experiencing a continuous and 
precipitous shrinkage since the dawn of industrialisation, in Britain and elsewhere.108 
In 1851 there were 1.48 million agricultural workers in England and Wales, a century 
later less than 0.7109: in the following three decades this number fell further, so that by 
1984 there were 122,000 full-time hired male workers, 11,000 full-time females, and 
138,000 part-time, casual and seasonal workers in the industry.110 By 1993, Britain’s 
agricultural sector, as a proportion of the entire workforce, was one of the smallest in 
Western Europe: 2.2% of all workers were employed on the land compared with a 
Western-European average of 11.4%.111 Over the same general period, a clear trend 
for fewer and physically larger farms occurred.112  
 However, despite the counter directional trajectory of the agricultural industry, 
enough similarities remain between agriculture and low-waged industries in the New 
Economy to make my analysis pertinent: comparatively high levels of unemployment, 
compared to the immediate Post-War Era, have typified Britain’s urban labour 
markets since the 1970s.113 This unemployment has helped bind New Economy 
workers into precarious labour relations for fear of the alternative. This has been the 
longer-term case in agriculture: rural environments have long suffered massive 
underemployment, with agricultural production one of only a few ‘choices’ available 
to rural workers.114 Wide underemployment had meant that, before and after the 
1970s, “a substantial proportion of workers on the land are captive to the extent that 
they have accepted agricultural employment rather than chosen it”.115 The drift from 
the land – that is the depopulation of Britain’s agricultural industry, has primarily 
been brought about not due to labour mobility and the strategic actions of labourers 
seeking new jobs. Instead push factors – specialisation, mechanisation and 
chemicalisation – have outweighed pull factors in terms of their causal influence in 
this shedding of jobs.116 Clearly then, the pressures keeping precarity-prone workers 
in precarious work have been much the same in agriculture’s declining, and the New 
Economy’s expanding, sectors; both before, during and after the 1970s.  
From the above juxtapositions, I define the transition to the New Economy as 
the ruralisation of Britain’s urban labour relations: with this logic, it is reasonably to 
hypothesise that a strategically enabled union operating in Britain’s rural 
environment, more acquainted with the precarious labour relations and inhospitable 
environmental conditions that have crept back into the rest of Britain’s economy from 
the 1970s onwards, would have utilised perceptively ‘sophisticated’ or ‘modern’ 
operational-technologies, well suited to the emerging paradigmic environments of 
Britain’s low-waged sectors, at an earlier date and in a more consistent manner than 
the mainstream Movement. According to this hypothesise: a union representing 
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British farmworkers would have had a significantly differentiated portfolio of 
orientations and strategies from the mainstream Movement at the onset of the 1970s; 
after which the mainstream Movement, reacting to the disabling of its previous modus 
operandi, would be the prime mover in any convergence of actions.   
 
4. Enshrining the Strategic Actions of Actors: Anti-Deterministic Institutionalism. 
 
 Having demonstrated the compelling trans-temporal similarities between 
British agriculture and certain industries in the New Economy, this section discusses 
the analytical perspective this thesis takes when interrogating the above hypothesis. 
This thesis grounds itself in the academic field of industrial relations. That is, 
the study of the socio-economic processes of control that shape and regulate work 
relations.117 In this academic school, three principle actors are traditionally identified 
as key: workers and their collective organisations; managers/employers and theirs; 
and State agencies.118 This thesis’ focuses on these three groups as its principle 
industrial actors. I accept that in doing so this thesis constructs a pragmatically partial 
map of Britain’s agricultural industrial relations. Of course, such a construction can be 
criticised for its simplicity: in a fractal society it is always possible to introduce 
additional, apparently key, actors into an explanatory theory.119 I response I would 
argue, like Przeworski and Teune, that explanatory theories must balance “generality, 
parsimony and accuracy”120: the absolute accuracy of explanations needs to be 
balanced with a healthy respect for parsimony. 
Modern theories of organised industrial relations often emphasize the 
determinant influence of institutional configurations when considering interactions 
between labour and capital.121 Union actions are relegated to a position of secondary 
importance, viewed as either ultimately derivative of institutional circumstance, or 
else as overwhelmed by asymmetrical powerful opponents.122 Such firm-centred 
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theories reflect contemporary societal power differentials: the past four decades have 
undoubtedly seen a trans-global eclipse of traditional working class organisations.123  
 However, empirical observations, in Britain and elsewhere, reveal that many 
trade unions have developed innovative coping mechanisms in adjusting to the 
paradigms of the New Economy.124 Certainly weakened, organised labour is still able 
to act independently, decisively and with implications to others, and needs to be 
studied as an independent variable. “Not bereft of independent influence”,125 the 
scope for strategic action is still consistently available to trade unions, regardless of 
the considerable constraints they may find themselves in.126 The study of constrained 
strategic actions is the study of the reciprocal connections between institutions and 
agency127: in a world of “disorganised capital”,128 there is such a multitude of 
competing and contradicting institutional forces that strategic choice must exist, not 
because of a lack of weakness of structural determinations, but the fact that such 
determinations are inherently contradictory.129 Therefore, an ultimately anti-
deterministic analytical framework is used in analysing the strategic actions of the 
Farmworkers’ Union and others, when assessing what orientations and strategies have 
been displayed, and why.  
This is not to say that I conducted analysis from an anti-institutional 
perspective: gross socio-economic power differentials, between and within classes, 
characterise capitalist society,130 and anti-institutional pluralism fails to recognise the 
marked and ingrained inequalities of condition and opportunity that are found in 
society at large.131 While it is certainly possible for unions to cooperate with the 
organised interests of capital, wages and conditions represent inherent and partially 
controllable costs for profit-maximising firms in ownership of the means of 
production: therefore unions repeatedly find themselves in diametric opposition to a 
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better resourced oppositional force.132 Hence, while the potential for union strategic 
action certainly exists in a disorganised capitalist society, the assessment of such 
potential has been, and is perhaps increasingly, sombre.133 Clearly then, it is important 
to consider the extra-organisational institutional environment when assessing any 
union’s actions.134  
 Likewise, it is important to analyse a body’s internal environment: some have 
made compelling accounts of how a union’s organisational structures and component 
demographics have an instrumental effect on its displayed orientations and enacted 
strategies.135 This above described union ‘identity’, or “opportunity structure”,136 
serves to frame issues and problems for union leaders,137 and indeed other societal 
actors,138 and thus partially determines what forms of strategic action are considered 
legitimate and feasible in the eyes of union leaderships.139 I will then consider a 
union’s or Movement’s internal institutions, its “inherited traditions which shape 
current choices (and) which in normal circumstances… reinforce and confirm 
identities”,140 when determining how and why they acted in the way they did.141 
While intra-union institutions can be augmented and replaced,142 they often, in fact 
usually, persist for long periods,143 and need to be considered in analysis.  
Complementing this idea, others have argued that the dominant identities of 
individual unions, peak confederations and national movements are reflections of the 
specific contexts in which the organisations emerged and matured.144 That is to say, 
labour movements are “creatures of their past circumstance”145: the resultant identities 
have helped shape the agenda they chose to pursue, and the type of power resources 
that they have chosen to cultivate and apply.146 Therefore, studying how and why 
unions have acted in the modern era, it is additionally necessary to refer to and 
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analyse inter and extra-union institutional arrangements in temporally more distant 
periods to that of our chosen periodisation.  
 
5. Defining and Assessing Union ‘Orientations’ and ‘Strategies’. 
 
Having discussed the thesis’ institutional but anti-deterministic perspective, 
the following section explains how this perspective is methodologically 
operationalised when I assess the orientations and strategies of the Farmworkers’ 
Union and others.  
 To assess the underlying orientations of a union – its hegemonic ideological 
positions – rich qualitative research of primary and secondary sources, produced by 
the union in question and other industrial actors, needs to be conducted. It is a painless 
process to determine the formal ideological agenda of a union: well documented in 
publicly published conference minutes, programmic declarations, bargaining 
submissions, press releases and the like.147 As a first step in assessing a union’s 
underlying position, the strength of particular voiced attitudes – that is, particular 
ideological positions – as expressed in such texts are noted.148 However, even after 
conducting such intertextual analysis, it must be remembered that union leaderships 
are well aware of their prerogative to formally represent the disparate and perhaps 
incompatible interests of the workforce. To take analysis deeper, it is necessary to 
determine which ideological ambitions are more vigorously pursued, and which were 
neglected or abandoned, during the political exchanges of give-and-take that a union 
enters into with employers and the State.149 To deal with this difficulty, critical and 
repeated readings of primary and secondary sources that detail the actual practices of 
a union allows for reliable and compelling assessments of a union’s underlying 
orientations towards precarity-prone workers. 
 Assessing what strategies a union most regularly employs again requires rich, 
detailed study of the historic record. An analysis of union strategies differentiates 
between different modes of contention – the collective making of claims that, if 
successfully realised, affects the interests of both the claimant and others.150 An act of 
contention is a purposeful performance: when determining the nature of each 
successive performance, a union has to its disposal an expansive repertoire of 
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contention from which to select151; like how band-members draw from their back 
catalogue when determining their set list, a union draws from historic approaches of 
contention. Tilly and Tilly believe this analogy only works when one conceptualises 
the repertoire as that of a jazz ensemble, rather than the sheet music of a military 
marching band: different modes of contention tend to overlap and merge with one 
another when actualised in practice.152 Therefore a single, simplistic, reading of union 
literature would reveal, if anything, too much information: disparate union branches 
from across Britain would of course develop localised campaigns of action often 
diametrically opposed in nature. To practically delimit the subject matter of my 
research, analysis focusses on those enduring actions that appeared to have been 
purposefully deployed in the pursuit of a particular orientational goal, and have been 
repeated to a substantial degree over time. Put simply: my analysis concentrates on 
the most commonly and purposefully deployed elements of a union’s extensive 
repertoire of contention – these were viewed as coherent ‘strategies’ as opposed to 
individually isolated ‘actions’. Of course, it is accepted and expected that a union’s 
choice of strategy, and orientation, will vary over time. 
 
6. Identifying the Causal Mechanisms that Help Determine a Union’s Orientations 
and Strategies. 
 
I need to assess the causal mechanisms responsible for producing certain union 
orientations and strategies if I am to adequately interrogate my principle research 
question and hypothesis. In order to unpack this research sub-question I draw from a 
number of theorists, in order to produce a qualitative methodology that allows this to 
be achieved. 
As mentioned previously, I privilege the study of institutions, internal and 
external to a union, when assessing the processes that have either encouraged or 
discouraged the actualisation of particular orientations and strategies. A wide body of 
industrial relations literature has identified a number of formal institutional elements 
that have been shown to partially determine the actions of industrial actors. Key 
variable elements have been said to include: the centralised or decentralised nature of 
collective bargaining153; the relative strength and coherence of employer 
organisations154; the presence, or lack, of formal corporatist institutions in the national 
arena155; and the nature of national and supra-national employment laws.156 Such 
issues are taken into consideration during analysis. However, many industrial 
relations theorists have tended to focus their analysis on the strictly formal and 
codified institutions that shape and maintain job regulations.157 Institutions certainly 
abide in such formal bodies, but also within intangible nexuses such as societal 
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cultures, which have been shown to shape the actions of industrial actors158: customs, 
beliefs and existing social relations clearly need to be taken into account during my 
analysis.159 I particularly recognise the influence of internal organising principles, 
which produce path dependencies on unions’ strategic decisions.160 In sum, the 
influence of employer organisations and successive governments, and shifts in 
cultural attitudes are all considered, alongside internal union structures, in order to 
locate unions within nexuses of controls and regulations. 
Nonetheless, union identities produced by institutional conditioning can be 
changed over time, particularly during moments of crisis, such as those experienced 
by the Movement from the 1970s onwards. While stable institutions influence and 
regulate the actions of actors, so too do actors influence the formation and shape of 
institutions. Recognising the power of strategic actions, the theoretical incentives and 
costs offered to a union from the use of various orientations and strategies are 
likewise assessed in the course of analysis.  
As are the effects of contingent historical events: just as strategically enabled 
actors internal to an organisation are able to augment said organisation’s systems of 
control and regulation, so too can exogenous shocks from elsewhere.161 An awareness 
of all the above listed factors allows me to persuasively recount the causal 
mechanisms responsible for necessitating or inhibiting a union’s use of particular 
orientations and strategies.  
 
7. Assessing the Effectiveness of Particular Union Strategies. 
 
 I need to assess the effectiveness of identified union strategies if I am to 
adequately address my principle research question. This section discusses how a 
union’s strategies can be assessed for effectiveness. First though, I demonstrate why 
this particular sub-stream of analysis enhances this thesis’ academic and extra-
academic value.  
 As mentioned, I expect my analysis to reveal the Farmworkers’ Union to have 
utilised apparently cutting-edge rejuvenatory orientations and strategies at an early 
date, due to the once-idiosyncratic nature of Britain’s agricultural sector. If this 
transpires to be true, analysis of the Farmworkers’ Union’s actions could enhance the 
strategic actions of strategists in the wider Trade Union Movement, leaving them able 
to ascertain, from the Petri dish that is British agriculture, what, if any, strategies 
could reasonably be expected to be efficient and effective in operating conditions such 
as those now found in the New Economy.162 
Measuring British union effectiveness, and the effectiveness of other societal 
pressure groups, has for decades been inadequately researched.163 There are a number 
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of reasons for this, not east the high degree of secrecy in which the British political 
system has traditionally operated in,164 only slightly tempered with the passing of the 
2000 Freedom of Information Act.165 Such secrecy makes it difficult to definitively 
assess the effectiveness of lobbying approaches to union strategy, for example. One 
could simply try to match a union’s formal policy ambitions with the state-of-the-field 
at some specified point in the relative future: a harmonisation of desired and end 
results could be taken to indicate the successful deployment of union strategy. 
However, such an exercise would involve a causal fallacy: even if a union wished to 
secure a particular ends with a particular means, and that particular ends were to come 
about, there would still be a need to established what role the union’s actual actions 
played in this turn of events, and what roles were played by other institutions and 
actors. One could conduct research with an oppositional logic, and seek out 
statements from unions complaining about the effectiveness of its chosen strategies of 
contention. However, the act of complaint is in itself a strategy of contention: vocal 
dissent from an interested party – union or otherwise – cannot be interpreted as 
neutral observations.166 Therefore such a mode analysis would have to be utilised 
cautiously.  
There is no easy analytical mechanism that solves ultimately philosophical 
issues of cause and effect: only by grounding all analysis with rich contextual 
information, regarding key industrial actors and institutions in society, is it possible to 
make reasonable and plausible analysis regarding the degree of effectiveness of a 
union’s choice in strategy. 
 
 To measure why particular strategies are effective, or not as the case may be, I 
adapt Grant’s model regarding the effectiveness of pressure group activity.167 Grant’s 
definition of a pressure group – those organisations that “seek, as one of (their) 
functions, to influence the formulation and implementation of public policy”168 – 
clearly encompasses the definition of a trade union, and other key industrial actors, 
such as employer organisations.169 Therefore, analysing the effectiveness of union 
strategy with reference to the following model allows one to consider the institutional 
contexts and power resources at the disposal of a union, but also the institutional 
contexts and power resources of other groups that could either enhance or negate the 
effectiveness of particular union strategies. Drawing from Grant, and others still – 
taking a cue from Korpi and the Power Resource Theory of the welfare state, this 
thesis contends that, in order assess causal mechanisms of success and failure, a 
thorough examination of the differing resources available to oppositional industrial 
actors needs to be taken into account throughout all analysis170 – I explain the varying 
(in)effectiveness of union strategies with reference to: 
 
                                                
164 Grant, Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain, pg. 127. 
165 Cf. Act of Parliament, Freedom of Information Act 2000, London: HMSO, 2000. 
166 As demonstrated in chapter three of this thesis.  
167 Grant, Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain, pg. 130. 
168 Ibid., pg. 9. 
169 Grant’s model was itself drawn from multiple academic sources, the authors acknowledged here: 
Robert Prestus, Elites in the Policy Process, Cambridge: Cambridge. University Press, 1974; Philippe 
Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck, The Organization of Business Interests, Berlin: IIM, 1981.  
170 Cf. Walter Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle, Boston: Routledge/Kegan, 1983; Gøsta Esping-
Andersen and Kees van Kersbergen,  “Contemporary Research on Social Democracy”. In: Annual 
Review of Sociology, 1992, 18, pp. 187–208; Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism. 
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1) The features of a union’s proximate environment i.e. the domain a union seeks 
to organise or influence, in particular the characteristics of the (potential) 
members being organised and represented. Put simple, I consider the sociological 
nature of labour and life in the rural environment: perhaps socio-psychological 
cultures of deference towards workplace superiors proved inconducive to the 
actualisation of militant strike mobilization, for example. 171 
 
2) The resources available to a union, and other groups operating within the same 
domain. In particular:  
 
i) An organisation’s internal group structures, such as decision making and 
conflict-reduction mechanisms. 
ii) Its marketable skills that encourage the attraction and retention of members. 
iii) Its membership mobilisation capabilities. 
iv) Its financial resources. 
v) Its staffing resources. 
vi) Its capability to legitimately sanction the activities of itself and others. 
 
Put simple, the internal institutions of unions and other societal bodies, both 
contemporary and historic, are considered in assessing why strategies became 
effective, or not. Perhaps the Farmworkers’ Union simply lacked the financial 
clout to offer enticing ‘friendly society’ benefits to its members, for example. 172 
 
3) Finally, the features of the wider external economic, political and legal 
environment have to be considered. Namely: 
 
i) Public opinions and attitudes. 
ii) The ideological of the political party in office 
iii) Economic circumstances, such as trends in public expenditure. 
iv) Support or opposition from governmental departments.  
v) The shape and nature of formal and informal arenas of contention.  
 
While point one considers economic and sociographic issues of a union’s 
immediate environment, and point two considers internal constraints on a 
organisations’ actions, point three considers wider institutions and contingent 
events that may affect the effectiveness of particular strategies: perhaps the 
existence of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) scuppered a union’s 
recruitment drives from the late 1990s onwards, or a news-event caused a sudden 
shift in public discourses, facilitating the use of certain approaches, to give two 
hypothetical examples.173 
 
8. Spatially and Sectorally Delimiting the Scope of the Thesis. 
 
 Having determined the methodology with which I advance this thesis, I now 
consider its parameters. The public and private regimes governing agriculture in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland have long been radically differentiated from those in 
England and Wales. Furthermore, Britain’s Farmworkers’ Union has only had a 
                                                
171 Cf. Grant, Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain, pg. 130 
172 Cf. ibid., pg. 30. 
173 Cf. ibid., pg. 30. 
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significant presence in Scotland and Northern Ireland since the mid-1980s. Therefore, 
a study of the northern nations would not have been particularly relevant with regards 
to this thesis’ principle research question: therefore this thesis studies the 
Farmworkers’ Union in only those regions of the UK covered by Westminster’s 
Agricultural Wages Board: that is, England and Wales. The Agricultural Wages Board 
is introduced properly in chapter three of this thesis.  
 Now let us consider those economic sub-sectors grouped together in the rubric 
of ‘agricultural production’. This thesis has asserted numerous sectors of Britain’s 
urban labour market have become ruralised in recent decades, and have come to share 
similarities with the rural, agricultural labour market: namely atomised, small-
employee workplaces with either personalised or triangular employment relations. 
However, during Britain’s post-industrial transformations of the 1970s onwards, 
several sectors of the economy have bucked this trend and developed highly intensive, 
factory-based systems of production. Ironically, two of these counter-trajectory 
industries fall within the Farmworkers’ Union’ sphere of operation: namely, the 
horticultural and food processing sectors. While acknowledging the highly precarious 
nature of the work in these sectors, I believe that, strictly with regard to their large-
employee firms and depersonalised employment relations, these rapidly 
industrialising, or perhaps ‘urbanising’, sectors provide a complementary image to the 
pre-1970s environment of the urban Movement, rather than the contradictory image 
sought.174 To filter out some of these industrialised firms, I again focus my analysis of 
the Farmworkers’ Union in those sectors covered by the Agricultural Wages Board: 
this excludes poultry workers and others involved in ‘secondary food production’. 
Having made this sectoral delimitation, it would be reasonable, though 
ultimately wrong, to accuse this thesis of observational bias: by the selection of 
sources perhaps resultant analyses would end up confirming the thesis’ hypothesis 
while ignoring key divergent facts in the historic record. Fortuitously for any 
naysayer, Westminster’s Agricultural Wages Board covers horticultural workers. 
Work in this agricultural offshoot industry is virtually founded on the principle of 
industrialisation and factorisation.175 So while this thesis primarily on open-air 
agriculture, an environment inconducive to pre-1970s forms of mainstream unionism, 
it does consider the Farmworkers’ Union’s activities in workplaces and sectors 
perhaps more to conducive to such modes. 
 
9. Temporally Delimiting the Scope of the Thesis. 
 
 I focus on the period between 1970 and 2013. The starting date was chosen as 
the 1970s was a momentous decade for British trade union organisation. At this 
decade’s outset the British Movement’s Big Battalions – unions in the mining, steel 
and manufacturing sectors – still held great sway on the national scene. Yet all this 
was about to change: the Oil Crisis of 1973 is regarded as the symbolically crucial 
date that initiated the transition from Fordist to Post-Fordist economies the world 
over,176 which prompted the eclipse of Post-War forms of collective action. As we 
shall see in the following chapter, it was the government-assisted declines of these 
densely-unionised sectors, the weakening of their respective unions and the 
                                                
174 Wynn, Skilled at all Trade, 1993. 
175 Precision Prospecting, Temporary Workers in UK Agriculture and Horticulture. 
176 Of course matters were not quite so simple, and the limitations of Fordist production principles 
operating within saturated markets were beginning to show before this time. Cf. Grint, The Sociology of 
Work, pg. 295. 
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concurrent growth of the ruralised New Economy over the subsequent two decades 
that coerced the Movement into cautiously adopting a piecemeal campaign of 
rejuvenation that has, in part, centred on the enhanced protection of precarious 
workers.  
 Accordingly, the turn of this decade was taken as this thesis’ analytical starting 
point. Of interest is how the Farmworkers’ Union, relatively well used to operating in 
an inhospitable terrain, behaved concurrently to the, until then, relatively privileged 
urban Movement’s active participation in the alien crises of the 1970s and their full-
on “cascade of decline” seen from the 1980s onwards177: it was not until the 1980s 
that the first saplings of rejuvenation started to sprout in the urban Movement, and as 
seen in chapter two of this thesis, these saplings have not, until now, grown in a 
particularly impressive manner; analysis from the 1970s onwards will reveal whether 
the Farmworkers’ Union’s longer heritage of operating in an inhospitable 
environment resulted in a more coherent and purposeful actualisation of supposedly 
rejuvenatory orientations and attitudes over the same period.  
 By extending the periodisation up until the present day, the thesis is able to 
determine to what extent, if at all, the Farmworkers’ Union has been affected by the 
wider Movement’s rejuvenation processes, and vice versa. In addition, certain 
economy-wide institutional shifts of the 1990s, such as the introduction of the NMW 
in 1998, are likely to have fundamentally altered the validity and effectiveness of 
certain forms of collective action: accordingly a time-series running up to the present 
day enhances the applicability and relevance of the thesis’ analysis.  
 
10. Identifying and Selecting Sources. 
 
When studying the agricultural sector, relevant trade union produced literature 
is utilised as the principle material of this thesis. The most prominent source is the 
Farmworkers’ Union’s monthly (later bimonthly) newspaper, the Landworker. First 
published in 1919,178 and primarily written by the Farmworkers’ Union’s Executive 
Committee, it is safe to assume that the Landworker gives a good indication of at least 
the formal attitudes of the Farmworkers’ Union, and a good indication of those 
strategies that the Union has prioritised. In addition, the Landworker has provided 
consistently detailed coverage of the Farmworkers’ Union’s Regional annual and 
National Biennial (later annual) Conferences, where priorities are decided, motions 
moved and passed, and much time spent in formally and informally discussing the 
perceived and desired identify of the Union: analysis of the Landworker therefore 
reveals some of the more subtle hegemonic and counter-hegemonic orientations and 
strategies found within the Farmworker’s Union over time.179 To further assess 
orientations and strategies, additional Union produced documents: conference 
minutes; programmes declarations; bargaining submissions; press releases,180 and 
                                                
177 Visser, European Trade Unions: the Transition Years. 
178 Having replaced the short lived Labourer. Cf. Groves, Sharpen the Sickle, pg. 145, 233. 
179 Partially incomplete archives of the Landworker were accessed at the Trades Union Congress 
Library, held at London Metropolitan University, and the TGWU’s Archive, held at the Modern 
Records Centre at Warwick University. During a two-week period in February these archives were 
visited, and digital copies of documents made for analysis at a later date. Some papers were missing 
from both of these archives: therefore personal contacts were used to obtain otherwise inaccessible 
issues. 
180 Cf. Grant, Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain, pg. 125. 
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internal and external private correspondence from the Farmworkers’ Union, are also 
analysed.181 
To complement and cross-reference these sources, historic documents created 
by other societal actors are used. This allows for an analysis of the Union’s 
interactions with other societal actors in meaningful acts of contention, as opposed to 
the Union’s official, highly mediated and hence biased reportage of such events. Such 
sources include: governmental reports regarding annual negotiations on the 
Agricultural Wages Board; press releases and interviews given by the principle 
employers’ organisation in the sector, the National Farmers’ Union (NFU); internal 
policy documents and minutes from the Labour Party, and private correspondence to 
the Farmworkers’ Union. Furthermore, sources created by the Citizen’s Advice 
Bureaux, Low-Pay Unit and other NGOs are accessed according to need and validity.  
Further complementing these disparate primary sources, secondary sources 
created by non-union actors are utilised. Descriptive biographies regarding key 
individuals in the Farmworkers’ Union are referenced,182 as are the two ‘official 
histories’ of the Union: highly descriptive, but analytically light, accounts of the trials 
and tribulations of rural collective organisation from 1831 through to 1984.183 Also 
utilised frequently is Danziger’s Political Powerlessness: which while not studying 
the Farmworkers’ Union per se, analyses British farmworkers in the Twentieth-
Century up to the late 1980s, and often touches upon the actions of the Union. 
Supplementing these sources, I have conducted qualitative interviews with Chris 
Kaufman, a retired unionist who held numerous positions of high reasonability within 
the Farmworkers’ Union throughout our periodisation,184 and incorporate the contents 
of these conversations where appropriate. 
The rejuvenation of Britain’s urban unions has been well studied from a 
variety of perspectives. However, perhaps due to the Farmworkers’ Union’s apparent 
powerlessness, or the perceptively marginal role of agriculture in Britain’s New 
Economy, the agricultural sector has been systematically under-examined in the 
literature focussing on union rejuvenation. Having said this, a few previous analytical 
studies focussing on the power resources of British farmworkers and/or the 
Farmworkers’ Union have been produced; these are critically incorporated, fully 
referenced, into analysis where appropriate. 
 Of course the Farmworkers’ Union has displayed contradictory orientations 
and strategies simultaneously, as certain elements within the Union contest the 
influence of others. I present an account of the underlying modus operandi of the 
Union: the shifting hegemonic orientations and strategies. Key divisions, debates and 
schisms within the Union will be detailed when relevant.  
  
 When studying the mainstream Movement’s changing orientations and 
strategies, I conduct analysis through a wide lens, in order to identify an underlying 
modus operandi of the sprawling and often factitious network of unions in the UK. To 
produce a compelling account in a relatively succinct manner, secondary sources, 
                                                
181 Archives of which were available at the same centres as listed above. 
182 Cf. Mason O’Connor, Joan Maynard. 
183 In particular: Wynn, Skilled at all Trade; and Groves, Sharpen the Sickle. Groves and Wynn give 
rich accounts of the creation and maintenance of the organisational structures of the Union and are 
referenced frequently, to adequately explain the prominence of particular orientations and strategies 
and help fill some gaps in the primary sources accessible to myself.  
184 Kaufman has variably been the Union’s chief researcher, chief negotiator on the AWB – cf. chapter 
three of this thesis, and the Union’s Secretary for the latter 1990s and early 2000s. 
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produced by theorists investigating different streams of union actions, are analysed: 
the extensive union rejuvenation literature is drawn from particularly heavily, with the 
works of Heery and Hyman figuring particularly prominently throughout this 
thesis.185 This to due to the fact that as they utilise anti-pluralistic approaches that still 
acknowledge the importance of strategic actions, I regard the works of Heery and 
Hyman as among the most persuasive of the burgeoning field of work focussed on the 
topic of union rejuvenation. In chapter two I use their analytical models to categorise 
the orientations and strategies of the mainstream Movement, and later apply these 
models to the agricultural environment.186  
 When studying the wider economy, I concede that a degree of informed 
conjecture is utilised when determine what differentiated aspects of union actions can 
be taken as representative of the mainstream Movement’s hegemonic orientations and 
strategies. In order to interrogate and adjudicate between often differing academic 
accounts of the mainstream Movement, original primary sources produced by actors 
within the Movement are analysed and cross-referenced with my secondary sources. 
Similarly, in order to compare the Farmworkers’ Union’s orientations and strategies 
with those of the wider Trade Union Movement, and determine the Farmworkers’ 
degree of idiosyncrasy, references are made to primary sources created by individual 
urban-based union and the Trades Union Congress (TUC).187 Unlike numerous 
Continental movements’, Britain’s sole peak union confederation – the TUC – has 
never exerted a significant degree of influence or control over its affiliated union, with 
its powers even more diffuse and slight before the 1990s. Despite the TUC’s 
organisational limitations, most British unions send delegates to its annual 
conferences, and its changing constitution and internal discussions are good markers 
of shifting hegemonic tendencies within the movement.188 As a final reserve of 
sources, I utilise reports of the Annual TUC conferences, minutes of its meetings, its 
internal correspondences, consultative documents and so forth.  
 
11. The Shape of the Essay to Come. 
 
 The next six chapters form the principle analytical component of this thesis, 
where research questions (vi), (vii) and (vii) are asked of a variety of bodies in a 
variety of operational domains.  
 In order to ascertain the degree of idiosyncrasy displayed by the Farmworkers’ 
Union, in is necessary to first make assessments of the orientations and strategies of 
the mainstream Movement, both before and after the 1970s. This occurs in chapter 
two, as does the introduction of the two analytical models with which I classify 
various modes of orientation and strategy.  
Next, analysis turns to focus on the Farmworkers’ Union. Such analysis is 
conducted via a shifting thematic narrative, focussing on various operational domains 
within which the Farmworkers’ Union has acted. Firstly, a brief interlude is afforded 
between chapter two and three, where the Farmworkers’ Union, in the various 
                                                
185 Most notably Heery, Trade Unions and Contingent Labour: Scale and Method; Hyman, 
Understanding European Trade Unionism; Changing Trade Union Identities and Strategies. 
186 If nothing else, this thesis contributed to the wider academic literature by applying Hyman and 
Heery’s models to a field of study where they have not been applied before, producing novel and 
compelling analysis, to either complement or problematise these works. 
187 Cf. John Lovell, A Short History of the TUC, London: Macmillan, 1968. 
188 Again, the Modern Records Centre and the Trades Union Congress Library were used to access such 
documents, as was the TUC’s expansive web presence.  
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nomenclatural guises it has inhabited throughout the years, is introduced. Next, 
chapters three and four look at the Farmworkers’ Union’s actions in operational 
domains that, for the mainstream Movement in the Post-War Era, had been 
hegemonically determined within arenas of voluntary collective bargaining: chapter 
three looks at how the Farmworkers’ Union has dealt with issues regarding worker 
remuneration, while chapter four looks at its actions regarding quality-of-life issues – 
namely worker housing and health and safety regulation. Such issues have 
traditionally been thought of as the traditional, and morally privileged, domains of 
union activity: it is therefore vital to consider whether agriculture’s idiosyncratic 
environmental conditioning caused the Farmworkers’ Union’s orientations and 
strategies to diverge from the mainstream Movement’s in such matters. 
 Chapter five looks at various interactions between the Farmworkers’ Union 
and the wider Movement during our periodisation: analysing whether the Union’s 
orientations and strategies changed as it found itself increasingly bound to the 
mainstream Movement in financial and organisational terms. Following this, chapter 
six looks at the Farmworkers’ Union’s relationship with several emblematic features 
of the New Economy: a feminised workforce; non-standard contractors, and migrant 
labour. As shown imminently, key pillars of union rejuvenation theory rest on the 
notion that unions have needed to alter their orientations and strategies regarding 
these groups of workers in particular: it is therefore necessary to study whether 
agriculture’s historic operating environment negated this necessity in the 
Farmworkers’ Union’s case.  
Chapter seven ties the five proceeding chapters together, and directly 
addresses this thesis’ principle research question. Subsequently, the implications of 
this thesis’ findings are laid out, with regards to the Farmworkers’ Union, the wider 
British Movement, and the Dutch Movements. Concluding remarks are found in 
chapter eight. 
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Chapter 2: The Orientations and Strategies of the Mainstream Movement Regarding 
Precarity-Prone Labour: Before and After the Onset of the New Economy. 
 
 This chapter addresses research sub-questions (vi), (vii), and (vii) with regards 
to the hegemonic mainstream Movement. This is required so that the actions of the 
Farmworkers’ Union can be compared with it, in order to determine its degree of 
idiosyncrasy.  
 A first section of this chapter briefly demonstrates why descriptive and 
historical, rather than theoretical or normative, analysis is needed to address such 
issues. Section two describes the orientations and strategies of the Movement up to 
and including the Post-War Era, so as to provide a base from which to analyse 
changes in orientations and strategies from the 1970s onwards. Section three 
describes the economic, political and discursive readjustments seen in Britain’s 
industrial environments from the 1970s onwards, which threw the once stable 
operating norms of the Movement into a state of instability, and demanded a change 
of direction from it.  
 Sections four and five assess how the mainstream Movement’s orientations 
and strategies have partially shifted since 1970. In the process the models of union 
rejuvenation to be utilised throughout this thesis, as developed by Heery and Hyman, 
are fully introduced. Section six deepens analysis by examining what causal 
mechanisms have allowed and encouraged this so-called rejuvenation. However, 
section seven demonstrates how and why this rejuvenatory trend has been partial and 
ineffective at best. Section eight gives a brief summary of the chapter’s findings. 
 
1. Unions and Precarity Prone Workers: The Inadequacy of Normative and 
Theoretical Perspectives. 
 
 This section briefly demonstrates why matters regarding union orientation 
cannot be resolved with reference to normative or theoretical models alone, and 
require rich historical study. 
Altruistic accounts of the role of organised would imply that, with the growth 
of the New Economy, trade unions have had an obvious moral obligation to protect 
the interests of the precarity-prone workers found in the economy: accordingly, the 
protection of “workers at large”, precarious and otherwise, is an inherent and 
talismanic “aim” of the Movement.1  
Indeed, normatively looking at alternative potential sources of employment-
protection in Britain, there is good reason to say that due to the sheer lack of 
alternative advocacy, the union Movement should, historically and contemporarily, 
seek to protect the interests of precarity-prone workers.  
An issue that has long differentiated Britain from its European peers is the 
absence of a singular governmental employment body with a broad remit to ensure 
employers comply even with their legal obligations to workers.2 Instead of a single 
                                                
1 Wolfgang Streek, “Training and the New Industrial Relations: a Strategic Role for Unions?”. In:  
Ferner and Hyman (eds.), New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations, pp. 250-269; Christopher 
Forde, “Temporary Arrangements: the Activities of Employment Agencies in the UK”. In: Work, 
Employment and Society, 2001, 15(3), pp. 631-644, pg. 639–642; Celia Stanworth and Jan Druker, 
“Labour Market Regulation and Non-standard Employment: the Case for Temporary Agency Work in 
the United Kingdom”. In: International Journal of Employment Studies, 2000: 8(13), pp. 3-25, pg. 7–
11. 
2 Citizens Advice Bureau, Nowhere to Turn. 
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enforcement body, a disparate body of organisations, each with different and often 
competing purviews, regulates contemporary Britain’s labour markets: H.M. Revenue 
and Customs oversees enforcement of the NMW while the Health and Safety 
Executive seeks to ensure the physical wellbeing of workers; local Authorities attempt 
to ensure compliance with issues regarding the employment of young persons while 
the UK Border Agency deals with issues of immigration restrictions. In the 2000s 
most of these bodies lacked the financial resources to act proactively, and in 2004 
were found by the House of Commons to have comprehensively failed to cooperate 
with one another in their operations.3 Such a piecemeal, reactive system has allowed 
abuses of labour to fall through its numerous cracks, facilitating the continued 
presence of precarious labour relations in Britain: over the last half-century 
workplaces have been subject to substantially lower levels of governmental inspection 
than other EU member states, due to successive governments’ ideologically 
determined attitude to the labour market.4 Therefore “dauntingly legalistic, 
adversarial” and toothless industrial tribunals have been the de facto first and last port 
of call for many workers seeking redress.5 Cuts in legal aid in the mid-2000s, from a 
national budget of £320 million in 2003 to £227 million in 2005, have effectively 
restricted all but the most economically independent workers from readily accessing 
these tribunals.6  
 In addition to failing to adequately enforce labour regulations, governments 
have consistently failed to provide information to workers regarding their 
employment rights. Over the last two decades funding for employment rights 
campaigns have been negligible: funding for the information campaign regarding the 
1998 National Minimum Wage Act amounted to 2% of the budget for the Benefit 
Fraud Office’s advertising department.7 Resultantly, by 2008 only 17% of workers 
claimed to “know a lot” about their employment rights.8 This information desert has 
allowed employers to propagate precarious, semi-legal employment relationships with 
relative impunity. Combine these above factors with the fact that Britain lacked a 
statutory minimum wage till 1998, and it is easy to ascertain why Britain has long had 
one of the high incidences of low-pay within the OECD.9 Surely a normative 
argument can be made from the above facts to that notion that precarity-prone 
workers affected by such conditions ‘deserve’ an improvement in trade union 
representation. 
 
However, one can likewise make theoretical arguments to the effect that 
precarity-prone workers would be seen as posing an undercutting threat to the 
relatively empowered workers who traditionally made up the core memberships of 
British trade unions in the Post-War period: according to such accounts, unions would 
                                                
3 House of Commons, Gangmaster (Licensing) Bill – White Paper Debate 27th February 2004, 
London: Hansard, 2004. 
4 Andrew Geddes, Sam Scott and Katrine Nielsen, Gangmasters Licensing Authority Evaluation Study 
– Baseline Report, Sheffield: Sheffield University, 2007. 
5 Citizens Advice Bureau, Nowhere to Turn, pg. 2. 
6 TUC CoVE, Hard Work, Hidden Lives, pg. 52. 
7 Likewise, no national campaign was launched with regard to the European Union’s 1993 Work Time 
Directive. This allowed many employers to give the false impression that they could demand the 
signing of opt-outs as a condition of employment. Cf. TUC CoVE, Hard Work, Hidden Lives, pg. 42. 
8 TUC CoVE, Hard Work, Hidden Lives, pg. 36. 
9 M. Keese, A. Puymoyen and P. Swaim, “The Incidence and Dynamics of Low-Paid Employment in 
OECD Countries”. In: Rita Asplund, Peter Sloan and Ioannis Theodossiou (eds.), Low-Pay and 
Earnings Mobility in Europe, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1998, chapter twelve. 
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have taken an active stand against both precarious work and precarity-prone workers, 
with union ‘insiders’ opposing the arrival of non-standard ‘outsiders’ to an economy 
or firm’s internal labour market.10. Alternatively, it can be theoretically argued that a 
precaritised workforce acts as a cyclical buffer, protecting core workers from the 
threat of economic recession or downsizing: accordingly, unions would act to 
maintain the precarity of some in an economy.11 Or else it is possible to argue that 
firms, gaining from the flexibility precarious work brings, become more profitable, 
and therefore hard-pressed unions, hoping to extract maximum rents from their core 
members, may have supported employers’ use of these relationships.12 From these 
contradictory normative and theoretical readings, it should be obvious that one must 
draw from rich, historical data in order to determine how, precisely, individual 
unions have orientated themselves to, and strategised regarding, precarity-prone 
labour.  
 
2. British Unionism, 1800s-1970: up to and through the Fordist “Golden Age”.13 
 
This thesis contends that unions have been augmented and weakened by 
Britain’s transition into the New Economy. Before one can discover how this has 
resulted in a change in orientations and strategies, it is necessary to understand how 
the Movement hegemonically acted in the era preceding this time. This is the purpose 
of this section. In the following pages the path that British unionism took towards, 
through and to the end of Britain’s ‘Post-War economic settlement’ is mapped14; to 
determine how the Movement typically acted before the 1970s, in whose interests and 
why. In the process this section partially introduces Heery’s model of differentiated 
union orientations. 
The history of British unionism predates industrialisation. Popular narratives 
tell the tale of how localised trade unions emerged, in a relatively recognisable form, 
repeatedly and spontaneously whenever nations industrialised: apparently the 
resultant depersonalisation of employment relations bred a lack of trust between 
employers and workers, which caused the latter to organise the collective defence of 
their interests.15 However this is a relatively simplistic narrative, which ignores a 
longer history of organised labour activity. 
Pre-industrial craft guilds played much the same role as contemporary trade 
unions, and certainly fed into the embryonic British Trade Union Movement from the 
Eighteenth-Century onwards.16 These guilds were the preserve of skilled male 
workers, full-time employees in long-term careers, keen to preserve their relatively 
privileged labour market positions by protecting and promoting their marketable 
niche skills.17 Resultantly, throughout the Eighteenth- and much of the Nineteenth 
                                                
10 Assar Lindbeck and Dennis Snower, The Insider-Outsider Theory of Employment and 
Unemployment, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988. 
11 Edmund Heery and Brian Abbott, “Trade Unions and the Insecure Workforce”. In Edmund Heery 
and John Salmon (eds.), The Insecure Workforce, London, Routledge, 2000, pp. 155-180, pg. 158, 161. 
12 Pierre Cahuc and Andre Zylberberg, Labour Economics, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004. 
13 Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism, pg. 94. 
14 Cf. Peter Lange, George Ross and Maurizio Vannicelli, Unions, Change and Crisis. London: Allen, 
1982, pg. 209; Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. 
15 Fox, Beyond Contract; Watson, Sociology, Work and Industry, pg. 311. 
16 Alan Fox, Man Mismanagement, London: Hutchinson and Co., 1985; Grint, The Sociology of Work, 
pg. 73. 
17 Bean, Comparative Industrial Relations, pg. 29; Cf. Gumbrell-McCormick, European Trade Unions 
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Century many embryonic trade unions were hostile to syndicalism, socialism and anti-
patriarchal tendencies both within and beyond their ranks,18 or else were self-
consciously apathetic, actively banning political discussions at branch meetings.19 
However, some of the prototypical-unions sought to convey the perception, perhaps 
even to themselves, that they were both radical and egalitarian in nature. Yet by the 
Nineteenth Century socialist contemporaries saw the trade unions as antithetical to the 
spread of socialism: Engles regarded the unions as “the aristocracy of labour” – the 
most skilled, regarded and organised section of the supposedly singular British 
working class.20 It was not just left-wing contemporaries that regarded the early 
unions as anti-egalitarian: historians of all hues have disregarded the quasi-egalitarian 
nature of the Nineteenth Century Movement as a totality, while conceding that the 
Movement had truly radical fringe elements.21 
The guild-influenced Movement, composed of craft unions, generally avoided 
entering into bilateral relations with employers up until the middle of the Nineteenth 
Century. Instead, the craft unions unilaterally prescribed norms which their members 
would work to: after setting minimum-standards regarding rate of pay, hours of work 
and contractual remits, union members were banned from accepting work on 
substandard terms and conditions. If, resultantly, no work were available on the open 
market, members would be provided unemployment benefits from the union’s funds. 
Using this “device of restriction of numbers”,22 many of the craft unions claimed to be 
explicitly anti-strike, styling themselves as ‘friendly societies’ rather than militant 
worker organisations. Yet they remained able and willing to distort labour markets for 
the benefit of their members.23 By the mid-Nineteenth Century, many of these 
previously localised craft societies, particularly in the engineering, construction and 
printing industries, consolidated into formal national unions.  
The first national non-craft unions, from the ‘new’ industries of coal, cotton, 
steal and railways, soon joined them.24  There were two distinct waves of this ‘new 
unionism’: the first emerging in the mid-Nineteenth Century in the massive coal-
mines, iron and steel mills, and cotton factories of the North.25 A similar wave of 
unionisation extended organised labour into a wider range of lower-skilled trades at 
the fin de siècle.26 With their members lacking the recognised skills and qualifications 
of the craft unions, these unions briefly seemed to upset the bourgeoisie sentiments of 
the craft-wing of the embryonic Movement. Unable to unilaterally regulate labour 
markets in the same manner as the craft unions, the New Unionism of the mid-to-late 
Nineteenth Century was forced to actively engage with employers, who often reacted 
                                                
18 Grint, The Sociology of Work, pg. 76-77. 
19 Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism, pg. 76. 
20 Friedrich Engels, “England in 1845 and 1885”. In: Commonwealth (London), 1985. While Engles 
came to reappraise the Union after Marx’s death, socialist hostility towards the unions remained 
entrenched across Europe: Lenin was particularly dismissive of Movement’s ability to attain ‘class 
consciousness’, saying in 1902 that if left to develop spontaneously, unions became preoccupied solely 
or principally with the defence of their members’ immediate occupational interests. Cf. Vladimir 
Lenin, Collected Works: Vol 1, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961.  
21 Cf. Henry Pelling, The Challenge of Socialism, London: Trade Cloth, 1968; Grint, The Sociology of 
Work, pg. 164. 
22 Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, London: Longman, Greens and Co. 1897. 
23 Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism, pg. 75-76. 
24 Ibid., pg. 72. 
25 Keith Burgess, The Origins of British Industrial Relations: The Nineteenth Century Experience. 
London: Croom Helm, 1975; Webb and Webb, Industrial Democracy. 
26 Eric Hobsbawm, “General Unions in Britain, 1889-1914”. In: Economic History Review, 1949, 1, pp. 
123-142, pg. 135. 
 43 
with violent antipathy towards unionists. Resultantly, large swathes of the Movement 
began to analyse the labour market, and their position within it, in explicit class 
term.27 
However, after myriad experiments in form and function, the majority of the 
unions’ professional secretariats, and indeed rank-and-file members, came to privilege 
the same fundamental self-interest as the craft unions. Only they pursued this with the 
use of a differentiated strategy: the unions found that via the usage of collective 
bargaining, while simultaneously restricting access to workplace labour markets via 
the use of the closed shop, they could satisfactorily raise the living standards of their 
members without directly challenging the capitalist mode of production.28  
Collective bargaining can be defined as “voluntary negotiations between 
employers or employers’ organisations and workers’ organisations, with a view to the 
regulation of terms and conditions by collective agreements”.29 The closed shop was a 
once-common stipulation of such collective agreements, to the effect that employers 
could only hire union members. While utilised in Britain most often with regard to 
issues of remuneration, collective bargaining can entail discussions relating to 
working conditions and rules governing the relations between employees and their 
supervisors.30 While many early British industrialists were initially hostile to such a 
concept of organised industrial labour, most large-sized employers of the late 
Nineteenth- and early Twentieth Century made themselves available for such 
bargaining processes, accepting that this institutionalised form of industrial relations 
could assist their profit-maximising operations, via the provision of regularity and 
predictability in employment relationships.31 
Preserving a degree of continuality, many of the new semi-, low- and 
unskilled unions of the Nineteenth Century loosely adopted the occupational-based 
structure of their craft-based peers, resisted the formation of broad and more radical 
industrial unions,32 and settled into patterns of protecting their members’ intra-class, 
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sectional interests, albeit while making ceremonial or rhetoric appeals to the unity of 
the working class as a whole.33 Even the trans-industrial general unions, which grew 
to maturity in the early Twentieth Century, came to adopt many of the competitive 
mannerisms of their occupational forebears. Such structure led to frequent clashes 
between unions, and a highly fragmented movement.34 This craft-heritage, still 
manifested in the Twentieth Century in British unionism’s predisposition towards 
occupational unions as an organising principle, played a partially deterministic role in 
much of the subsequent history of the Movement.35  
Unions, able to secure their members’ interests in the arenas of collective 
bargaining,36 came to conceive their purpose in narrow, economic terms37: by the 
beginning of the Twentieth Century, wider social agendas had been  hegemonically 
left by the wayside, or paid mere lip-service to, as unions came to privilege the pursuit 
of optimal monetary wages and workplace conditions via collective bargaining 
conducted at the plant, or where a monopolistic/State employer allowed, industry 
level. This strategy was often reinforced by the strategic threat of strike action. While 
unions sought to maximise their density rates in firms, in order to build up their 
‘industrial muscle’, the average unionist played a relatively inactive role in the day-to-
day affairs of a union, particularly in times of apparent industrial-harmony.  
 Radically differentiating Britain from its Continental neighbours has British 
unionism’s hegemonic commitment to voluntarism.38 Throughout the Twentieth 
Century the majority of unions were hegemonically keen to operate without direct 
interference or mediation from the State, at least with regard to “free collective 
bargaining”, and engaged directly with employers to resolve differences by whatever 
means were found to be mutually acceptable, bound by honour only.39 Many of the 
earliest union campaigns in Britain were directed against State regulations of 
organised labour: the long running series of campaigns aiming to repeal the 1799 
Combination Act, used to criminalise and deport unionists being a case in point. 
Subsequently, British unions were broadly happy to conduct their industrial relations 
in an ultimately unregulated arena: between 1800 and 1970 only three major acts of 
parliament were passed which tried to explicitly regulate relations between employers 
and employees, and their organisation.40 Unlike other nations then, British unions 
never sought, nor attained, extensive positive rights to organisation. Examples of this 
hegemonic opposition to governmental interference with wage-determining processes 
are seen by the fact that the TUC of the Twentieth Century never once lobbied for a 
statute extension of collective bargaining to cover unorganised workers and resisted, 
until 1986, some of its more egalitarian affiliated unions’ desires to press for a 
NMW.41  
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 At the turn of the Twentieth Century, aware that their working class members 
required political as well as workplace representation, the general unions, again after 
much experimentation, responded by being instrumental in the creation of a 
discursively separated Labour Party.42 This separation was partially the result of a 
court decision made in 1909, which disbarred unions from spending substantial 
monies on political campaigns: resultantly two spheres were quickly drawn apart; two 
centres of power – the Party and the TUC – discursively and legally divided. Such a 
separation fostered an acceptance, by activists on each side “of two orders and two 
sets of functions”43: while potentially cooperative, one centre gained privileged 
influence over the operations of the workplace, the other of the wider economy, and 
the two camps have subsequently clashed in practice.44 This partial separation 
between workplace and political representation forms the bedrock of the ideology of 
Labourism, that has underwritten much of the orientations and strategies of the British 
Movement over the last century45: by the early Twentieth Century Unions may have 
wished and attempted to influence the sphere of government, particularly through 
their fellow-traveller the Labour Party, but hegemonically accepted an ultimate 
spherical division between the domains of the Movement and the state.46 
However, beyond the narrow issue of workplace-regulation and remuneration, 
it is important not to overstate the unions’ separation from the nation state in the first 
half of the Twentieth Century. While the Movement viciously defended the tradition 
of free collective bargaining, the unions maintained deep relationships with employers 
and government: in-fact cooperation became a de facto norm in the Inter-War period. 
Successive British governments, fearful from the tribulations of WWI and the Russian 
Revolution, sought to secure stability in the industrial order, and divested power in 
employee organisations and the Trades Union Congress as governing institutions: the 
social partners came to relish their positions in the inner sanctums of Whitehall and 
Westminster, and from the 1920s onwards styled their centralised structures as being 
“estates of the realm”.47 This “insider” status is attested to by the fact that during 
WWII, full-time union representation was afforded the status of a ‘reserved 
occupation’ – one formally excused from conscription.48 In terms of absolute power, 
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in both the workplace and the mechanisms of the state, the unions found themselves 
entering into an apparently Golden Era.  
At the end of WWII successive Labour and Conservative governments helped 
mould public discourse regarding unionism, so that organised labour came to be 
regarded as efficient, for the good of the nation, including the nation’s employers.49 
British unionism may have built its founding myth around free collective bargaining, 
but much of their power and influence in the immediate Post-War period was bound 
up in the back corridors of Westminster and Whitehall. In exchange for its pacifying 
influence over the working classes, the Movement was ceded four key demands: the 
maintenance of full-employment during the transition to a peacetime economy; 
further extension of the social role of the state; abolition of anti-union legislation 
passed in the aftermath of the 1926 General Strike, and for the unions’ status in the 
corridors of power increased and maintained.50 
 Yet even in the apparent Golden Age of the immediate Post-War Era the 
unions’ powers were not absolute: following the Fuel Crisis of 1947, Labour’s 
Minister of Labour, Ernest Beven, adopted a policy of pay restraint, reversing 
previous commitments to free collective bargain. The TUC, with the begrudging 
support of the majority of its affiliates, supported the imposition of this relatively 
flexible plan of constraint. However in 1950, to the chagrin of the TUC’s Executive 
Committee, affiliate delegates rejected a continuation of this union support of wage 
restraint: only the election of McMillan’s Conservative Government in 1951 delayed 
a collision with a governing Labour Party. From this it should be clear that 
Movement/State relationships were far from cordial at the onset of 1950s, and the 
trade unions’ once privileged position had come to be encroached upon. 
 Throughout the 1950s, and beyond, economic orthodoxies continued to 
privilege the importance of income controls.51 In an attempt at pacifying union 
objections to such measures, Conservative Prime Minister McMillian created the 
tripartite National Economic Council and the bipartite National Joint Advisory 
Council: each sought to formalise the unions’ and employers’ advisory influence over 
macro-economic policy52; however, in return the TUC conceded further ground over 
the discursive hallowed issue of free collective bargaining by submitting to a new 
incomes policy.53 The return of Labour in 1964 saw a maintenance of this wage 
restrained, albeit rebranded as the Planned Growth of Incomes.54 Here, the TUC gave 
its formal blessings to the creation of the National Board for Prices and Incomes 
(NBPI): tasked to make general and specific recommendations to government 
regarding pay increases in the state-run industries. In 1966, the government gained 
further statutory powers to veto collective wage increases determined via industry 
level and shop-floor bargaining: the TUC was critical of such a development, but 
lacking a method to resist such controls, actively worked with the government’s NBPI 
in this new operating paradigm55; the apparent Golden Era of union power and 
influence within the mechanisms of government seemed to be coming to an end. 
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In retrospect, Britain’s Inter- and Post-War corporatist experiment must be 
thought of as partially phantasmal: if corporatism is defined as the “the development 
of arenas for negotiation and compromise by a variety of partially antagonistic 
interests under State oversight”,56 one can seriously question the degree to which 
Britain experienced corporatism at all. When the TUC cooperated with the 
government in advocating voluntary wage control mechanisms, its lack of unitary 
control over the decentralised Movement led to an abject failure in implementation.57 
Likewise, when the government statutorily enforced wage mechanisms with TUC 
support, lent due to the fear of the alternative, corporatism could not really be said to 
exist: proximity to government did not equal influence, and senior unionists’ 
apparently privileged access to the mechanisms of power did not translate into 
decisive influence when shifts in economic orthodoxies brought the Movement’s 
pursuit of continuous wage increases into opposition with the state. While the middle 
half of the Twentieth Century saw many union-led adventures in London’s 
governmental institutions, the Movement’s underlying modus operandi remained 
embedded at the firm level, embodied in the “tradition” of voluntary collective 
bargaining.58  
The reasons for the unions’ adherence to such a tradition are complex and 
contested. Long held suspicions of the establishment, an ideological reluctance to see 
employment rights legally regulated, a fear of an undermining of the unions’ core 
functions, and a sense of the moral superiority of collective bargaining over political 
campaigning are the usual reason given.59 However, it has been well argued that this 
Twentieth Century repulsion to governmental interference in the labour market was in 
a large part fostered by the more privileged, occupational-based unions in the 
Movement, which used their economic and societal resources to resist successive 
governments’ creation a more-expansive egalitarian welfare state, in order to prevent 
a wholesale societal redistribution of risks and benefits to the advantage of the worse 
off in society, and to the detriment of the occupational unions’ relatively privileged 
members.60 Oude Nijhuis’ analysis to this effect certainly withstands analytical 
interrogation: in the late 1940s and 1950s a buoyant Labour Government made 
sweeping reforms of the nation, revitalising a war-torn economy, presiding over near 
to full-employment, nationalising the coal, gas and electric, railways and other 
densely unionised sectors of the economy; however the Party’s and unions’ 
commitment to the expansion of the welfare state was far from absolute – issues 
related to societal poverty traps were combated to a lesser degree, and not pressed by 
the unions61; as a result, while the welfare state extended its limbs to an extent never 
seen before or since, the proportion of the British population living below the poverty 
line failed to fall much below double figures throughout the immediate Post-War 
period.62 Indeed at this time the Movements’ not inconsiderable central resources 
came to be used as a “Praetorian Guard”, used to prevent left-wing fringes of the 
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Movement and working class from challenging the industrial status quo.63  
Even while central union secretariats ran free-range in Whitehall and 
Westminster, a commitment to firm-level voluntary collective bargaining was further 
solidified in the immediate Post-War Era. While the most senior members of the TUC 
were negotiating within the power structures of London,64 many of its affiliated 
unions, from the 1950s onwards, experienced processes of decentralisation in their 
internal structures,65 particularly in those general unions representing workers in the 
public services. Due to the highly fractured and sectional nature of the British 
Movement, inherited from its historic occupational organisational norm, the TUC has 
until recently held little direct power and influence over its affiliated unions: real 
exchanges of give-and-take between employers and workers in the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s typically took place in collective bargaining at the firm level. Sectoral level 
agreements, if existent at all, usually set only minimums regarding wages, working 
hours, and other basic elements: more detailed negotiations concerning conditions at 
work and final take home pay were conducted on the shop floor.66 It was only when 
agreements fell foul of governmental incomes policies did the state’s tripartite, 
corporatist bodies have any direct effect on the average member of an average 
union.67 This Post-War decentralisation reflected at first the unions’ power on the 
shop floor, and later frustration at the apparent concessions being made by the elite 
circles in the Movement.68 Full-time union officials, who had previously seen their 
purpose as professional servers of a passive membership, came to see their role as that 
of facilitators, enhancing the self-servicing and participative functions of shop 
stewards, and to a considerably lesser extent, lay-members.  
The increasingly decentralised nature of the Movement perceptively 
encouraged militant actions by the rank-and-file, to the chagrin of union secretariats 
and the TUC. As decentralising tendencies increased, so did the usage of strike action 
as a reinforcement strategy utilised to complement voluntary collective bargaining. 
Unlike employer organisations, which could often use their privileged access to the 
mechanisms of government to augment their operating environments, British 
unionism typically relied on a different form of power: even the governmental insider 
status afforded to the hegemonic thrust of the Movement in the immediate Post-War 
Era was partially afforded in recognition of the notion that to exclude organised 
labour from governmental processes would have led to overt industrial strife, 
jeopardizing industrial efficiency69; that is to say, British unions historically derived a 
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substantial portion of their influence from their threatened ability to strike and/or 
disrupt industrial processes through other means.70 The argument that the strategic use 
of strike action is the “ultimate weapon” of a trade union is regularly made: indeed 
some academics have claimed that those organisations lacking recourse to this 
strategic action should not be thought of as a union at all.71 While such an observation 
underplays certain Continental European and extra-European union models, a wide 
body of literature has found that the tactical use of strike action has been repeatedly 
instrumental in facilitating unions, include those operating in pre-1970s Britain, to 
achieve their desired outcomes.72 
 
 Having observed British unionism’s developmental path up to the 1970s, now 
let us consider its operating environment, and its relationship with traditionally 
precarity-prone groups of workers. As briefly outlined in this thesis’ introduction, 
new technologies of production and capital accumulation developed concurrently with 
the solidification of organised labour’s position in the industrial arena during the first 
quarter of the Twentieth Century. With the American motor industry as an archetype, 
industrial states came to operate along Fordist principles of economies of scale: 
“production of standardised commodities for mass markets, in large factories using 
dedicated machinery, and with a largely semi-skilled workforce” became an industrial 
norm in multiple nations.73 Fordist principles were originally codified in Ford’s 
Detroit factory in 191374: assembly line production, the compartmentalisation of jobs, 
a high division of labour, and managerial control of speed were its high principles.75 
Risks were underwritten by the state that, with the substantial support of the unions 
and employee organisations, constructed public welfare regimes around relative 
industrial placidity.76 
 British unionisms’ organisational structure and the tradition of voluntarism 
proved a good match for such a system: up until the 1960s, professional negotiators 
could negotiate at the sectoral and/or firm level on behalf of a largely passive, highly 
concentrated and – due to the high number of demographically-similar workers on 
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super-massive shop floors – easily recruitable membership.77 Once a decentralisation 
of the Movement occurred in the Post-War Era, shop stewards could propagate a 
marginally flattened continuation of such advocacy.  
 This socio-economic system of production, enjoying the tactic approval of 
organised labour, did much to ‘decommodify’ labour relationships: placing first de 
facto, and then de jure restrictions on employers’ ability to fire and hire staff at will; 
privileged members of the working and middle classes were assured a full-time job 
with an employer who could break the terms of, or terminate, their contracts only for 
narrowly defined and negotiated purposes.78 Clearly then, many reaped the benefits of 
the strong union Movement in the epoch of Fordist production.  
 However others were excluded from the extensive de facto only rights won by 
the unions. If one looks at urban-centric accounts of the orientations and strategies of 
the British movement before the 1970s, a relatively bleak picture emerges regarding 
the Movement’s relationship with precarity-prone workers. Folk history informs us 
that Thatcher and Co. attacked, from 1980 onwards, the unions’ ability to represent 
the working class, by limiting their power while simultaneously fracturing the class as 
a whole. However such a narrative is “oversimplified, overgeneralised and 
overdeterministic”79: with the working class being a divided, contradictory group,80 
unions are always required to harmonise and reconcile the myriad combination of 
their members’ particularistic interests81; in this harmonisation process in pre-1970s 
Britain, ideological solidarity seldom prevailed.82 In practice the unions, before and 
during the Post-War Era, individually and as a Movement, were adept at, and wont to, 
represent the interests of a narrow segment of their memberships, and imposed these 
priorities on all other groups inside and beyond their often inter-competing domains.83  
 By the 1970s, white, male, marketable and full-time workers still formed the 
core membership of most unions, occupational and general.84 This wrought direct, 
and negative, repercussions for other unprivileged and traditionally precarity-prone 
groups of workers. Take female labour for example: while female-only unions and 
female participation in male dominated unions had become relatively common by the 
latter Nineteenth Century,85 unions in the first half of the Twentieth Century held an 
unenviable record for discriminating against females outside of the Movement, and 
failing to secure the material interests of those within the rank-and-file.86 This 
historic, hegemonic lack of interest in female workers produced a toxic feed-back 
loop, whereby union disinterest was met by low female membership take-up and 
density rates, which further produced and reinforced a mutual hostility of one for the 
other.87 The unions’ pre-1970 hostility to unprivileged workers extended to migrant 
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workers: the TUC made discriminatory declarations against “alien labour” as early as 
1892.88 Even those measures that undoubtedly benefited workers outside of the 
Movement – the constant pressure on Labour governments to maintain full-
employment and extend the welfare state as examples – were tempered by a refusal 
from the occupational unions to participate in a redistribution of their members’ 
wealth to secure such ends.89  
 Let us now look at the non-accomodation in more detail. Heery argues that in 
the second half of the Twentieth, and early Twenty-First centuries, British unionism’s 
ideological “attitudes” to precarity-prone workers went through four overlapping but 
distinct phases.90 Analysing British unionism’s attitude towards so-called ‘contingent 
labour’ – that being; part-time workers, temporary agency workers; fixed-term 
contract workers and the self-employed – Heery effectively maps the urban 
Movement’s changing ideological attitudes towards these traditionally 
disenfranchised groups of worker, and produces a model that implicitly details the 
changing hegemonic ‘attitudes’ of the Movement towards several other, overlapping 
groups of precarity-prone labour: this is due to the well-established, disproportional 
overrepresentation of female and foreign migrant workers in such non-standard forms 
of employment contract. I contend that such phases should be viewed as conscious 
and unconscious aspects of British unionism’s rejuvenation process, and the 
Movement’s previous pre-rejuvenationary hegemonic form.91 
Heery demonstrates that for much of its Pre- and Post-War history, British 
unionism held an orientation towards precarious work based on exclusion: seeking to 
prohibit non-standard and precarity-prone workers from the labour market outright. 
Seeking to protect their traditional constituents from labour market competition, 
exclusionary unions were out-rightly hostile, contemptuous, or at best indifferent to 
contingent forms of work, and also contingent, precarity-prone workers.  
However, fearful of the tendency of precarity-prone workers to undercut 
wages and conditions of employment, as much by accident as by intent,92 some 
unions from the 1960s came to hold an orientation towards precarity-prone workers 
typified by ideologies of subordination. When guided by this orientation, contingent 
work was embraced by unions as a protective buffer, with the insecurity of precarity-
prone workers proving of value to core union memberships in securing job stability.93 
A localised strategy that often complemented, and still complements, this 
subordinatory orientation involves unions forging agreements with employers so that 
non-standard workers come to be the ‘last in, first out’ in times of economic growth 
and shrinkage, thereby protecting core constituents from the economic cycle’s threats 
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of redundancy.94 Thus, the propagation of precarious labour relations was accepted 
and in fact encouraged by unions when they held such orientation.  
I define these two orientations as ‘pre-rejuvenatory’, in that in both phases 
unions divisively privileged the interests of certain relatively protected union 
members at the direct expense of less-protected, more precarity-prone workers both 
within and external to the Movement. 
 
The vital lesson to take away from this section is the fact that, in the Post-War 
Era, Britain’s Movement hegemonically sought to secure the interests of relatively 
privileged, white, male, full-time workers, using the favoured strategy of voluntary 
collective bargaining backed by the strategic use of strike action at the firm or 
industry level, due to a heritage inherited from the craft-union tradition. Of course 
there were counter streams to this tendency, but the generalised story of Britain’s 
urban unionism up until the 1970s was, primarily, the story of how and why self-
interested and divisive collective bargaining came to eclipse other forms of contention 
to become the pre-eminent instrument of trade union strategy.95  
 
3. British Unionism, 1970-2013: a Particularly Steep “Cascade of Decline”,96 and 
the Rise of the New Economy. 
 
In this section I examine how Britain’s political-economy has been 
fundamentally transformed over the last four decades, and how this has affected the 
validity and effectiveness of the Movement’s Post-War operating norms. This section 
looks not at the ‘new’ rejuvenatory orientations and strategies of the Movement, but 
why its previous ones needed to be adapted to better suit the new economic paradigm.  
Union movements the world over have in the last half century experienced a 
decline in membership numbers, and a concurrent eclipse of power and influence.97 
The British Movement felt the effects particularly hard: trade union density rates 
continued to rise in the 1970s, peaking at 56.3% of the full-time equivalent workforce 
in 1980, but collapsed soon after, falling to just under 30% nation-wide, and to 16% 
in the private sector, by 2007.98 To give a sense of gross figures, in 1980 there were 
12,172,508 TUC affiliated unionists, by 2012 only 6,471,030.99 Many factors, both 
endogenous and exogenous to the Movements’ internal institutions,100 contributed to 
this ‘cascade of decline’, the most important of which are discussed below.  
 
As mentioned, a key development in Britain’s New Economy has been the rise 
of highly fragmented, tertiary industries dominated by small firms. Worryingly for the 
unions a strong, if not linear, correlation between firm size and unionisation rates is 
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well recognised101: with the economic restructurings, an increasingly differentiated 
and segmented labour force came to be divided into core and marginal groups of 
employers, who were poorly represented by, and inconducive to, traditional forms of 
union activity.102  
This sectoral adjustment is the primary contributory factor to the unions’ 
sustained declines in memberships and strengths.103 The massive waves of 
unemployment that the reorganisations caused can alone account for much of the 
decline in membership levels: in 1982 unemployment in the UK reached 14%, one of 
the highest rates in Europe104; this figure startlingly contrasted with the first two 
decades of the Post-War Era, when successive governments had managed to sustain 
unemployment rates of less than 2%; subsequently, the 1960s and early 1970s saw a 
gradual deterioration in unemployment rates, before levels accelerated rapidly under 
Thatcher’s first Government of 1979.105 Slack labour markets weakened the position 
of unions in their free collective bargaining, as employers came to enjoy a greater 
labour-force to draw from in the face of union demands.  
 More fundamentally, sectoral reorganisation decimated the traditional 
strongholds of British unionism. The participation in free collective bargaining 
backed by the strategic use of strike action had long been dominated by five 
industries: the mining, docks, shipbuilding, car manufacturing and iron and steel 
sectors. In 1979 over 50% of strike days in Britain came from engineering workers, 
mostly in the steel industry, while in 1984 and 1985, 83% and 63% of strike days, 
respectively, were in the mining industry.106 Joining these Big Battalions had been the 
new union strongholds in the expansive white-collar public sector, where highly 
bureaucratised and impersonally managed workplaces, which too proved highly 
conducive to traditional forms of union activity, grew in the latter years of the 
immediate Post-War Era107: in the mid-1970s approximately 40% of the Movement’s 
members were found in white-collar firms; thirty years earlier this figure had been 
closer to 20%. Yet it was precisely these sectors of the economy that bore the brunt of 
the Post-Fordist restructuring of the economy, particularly when the state-as-employer 
became increasingly hostile to the presence of unions within its own territory: here, 
ideologically driven closures and privatisations of previously publicly-owned 
industries reformulated many previously conducive-to-union workplaces. Waddington 
attributes 66% of the decline in union membership figures between 1979 and 1987 to 
these sectoral shifts in the economy. Even Booth’s more conservative estimate 
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suggests that 40% of membership losses in this period occurred due to the decline of 
large industry.108 
 
 However, it must be remembered that membership rates declined in virtually 
all unions of the UK, and not those operating within sectors in retreat. Apart from 
affecting the Movement’s ability to readily recruit new members, far-reaching 
structural changes to the economy weakened the coherence of an already fragmented 
Movement and produced a number of further pressures which affected the unions109: 
collective bargaining became ever-more decentralised as workers’ remits and interests 
came to be increasingly differentiated; the new economic paradigm increased the need 
to widen negotiations, previously centred around wage levels, to include discussions 
regarding internationalisation, technological and organisational restructurings, multi-
tasking, teamwork and client-related work processes. Concurrently new internal 
divisions in the workforce became accentuated: rifts between exposed and sheltered 
sectors, and between those on standard and non-standard employment contracts, 
became increasingly apparent to union and employer negotiators alike.110 This 
rendered sectoral, and even firm level, collective bargaining as less feasible and less 
efficient in the eyes of employers and unionists alike.111 With employers rapidly 
acquainting themselves with paradigmic theories of Human Resource Management,112 
a ‘substantial reduction’ in already minimal multi-firm bargaining occurred in the 
1980s113; and with firms increasingly confident in their ability to act unilaterally, 
many unions were denied a say in ‘flexibilising’ restructurings altogether114; by the 
end of the 1990s, only 44% of Britain’s workforce worked in firms that even 
recognised trade union representatives.115 Even though the Movement had previously 
hegemonically pursued the interests of a privileged sector, rather than totality of the 
working and middle classes, this fractalisation of interests has clearly done much to 
negate the power of the Movement’s previous modus operandi.116  
Bringing us right to date, the long-recession of 2008 onwards struck Britain 
hard, particularly in the area of unemployment, which again further problematised 
traditional union strategies reliant on a union’s ability to restrict access to a firm.117 
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 Of course such disempowerment was aided and further accelerated by the 
actions of successive governments, which further rendered invalid the Movement’s 
preferred strategies. Where demand management principles had once caused 
governments to seek wage moderation from the unions, new combative, supply-side 
orientated economic ideologies sought to remove much of the influence of collective 
organisations from the labour-market altogether.118 
 The Movement’s political environment did not deteriorate overnight. In fact, 
corporatism of a sort increased during the 1970s. In the UK the decade opened with 
Heath’s Conservative Government attempting to unilaterally regulate trade union 
activity beyond policies of wage restraint: the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 
demanded detailed external regulation of trade union activity, imposed mandatory 
‘cooling off’ periods before strike action, increased bureaucratic demands on the 
unions, and attempted to impose public sector pay restraint.119 The Big Battalions 
reacted with militant gusto, and in an attempt to restore order the NEDC’s 
macroeconomic advisory role was actually strengthened.  
However, unable to secure the support of the affiliates for a continuation in 
wage restrained, the TUC soon withdrew from most tripartite negotiations, and an 
unrestrained National Union of Miners again militantly opposed legislatively enforced 
pay restraints. In response, Heath called the 1972 election, built around the single 
question: Who Governs? Labour returned to power with a minority government, later 
strengthened to a thin majority. Yet the 1972 elections created an increasingly hostile 
public discourse, with swathes of the population coming to see unionism as an 
undermining threat, rather than pillar, of democracy.120 Governmental policies 
continued to magnify anti-union hostilities in the public, which were eagerly seized 
upon by right wing and apparently centrist tendencies in the press: this further eroded 
the once conducive operating environment of the Movement. Edwards and Bain 
demonstrate that public approval for union actions declined significantly throughout 
the 1970s, helping to facilitate the diminishing of their powers in that decade and the 
next.121 
 The Labour Government repealed the Industrial Relations Act and initially 
sought to resolve industrial disputes on generous terms with the Movement. However 
a dramatic inflationary and foreign exchange crisis led to the creation of a new and 
draconian pay control regime, partially imposed on the UK by the terms of the 
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International Monetary Fund’s bailout of 1976.122 A begrudging TUC, attempting to 
preside over an increasingly decentralised and militant movement, attempted to 
dampen some of the continuing effects of the Oil Shocks by more firmly committing 
itself to corporatist macroeconomic management structures than ever before123: a 
‘social contract’ was drawn up between the Labour Government and the TUC, which 
exchanged wage restraints for a degree of progressive social and fiscal governmental 
policies.124 
 These ‘Keynes-plus’ institutional arrangements proved only temporarily 
effective.125 Relationships between an increasingly frustrated Movement, dissatisfied 
with the government’s lack of desire to control prices and unemployment along with 
wages, and the Labour Party deteriorated.126 Eventually the Labour Government 
collapsed following the 1978-79 Winter of Discontent, when public sector unions 
engaged in regular and lengthy industrial actions over issues of pay restraint.127  
 While the 1970s were turbulent times for British unionism, its hardships were 
just beginning. The twinned deconstructions of Britain’s expansive welfare state and 
trade union influence certainly predated Thatcher, but her governments’ “Copernican 
Revolution”128 – the neo-liberal reconstruction of the economy in the 1980s – 
accelerated these process immensely: better than anyone Thatcher proves the power 
of strategic action.129 The popular notion that Thatcher initiated a ‘deregulation’ of 
Britain’s labour market is only half the story: the Conservative Governments’ neo-
liberalism represented a reconfiguration, rather than withdrawal, of the state’s 
involvement in the labour market.130 A principal aspect of this reconfiguration was the 
abandonment of tripartite negotiations between the state, unions and organised 
capital. The TUC, and to a lesser extent the employers’ Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) became infrequent visitors to 10 Downing Street.131 More significantly 
for the previous Movement’s modus operandi: between 1980 and 1993, eight acts 
were passed which progressively restricted the unions’ right to industrial action, 
weakened the legal protections of individual striking workers and invalidated the 
traditional legal immunities within which union activities were normally conducted. 
Resultantly, the unions’ ability to conduct legal strike action was unprecedently 
restricted and their internal structures heavily regulated: “from one of the least 
legalistic industrial relations systems in the world, Britain became one of the most 
legally prescriptive, and in a form bearing a asymmetrically on workers organisations 
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as against employers”132: deregulation seems a loaded term indeed to describe these 
developments. This erosion of the unions’ ability to strike can be thought of as a 
direct attempt at limiting their wider economic influence. 
 It should be remembered that Thatcherism was an ideology not only hostile to 
unionism: in its purest form it displayed a contempt for all forms of organised vested 
interests in society, which were seen to deny individual employers’ apparent ‘right to 
manage’.133 However, while in theory the ideology of Thatcherism was in opposition 
to all vested interest groups, in practice governmental attackers focussed on the 
unions: ‘Solving the Union Problem is the Key to Britain’s Recovery’ was the title of 
a seminal pamphlet of Thatcher’s senior advisor, Keith Joseph, published in 1979.134 
 Tory infighting over Europe, the fiasco of the Poll Tax, and the glaring 
deficiencies of hard-line neo-liberalism led to the departure of Thatcher from 
Downing Street in 1990. Many narratives state that under her successor, John Major, 
“there was a return to the more traditionalist style of policy-making in Britain… civil 
servants… now felt more able to return to a previous form of intimate dialogue with 
groups”.135 However, this reopening is largely apocryphal, particularly with regards to 
the unions: the Movement continued to be marginalised in both the political sphere 
and the workplace.  
 This situation did not improve greatly after New Labour’s landslide electoral 
victory in 1997. A complex pattern of change and continuality has been observed 
between Thatcher’s and Blair’s Britains: while the TUC superficially regained its 
‘insider’ status in Whitehall and Westminster, it found its ability to influence 
government policy through direct lobbying, consultation and persuasion to be next to 
nugatory.136 In 1993 the then Labour Party leader, John Smith, had restructured the 
Party’s internal democracy, weakening the unions at the Party’s annual conferences 
and on its National Executive Committee (NEC).137 Blair went further in reorientating 
the Party towards the interests of employers, symbolically erasing Clause Four of the 
Party’s constitution, which had theoretically committed the Party to the ideal of the 
common ownership of the means of production since 1918. Lacking the 
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organisational strength to resist, such measures were accepted with “grudging 
acquiescence” by the unions.138 
 Many intertwined reasons have been put forward for this lack of New Labour 
support for the Movement, including: New-Labour had meshed its own interests with 
that of capital to the extent that policy makers were no longer able to safely engage 
with their supposedly fraternal trade-unionist colleagues139; the Party’s folk memory 
continued to blame the unions’ Winter of Discontent for its 1979 electoral defeat140; 
or else with Blair seeking the centre ground of a Thatcherite societal discourse, the 
unions an electoral liability, and lacked the sufficient membership numbers that 
would have encouraged a pre-electoral courting.141 In any case, there was no 
fundamental restructuring of the post-1979 macro-management of the State,142 nor a 
fundamental reappraisal of the Movement’s bargaining role with the 1997 return of 
Labour.143  
However, post-1997 there were some sizeable adjustments to the 
Conservatives’ constructed political paradigm, which once again altered the unions’ 
position in British society. Particularly evident was the state’s new commitment to 
underwriting individual employment protections with statutory legislation144: the 
Employment Relations Act of 1999 granted, in principle, statutory union recognition 
and collective bargaining rights in most medium and large-sized firms145; in a similar 
vein, the introduction of a national pay floor in the form of 1997’s NMW is another 
prime example. Yet despite these developments, ‘flexibility’ had come to dominate 
the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP)’s normative vision of the labour market. Tony 
Blair boasted in 1998 that Britain had “the most lightly regulated labour market in any 
leading economy in the world”146: a sentiment largely supported by international 
comparisons, if one ignores Britain’s draconian restrictions on union activity.147 By 
the late 1990s, successive governments had constructed a labour market where it was 
easier for employers to offer lower real wages, perpetuate poor working practices and 
readily hire and fire staff than any other OECD nation.148 
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 For a time, mainstream unionism responded to their cascade of decline using 
the tried and tested strategies they knew well. However, four symbolic defeats caused 
a crisis of confidence in the Movements’ most favoured melody in its repertoire of 
contention – that is, collective bargaining backed by strategic strike action. In 1979 a 
strike at a British Leyland Motor Plant, organised to protest at the firing of a popular 
and radical shop steward, failed to reverse the contract’s termination. Then, in 1980, 
the once formidable Iron and Steel Trades Confederation was humbled when the 
newly installed hard-line management of the state-run British Steel company faced 
out a three month national strike, organised to counter the dismantling of industry-
wide pay negotiations.149 Later, in 1984-5, perhaps the Biggest Battalion of them all, 
the National Union of Miners failed in its yearlong strike against pit closures after a 
full on engagement with the state’s violence.150 Finally, in 1986 Rupert Murdoch 
comprehensively broke the various Printing Unions by withdrawing union recognition 
at his Wapping printing press, firing outright those workers that struck in protest.151 
These catastrophic losses, all occurring in the heartlands of traditional 
unionism, confirmed the notion for many, both internal and external to the Movement, 
that unionism had become, or perhaps always was, “the bearer of a secondary, 
derivative, negative, limited power, severely circumscribed by economic change and 
State initiative”.152  
Further exacerbated the growing ineffectiveness of the Movement’s previous 
modus operandi, Britain’s aging population led to an en mass retirement of those 
trade unionists that survived the structural readjustments of the cascade of decline: a 
generational gap in knowledge and experience was created in the 1980s and 1990s, 
which further stretched the Movement’s resources.153 This issue is accentuated by the 
fact that trade unions have recently struggled, internationally, to recruit and mobilise 
young workers, higher concentrated in typical new economic sectors.154 
These above factors, coupled with the collapse of strike-prone industries, the 
increasing numbers of experienced trade unionists being made redundant,155 and 
substantial public hostility to the Movement, meant that by the end of the 1980s overt 
industrial conflict declined to the lowest level since records began at the turn of the 
century.156 Remaining usage of the tactic shifted, to occur virtually exclusively in the 
white-collar public sector: the strategy of voluntary collective bargaining backed by 
militant mobilisation simply did not appear to secure the unions’ interests in this new 
operating environment.157 Now unable to regulate labour markets – those internal to a 
firm or in the wider economy – the maintenance of pre-rejuvenatory orientations 
became counter-productive for resource deficient unions: unable to back their 
discriminatory rhetoric with decisive actions, unions risked pricing their members out 
of the market, and encouraging the expansion of the non-standard workforce for use 
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as undercutting agents. 
 This collapse in influence meant that the Movement came to have a minimal 
presence in much of the Post-Fordist New Economy of Britain. By the mid-2000s 
around 33% of standard, full-time, permanent workers were unionised, a low figure 
by historic standards but high in comparison to ‘non-standard’ workers, of who only 
around a 20% were organised.158 Such workers have proved particularly inconducive 
to traditional forms of unionisation, as the Movement has struggled to recruit, 
organise and retain those that regularly rotate between workplaces, thereby falling 
under the remits of a variety of potentially oppositional unions. 
 Of course, the growing ineffectiveness of union strategy cannot alone account 
for the lack of union penetration in the New Economy. Some have argued that Post-
Fordist production technologies accentuated already existent anti-union cultures 
among entrepreneurs and employers. Freeman and Medoff, and Kochan et al. show 
that wage mark-ups – the premium wages of union workers over non-unionised 
workers – act as incentives for employers in the USA, a society with an already weak 
union movement, to proactively de-unionise their firms. It is a fair assumption to 
make that many British employers in the New Economy sought the same as they 
watched the eclipse of the Movement’s once formidable powers. Anti-union 
sentiments from employers have been shown to prohibit numerous forms of union 
recruitment, partially explaining the lack of union density in the New Economy: 
temporary agency and migrant workers have been known to systematically reject 
contact with unions due to the real and pressing fear of instant dismissal.159  
 
The vital lesson to take from this section is the fact that, from a position of 
relative strength, the British Movement’s strategic modus operandi has been severely 
disabled, and its hegemonic orientational outlook rendered counterproductive, due to 
formal and informal institutional changes in Britain’s economic, governmental and 
discursive structures from the 1970s onwards.  
 
4. Unions, Rejuvenation, and Changes in Orientation. 
 
 This thesis posits the notion that the mainstream Movement has, in reaction to 
the cascade of decline as described above, partially shifted its previously divisive 
orientations regarding precarity-prone workers; this section recounts these partial 
changes, continuing to introduce Heery’s model in the process.  
 Clearly, the Movement had to react to the cascade. Few unions folded outright 
during the decline’s initial stages, though many had to raise their fees substantially,160 
and a period of intense merging occurred, as unions sought to pool resources and 
create economies of scale in the provision of services and representation161: in 1988 
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there were 326 active Unions in Britain, in 1998 238 and by 2008 only 167.162 Unite 
the Union, a self-declared super union of 1.9 million workers formed from the 
merging of two of the biggest general unions, the TGWU and Amicus, in 2007 is the 
prime example of this trend.163  
In practice, the majority of mergers to occur in the post-1970s era went ahead 
in a defensive and opportunistic manner, driven not by ideological convictions but 
necessity, leaving the British Movement as “uneven (and) illogically structured… as 
always”.164 Yet a more fundamental counter-tendency in the Movement’s orientations 
and strategies has emerged. From the 1970s, accelerating greatly in the 1980s, and 
coming to dominate formal Movement doctrine from the late 1990s, change has been 
seeping into the Movement.165 Sometimes eagerly, more often than not while kicking-
and-screaming, unions have sought to better recruit, represent and defend the 
interests of numerous differentiated groups of traditionally precarity-prone workers – 
not in the least females, migrants, and part-time and non-standard workers: 
effectively redistributing risks and benefits to their traditional constituencies 
disadvantage in the process.166 Put simply, the cascade of decline’s period of 
prolonged crisis has forced the hegemonic Movement to critically address the 
question long rhetorically asked: “what are we here for?”167  
 The third identified overlapping orientational phase of the urban unions 
identified by Heery was that of inclusion. While elements of inclusivity had always 
been seen in the Movement’s fringes, by the mid-1980s its rejuvenatory buds could be 
seen in the hegemonic core of the Movement.168 Here, unions came to accept the 
material interests of contingent workers as fully legitimate, equal in status to 
relatively protected workers on standard contracts: non-standard workers were 
conceived as being owed a debt of solidarity, as they were bearing a significant brunt 
of the labour market restructurings that were well underway. Precarity-prone workers 
were thereby afforded equal intra-union membership and participation rights, and 
positive action was at times taken to encourage a greater level of involvement in 
union structures. As an example of such inclusive orientated discourses, see Bill 
Morris, General Secretary of TGWU, who sought to legitimize the interests of agency 
workers at the 1987 TUC, stating “they are insecure. Many are low-paid and have 
little or no protection. Employers see them as disposable workers, a throwaway item 
in a throwaway society. Their dignity, their rights are to be sacrificed on the altar of 
flexibility and profit maximisation. Their pay and conditions are worse. Their legal 
rights are fewer, and they are more likely to suffer discrimination. Most are women. 
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Many are black. An increasing number are young… We in the Trade Union 
Movement must be the champions and must be the defenders of their rights”.169  
Heery’s final orientation, that of engagement, is underwritten not so much by 
an inclusive notion of solidarity as defined by common interests, but a notion of 
solidarity based “not on uniformity but multiformity”.170  This engaging orientation 
again accepts the legitimacy of particularly precarity-prone workers, but goes further 
by recognizing and catering to the distinctive and divergent needs of such workers, 
seeing them as requiring tailor made systems of representation.171 Also distinctive to 
this orientation is the idea that not only are the interests of contingent workers 
legitimate, but so too is contingent work: while the unions may try to combat 
precarity, there is an acceptance that apparently non-standard employment contracts 
are regularly, if not exclusively, freely chosen and acceptable forms of employment. 
According to Heery, such a reorientation can be traced back to the early 90s, and 
continues to gain credence and acceptability within the urban Movement to this day. I 
posit that these inclusive and engaging tendencies should be thought of as the 
actualisation of rejuvenatory orientations from the Movement. 
  
 Heery created his model with reference to workers on ‘contingent labour 
contracts’. However, when studying union attitudes to other partially discrete and 
traditionally precarity-prone groups of workers, such as migrant labour, Black and/or 
Minority Ethnic (BME) workers and female labour, a broadly similar transition can be 
discerned, both in shape and periodisation.172 
 Hegemonic pre-rejuvenatory attitudes towards migrant workers were highly 
divisive. When wider societal institutions facilitated it, the Movement’s reaction to 
foreign precarity-groups of workers entering the market had once been one of 
hostility rather than solidarity: trade unions often called for greater for restrictions on 
immigration from the turn of the century up until the cascade of decline, and indeed 
beyond.173 Only when foreign labour penetrated the market en mass, from the 1950s 
onwards, did the union approach change in a fundamental manner: from here on in, 
unions did open up partially to migrant labour, but at first the Movement rarely 
matched their rhetoric sentiments of solidarity with investments of their resources.174 
Yet from these positions of outright hostility and disinterest, unions, from the 1970s 
but more so the 1980s onwards, came to hegemonically accept and cater to migrant 
workers in a first inclusive and later positively engaging manner. The TUC came to 
discuss the “problem” of “racism”, as opposed to the problem of “integration”, in 
1973, after anti-racist elements of affiliated rank-and-files forced the issue onto the 
Movement’s formal agendas.175 In 1989 TUC modified its anti-racist clause of its 
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constitution, to require the expulsion from the Movement of any unionist found to be 
engaged in “deliberate acts of unlawful discrimination”.176 This action, and others of 
the peak confederation, reflected changes in affiliated unions that occurred in the 
1980s. Then, numerous affiliates came to develop innovative, if under resourced, 
internal mechanisms designed to secure the recruitment and representation of BME 
and migrant members: black workers’ sections became ubiquitous, as an example.177  
Beyond the workplace, unions, particularly the general unions such as the 
TGWU, once historically wont to support the tightening of immigration policies, have 
come to be increasingly and vocally critical of restrictive migration regimes, and have 
tried to organise workers regardless of their legal status.178 In the last decade in 
particular, having been influenced by new migratory patterns between Britain and the 
European Union’s Accession Nations, the Movement has become increasingly aware 
that new migrants to Britain have traditionally been, and continue to be, keen to join 
trade unions when opportunities have allowed for this.179 Engagement with migrant 
workers has become enshrined in the Movement’s formal orientations at the least, and 
tailor made services, catering to BME and migrant workers’ specific needs, have 
become ever better resourced: migrant focused legal and housing advice and the 
pursuit of religious dispositions in collective bargaining agreements have become 
standard union policies, as examples.180 
 Likewise, the 1980s proved to be a watershed in the history of the 
Movements’ at times ignoble history regarding female work. While still 
underrepresented in the Movement’s internal structures, female British unionists have 
made considerable progress within the Movement’s ranks.181 By 1984 the TUC 
ensured that at least six seats of its 50+ member General Executive were reserved for 
female unionists. Likewise, in that year it also published its first Charter for Women, 
which aimed to codify the Movement’s obligations to female workers, develop 
satisfactory channels of union representation and prioritise the recruitment of female 
unionists within the Movement. Compared with the immediate Post-War period, 
females’ positions in unions were certainly improving, due to first inclusive and then 
engaging ideologies in the Movement competing for hegemony. 
 
 The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that, from the 1970s 
onwards, contested and overlapping ideological streams within the Movement have 
partially shifted its once divisive orientations regarding precarity-prone groups of 
workers, firstly in an inclusive and then an actively engaging fashion: a rejuvenation 
has been initiated.  
 
5. Unions, Rejuvenation and Changes in Strategy. 
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 I now turn to examine how the Movement’s hegemonically dominant tradition 
of voluntary collective bargaining came to be partially rejuvenated in the New 
Economy by a portfolio of alternative strategies. This change in strategy has 
complemented the Movement’s change in orientation. Hyman’s model of 
differentiated union approaches, utilised throughout this thesis, is described in the 
process.182 
 Since the 1970s the Movement has sought to demonstrate that the cascade was 
not a crisis of unionism outright, and that it was possible to recruit and retain 
members even in the new economic reality of flexible, mobile jobs and atomised 
collective bargain: rejuvenation of the Movement’s strategies has been sought, both in 
Britain and internationally.183 Clearly, unions have always utilised numerous 
divergent strategies simultaneously184: so, no singular union strategy absolutely 
defines the rejuvenation process. However, careful analytical analysis reveals that 
some certain strategies have come to occur at a higher frequency, and to a deeper 
degree, during the Movement’s attempted rejuvenation.  
 Hyman, aware of previous typographical paradigms,185 comprehensively maps 
the strategic reactions of British unions to their cascade of decline. Six clear 
rejuvenatory strategies are identified, being used repeatedly by different unions across 
the economy. Some, but not all of which, revolve around the recruitment, organising 
and servicing of particular precarity-prone workers. One can trace the roots of all such 
approaches to earlier moments in the Movement’s history: none are absolutely new, 
but all have been used in new and innovative manners.  
 
I. Servicing Approaches 
 
 In the late 1980s, and with the endorsement of the TUC, some unions 
attempted to recruit highly-marketable and/or managerial employees by offering cut-
price financial services, pension advice and other services not directly linked to the 
employment relationship,186 reminiscent of the perks offered by the friendly societies 
of the Nineteenth Century. Concurrently, a number of unions began to seek the 
recruitment and retention of less-marketable private white-collar workers, part-time 
                                                
182 N.B the following account of Hyman’s model has been supplemented with references to other 
studies that, either implicitly or explicitly, support or have influenced the author’s work. The remainder 
of this section summarises two of Hyman’s most comprehensive works on the matter, unless otherwise 
stated. Cf. Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism; Changing Trade Union Identities and 
Strategies. 
183 Martin Behrens, Kerstin Hamann and Richard Kurd, “Conceptualizing Labour Union 
Revitalization”. In: Ferge and Kelly (eds.), Varieties of Unionism, chapter two; Healey and Engel, 
Learning to Organise; Harry Katz, Rosemary Batt and Jeffrey Keefe, “The revitalization of the CWA: 
Integrating Collective Bargaining, Political Action, and Organizing”. In: Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 2003, 56, pp. 573-589; Fred Rose, Coalitions Across the Class Divide: Lessons from 
the Labor, Peace and Environmental Movements, New York: Cornell University Press, 2000; James 
Arrowsmith, United Kingdom. Partnership 'Alive and Well'. London: EIRO, 2002. 
184 Heery and Adler, Organizing the Unorganized.  
185 A number of writers have constructed models regarding the ever-evolving strategic choices of 
unions: the Webb’s seminally proposed a still applicable model which differentiated strategies as those 
of: unilateral regulation, the setting of workplace standards without the input of employers; collective 
bargaining, the setting of workplace standards with the input of employers; legal enactment,, the use of 
state institutions in setting workplace standards; and mutual assurance:  the use of members’ financial 
subscriptions to raise the living standards of members inside and beyond the workplace.  Cf. Webb and 
Webb, Industrial Democracy. 
186 Cf. Phillip Bassett and Alan Cave, All for One: The Future of Union, London: Fabian Society, 1993.  
 65 
workers and female workers with use of similar service focussed tactics,187 designed 
to unilaterally develop and maintain workers’ human capital.188 This servicing 
approach has at times been achieved collaboratively via partnership arrangements 
with employer organisations, state agencies and community-based groups,189 all keen 
to maintain skills that would diminish in an unorganised labour market.190 
 
II. Legal Approaches 
  
 Additionally many, if not most, unions have shifted their attitudes towards the 
law from the mid-1980s onwards, and have attempted to statutorily underwrite old 
and new protections for workers, particularly for those traditionally liable to entering 
precarious labour relationships.191 With “legal enactment” being the Webbs’ preferred 
union strategy as of 1897, it should be clear that, like all strategies discussed in this 
section, the legal approach should not be regarding as an essentially modern 
technology, nor one completely absent in the Post-War period: we have seen how 
high level unionists were regular and influential faces in the offices of Westminster 
and Whitehall both before and after WWII. However a key differentiation can be 
found between the Movement’s approaches to legal regulation in the Post-War 
Golden Age and during the cascade of decline: then, the hegemonic Movement, while 
making pragmatic usage of legal institutions, rarely advocated the usage of legal 
devices that would have directly resulted in a widespread redistribution of resources 
and risks in society.192 The legal approaches displayed in the rejuvenation period 
differ in this key regard. 
 The archetypal example of the Movement’s new ready embrace of “post-
volantarist”193 legal approaches has been its shifting attitudes towards the notion of a 
NMW. Whereas the unions long used legal tactics in the Post-War period on an 
incidental, piecemeal basis, they hegemonically opposed, or at least failed to actively 
support, the statutory creation of a NMW, which would obviously have entailed a 
fundamental redistribution of benefits and risks in society, to the possible detriment of 
relatively privileged unionists, to the advantage of the lowest-paid in society.194 
Despite the Webbs advocating the adaptation of a “a systematic and comprehensive 
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Labour Code, prescribing… precautions of sanitation and safety... maximum hours of 
toil (and) a minimum of weekly earnings” as early as 1897,195 such a system was 
never systematically pushed for by the British Movement. Traditional explanations for 
the TUC’s and hegemonic Movement’s previous lack of support boil down to the 
notion that unionists possessed rightly held suspicions of an often-hostile state, and 
therefore preferred the arena of voluntary collective negotiations in setting wage 
levels. However, such explanations ignore the fact that several unions that counted 
large numbers of low-waged workers in their memberships supported and lobbied for 
the creation of a NMW from the 1940s onwards: this alludes to the fact that it was a 
union resistance to state-led wealth redistribution, rather than the state per se, which 
discouraged the hegemonic usage of this strategy.196  
 However in 1986, as the cascade of decline decimated traditional union 
strongholds and inhibited the usage of voluntary approaches, the TUC changed its 
official policy, and for the first time since the 1920s formally advocated the pursuit of 
a NMW and, after a skilled campaign, managed to bring a sufficient number of 
initially sceptical affiliates on board to propagate a substantial campaign in its 
favour.197 Resultantly, the Labour Party adopted the pursuit of the NMW as a 1992 
manifesto commitment. Of course, it would take the 1997 election of New Labour for 
the unions’ position to gain any credence in the corridors of power, but since the 
passing of NMW legalisation in 1998 the Movement, virtually unanimously, has 
come to be highly protective of the statutory wage floor.198 
 Unions pushing hard for the eventual acceptance of EU Working Time 
Directives, the creation of anti-discrimination legislation and work-life balance 
protections provide further examples of this strategy being operationalised, to give 
some idea regarding the depth of this development.199 In addition to attempting to 
create new employment laws in Westminster, the Devolved National Parliaments and 
Brussels,200 unions have become adept at making test-cases in the local, national and 
supra-national courts, and Industrial Tribunals, in sometimes successful attempts at 
securing employment rights via common law decisions.201 Indeed, after being wooed 
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by the socialist French President Jacques Dalores, who assured delegates that their 
apparent impotence in the face of Thatcherism could be cured by an empowered 
Brussels, an acknowledgment of the “multi-level” avenues of legal influence afforded 
by the European Courts was an important factor in the TUC, with the partial support 
of its affiliates, dropping its long-held opposition to the UK’s membership to the EEC 
in 1988.202    
 
III. Partnership Approaches 
  
 Reflecting the Movement’s growing pessimism regarding the power and 
effectiveness of collective militant mobilisation, many unions have utilised, especially 
from the mid-1990s onwards,203 a more explicitly cooperative approach with regard 
to their relationships with employers204: social partnerships have become the norm at 
the industrial, or more commonly, plant level in some often relatively niche areas of 
the economy. Participating unions have attempted to embed themselves into firms’ 
regulative machinery, in return for lending their support in increasing flexibility 
within the workforce: here, “unapologetic endorsement(s) of the principle of 
compromise”, once heretical to the organisational principles of the Movement in the 
Post-War Era, began to emanate from certain quarters of the Movement.205 
Spearheaded by the TUC, arguably with little democratic input, oversight or support 
from the affiliated unions, the underlying logic of this approach was enshrined in the 
TUC’s 1997 policy document ‘Partners for Progress’.206 
 Obviously for this strategy to be seen as viable, unions are going to have to 
hold particular orientations towards the nature of capitalist production. In the Post-
War period, voluntary bargaining required at least an acceptance of capital’s 
ownership of the means of production: the leap to fully-fledged strategies of 
partnership or cooperation was not so great from this orientational origin. Yet this 
small leap represents a major reconfiguration in union activities: whereas in the Post-
War Era unions conceived their responsibilities principally in distributive terms, 
rejuvenatory actions of such a cooperative sort often revolve around the supply-side 
of labour and product markets, focussing on issues of skill production, firm 
competitiveness and product quality and productivity.207 This shift towards actions 
focussing on supply side issues has been seen within union movements across Europe, 
and is not exclusively consigned to Britain.208 
                                                
202 Paul Marginson and Keith Sisson, European Integration and Industrial Relations: Multi-level 
Governance in the Making, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004. 
203 Healey and Engel, Learning to Organise. 
204 Boxall and Haynes similarly suggest that a dualism demarcates the temporal border of union 
rejuvenation: accordingly, “adversarial” approaches of voluntarism and the threat of withdrawing one’s 
labour gave way to “cooperative” relations with employers and their organisations. Cf. Peter Boxall 
and Peter Haynes, “Strategy and Trade Union Effectiveness in a Neo-liberal Environment”. In: British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 1997, 35(4), pp. 567-91. 
205 Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism, pg. 48; Peter Ackers and Jonathan Payne, 
“British Trade Unions and Social Partnership: Rhetoric, Reality and Strategy”. In: International 
Journal of Human Resource Management, 1998, 9(3), pp. 529–49; David Guest and Riccardo Peccei, 
“Partnership at Work: Mutuality and the Balance of Advantage”. In: British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 2001, 39(2), pp. 207-236; Healey and Engel, Learning to Organise. 
206 Trades Union Congress, Partners for Progress, London: TUC, 1997. 
207 Streek, Training and the New Industrial Relations, pg. 251-253. 
208 Mark Stuart, “The industrial Relations of Training and Learning: a ‘New Consensus’ or a ‘New 
Politics’”. In: European Journal of Industrial Relations, 2007, 13(3), pp. 269–280. Cooperative 
approaches, or partnership strategies can, and in the UK have, occurred at the firm level: cf. Benson 
 68 
Particularly between 1997 and 2010, when New Labour controlled Parliament, 
governmental policies have been one of the chief driving forces behind the 
propagation of this approach.209 Examples of this overt State encouragement can be 
seen in the creation of the National Advisory Group for Continuing Education and 
Lifelong Learning, a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation (quango)210 
incorporating union and business staff tasked to advise government on widening 
participation in lifelong learning,211 and the Skills Task Force, another trilateral body 
tasked to promote skill development.212 Rather unlike the corporatist bodies of the 
apparently Golden Era, the Movement has enthusiastically embraced such schemes.213  
Clearly, a key area where the partnership approach has been utilised has been 
the area of lifelong learning and skill formation arenas.214 New Labour found this 
operational domain “a natural issue for partnership in the workplace between 
employers, employees and their trade unions”, one that “signal(led) a new and 
modern role for unions”,215 and created a £12.5 million pound Union Learning Fund 
(ULF) in 1998. Granted an additional £20 million over 2002 to 2004,216 explicitly for 
the purpose of promoting union/employer learning initiatives, the ULF had supported 
60 different unions on over 300 different projects as of 2003.217 Despite governmental 
hostility and cutbacks from 2010 onwards, the ULF continues to operate in a limited 
capacity, after the TUC prioritised its continuation in all its discussions with the new 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat Government218: this demonstrates the degree of 
importance the Movement has come to attach to this approach. 
Not only has the British government produced incentives for unions to pursue 
partnership approaches. Predating the rise of New Labour, the Movement had made 
inroads into the “corporatist policy community” of the European Union,219 and found 
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the results highly appealing. On being granted, alongside employer organisations, a 
consultative role with the European Commission, collegiality at the international level 
prompted the proliferation of multi-level partnership actions between these oft-
antagonistic groups.220    
Such partnerships have at times been specifically tailored to, and beneficial 
for, the needs of traditionally precarity-prone groups: UnionLearn, a body that 
combines the resources of the TUC’s learning department, individual unions and 
employers has developed numerous English as a Second Language courses over the 
last decade, as an example.221 Yet benefits run deeper than the relatively standard 
provision of language tuition: Forrester argues that the partnership approach, 
actualised in learning arenas, provides a basis for linking otherwise disparate groups, 
both internal and external to the active union and the workplace,222 in a way that 
voluntary collective bargaining never achieved. 
 
IV. Campaigning Approaches 
 
A crucial rejuvenating development has been the unions’ increased attempts at 
raising their public profiles through the use of active campaigning beyond the 
workplace. Spearheaded by the general unions, this approach gained much credence 
in the Movement in the late 1980s and 1990s. In 1994, the TUC formally “re-
launched” itself,223 emphasising the notion that unions, and unionists, need to 
mobilise vocally and publicly in the pursuit of stronger employment rights, but also 
with regard to other social-economic phenomena, such as anti-racism and 
environmental issues.224 With the campaigning approach unions, if not cooperating 
directly with employers as per the partnership approach, have sought to create and 
maintain alliances with other societal organisations: in the UK this has included the 
Citizens Advice Bureaux, local housing trusts, solicitors and careers advisors, 
religious groups, anti-fascists organisations, New Social Movements, NGOs and at 
times employer organisations.225 This is in stark opposition to the norm of the Post-
War Era, where, despite occasional discursive allusions of solidarity, trade unions and 
wider community organisations only tended to come together defensively at times of 
absolute crisis.226 Contrastingly, now many unions have come to present themselves 
as “societal actors”227: up-scaling their own role beyond that of ‘mere’ worker 
representatives.228  
 A starting point for this approach was the recognition that the “worksite 
unionism”,229 that typified voluntary bargaining, largely failed to effectively organise 
the precarity-prone workers needed as part of the Movement’s rejuvenation. 
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International evidence certainly indicates that particular groups of precarity-prone 
workers are highly conducive to this alternative form of union activity230: BME and 
migrant community-based NGOs have been found to process a high propensity for 
collaborating with trade unions when given adequate opportunities, over a diverse 
range of issues, despite various international Movements’ pre-rejuvenatory reluctance 
to collaborate with them. 
 
V. Organising Approaches 
 
Perhaps the most ubiquitous, and morally priviledged, of the rejuvenating 
strategies, certainly in the general and low-skilled unions, has been the identification 
of the need to develop or rediscover organising approaches within the Movement’s 
rank-and-file. When the cascade of decline struck, foremost in the minds of numerous 
union strategists was the need to stymie membership losses and, if possible, ensure 
growth. Observations were repeatedly made to the effect that the passive recruitment 
processes that typified the Post-War Era, often reliant on social pressures from fellow 
colleagues, proved ill suited to the New Economy of small-employee firms: as the 
closed shop came to be systematically outlawed, as anti-union discourses raged in 
society and as employers increasingly sought to marginalise trade union 
representatives in the workplace, unions, facing a catastrophic acceleration in 
membership declines, began to discuss the need for economy-wide, or at least union-
wide, coordination in recruitment.  Through these discussions many came to believe, 
from the 1980s onwards, that complacent Post-War unions had simply forgotten how 
to actively organise. New sectors of the economy had to be penetrated, and pre-
existing union members had to be turned into fully-fledged, active unionists. Unions 
began to develop new strategies, and resuscitated others once prevalent in the earlier 
history of the movement, in attempts at addressing this holistic bundle of barriers.  
Boxall and Haynes propose a fairly reductionist, but still revealing, dualism 
between “servicing” union strategies, actualised by professional unionists or shop-
stewards aimed at a passive membership, and “organising” strategies, aimed at 
creating self-sustaining and replicating support networks in the rank-and-file of 
unions.231 What differentiates the organising approach from the so-called servicing 
approach that supposedly typified the Post-War period is its idealised emphasis on the 
self-determination of union agendas by individual groups of workers at the firm 
level.232  
 It has been argued that servicing approaches were actually imposed on rank-
and-file members in the Post-War Era, when central union secretariats and the TUC 
sought to inhibit the growth of membership self-reliance and self-determination, 
fearful that if allowed to develop, undercurrents of union militancy would seek more 
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ambitious demands, and ascribe more fully to ideologies of class conflict, then the 
tradition of voluntarism allowed.233 Ironically then, the parallels between the 
Movement’s formal contemporary approach, and the informal militant undercurrent to 
the Movement that central bodies resisted in the Post-War Era seem to make 
organising approaches fit well within the British context.234 In this regard, what has 
changed since the cascade of decline is the fact that central unions now standard seek 
to create, rather than suppress, internal legitimacy and resources for independently 
operating branch members.  
 The organising approach, it has been hoped, promotes the recruitment of 
workers into the Movement, and dampens membership turnover rates, by giving 
workers a justified sense of responsibility and ownership lacking in the servicing 
approach. However, the Movement has sensed other benefits to this approach: 
believing it to increase its power resources when it comes to political lobbying: 
hoping a larger and politicised membership accrues the Movement greater legitimacy 
and influence in its political actions.235 Therefore, hand-in-hand with attempts at re-
activating self-sufficiency in their rank-and-files, unions have sought, particularly 
from the late 1990s, to penetrate previously unorganised, and often precarity-
producing firms and sectors of the economy.236 Likewise, proactive attempts have 
been made to engage groups of traditionally precarity-prone workers previously 
disregarded as being too problematic to organise237: British unions have developed a 
whole away of organising strategies for this purpose; one of the most tried and tested 
being the use of ‘like for like’ organisers in recruiting migrant workers, as an 
example.238 
 
VI. Communicative Approaches 
 
Finally, many unions, previously embodying opaque and hierarchical forms, 
have come to recognise that in the early Twentieth Century there had not been enough 
bidirectional communication channels within their internal structures. The 
Conservative Government of the 1980s, ideologically inclined to the belief that union 
leaderships were more militant and left wing then their members, enforced 
‘democratising’ policies on the unions: rolling programmes of legislation came to 
require direct, secret and repeated elections for top officials, secret ballots before 
strikes and other industrial actions and once-a-decade votes to allow for the 
continuation of political and strike funds. Surprisingly, for the government if not for 
professional unionists well used to curbing undercurrents of left wing militancy in 
their unions, such democratising processes caused no lurch to the right nor a 
depoliticisation of the unions239: if anything the Movement, galvanised through anger, 
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shifted to the left during this decade. However, such a process did force the opening 
of direct communication channels between the leadership and memberships of unions 
which had, in many cases, simply not existed before. From the 1990s onwards many 
unions came to consciously further increase the effectiveness of their internal 
communications channels through this burgeoning communicative approach. 
 This opening actually wrought further ramifications regarding the 
Movement’s hegemonic orientations. One cannot ascribe a master narrative covering 
the entirety of the Movement in the Post-War Era, stating that unionists were wont to 
defend only the interests of their own core members over those of other workers: it is 
undeniable that many within the Movement’s rank have long held and pursued 
alternative interests.240 While the institutional environment of the Post-War Era, both 
internal and external to the Movement, promoted the pursuit of self-interest through 
the strategy of voluntarism, the ideological makeup of much of the Movement’s rank-
and-file lent itself, however slightly or partially, to the pursuit of alternative 
orientational goals via different strategies when the construction of conducive 
internal-communication channels allowed.  
 
Some of these rejuvenatory strategies – such as the partnership and 
campaigning approaches – seem to inherently contradict one another, while others – 
such as the legal and campaigning approaches – appear to complement one another 
well: however, neither a single strategy, nor a narrow set of strategies, is likely to 
emerge uncontested as the principle operating standard of a single major union, let 
alone the Movement as a whole, in a hypothetically fully-rejuvenated future. The 
reasons for this variety is intimately linked to a union’s organisational structure: 
unions with a highly-skilled and marketable constituency may find the greatest utility 
in entering into partnership productive coalitions with employees, forming company 
‘unions’; while unions attempting to represent or court a more precarity-prone 
membership could well find it more beneficial to seek legal engagements with the 
government, campaign in the wider societal environment as a social movement, or 
provide tailor-made services to individual members as a friendly society.241 
 
 The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that from the 1970s 
onwards the Movement partially (re-)adopted a wide portfolio of divergent strategies, 
significantly differentiated from the Post-War hegemony of voluntary collective 
bargaining.  
 
6. Rejuvenation’s Causal Mechanisms. 
 
 It is now necessary to examine what causal mechanisms allowed and 
encouraged a change in unionism; to ascertain how exactly the transition to the New 
Economy pragmatically demanded a rejuvenation of the Movement’s orientations and 
strategies. It must be asked: how were rejuvenatory developments allowed to occur at 
all? Surely the historic organisation principles and invested interests of unionists 
would have prohibited a fundamental transformation of the ideologies and tactics of 
the hegemonic Movement, even in the face of economic restructurings and the like.  
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 Pull-factors were certainly involved: at a time of union decimation, the 
incentives of new and self-sufficient groups of workers, of use in buttressing 
membership numbers, reducing costs, dampening under-cutting tendencies, and 
increasing the perceived legitimacy and power of unions on the national stage are in 
themselves compelling reasons for any self-motivated and strategically enabled 
organisation to change its modus operandi, even if this entails a short-term reduction 
in benefits for the organisation’s traditional constituents.242 As an example of this 
self-calculation of benefits, see Jack Dromey, ex-Deputy General Secretary of the 
TGWU, who summarised the purpose and apparent need of the organising approach 
thusly: “unless you build strong, fighting, self-confident and self-sustaining 
workplace organisations, you do not win, you do not grow and our hard-pressed 
officers are run ragged servicing a fragmented and declining membership”.243 From 
this quote it is clear that beyond the weighty notions of internal democracy that often 
pepper accounts of the organising approach, a key perceived benefit of it is that, if 
actualised fully, the Movement’s rank-and-file membership would have relatively 
light resource requirements.  
 According to the above explanation, the dependencies of historic 
organisational principles were broken by the purposeful self-identification of 
interests, yet the Movement’s partial shift in orientations did not represent a move 
away from ultimately self-interested motivations. As for strategies: as in earlier “times 
or in areas of industrial weakness”, the British Movement started to display a 
“readiness to resort to (rejuvenatory) method(s)… either because collective 
bargaining was unavailable or because its results were unacceptable”.244 So, while 
conscious cost/benefit analyses prompted the rejuvenation of both the Movement’s 
orientations and strategies, these calculations must principally be seen as a defensive 
reaction to the decline in the effectiveness of the Movement’s Post-War Era actions. 
Aspects of this account, which basically states that rejuvenation has been a 
wholly conscious, rational and direct consequence of economic restructuring, are 
undeniable: in periods of crises, or otherwise, conscious appraisals of incentives can, 
and have, coaxed a reorientation from unions.245 Take the issue of migrant labour for 
example: while it may be logical for self-interested unions, when protecting their most 
privileged core members, to oppose immigration into a social formation for fear of 
wage dumping, it too is logical, according to completely self-interested equations, to 
organise migrant workers if and when they embed themselves into society, for the 
same reason: to prevent the undercutting and erosion of privileged workers’ wages.246 
  
 However, additional contingent historical explanations must be drawn upon to 
adequately explain union rejuvenation. First and foremost was the role of the state, 
which from the 1970s arrested the Movement’s ability to exclude certain forms of 
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labour from the market. Of particular importance was the abolition of the closed shop, 
with which the unions were previously able to maintain and regulate the standard 
employment contracts and demographics of a firm’s workforce.247 As mentioned 
earlier, a series of legislative changes likewise disabled the Movement’s usage of 
strike action: in sum, unionism’s ability to restrict access to labour markets became 
seriously restricted, on both a short and long-term basis. This encouraged a change in 
strategy from the unions, and also, if they were to retain any legitimacy and influence, 
a shift in orientations towards precarity-prone workers also.248 Another aspect of 
government action that inadvertently helped jumpstart rejuvenation were the 
unintended effects of the 1984 Trade Union Act, which required all union executives 
to be elected by secret individual ballots: while the Conservative Government 
expected and failed to observe a resultant rightwing shift in union activity, strong 
causal links can be made between the passing of this act and the rise of females on 
union executives; it is clear that rejuvenation was certainly in part an unintended 
consequence of the anti-union governmental policies of the 1980s. 
Yet one does not have to place too much credit, however indirect, at the feet of 
Thatcher and Co. for the process of union rejuvenation: an additional process likewise 
did much to kick-start the rejuvenation process. As “value-rational” organisations,249 
unions are in part driven by ideological convictions, and these are open to change 
from internal and external processes. After the onset of the cascade of decline, new 
discourses based on notions of fundamental human rights came to have a great 
influence over the Movement. These discourses, long emanating internally and 
externally to the Movement but often suppressed by officious central offices in the 
Post-War Era, framed the interests of precarity-prone workers in a more sympathetic 
light than had been the case before250: non-standard workers, oft thought of as little 
better them blacklegs and scabs in the Movement’s Golden Era, were ideologically 
recast as exploited groups worthy of and needing union representation.  
  
 The key lesson to take from this section, drawn from a combination of the 
above accounts, is the fact that a mixture of conscious self-interested cost/benefit 
analyses – regarding the incentives offered by the representation and recruitment of 
traditionally precarity-prone workers, governmental regulations that vetoed previous 
hegemonic orientations and strategies, and the propagation and internalisation of 
various societal discourses all allowed and encouraged a rejuvenation of union 
orientations and strategies from the 1970s onwards. Of course, all such institutional 
and contingent pressures must be framed with reference to the cascade of decline, 
which largely invalidated the previous hegemonic tendencies of the Movement. 
 
7. Rejuvenation’s Arrested Development. 
 
I have shown how the cascade of decline broke the efficiency of the modus 
operandi of a once relatively empowered but complacent Movement, adept at 
representing the interests of its privileged core workers; yet, slowly and surely, the 
strategically enabled Movement adapted its orientations and strategies, often to the 
benefit of the more precarity-prone workers of society. Is this the end of the story? 
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No. The mainstream Movement’s rejuvenation has been partial and incoherent at best: 
in this section I describe and explain this failure.  
 TUC delegates had been known to label one form of non-standard workers – 
temporary agency workers, as “parasites”, “scavengers” and “pimps” before the 
1980s.251 Such a tendency is not surprising, coming as it was from a pre-rejuvenatory 
Movement. However, such attitudes survived till very late in the Twentieth Century: 
in 1985 a delegate at the TGWU’s Biennial asked, again regarding temporary agency 
workers, “how do you control rabies?”; he answered, “You destroy rabies – you get 
rid of it completely and do not allow it to spread”.252 Clearly, divisiveness remained 
the norm for many, and even at the beginning of the 2000s only a few of the larger 
general unions had developed any consistently well-resourced functions aimed at 
pursuing the interests of workers on non-standard contracts.253 In other words, a 
rejuvenation of orientations regarding non-standard contractors is still incomplete. 
This is likewise the case for traditionally subordinated demographic groups. 
Regarding female workers: despite much cosmetic and discursive reorganisations, 
progress during the height of the cascade of decline was grindingly slow in practice; 
at the 1986 TUC congress, while females made up 38% of the affiliated unions’ rank-
and-file members, only 18% of delegates were female254; this demonstrates that in the 
rejuvenatory period, when females proactively joined and maintained membership in 
unions, they risked marginalisation within the internal structures of the Movement. In 
the same year, only 2% of female unionists held elected positions of responsibility 
within their union255; problematically, under representation was no less accentuated in 
the higher levels of the internal structures of Movement; in the same year only 5 of 
the TUC’s 84 affiliated unions had elected a female as its General Secretary,256 and in 
1988, of the 3000+ full-time officials employed by the five largest unions in the UK, 
only 77 were female.257 So, well into the cascade of decline, and after initial attempts 
at rejuvenation, “for most women, trade unions meet at the wrong time in the wrong 
place about the wrong things. For most trade unions, women are the wrong people in 
the wrong place at the wrong time going about the wrong things”.258  
 Other intersecting groups have fared little better. Since the onset of 
rejuvenation, unions in Britain have come to be vocal in their demands for the equal 
treatment of BME and migrant workers. However, the actual active organisation of 
migrant workers has been conducted with less urgency: by 1986, 56% of ethnic 
minority employees were unionised – as opposed to 47% of white British workers, yet 
only 4% of ethnic minority male unionists held elected positions of responsibility 
within their union, as opposed to 11% of white British male unionists259: explicit and 
implicit racist assumptions and practices within the Movement long inhibited an 
improvement in this situation,260 though perhaps formal union ideologies of 
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internationalism and solidarity kept the worst racist behaviours of the Movement in 
check.261 When, in the 1980s and 1990s, central secretariats dedicated more resources 
to BME issues, a disconnection between the policies of the unions’ and TUC’s head 
offices, and their implementation the firm level became apparent262: this further 
highlights a difference between the often rejuvenatory sentiments of the Movement 
during its cascade of decline, and its orientations as actualised in practice. 
Clearly, for all its rhetorical orientational realignments and alternations, a base 
aim of union rejuvenation has remained unfulfilled: traditionally precarity-prone 
groups of workers have remained in many ways excluded from the Movement, well 
into the ongoing cascade of decline. If one remembers that even during the immediate 
Post-War Era altruistic undercurrents – which sought to pursue more positive policies 
– existed within the Movement, it must be accepted that changes in the underlying 
orientations of the Movement have been piecemeal, sporadic, nugatory, contested and 
reversible at best.263 In the following pages, we analyse why this has been the case.  
 
While unions have long held the notion of solidarity as a founding principle, 
the defence of precarity-prone workers seemingly requires more: altruism,264 at least 
in the short-term, and this has been lacking in the UK. Union disinterest in precarity-
prone workers has been, and continues to be, an issue of short-term opportunity costs: 
it is difficult to recruit and unionise geographically dispersed and time-poor non-
standard workers,265 particular when they are employed within small and otherwise 
unorganised firms (remember, it is in such firms, and contract types, that we continue 
to see an overrepresentation of female, BME and migrant labour). Other issues that 
complicate the recruitment and retention of non-standard workers includes the facts 
that many labourers work for multiple employers in the New Economy and/or for 
cash in hand, and that low-waged firms often experience a high degree of staff 
turnover: these factors prohibit the use of check-off procedures – where union 
subscriptions are debited directly out of pay-checks.266 Due to these difficulties of 
building and sustaining a union presence in new economic firms, unions have found it 
difficult to build up lay representative structures within them: therefore a greater 
proportion of advocacy and representative work has to be performed by full-time 
union representatives: thus, when compared with more standardly arranged 
businesses, these firms represent a bigger drain on the increasingly squeezed 
resources of unions.267 Indeed, Sharpe shows us that the marginal costs of organising 
increase for unions in progressively smaller firms.268  
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To extrapolate further, there has been a lack of guaranteed financial 
incentives for consistent union rejuvenation attempts in the New Economy, and the 
typical groups of workers found therein.269 Fully resourced attempts to penetrate and 
unionise such sectors, contract types, and precarity-prone demographic groups would 
redirect resources, however temporarily, away from the Movement’s traditional 
constituents, just when they are required the most.270 Self-interested secretariats 
would be cautious at risking the anger of their core constituents by diverting attention 
to resource-intensive precarity-prone workers, particularly as unions have long held 
justifiable suspicions that employers have systematically utilised non-standard 
contractors, across time and space, to undermine the pay, security and working 
conditions of established and empowered workers.271  
Of course, one can reverse this logic too: some forms of non-standard 
workers, such as temporary agency workers, may be less likely to support, or seek the 
support of, unions, given the short-term nature of their individual assignments and 
their lack of prior experience with unions.272 Both issues here become accentuated 
with particular demographic groups of workers, such as sojourning migrant 
labourers.273 However, there are good reasons to believe that these groups contain no 
inherent negative predisposition towards unions274: to say otherwise is to normalise 
the status quo brought about by decades, if not centuries, of anti-precarious-worker 
sentiments from the Movement itself.275 
 
In terms of strategy, change has been slight, disparate and confused too276: 
even when expecting a wide variety of differentiated rejuvenatory strategies, 
developments from the Movement as a whole have been unconvincing, and should 
not be exaggerated. In the following pages, we assess and explain this partiality.  
In practice, unions have adopted numerous strategic approaches 
simultaneously, in piecemeal, non-comprehensive and frankly conservative manners, 
since the onset of conscious rejuvenation processes in the 1970s.277 Take attempts to 
orchestrate organising approaches as an example: while must ink was spilt and lip 
service paid to the apparently pressing prerogative of organising principles, 
overwhelmed and under resourced union officials found it difficult to fully embrace 
the organising agenda in practice throughout the 1980s.278 In the mid-1990s the TUC 
was compelled to respond to this failure by establishing a specialist Organising 
Academy, for the training and dispersion of specialist organisation representatives 
throughout the Movement.279  From this evidence it is clear that strategists seem not 
                                                
Gumbrell-McCormick, European Trade Unions and Atypical Workers. 
270 Cf. John Dunlop, Collective Bargaining: Principles and Cases, Chicago: Richard Irwin, 1949. 
271 Cf. Bean, Comparative Industrial Relations; Hegewisch, Temporary Agency Work, National 
Reports – United Kingdom; Gumbrell-McCormick, European Trade Unions and Atypical Workers. 
272 Cervano, Trade Union Strategies Towards Atypical Work, pg. 7. 
273 Schmidt, Temporary Migrant Workers, pg. 194; Penninx and Roosblad, Conclusion. 
274 John Kelly, “British Trade Unionism, 1979-89: Change, Continuity and Contradictions”. In: Work, 
Employment and Society, 4(5), 1990, pp. 29-65. 
275 Malo, Temporary Workers and Direct Voting Systems for Workers' Representation. 
276 Cf. Carter, Trade Union Organizing and Renewal; Edmund Heery et al., Union Organizing in 
Britain; The TUC’s Organising Academy; Fitzgerald and Hardy, Thinking Outside the Box’; Jane 
Wills, “The Geography of Union Organising in Low-Paid Service Industries in the UK: Lessons from 
the TGWU’s Campaign to Unionise the Dorchester Hotel, London”.  In: Antipode, 2005, 37, pp. 139-
159. 
277 Healey and Engel, Learning to Organise.  
278 Heery and Kelly, Working for the Union: British Trade Union Officers, pg. 103-5, 190-1.  
279 McKay, Unions and New Migrants.  
 78 
to have known how to actualise fully a transition to the self-sustaining forms of 
recruitment as described by organising models.  
Resources, or the lack of them, again explain this failure of rejuvenation. 
Union representation, of all kinds, is an expensive business: in the UK, as of 1994, 
about 80% of union expenditure was spent on the salaries of union officials, the 
overwhelming majority of whose time was spent on attending to the needs of existing 
members280: so, while unions have a large incentive to restructure themselves into 
becoming more efficient or streamlined bodies, which could afford to spend more on 
the organisation of previously unorganised sectors of the New Economy,281 it is 
extremely difficult, and risky, to divert resources in the short-term to initiate such a 
transition.282  
Such risks are not only associated with the organising approach. McIlroy 
demonstrates how the partnership approach – which ironically came to be highly 
regarded just as the Movement lost much of its formal insider status – has been highly 
reliant on government patronage: its fortunes prone to the shifting sands of 
governmental support.283 The legal approach also often relies on the goodwill of 
governmental policy, which has been sorely lacking in each and every government 
from the 1970s onwards.284 Likewise, the legal approach is both time and resource 
consuming, and seems to further separate the activities of specialised union officials 
from the rank-and-file membership, which may potentially lead to ever greater losses 
of members and their subscriptions. Similarly, the campaigning approach relies on the 
strength of societal actors, and a societal fabric, which have been weakened by the 
enduring ideologies of Thatcherism285: with the risks of strategic change so great, it is 
little wonder why much of the Movement remains stubbornly conservative in its 
actions. 
Resultantly, fully resourced rejuvenatory strategies remain the exception, 
rather than norm, of union activity in practice. While memories of the operational 
comfort and efficiency of the Post-War period fade, the Movement has found it 
difficult to break out of the cycles of dependencies it operated within, with great 
success, during that period. The Golden Age has dipped below the temporal horizon, 
but during this prolonged sunset the reminiscent Movement has not been able to turn 
away from that Age’s last dwindling rays of light, and commit itself fully to the long 
night ahead. 
 
 The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that rejuvenation, within the 
mainstream Movement, has been slight, contested, partial and under-resourced at best. 
Unions struggling to secure the interests of their traditional core constituents have 
struggled to commit adequate resources to follow through with their idealised 
rejuvenatory tendencies, even though the theoretical need to rejuvenate has been 
hegemonically accepted by the Movement as a whole. Unions have had to, and 
continue to need to, make careful and precise choices in the years of rejuvenation, 
regarding their strategic actions, in an extremely high risk game: playing from a 
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position of relative powerlessness and with ever decreasing resources at their 
disposal.  
 
 This is where deep analysis of the Farmworkers’ Union actions could be of 
use to strategists in the wider Movement. Due to agriculture’s long-hostile operating 
environment, the Farmworkers’ Union has never been able rely on the crux of self-
interested voluntary collective bargaining: unable to retreat to an increasingly 
inefficient comfort zone, there is good reason to suspect that the Farmworkers’ Union 
would have developed rejuvenatoryesque orientations and strategies at an earlier date, 
and in a more coherent manner, when compared to the mainstream Movement. As the 
New Economy becomes increasingly ruralised, the Movement could be well advised 
to treat the Farmworkers’ Union’s experiences as distilled premonitions of the 
Movement’s future experiences in the New Economy. The Movement could regard the 
agriculturalists’ past actions as Petri dish experiments of potential avenues for future 
development, and adopt the most compelling courses of action identified from 
analysis.  
 
8. Summary of the Mainstream Movement. 
 
 This chapter addresses research sub-questions (vi) through to (viii) with 
regards to the mainstream Movement. To summarise each: 
 
vi)  What orientations and strategies have the wider Movement employed with 
regards to precarity-prone workers? 
 
 In the immediate Post-War Era, up until the 1970s, the Movement 
predominantly, but not exclusively, held a negative, divisive orientation towards 
precarity-prone workers. The Movement attempted to exclude these workers from the 
labour market altogether, or else subordinate their interests in order to bring benefits 
to their relatively privileged core constituents, namely white male workers on full-
time contracts. Such orientations were primarily supported by the strategy of 
voluntary collective bargaining backed by the strategic use of strike action. 
 Following the 1970s, orientations partially shifted to less divisive rejuvenatory 
positions, so that the Movement purposefully courted precarity-prone workers in 
inclusive and then engaging manners. Such courtship was orchestrated via the use of 
an expanded repertoire of strategic approaches, each drawn from earlier epochs. 
However, these shifts have been partial at best, and many pre-rejuvenatory tendencies 
can still be observed in the Movement up to the present day. 
 
vii)  What causal mechanisms have been responsible for producing said 
orientations and strategies? 
 
 The cascade of decline’s economic restructurings created a New Economic 
operating environment inconducive to Post-War forms of union actions: this 
demanded a change from the increasingly resource-deficient Movement. Further 
facilitating rejuvenatory tendencies were self-conscious cost/benefit analyses 
conducted by the Movement, governmental proscriptions of previous forms of 
activity, and the propagation and internalisation of sympathetic discourses regarding 
precarity-prone workers. However a deep-seated caution, brought about by dwindling 
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financial and organisational resources, has prohibited the full actualisation of union 
rejuvenation in practice.  
 
viii) How effective have said strategies been in securing the unions’ desired 
orientational goals, and why? 
 
 Rejuvenation has been partial and contested at best. Not enough resources 
have been allocated to rejuvenatory strategies so as to assure their effectiveness. 
Strategists operating in what is to them a relatively alien environment have been 
reluctant to act in innovative manners diverging significantly from their Post-War 
modus operandi. Rejuvenatory success stories have therefore been few and far 
between.
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An Interlude: Introducing the Farmworkers’ Union. 
 
 Having assessed the changing orientations and strategies of the mainstream 
Movement, I now turn to assess the actions of the Farmworkers’ Union. This brief 
interlude introduces the Farmworkers’ Union, to be analysed from a variety of angles 
and temporal locations over the following four chapters.  
 Patterns of organised labour have long found in the fields of Britain. 
Agriculture, like all industries, knew sporadic and occasionally spectacular outbreaks 
of labour organisation in pre-capitalist eras.1 Looking ahead, focussing on the 
Nineteenth Century and later, the agricultural sector was far from quiet: sporadic but 
sustained peasant actions against the Poor Laws of the 1830s led to mass deportations 
and even executions of the rural workforce2; indeed, one of the early totemic incidents 
seared into the British Movement’s collective consciousness occurred in the 
agricultural village of Tolpuddle, Dorset in 1834; there, six field-workers, organised 
in a local union, were arrested and sentenced to seven years transportation under an 
obscure Eighteenth Century law for being bound in a secret and unlawful act, despite 
the fact that the right to organisation had been formally secured by the 1824 and 1825 
Combination Acts. National rallies were held in support of the ‘Tolpuddle Martyrs’, 
who became cause célèbres for the anti-craft-union faction of the Movement, and the 
general right to organise freely and openly.3  
 Throughout the mid-Nineteenth Century, relatively isolated cases such as 
these, and more discrete forms of collective protest such the spurning of the 
established Church in favour of Primitive Methodism, were part and parcel of 
agriculture’s human geographies. However few contemporaries predicted the 
formation, in 1872, of ‘the National’, a conglomerate of various local agricultural 
unions which quickly grew in size to rival the established urban unions of the day: by 
the end of its first year the National contained 72,000 members spread over 980 
branches.4 Empowered by industrialisation’s labour demands, the National funded 
strategic migrations of its members, controlling the rural labour supply and thereby 
increasing wages on a national scale. However, the National could not survive the end 
of a period of relative economic buoyancy and labour mobility, and by the early 
1880s the National could not only count more than 2,000 members. Numerous other 
unions, of various size and type, continued to flit in and out of existence for the 
remainder of this century.5  
 It was only in 1906, when the Eastern Counties Agricultural Labourers and 
Small Holder’s Union was set up, by farmworkers fearing retaliations for the 
Liberal’s victory at the 1906 general election, that agriculture gained a union with 
staying power. By 1909 the Union changed its name to the National Agricultural 
Labourers and Rural Workers’ Union to reflect its widening membership base.6 By 
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1913 the Union had 12,000 members, in 232 branches across 26 counties in England 
and Wales. Its name was changed again in 1920 to the National Union of Agricultural 
Labourers.7   
With a minimal number of professional staff – 14 full-timers were employed 
by the Union in 1928, 16 in 1938 and 38 in 19478 – the Union tried valiantly to raise 
membership numbers in the Pre- and Inter-War Eras: professionals and lay-members, 
walking and cycling the length and breadth of counties, set up branches and collected 
union subs under conditions of cloak-and-dagger to avoid repercussions from 
dominant antipathetic interests in the countryside’s Conservative heartlands.9 Yet, due 
to rural environments’ physical geographies, the Farmworkers’ Union consistently 
had perhaps the most scattered membership of any of the medium-to-large-sized 
unions of the Twentieth Century: in 1940 the Union was spread over 4,000 branches, 
the vast majority of which were based in isolated villages.10 
 WWI, and an increased need for agricultural food production, boosted 
membership greatly,11 but not as much as WWII did: between 1938 and 1948 the 
Union’s membership increased from 46,943 to close to 200,000 persons,12 which 
turned out to be the Union’s high water mark in terms of raw numbers. This 
membership has to be seen in context: wartime domestic production had massively 
increased the agricultural workforce, which peaked at 748,000 full-time equivalent 
workers in 1949, the highest level since the 1920s.13 From this moment, the drift from 
the land, briefly delayed by food production on the Home Front, accelerated 
massively. This can be attributed to the ever-increasing mechanisation and 
chemicalisation of agriculture that occurred from this point onwards.14 Resultantly, 
from the 1950s to the early 1970s the Union experienced close to 10% annual losses 
in its membership15: so, not only has the Farmworkers’ Union long operated in an 
environment reminiscent of the New Economy, it too experienced a precipitous drop-
off in membership numbers, a microcosmic replication of the decimation of British 
industry’s Big Battalions, only back shifted in time by several decades. 
 Even disregarding this precipitous drop-off rate: when compared to the wider 
economy agriculture resisted union penetration throughout the entirety of the 
Twentieth Century. G.D.H Cole’s survey of Britain’s industrial economy, conducted 
in 1939, found that agricultural workers were one of five key categories of workers as 
yet predominantly unorganised.16 Fast-forward to the 1980s, and we find that the 
Labour Party believed the Movement “was neglecting the rural worker”.17 Supporting 
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the notion that small-sized firms and personalised employment relations prove 
inconducive to the penetrative unionism typical of large-sized firms in the immediate 
Post-War Era, union density rates for the industry never exceeded 40% of the total 
agricultural workforce,18 and remained closer to 30% for most of the Union’s pre-
1970s existence19: clearly then, the mid Twentieth Century agricultural landscape, in 
terms of its conductivity to union organisation, was far closer to our contemporary 
New Economy, than its contemporary urban counterparts. 
 This is not to say that the state of agricultural unionism was homogenous 
throughout the country. The same Labour Party report as described above noted “the 
exception of certain areas, such as the South-West and East of Anglia” where the now 
renamed “National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers (was) well organised”20: 
this line comments on the fact that, in the 1970s, 40% of the Union’s membership was 
concentrated in the cereal producing counties of Lincolnshire, Norfolk and 
Yorkshire.21 To a large degree this weighting represented the geographic variations of 
Britain’s heterogeneous agricultural sector, with different farm types being highly 
varied in terms of their land and labour requirements22: in the early 1980s 20% of all 
of Britain’s agricultural workers were concentrated in the arable Midlands, South and 
South East of England, while only 4% worked in the mostly sheep-farming far 
North.23  
 
 The Union’s members have “always been in the front line in the battle against 
oppression, not in great numbers on the picket line in a wave of publicity, or on the 
factory floor with hundreds or thousands of other workers, but often in ones or twos, 
demanding decent wages and working conditions from the bosses who own the very 
houses they live in. Farmworkers have had to campaign in the Tory heartlands for 
social justice and seek to maintain and extend union influence in hostile territory”24: 
because of this hostile environment, the Movement’s agricultural arm has appeared 
relatively quiet – no large-scale, multi-firm strikes or overt acts of industrial action 
have occurred since the 1920s.25   
 Perhaps though, the Union has been active in other ways. By seeking to 
identify which types of orientations and strategies have been employed by the Union, 
                                                                                                                                      
food processors in the Union’s ranks. In 1970, 35% of the Union’s membership was employed in the 
Allied Industries. Cf. The Landworker, Febuary 1972. 
18 Cf. Danziger, Political Powerlessness; Grant, Skilled at all Trades; Groves, Sharpen the Sickle. 
19 Peter Self and Herbert Storing, The State and the Farmer, London: Allen and Unwin, 1962, pg. 160; 
Newby, The Deferential Worker, pg. 254. 
20 Labour Party National Executive Committee, Rural Areas Working Group, pg. 34, emphasis added: 
The Allies were added to the Union’s name in 1966 to acknowledge the growing number of secondary 
food processors in the Union’s ranks. In 1970, 35% of the Union’s membership was employed in the 
Allied Industries. Cf. The Landworker, Febuary 1972. 
21 Newby, The Deferential Worker, pg. 254. 
22 Hatchett et al., The Implications for the National Minimum Wage of the Abolition of the Agricultural 
Wages Board in England and Wales, pg. 2; Britain Information Services, Agriculture in Britain 1970, 
London: BIS, 1970. 
23 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Regional Trends, London: HMSO, 1984. 
24 The Union’s then leader, Barry Leathwood, quoted in Wynn, Skilled at all Trade, 1993, pg. xvi. 
25 Though of course it should be pointed out that collective action is not the only form of protest. 
Labour historians will attest that numerous discrete forms of protest: thefts, wreckages, the maiming of 
animals and trees, poaching and protest by riot have been endemic in British agriculture for centuries. 
Cf. Carl Griffin, “Protest Practice and (Tree) Cultures of Conflict: Understanding the Spaces of 'Tree 
Maiming' in Eighteenth- and Early Nineteenth Century England”. In: Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers, 2008, 40(1), pp. 91-108; Eric Hobsbawm and George Rude, Captain Swing, 
London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1969. 
 84 
this thesis seeks to ascertain whether its longer heritage of working in inhospitable 
environments has led the Farmworkers’ Union to bear the hallmarks of rejuvenation 
at an earlier date, or in a more decisive and structured manner, in the interests of the 
industry’s precarity-prone workers. Agriculture never had a comfortable Golden Age: 
it took governmental attacks to fully break the efficacy of Post-War forms of 
organisation in urban environments; in agricultural areas, this efficacy rarely existed 
in the first place; the Union may therefore have been unburdened and allowed to act 
in decisive, innovative and perhaps risky manners. 
 
 At the onset of our periodisation, and up until the 1980s, the Union was 
organised thusly: at the bottom were the Local Branches, each with their own 
voluntary officials and committees. Moving upwards, neighbouring branches were 
grouped to form District Committees, where local issues were discussed, with each 
Branch having a selected delegate in attendance. Next came the County Committers, 
which the Districts sent elected delegates to once a year to discuss regional issues. 
Above the County Committees were the National Biennials, the theoretical “supreme 
decision making body” of the Union, which District Delegates attended once every 
two years. A National Executive Committee (EC), elected by a series of national 
ballots, was tasked to implement Biennial motions, and in practice ran the Union’s 
Head Office – Headland House in London – to their own design in the intermediately 
years between Biennial. Members of the EC were effectively paid unionists, being 
“remunerated” for lost earnings during their normally prolonged tenures. Headland 
House also employed a varying number of additional full-time staff, both in London 
and the regions. Furthermore, the EC appointed a Secretary, who was joined by a 
President and a Vice-President, each elected through membership ballots, to function 
as the public faces of the Union.26 
 Outside of Scotland, this ‘Farmworkers’ Union’, through its various name 
changes, has been the only trade union to consistently represent agricultural workers 
in any substantial numbers throughout the Twentieth and Twenty-First centuries.27 In 
1983 the Union merged with the TGWU, for reasons discussed in chapter five of this 
thesis, initially forming the semi-independent Agricultural and Allied Workers 
National Trade Group, which was later renamed the Rural, Agricultural and Allied 
Worker Trade Group. After this merger, and the TGWU’s subsequent amalgamation 
to form Unite the Union, the Farmworkers’ Union’s internal organisational structures 
were augmented further to varying degrees. These augmentations are discussed in 
chapters five and seven of this thesis. From here on in, the term ‘the Farmworkers’ 
Union’, or else the capitalised ‘the Union’, should be taken as references to the 
evolving organisation as described above. 
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Chapter 3: The Farmworkers’ Union and Worker Remuneration. 
 
 As demonstrated in chapter two, Britain’s hegemonic Movement settled for a 
self-interested modus operandi based on the principle of voluntary collective 
bargaining in the immediate Post-War Era. While concerned with a whole manner of 
issues, the bulk of collective bargaining agreements traditionally focussed on 
remuneratory matters: worker take-home pay, the length of the working week, and so 
forth. This thesis does not expect the Farmworkers’ Union to have exclusively 
concerned itself with such themes: a key pillar of union rejuvenation theory is the 
notion that unions have expanded, or should expand, their spheres of operation; 
therefore, according to this thesis’ hypothesise, the Farmworkers’ Union should have 
been operating in this widened capacity for an extended period of time. However, in 
order to determine the Farmworkers’ degree of idiosyncrasy, it is necessary, in this 
chapter, to seek answers to research sub-questions (vi) through to (vii) with regards to 
the Farmworkers’ Union in the operational domain of worker remuneration.  
 Section one of this chapter introduces the history, remit and functions of what 
has been the Union’s chief arena of contention regarding worker remuneration: the 
tripartite Agricultural Wages Board (AWB). Section two partially addresses research 
sub-question (vi) and (vii), by analysing the enforced strategy that this Board 
embodies and dictates, and the reasons why the Union has rarely supplemented its 
actions on the AWB with complementary militant operations. Sections four, five, six 
and seven continue to address the same sub-questions, by analysing the changing 
orientations of both the AWB and the Union in relation to precarity-prone workers, 
and the causal mechanisms responsible for producing these said orientations. Section 
eight turns to address research sub-question (viii), and assesses the effectiveness of 
the Union’s strategies. 
 Having said this, between sections three and eight of this chapter I 
purposefully focus on a curtailed and discrete time-series: looking at Union actions 
from 1970 through to 1997. This is due to the fact that New Labour’s return to 
government in that latter year soon resulted in the creation of the NMW: the NMW 
had such a widespread effect on Britain’s low-waged industries, agriculture included, 
that I dedicate a separate section to analyse the Union’s actions regarding worker 
remuneration from 1997 onwards. Therefore, section nine addresses research sub-
questions (vi), (vii) and (viii) with respect to the period between 1997-2013. 
In the course of the above analysis, I identify a second stream of Union action 
that demands attention. In addition to acting on the AWB, the Union has had to resist, 
on several occasions since the 1980s, attempts at government led abolition of the 
AWB: section ten mostly addresses research sub-question (viii) with regard to these 
actions. Rounding off the chapter, section eleven summarises my findings regarding 
research sub-questions (vi), (vii) and (viii). 
 
1. Introducing the Agricultural Wages Board: The Farmworkers’ Union’s Chief 
Arena of Contention. 
 
 Looking at remuneratory issues, this chapter principally examines the 
orientations and strategies of the Farmworkers’ Union on and around the AWB: a 
tripartite negotiating body which sets a series of minimum wages, overtime rates, 
holiday entitlements, sick pay, payments-in-lieu and other ancillary provisions for 
English and Welsh Agricultural and Horticultural workers. This section briefly 
introduces the history, form and function of the AWB. 
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Statutory Agricultural Minimum Wage (AMW) machinery was, initially, 
bundled together and introduced to Britain with the Minimum Prices Legislation that 
was passed in 1917 to promote domestic wartime production of corn and oats. 
However, such legislation was quickly jettisoned by laissez faire governments 
following the Armistice: the resulting collapse in farmer profits caused a national and 
precipitous downward wage spiral. Only a desperate and resource draining 
agricultural strike “won the Wages Board back” for the industry.1 The resultant 1924 
Agricultural Wages (Regulation) Act caused a general statutory rise in wages 
throughout the nation, and secured noticeable improvements in hours and working 
conditions.2 However, due to the fact that the Act granted Regional Boards, which 
were often dominated by conservative landowning interests, powers over the National 
Board, gross regional differences in employment standards and precarity levels 
emerged. These variations closely matched the county-to-county strength of the 
Union.3 Nonetheless, the influence of the National AWB was eventually strengthened 
when the productive demands of WWII necessitated a new stabilisation of agricultural 
production: initially temporary measures, which accrued power to the National Board, 
were legislatively entrenched by the 1948 Agricultural Wages Act: from here on in, 
the national tripartite AWB was empowered to set a single AMW for all agricultural 
and horticultural workers in England and Wales.4 All of England and Wale’s field and 
greenhouse workers, and those workers employed in the on-site packaging of a farm’s 
own produce, are covered by the AWB’s Orders: 152,000 workers, and their 
employment relations, were within the scope of the AWB as of 2012.5 
 
Concerning the AWB’s operations: each year eight Worker Representatives 
from the unions,6 and eight Employer Representatives from the NFU, meet five 
‘Independent Members’, including the AWB’s Chairman, who are appointed by the 
government’s Minister for Agriculture.7 The sole remit of the AWB is for it to “secure 
for able-bodied (workers) such wages as are adequate to promote efficiency and to 
enable a (worker) in an ordinary case to maintain (themselves and their) family in 
accordance with such a standard of comfort as may be reasonable”.8  
                                                
1 As detailed in section two of this chapter. Cf. Groves, Sharpen the Sickle, pg. 205.  
2 Ibid., 208-9. 
3 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Report on Wages in Agriculture (RoWiA), London: 
HMSO, 1930. 
4 In addition to ‘the AWB’, which regulates English and Welsh agricultural employment relations, 
additional Scottish and Northern Irish AWBs regulate labour relations in those nations in differentiated 
manners: these Boards remain outside the scope of this thesis, 
5 Ian Waddell of Unite, Agricultural Wages Board – Detailed Arguments, London: Unite, Undated 
(early 2010s). 
6 Until 1983, the Workers’ delegation was composed of 5 members of the National Union of 
Agricultural and Allied Workers (‘the Farmworkers’ Union’ for the purpose of this thesis), and 3 
representatives of the TGWU: this was a long source of contention for the Farmworkers’ Union, as the 
TGWU had only a very small land worker section, the majority of which was based in Scotland. 
However in practice, the TGWU delegation largely followed the dictates of the more specialised 
NUAAW delegates, and served to better enhance, rather than augment, the negotiators’ chosen courses 
of action, which were theoretically determined by the Farmworkers’ Union’s Biennials. Since the 
merger of the two unions in 1983, all eight worker representatives have come from the variably named, 
semi-independent agricultural trade group of the TGWU, later Unite. 
7 Though formally defined as Independent Members, there are very good reasons to question the 
supposed impartiality of these Members of the AWB, as discussed at length later in this chapter. 
Therefore the more neutral term Appointed Member is utilised throughout this chapter. 
8 Acts of Parliament, Agricultural Wages (Regulation) Act, London: HMSO, 1924, emphasis added. 
N.B this was the remit accorded to the prototypical 1924 Agricultural Wages Board. The 1948 
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The normal operating procedure of the AWB, between 1970 to the present, 
has involved the Workers’ Side submitting an annual claim, in writing, regarding their 
demands for minimum worker remuneration levels. These claims are traditionally 
determined at the Farmworkers’ Union’s national conferences. Subsequently, initial 
discussions occur between the three parties’ delegations: the vast majority of 
negotiations occur via strict mediation from the Appointed Members, with the Worker 
and Employer Sides spending an extremely limited amount of time in each other’s 
company.9 At a following meeting the Employers’ Side submits a written 
counterclaim, and during a third meeting, which often runs for multiple days, the 
Appointed Members attempt to conciliate between the two Sides in a series of 
negotiating rounds. If, as has been the norm, the two interested Sides fail to reach a 
unanimous agreement regarding all terms under discussion, the Appointed Members 
will exercise their vote to impose a wage settlement. After these meetings the AWB 
issues a notice of intent, and a period is allowed for legal and public consultations, 
before a final Order is sent to the relevant government minister for approval. The 
AWB exercises its power by the way of such annual AWB Orders: farmers whose 
wages levels breach the minimums prescribed face the prospects of fines, the enforced 
payment of arrears, and potential custodial sentences.10  
 
2. The Enforced Strategy of the Farmworkers’ Union. 
 
 This section analyses the strategy that participation on the AWB represents for 
the Union. Like other sectors of the British economy where minimum wage 
mechanisms were constructed in the early Twentieth Century, the relative lack of 
union organisation and the resultant poverty wages in agriculture were significant 
factors that prompted governments, when eager to secure the stability of domestic 
food production, to impose, strengthen and then retain a system of legally enforced 
trilateral negotiations: tripartism was legally imposed to create collective bargaining 
when and where hostile economic circumstances would otherwise have destroyed it.11  
 Indeed such statutory provisions have historically been considered as 
particularly essential for the agricultural industry: the 1965 Royal Commission on 
Trade Unions and Employer Associations12 argued that, due to agricultural 
                                                                                                                                      
Agricultural Wages Act dropped these guidelines from the statute book and did not in fact introduce 
new ones: formally therefore, the AWB has no explicit remit to speak of. However, in practice the 
members of the AWB, particularly the Appointed Members, have remained deferent to the loosely 
defined remit as described above. Cf. Brown and Winyard, Low-Pay on the Farm, pg. 1. 
9 Barry Leathwood – the senior workers’ representative for much of the 1990s – points out that on the 
AWB “each side of industry has to get the support of the majority of the Independent Members in order 
to get their views across. So what happens effectively is we don’t negotiate with the NFU, we negotiate 
with the Independent Members”. Quoted in Mason O’Connor, Joan Maynard, pg. 122. 
10 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Agricultural Wages in England and Wales: A 
Guide for Workers and Employers, London: DEFRA, 2011. Minuting these discussions, the Civil 
Service produces an annual Report on Wages in Agriculture (RoWiA): these have formed the principle 
historical source for this chapter. However the Civil Service only compiles summery, not verbatim, 
reports of negotiations, and so additional sources, and indeed a degree of informed conjecture, have 
been utilised to reconstruct these annual procedures. 
11 Frederic Bayliss, British Wages Councils, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962, pg. 56. It must be noted 
that the AWB, though relatively similar in form and remit, is considered legally distinct from the 
Wages Councils that were set up under the 1908 Trades Board Act. Cf. Simon Deakin and Francis 
Green, “Introduction”. In: British Journal of Industrial Relations, 2009, 47(2), for a history of the 
Wages Councils and other British minimum wage mechanisms. 
12 Which produced the infamous Donovan Report, which detailed the “British disease” of industrial 
strike action, as detailed in chapter two of this thesis.  
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employment relationships being scattered over a large number of small firms, the 
continuation of the AWB was needed to secure the material interests of the industry’s 
most precarity-prone workers; this was in opposition to the Report’s findings 
regarding those other low-waged industries of Britain that were then legally regulated 
by the tripartite Wages Councils; for those sectors the Report found that, if their 
relevant unions permitted, the Councils should be allowed to be abolished and 
replaced with bipartite bodies13; clearly, this report recognised that the exceptionally 
overbearing inconducivity of Britain’s agriculture environment to Post-War forms of 
union organisation demanded an exceptional wage mechanism. 
 Ultimately then, the Farmworkers’ Union has utilised, albeit in a compelled 
manner, a strategy much differentiated from the hegemonic tradition of voluntarism 
throughout the Twentieth Century: codified and imposed by the state, the AWB can 
be seen as a kind of enforced legal approach to wage negotiations, as according to 
Hyman’s model.14   
 Allow me to further unpack this imposed strategy: despite the fact that in the 
pre-history of the Farmworkers’ Union there was a strong tradition of grass-roots 
organising approaches to agricultural unionism, this wage negotiating system, that 
allows twenty-one Board members to set the ground floor wage rates of two nations,15 
is a system representative of a servicing approach to union activity, requiring little 
input from lay-members of the Union. Readers of this thesis used to the Dutch Polder 
Model may well presume that the existence of this national service-centred tripartite 
arena would promote partnership approaches to union activity, with pacified 
employees and employers working in close collaboration: however, with labour 
traditionally being amongst the most significant input costs for British agriculture,16 
the material interests of employers and workers have oft clashed on the AWB and, at 
least from the 1970s onwards, little attempts have been made at disguising the 
ingrained conflict between the demands for higher wages and increased profits.17  
  
 With acrimonies running so high, a conundrum remains. In the Post-War Era 
Britain’s Movement’s preferred strategic action was the participation in collective 
action backed by the use of strike action. Yet, despite the tripartite AWB offering a 
facsimile approximation of voluntarism, the Farmworkers’ Union has mostly 
refrained from making use of this latter caveat, both in the immediate Post-War Era 
and after 1970. With the Union participating in an artificially maintained system of 
collective bargaining, why did it not display a more militant personality in the 
framing environment of the AWB? Over the following pages I analyse the reasons 
for, and exceptions to, this tendency. In doing so I explore the Union’s enduring 
internal organising principles, created in part by its own earlier strategic actions.  
 In the 1970s and 1980s, the left wing of the Farmworkers’ Union did infact 
argue that a demonstration of the Union’s ability to engage in direct industrial action 
would bring immediate benefits to the workforce’s wage rate, and strengthen the 
Union’s claims on the AWB.18 This argument was not without merit: while I have 
                                                
13 Donovan, Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations. 
14 Whether the Union has supported the imposition of the AWB is another matter, to be addressed later 
in this chapter. 
15 That is, England and Wales. 
16 Britain Information Services, Agriculture in Britain 1970, pg. 31. 
17 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food/Department of the Environment, Farming and Rural 
Affairs, RoWiA, London: HMSO, 1970-2012.  
18 Mason O’Connor, Joan Maynard, pg. 105. 
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stated that the dispersed and personal nature of employment relations in agriculture is 
inconducive to traditional forms of union action, Britain’s rural workforce had been 
known to actualise direct actions in its earlier history, winning direct benefits as a 
result. This should not be a major surprise: as opposed to most industries, agricultural 
deals in animate produce; livestock and crops require, at times, round the clock levels 
of attention;19 the actualisation or even threat of a work stoppage should then, under 
favourable circumstances, embody the potential of great devastation for employers, 
thereby increasing the workers’ perceived power resources. 
 Indeed, the re-founding of an agricultural wage mechanism in 1924 was 
predominantly secured through strike action. After the government abolished its 
embryonic agricultural price and wage control structures in 1921, employers pushed 
down average wages in agriculture, from 46 shillings a week in 1921 to 25s for a 50+ 
hour week in 1923: one had to look to the mid-Nineteenth Century to find a 
comparable real agricultural wage.20 In reaction the Union’s EC consulted its apparent 
allies in the Labour Party, then forming a minority government, only to be told that 
the Party “could not be of any help” regarding the collapse in wages21: the Union 
found its preferred approach – that of lobbying government and working with the 
mechanism of the state – blocked. Desperate to halt the decline in living standards, 
local branches of the Union in Norfolk, the area of the country where the Union had 
traditionally enjoyed its greatest membership density and organisation strength, 
organised to come out on strike: the Great Norfolk Strike of March and April 1923 
began. 
Despite what the name suggests, only the North and West of Norfolk came out 
in large numbers: farmers and farmworkers in the East and South, generally 
operations with lower labour costs, largely remained detached from the fray, though 
they watched the unfolding events with grim intensity, as did the rest of Britain. 
Initially the Union issued instructions for a general strike. However, recognising the 
drain on the Union’s resources that this entailed – in addition to paying strike funds to 
its pre-existent members, the Union paid a 50% strike fund to workers who joined the 
Union once the campaign was initiated – it was soon decided that no worker working 
for less than 30s for a 50 hour week should report to duty. In total, at any one time 
never less than 6,000 workers participated in the strike, and at some points over 
10,000 downed tools.22 Despite these impressive numbers, one should not think of the 
1923 strike as a standard operation of Post-Waresque union militancy, used to back 
up voluntarism: it must be viewed as a desperate attempt at avoiding the worst pitfalls 
of the voluntary approach; a discursive appeal for the government to allow a 
resumption of a proto-rejuvenatory legal approach to Union action. 
 A superficial glance at the results of the Great Norfolk Strike gives the 
impression that the resumption of militant actions by the Union could be an advisable 
supplement to its contemporary negotiations on the AWB: wage declines were halted, 
not just in Norfolk but nationally; the Union shocked organised capital with its 
strength and resolve displayed in the course of events, and discouraged the further 
erosion of wages, even in those areas with less organisational capabilities. The 
county-wide agreement that ended the strike, brokered by the Labour Government 
with the cooperation of the NFU – under pressure from its own members’ anxiety to 
resume fieldwork as harvest time came ever closer –  settled workers’ wages at 25s 
                                                
19 Danziger, Political Powerlessness, pg. 7. 
20 Groves, Sharpen the Sickle, pg. 176. 
21 Ibid., pg. 178. 
22 Ibid., pg. 184.  
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for a 50 hour basic week, as opposed to the 23s for a 54 hour week that local farmers 
had been offering at the outset.23 Likewise, with a nod and a wink Labour promised 
both sides the recreation of a statutory, stabilising, wage mechanism.  
 However, wages were only frozen, not increased, and the Union had expended 
a vast sum of its resources in securing its ends: despite large donations from the 
national Movement and sympathetic third parties, the Union suffered a grave 
depletion of its funds.24 Perhaps more seriously, at the end of the strike over a 
thousand once-striking farmworkers found that their employers, well behind on their 
yearly work, were apparently unable to find them employment, despite the fact that 
the conciliation agreement specifically stipulated that no victimisation of strikers 
should occur: most damagingly, the Labour Government sided with the employers’ 
interpretation of the conciliation agreement, and pre-emptively denounced the last 
tactic available to the Union, a resumption of strike action on the proviso of all-in or 
all-out, as illegitimate.25  
 Seeing employers act with impunity in the rural environment, victimising the 
most active participants of union activity, caused the Union to experience a crisis in 
confidence regarding the potential of militancy, much like that which occurred in the 
mainstream Movement following the defeats of the auto-workers, steelworkers, 
miners and newspaper printers in the 1980s: however, due to the then-existent 
idiosyncrasies of the agricultural environment, this crisis was experienced at an earlier 
date, in 1924 rather than during the cascade of decline as it was for the mainstream 
Movement. While nominally successful, the strike instilled the notion, held by the 
general rank-and-file and leadership of the Union, that “the future of the Union lay in 
the establishment of a Wages Board and working within its statutory framework; 
except in the most exceptional circumstances strike action could lead only to 
demoralisation of the membership and the speedy self-destruction of the Union”.26 
This early miserable experience psychologically constrained the forms of contention 
available for use to the Union in the latter periods of the Twentieth Century: common 
sense stipulated that militant forms of union activity were simply ineffective and too 
risky in this then-idiosyncratic industry. This caused the hegemonically dominant 
wing of the Union, from this time onwards, to fully subscribe to a legal strategy, 
which entailed first the attainment of, and then partially cooperative engagement with 
employers on, legally bound wage-fixing machinery.  
 However, memories of crises and their path-dependencies fade over time: as 
mentioned, militant action re-emerged as a desired strategy for some in the Union 
during the earlier stages of our periodisation. This was not without reason: 
reminiscing on the declines in the real AMW27 that occurred between 1949 and 1955, 
an ex-AWB delegate from the employers’ NFU argued that the Farmworkers’ 
Union’s “leadership pursued the wrong strategy at this time”. 28 So, even according to 
the employers’ interpretation of events, the scars of the Norfolk Strike had led the 
Union to commit itself too much to a hybrid partnership/legal strategy in the 
immediate Post-War years, to the detriment of its members: this saw a number of calls 
                                                
23 According to the Norfolk agreement, the 50th to 54th hours of work per week were voluntary and to 
be worked on a pro rata hourly basis, after which a mildly incentivising overtime system kicked in. Cf. 
Ibid., pg. 198. 
24 Ibid., pg. 198. 
25 Ibid., pg. 204. 
26 Newby, The Deferential Worker, pg. 226. 
27 Real as in after compensating for inflation. 
28 Cited in Winyard, Cold Comfort Farm, pg. 22. 
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from the rank-and-file for firmer and more combative actions ignored by the Union’s 
EC.29. In reaction, militancy re-emerged at the fringes of the Union in the 1970s. 
 Resultantly, and concurrent to the hegemonic urban Movement’s last hurrah of 
voluntarism backed by the strategic use of strikes, the Union’s left wing conceived the 
notion that militant industrial action was the only way to win credibility, and therefore 
wage increases, from the AWB.30 The right wing, which in the early 1970s controlled 
the majority of the EC, disagreed: Union General Secretary Reg Bottini considered 
the notion of strike action as an impracticability and distraction for the Union.31 
Despite this lack of top-level support, delegates at the 1972 Biennial managed to 
instruct the EC to “formulate a plan by which workers could take positive action” if 
that year’s wage claim was not met.32  Such resolutions were periodically raised and 
passed, with little practical effect, throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.33  
 However, these pressures from certain branch delegates reached a crescendo at 
the 1984 Annual Conference of the AAWNTG, when a newly left-leaning EC 
oversaw the passing of a resolution which instructed each regional trade group to 
draw up plans of possible strike action in support of the annual AWB claim.34 Again 
the most coherent plan emerged from Norfolk. Here, while work remained highly 
dispersed, many of the large cereal producers of the region employed workers on a 
relatively sizeable scale, with workforces of between 10 to 20 being common if not 
the norm35: this implies that the perceived acceptability of direct militant industrial 
action is determined, to a large degree, by the apparent workplace power resources 
available to a union. Norfolk suggested that over the upcoming August Bank Holiday, 
which fell in the middle of the annual cereal harvest “all workers who would, because 
of work pressure, be working… should take the day off as they are entitled to. In 
addition, in the remainder of the week they should work their normal eight hour work 
and then cease”.36 
 Even those pressing for militant industrial action recognised the then-
idiosyncratic weaknesses of the agricultural labour market: it was no coincidence that 
the 1984 resolution, the strongest call for strike action from the Union in 60 years, 
came after the Union merged with the far larger TGWU37; it was hoped that lorry 
drivers and milk tankerers, whose deliveries and collections are vital for agricultural 
production, could have proved a decisive factor in securing the effective use of Post-
Waresque forms of industrial action.38 So, even for militants, it was seemingly an 
accepted fact that the Farmworkers could not strike alone. This was not without good 
reason: at the time, of the 116,000 holdings in England and Wales employing full-
time worker, over 90% employed less than five workers at any one time39; such 
isolation would have severely challenged the effectiveness and reach of any strike 
                                                
29 Keith Cowling, David Metcalf and A.J. Rayner, The Resource Structure of Agriculture: an Economic 
Analysis, London: Pergamon, 1970, pg. 650; Wynn, Skilled at all Trade, 1993, pg. 211, 219; Winyard, 
Cold Comfort Farm, pg. 21. 
30 Mason O’Connor, Joan Maynard, pg. 126. 
31 The Farmers Weekly, cited in Ibid., pg. 126. 
32 National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, Annual Report 1972, London, NUAAW, 1972. 
33 The Landworker, July 1970; July 1974; 1977, pg. 244; June 1983; April 1988. 
34 The shifting ideological composition of the EC is discussed at greater length in chapter five of this 
thesis. 
35 Danziger, Political Powerlessness, pg. 85. 
36 Jack Bobby, Letter to All Branch Secretaries, R.E. Proposed Overtime Ban, London: 
TGWU/AAWNTG, 15th June 1984.   
37 As discussed in chapter five of this thesis.  
38 Mason O’Connor, Joan Maynard. 
39 Mason O’Connor, Joan Maynard, pg. 126. 
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action. Recognising then the dangers of a resource-intensive full-scale strike, this 
overtime ban, the most radical plan for industrial action proposed by the Regions, was 
presented as a “token protest” by the Union: with which it merely hoped to “make a 
serious point to the employer about… the poverty wages” of the industry.40 However, 
even this modest attempt by the Union at appropriating the pre-rejuvenatory modus 
operandi of the hegemonic Movement was met with broad failure. The farmers 
exercised their power resources effectively: pre-emptive NFU circulars, sent to its 
members but well-viewed by farmers and farmworkers alike, discussed the legality of 
terminating strikers’ contracts, and many farmers threatened to deny participating 
farmworkers overtime work permanently, turning to the use of casual labour instead.41 
These actions bred fears of reprisals, which were amplified in the personalised 
operating environment of agriculture. This fear, coupled with a contingently early 
harvest brought about by favourable weather conditions,42 meant that the greatest 
campaign for industrial action that the Union had embarked on for sixty years 
amounted to virtually nothing: employer superiority was discursively reinforced, 
rather than undermined as a result.  
 Common sense once again solidified against the use of industrial action: in 
1985 the Northern Regional Trade Group of the Union, representing a more dispersed 
workforce than the Union’s Eastern strongholds, asked its members whether various 
forms of direct action should be utilised in support of that, and subsequent, year’s 
AWB claim; of the respondents, only 8% thought a one day work stoppage would be 
desirable, with the same number supporting an overtime ban. Even when considering 
more sedate strategies, such as a work-to-rule policy, only 20% offered definitive 
support.43 One can say therefore that psychological path dependencies, radiating out 
through time from the Union’s actions during the Great Norfolk Strike and 1984 
Overtime Ban, have taught the Union that a turn towards militant action is neither an 
alternative, nor a supplement, to the legal approach that the Union has engaged in 
since the formation of the AWB.  
  
 The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that the Union has, 
throughout our periodisation, participated in a legal approximation of collective 
bargaining on the AWB, as various governments have prescribed this stabilising 
course of action as a salve for the weak union presence in the industry seen 
throughout the Twentieth Century. Yet the Union was not a passive observer of this 
imposition: it had to strike in order to secure the attentions of governmental 
regulators. However, the Union’s inhospitable proximate environment of the 1920s 
rendered the use of this strike action costly, and institutional memories of these costs 
produced path dependencies against repeated supplementary strategic usages of such 
actions, which have radiated down through the decades. Resultantly, neither 
voluntarism nor strike action have typified the Union’s strategic actions during our 
periodisation. 
 
                                                
40 The Farmworkers’ Union were aware of the negative repercussions such actions could bring, and 
sought to control the public discourse surrounding the event, by ensuring that workers with 
responsibility to livestock should voice their discontentment in a different form, in order to ensure the 
press and public remained “sympathetic to the aspirations of the low-paid” rather than hypothetically 
neglected animals. Cf. Bobby, Letter to All Branch Secretaries, R.E. Proposed Overtime Ban. 
41 Danziger, Political Powerlessness, pg. 141. 
42 Wynn, Skilled at all Trades, pg. 247. 
43 Cited in Danziger, Political Powerlessness, pg. 136. 
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3. The Superficial Orientation of the Union, and the Apparent Ineffectiveness of the 
Enforced Legal Strategy, 1970-1997. 
 
 As shown in sections one and two of this chapter, the legally bound confines 
of the AWB has been the Union’s primary arena of contention regarding worker 
remuneration since before the 1970s. I now outline the Union’s behaviour within this 
arena between 1970 and 1997.  
 In its negotiations in the AWB, the Union has explicitly sought to reduce the 
precarity of agricultural and horticultural work, manifested in the forms of low-pay 
and over-employment. A long-term goal of the Union has been to reduce the 
“industrial gap”: the difference between the average wage in agriculture and the 
national industrial average44; the closure of this “particular cancer” was the Union’s 
self-declared “main objective” in 1976, and attempting to raise ground floor AMW on 
the AWB was the “principle strategy” with which the Union attempted to do this.45  
 In terms of this objective, the Union’s performance on the AWB in the 
decades preceding 1970 had been mediocre at best. Between 1949 and 1972 the 
average all-industry weekly wage increased by 376%, while the agricultural weekly 
wage increased by only 291%.46 Indeed, in the first six years following the passing of 
the Agricultural Wages Act, the Farmworkers’ delegation managed to ‘secure’ real 
AMW decreases at the annual negotiations,47 despite the facts that agricultural 
production was experiencing an unprecedented era of growth as a result of 
mechanisation, and government subsidies to the industry virtually equalled the 
industry’s total wage bill.48 
Continuing this trend, Union negotiators in the 1970s and early 1980s were 
unsuccessful at closing the gap between farmworkers’ pay and that of other workers.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, percentile annual increases in the wages of the average 
agriculturalist closely matched the percentile annual increases in the wages of the all-
economy average worker: legal tripartism seems to have been no more effective than 
voluntarism in raising average wages. Graph One shows how this close mirroring of 
annual percentile increases resulted to a significant widening of the all-economy gap 
between 1972 and 1985.49 
 
                                                
44 National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, Outlook for Agriculture; The Landworker, 
November 1980; December 1985. 
45 National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, Outlook for Agriculture, pg. 5.  
46 Wynn, Skilled at all Trade, 1993, pg. 105. 
47 Ibid., pg. 212. 
48 John Huges, cited in the Landworker, September 1955.  
49 The roller-coaster discrepancies of 1974 and 1975 can be explained with reference to the Social 
Contract, forged between the TUC and Labour Government at this time: keen to avoid industrial strife, 
the Labour Party pushed the TUC and Movement to limit wage demands in the early 1970s, in return 
for increased influence over the formation of Government policy. Agriculture, as a low-waged 
industry, was relatively exempt for the demands of this Contract: resultantly economic circumstance 
reduced the all-economy gap in 1974. The following year the Social Contract all but broke down, and 
the hegemonic Movement consciously sought to reassert its influence at negotiating tables, thereby 
reducing the gains made by the Farmworkers’ Union in the previous year. Cf. Minkin, The Contentious 
Alliance; Cliff, The Crisis. 
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 Note, Graph One compares mean average farmworker pay with the all-
economy average: manual and non-manual workers combined. Union rhetoric at the 
time paid closer attention to the ‘industrial gap’, and excluded non-manual work from 
its calculations. At first glance the Union appears to have performed better over this 
same period as judged by this criteria: the Union estimated that the average 
farmworker took home 76.5% of an industrial pay packet in 1975, 78.3% in 1980 and 
82% in 1982.50 However it should be noted that this decade represented the beginning 
of the Big Battalion’s cascade of decline, which produced downward pressures on 
Britain’s industrial wages: the trend towards industrial-wage harmonisation should be 
viewed with this in mind 
 A secondary focus of the Workers’ negotiators between 1970-1997 was the 
shortening of the agricultural working week: this again can be seen as an attempt to 
reduce precarity, in the form of over-employment. To this end the Union was 
somewhat successful: through AWB orders, the legal working week – the amount of 
hours a full-time employee has to work before overtime payments become applicable 
– was instrumentally reduced from 44 hours/week to 42 in 1970, to 40 in 1973 and to 
39 in 1991, where it has remained ever since51; this incrementally increased overtime 
payments for many in the industry. However, agricultural working hours – contractual 
and actual – remained abnormally long by economy-wide standards throughout our 
period of study. Concerning contractual hours: in 1983 the TUC victoriously declared 
that “with more than seven million manual workers covered by agreements giving a 
39 hour week or less, any employer still clinging to the 40 hour week is in a small and 
shrinking minority”52; agricultural workers had to wait 11 more years until their 
contractual working week was reduced to 39 hours. Of course it was possible and 
known for farmers to offer contracts with more generous arrangements than the 
                                                
50 The Landworker, November 1981; January 1992.  
51 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, RoWiA, 1970; 1972; 1973; 1991. Since the mid-1970’s 
Union negotiators, as instructed by the Union’s Biennials, have pushed for a 35-hour week on the farm. 
Cf. National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, Outlook for Agriculture, pg. 7. 
52 Cited in Agricultural and Allied Workers’ National Trade Group, Submission to the AWB, London: 
TGWU, 1983.  
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minimums prescribed by the AWB Orders: however this was an optional practice and 
tended not to affect the less marketable, most precarity-prone workers in the industry. 
Resultantly then, agricultural workers then worked longer contractual hours, longer 
overtime hours and still received significantly lower weekly take home pay than their 
industrial counterparts throughout our periodisation, rendering agricultural work, even 
when unstratified by occupational groupings, particularly precarious.  
 
From this evidence, it superficially appears that the Union’s enforced legal 
strategy simply failed to secure the Union’s goal of reducing agricultural precarity in 
the form of over-work and under-pay. However, this is not a simple story of the 
Union orientating itself in defence of precarity-prone workers and finding its 
strategies ineffective. Closer examination of AWB negotiations reveals the Union was 
able, and wont, to secure the material interests of relatively protected workers at the 
expense of the more precarity-prone in the market: pursuing a decidedly pre-
rejuvenatory, subordinatory orientation as according to my adaptation of Heery’s 
model; the following few sections develop this point further. 
 
4. The Agricultural Wages Board’s Stratification of the Agricultural Workforce, 
1970-1997. 
 
 This section describes the divisive nature of the AWB’s operations throughout 
our curtailed periodisation of 1970-1997: with the Union playing one of the tripartite 
leads in this body, this divisiveness provides circumstantial evidence regarding the 
Union’s orientation towards precarity-prone workers, to be further interrogated in the 
subsequent section. 
 In 1970 the Union succeeded in securing one of its long-term ambitions for 
the AWB: a grading scale so that rather than setting an all-agriculture minimum wage, 
discrete categories of workers were each afforded a differentiated minimum rate and 
array of additional entitlements. The Union, or at least its right wing EC, had hoped in 
the Post-War period that the introduction of a hierarchical wage structure would 
“markedly improve the career prospects of young workers” and thereby halt the 
endemic drift from the land.53 The measure was first mooted at conference in 1946,54 
and gained nominal approval from the NFU soon after. However, only after decades 
of contentious negotiations with employers regarding the plan’s fineries and nuances 
was the scale approved.  
Coming into effect in 1972, the AWB’s Orders were initially split 
accordingly: Ordinary Workers received the AMW, while Craftsmen were assured a 
10% statutory premium on top of this. Higher up the pay scale still, Appointment 
Grade II and I workers received 20% and 30% premiums respectively.55 Additionally 
to basic hourly wages, the AWB hence forth stipulated that many of the additional 
entitlements it regulated, such as overtime rates, holiday entitlement and sick pay, 
depended on a worker’s grade level.56  
While the Union publicly declared the AWB should have been used as a 
vehicle to close the industrial gap between agricultural workers and labour in the 
wider economy, it is clear that upon the initiation of this grading scale much of the 
                                                
53 National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, Outlook for Agriculture, pg. 6. 
54 Wynn, Skilled at all Trade, 1993. 
55 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Guide to the Agricultural Wages Structure in England 
and Wales, London: MAFF, 1971. 
56 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Agricultural Wages in England and Wales. 
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AWB’s operations revolved around the distribution, and redistribution, of wealth and 
risks amongst the agricultural workforce. 
In order to move up a grade, workers should theoretically have received 
declarations of competence from their employers, regarding their recognised skill and 
responsibility levels in a number of areas.57 However, the grading scale caused “no 
significant upward shift in farm workers earnings” once actualised, as the Union had 
rhetorically hoped for58; and, as Graph Two shows, no proportional increase in the 
number of premium-grade workers at the expense of Ordinary Workers occurred in 
the first decade of the structure’s operationalisation. What actually occurred with the 
construction of the wage structure was a legal underwriting of existing premiums on 
pay and conditions that the more marketable, less precarity-prone members of the 
workforce had enjoyed previously on a de facto basis, due to their niche labour 
market positions.  
 
 
 
 Farmers have always had to pay wages higher than the AMW in recognition of 
the market-clearing rates of relatively marketable workers. By 1976, 43% of full-time 
male agricultural workers were paid more than a £5/week premium on top of the 
minimum wage for their grade59; in 1984 this figure was 63%.60 Yet in both years, 
workers in the higher grades were more likely to receive these non-statutory 
premiums, paid on top of those pre-existent premiums that the AWB had statutorily 
underwritten in the form of a wage structure, but in reality were offered as the market 
clearing rate for certain types of worker. Clearly then, the precarity levels of the more 
                                                
57 Or in the case of dispute, workers and/or the Union took complaints to one of the AWB’s County 
Wages Committees for a highly bureaucratic form of adjudication. In practice this led to much 
industrial confusion, as many Ordinary Workers found themselves performing much the same tasks as 
Craftsmen, but for lower remuneration. Cf. National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, 
Outlook for Agriculture, pg. 32. 
58 Ibid., pg. 23.  
59 David Phillips and Allan Williams, Rural Britain, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982, pg. 68-9.  
60 Renée Danziger and Steve Winyard, Poor Farm-Workers, Rich Farms, London: Low-Pay Unit, 
1984, pg. 4. 
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privileged members of the agricultural workforce were reduced by the construction of 
this wage structure, as previously fluid contractual relations came to be partially 
solidified. However, such solidifications were not enjoyed by the lower-paid workers 
in the market, the most precarity-prone of whom were paid the basic minimum rate 
for the Ordinary Grade, or less.  
 After the construction of the wage structure, a worker’s entitlement to formal 
and informal premiums appeared to be impartially determined by one’s recognised 
skill and responsibility level. However, it is clear that wider that socio-economic 
inequalities led to an unequal demographic distribution of these recognised skills and 
responsibilities: for instance, female workers have been disproportionately 
concentrated in the lower grades of the AWB Orders throughout our periodisation.61 
Accordingly, it appears that the interests of female workers were not pursued by the 
AWB when it secured wage solidifications for more marketable, normally male, 
workers. The wage structure allowed for the camouflaging of this discrimination 
beneath market-based logics. 
 Certain developments that occurred after 1970 exacerbated the AWB’s 
discrimination of precarity-prone labourers in agriculture. In addition to the creation 
of positive differentials, which segregated the minimum wage of Ordinary Grade 
workers from those with more marketable skills, the AWB has, over the years, created 
numerous exceptional categories of workers, which farmers have been allowed to pay 
under the Ordinary Rate.  
 The first exceptional category, the Female Grade, existed before the 1972 
imposition of the pay structure. Here the AWB set an annual percentile of the Male 
rate at which farmers were allowed to pay the significant numbers of females 
employed in the industry. The Union long disapproved of this measure, and made the 
harmonisation of this differential a key demand on the annual negotiations of the early 
1970s.62 However, it was only with the passing of the Equal Pay Act, which came into 
effect with the 1976 AWB Order, that this differential was deleted. Yet that very same 
year the employers’ delegation pushed for the creation of two new bands of 
exceptional differentials: for part-time workers working more, and less, than 30 hours 
per week respectively63; previously, all part-time workers had been paid a pro rata 
hourly rate of their full-time equivalents. At this time, the majority of female workers 
in the industry worked on a part-time basis,64 and a slight majority of all agricultural 
part-time workers were female: therefore the construction of these Part-Time Grades 
should be thought of as the continuation of gender discrimination in agricultural wage 
machinery, albeit one which allowed for the further stratification of workers 
according to (non-standard) contract type. 
 Workers in the lower of these two bands, the -30 Hour Differential, were 
initially allowed to be paid 87.5% of the Ordinary Grade hourly rate. This gap 
expanded and decreased with the annual rounds of negotiations until in 1983, after a 
campaign by the NFU, a further exceptional Seasonal Rate was allowed to be 
separated from the -30 Hour Part-Time Rate: the Seasonal Rate initially allowed for 
                                                
61 Richard Dickens, Stephen Machin, Alan Manning, David Metcalf, Jonathan Wadsworth and Stephen 
Woodland, “The Effect of Minimum Wages on UK Agriculture”. In: Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 1995, 46(1), pp. 1-19. 
62 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, RoWiA, 1970-1975. 
63 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, RoWiA, 1976.  
64 In 1975 66% of the female agricultural workforce worked, by choice or necessity, on a part-time 
basis. Cf. Brown and Winyard, Low-Pay on the Farm, pg.  37. 
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the payment of hourly wages at 84% of the Ordinary Grade.65 Over the years the 
definition of what constituted a Seasonal Worker changed. Typically, workers paid on 
this level did not work around the year for a single employer. However, seasonal 
contracts have not been limited to the traditional British harvest season: for much of 
the 1980s and 1990s one could be employed for 30 weeks a year on a 40 hour week 
and still be legally considered to be in the Seasonal, or later, ‘Causal Grade’.66  
 Graph Three demonstrates that, while the basic minimum wages of Ordinary 
Grade workers climbed steadily throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the basic 
minimum wage rate of Casual Workers rose at a slower rate and, for several years in 
the early 1990s, froze altogether. 
 
 
 
 To unpack these statistics further: real percentile annual increases in the 
minimum wage rates of exceptionally graded workers mostly mirrored percentile 
increases in the Ordinary Grade for much of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. However, 
on several occasions, particularly during the 1990s, the Causal Rate proportionally 
increased to a significantly lesser extent when compared to Ordinary Grade 
settlements, as Graph Four demonstrates. Again then, at times throughout the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s the trilateral AWB clearly made Orders that benefited the interests 
of relatively niche agricultural workers, but failed to secure comparable benefits for 
the less marketable workers in the industry. 
 
                                                
65 The Landworker, May 1984. N.B European Union laws only legislated against the pecuniary 
discrimination of part-time work from 1995 onwards. Therefore, between 1984 and 1995 Part-Time 
AWB Rates existed between the Ordinary and Seasonal Rates. For the sake of brevity, the analysis of 
this chapter focuses principally on the lowest adult rate offered by the AWB at any one time. 
66 In 1988 the Seasonal Worker Category of the AWB Order was replaced by the Casual Worker 
category: there was little qualitative difference between the two. From here on it, for the sake of 
brevity, the term ‘Casual Grade’ will be utilised throughout analysis when referring to the lowest 
negative differential offered by the AWB at any one time. Cf. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food, RoWiA, 1988. 
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 Of note is the fact that the Farmworkers’ Union’s membership has traditional 
come from workers in the Ordinary Grade and above67: apparently due to difficulties 
in reaching and organising these exceptional categories of workers, a 
disproportionately small number of these negative differential receiving workers have 
ever been members of the Union. It seems then that the steady rises in basic wages 
enjoyed by Union members in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s were offset by wage 
freezes for precarity-prone workers outside of the Union but within the remit of the 
AWB’s tripartite discussions: in other words, the AWB increased, rather than 
decreased, differentials between standard and non-standard form of work, in a pattern 
that directly benefited the Union’s traditional constituents. If the Workers’ negotiators 
can be shown to have acted instrumentally and with duplicity in creating and 
maintaining these differentials in practice, one could certainly describe the orientation 
of the Union as pre-rejuvenatory and subordinatory, as according to Heery’s model.  
  
5. The Subordinatory Orientation of the Farmworkers’ Union: Complicity in the 
Stratification of the Agricultural Workforce, 1970-1997. 
 
 In this section I ascertain the degree of complicity the Union had in 
propagating the subordinatory orientation of the AWB as described above. I find that 
strong evidence can be found to the effect that the Union acted purposefully to help 
produce this patterned subordination.  
 For a start, while the Union consistently resisted the widening of the 
exceptional differentials, in certain years it sought, and won, a widening of the 
differentials between the Ordinary and Higher Grades.68 The maintenance and 
widening of such differentiated wages demanded trade-offs from the Union: while 
such a widening would have been of the benefit to the more marketable agricultural 
workforce, further legislatively solidifying their mostly pre-existent wage premiums, 
opportunity costs entailed stallings and freezings in the Ordinary Grade minimum; 
                                                
67 Chris Kaufman, In Conversation with Robin Hinks, London, 2013. 
68 Cf. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, RoWiA, 1985, for example. 
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this suggests Union complicity in actions which saw the interests of relatively 
precarity-prone workers in the industry sacrificed for the interests of the relatively 
less precarity-prone.  
Further evidence of Union complicity can be found with regards to an 
emblemic issue of the New Economy: that of flexibilisation. In 1986 the Landworker 
warned its members “flexible-working can damage your rights”.69 Such warnings 
were thoroughly vindicated at the time: in addition to seeking low-wage rates for 
exceptional groups of workers,70 the Employers’ Side of that year’s AWB 
negotiations sought to increase the “flexibility” of Ordinary Grade workers, in the 
form of seasonal variations in the working week that would have had negative 
repercussions on overtime payments for full-time workers.71 The precarity-prone 
groups of workers that employers were allowed to pay with negative differentials 
were seen by the Union at the time as the hammer with which the employers were 
trying to force through these “unreasonable conditions”.72  
Perhaps surprising, the Union’s tough stance it adopted against flexibility 
during the 1980s and early 1990s proved to be highly successful, with narrow regards 
to the preservation of regular full-time workers’ contractual conditions: 1986’s 
proposals were seen off, and when the AWB again confronted the issue of flexibility 
in 1992, the Workers’s delegation won considerably favourable terms, considering the 
wider economic circumstances. In the same period that the Wages Councils were 
being abolished wholesale, the Workers’ Side of the AWB managed to ensure that 
any alternations to a full-time worker’s working week would be voluntary,73 and in 
lieu of overtime payments a voluntarily flexible full-time workers’ basic hourly rate 
would be in excess of the basic minimum wage of said workers’ particular grade.74  
However, such a success, which secured the material interests of full-time 
workers and warded off precarity for these already relatively privileged grades of 
workers, came at the expense of others: that same year the Casual Rate was frozen for 
the second year in a row, representing a significant real wage cut for those particularly 
precarity-prone workers paid on this level.75 In the Union’s practices a subordinatory 
orientation was observable: protections for an increasingly diminishing group of 
workers were won and maintained only at the expense of a degradation of the 
material interests of the most precarity-prone in the market.  
This subordinatory orientation can be identified repeatedly when observing the 
Union’s negotiators on the AWB. The Union never formally dropped its pursuit of 
exceptional differential harmonisation, but in practice it consistently prioritised the 
short-term interests of the agricultural full-time workforce in its negotiations. A long 
list of evidence can be pointed to support this statement: the Union never won the 
                                                
69 The Landworker, December 1986. 
70 In addition to Causal and Seasonal Rates, the AWB has made negative differential provisions for 
industry interns, young workers, physically impaired workers and certain groups of foreign workers. 
Cf. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food/Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
RoWiA, 1976-2011. 
71 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, RoWiA, 1986-1987. 
72 The Landworker, December 1986. 
73 The Landworker, May 1993; Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Agricultural 
Wages in England and Wales. 
74 This has created a fairly complex system where all grades of work, excluding the negative 
differential Casual Grade, actually consists of two sub-grades of workers. Regular Ordinary Grade 
workers, for instance, are paid a slightly lower hourly wage than Flexible Ordinary Grade workers, but 
are entitled to more overtime payments in a greater variety of circumstances: on Sundays and after 8 
hours of work on a single day, as examples.  
75 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, RoWiA, 1992. Cf. again Graph Four of this thesis. 
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harmonisation of Casual and Ordinary Rates in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s; however, 
a number of ancillary provisions were won that disproportionately benefited those on 
regular contracts during the same period, and which implicitly required the further 
subordination of precarity-prone workers to be actualised. In 1975, the Union secured 
the provision of an occupational sick pay scheme for the first time, with workers 
initially entitled to up to thirteen weeks of sick pay per year from injuries and 
illnesses. However an initial proviso of this provision being it was only available to 
workers with over one year continuous service to a single employer: therefore 
benefits were not afforded to the most precarious in the industry.76 In 1979 the 
Workers’ Side won an improvement in these sick pay provisions: if a worker had 
completed 15 years continuous service with a single employer they would be entitled 
to 130 days paid leave: however, that same year the Employers won the right to pay 
foreign students a negative differential for the first time.77 In 1980 the Union 
nominally made the deletion of the Part-Time Rate its secondary wage demand,78 but 
came away instead with increased holiday provisions for those with 52+ weeks 
continuous service in the industry.79 In 1981, no differential harmonisation was 
achieved, but full-time workers received a significant improvement in their overtime 
payments.80 In 1986, the Union did secure better treatment for +30 hour part-time 
workers, who were granted holiday pay of 125% their normal wage, as full-timers had 
been assured since 1982: however, that same year the Casual Rate was frozen, despite 
the Union again rhetorically seeking harmonisation at the initiation of negotiations.81 
All the above cases further demonstrate how and when the Union won redistributions 
of risks and benefits from the AWB to the benefit of the less precarity-prone workers 
in the industry.  
 Tellingly, a perusal of the Landworker’s reportages of each year’s final Wage 
Order reveals that new Ordinary Grade and Craft Grade rates were prominently 
displayed and discussed between 1972 and 1997, but more often than not the negative 
differential grades were underreported and under analysed: so, it is clear that in its 
practices on the AWB, the Union pursued the material interests of its own members at 
the expense of others, in a pre-rejuvenatory, subordinatory manner. Rather than casual 
work being the hammer with which employers knocked down the privileged position 
of full-time workers, the employers used the Union’s defence of its full-time workers’ 
relatively privileged positions as the hammer with which to knock down and maintain 
the precarious working conditions of the ever expanding non-standard agricultural 
labour force.  
 
                                                
76 The Landworker, 1975, pg. 96.  
77 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, RoWiA, 1979. 
78 Traditionally, the Union’s primary claim concerned the length of, and remunerations for, an Ordinary 
Grade worker’s week 
79 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, RoWiA, 1980. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, RoWiA, 1982, 1986. Over the decades the qualifying 
provisos for some of these above mentioned provisions, and those regarding other issues, such as 
access to training and stand-by payments, have at times been gradually expanded to include greater 
numbers of workers on less standard contractual types, and workers with less experience in the 
industry. Some of these provisions were won by the Union on AWB negotiations: however more 
common sources of these apparent victories were legal rulings in the British and European courts, and 
changes in statutory legislation, particularly at the European level. Right up to the present day “certain 
rights under the Order depend on how long a worker has been continuously employed” by a single 
employer. Cf. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Agricultural Wages in England 
and Wales: A Guide for Workers and Employers. 
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6. The Farmworkers’ Union’s Rhetorically Inclusive Orientation, 1970-1997. 
 
In this section I problematise the above analysis regarding the Union’s 
orientation towards precarity-prone workers. I find that while the Union’s actions 
were orientated in a pre-rejuvenatory manner in practice, a discursivly 
rejuvenatoryesque orientation was visible from the Union throughout our curtailed 
periodisation.   
Clouding the picture to have emerged so far, the Union, in rhetoric at least, 
long recognised that the promotion of Ordinary Grade workers at the expense of 
exceptional grades was in the long-term disinterest of the Union’s traditional 
constituents, despite them being disproportionately concentrated in this grade and 
higher. A brief perusal of the arguments the Union made to, and regarding, the AWB 
between 1970-1997 reveals a discursive orientation more akin to Heery’s inclusive 
orientation: one which was deployed on a too coherent and regular basis for it be 
dismissed as mere ideological lip-service or propaganda.  
 In 1980, the Landworker argued the part-time workers represented a threat to 
the general agricultural workforce, in that they represented a “pool of cheap (mostly 
female) labour to be called on in busy times and as casually dismissed”82: while such 
a statement appears hostile to this form of contract, the editorial makes it clear that it 
was not part-time workers who were to blame for this pattern, but their lower wage 
rates as demanded by employers from the AWB. Seeking their equal treatment, albeit 
not for any altruistic or fraternal basis, the Landworker argued that the growth of this 
relatively precarity-prone contract type was to the detriment of those on regular 
contracts, and needed to be combatted with a decreasing of the negative differentials. 
 The self-interested incentives offered by this inclusiveness should be clear: the 
numbers of agricultural workers employed on exceptional grades was never 
inconsiderable, and grew steadily throughout our periodisation; the Landworker finds 
that between 1975-1979 the full-time agricultural workforce decreased by 16,000 
workers, while the casual and seasonal workforce grew by 13,000; this effectively 
represented a wholesale remodelling of the workforces’ contractual arrangements. 
Table One shows that this contractual restructuring continued in the following decade: 
while the drift from the land affected all contract types, the number of full-time 
workers in the industry fell at a disproportionately fast rate, as widening negative 
differentials incentivised employers to privilege non-standard contract types on their 
farms. From this the Union recognised, and argued, that it was in the material interests 
of its members to pursue an inclusive orientation and demand equal treatment and pro 
rata terms for these non-standard workers: to follow an orientation of subordination, 
where the Union would increase skilled differentials and placate employers by 
facilitating the stagnation of exceptional wages, would only “encourage farmers to 
destroy their… permanent labour force”, the Union’s traditional constituents 
included.83 
                                                
82 The Landworker, November 1979. 
83 Ibid. 
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Table One: The Number of Adult Agricultural Workers in England and Wales, and 
their Contract Type, 1982-1984. 
 1982  1984  
 
Number of 
Workers 
(000s) 
% of Total 
Workforce 
Number of 
Workers (000s) 
% of Total 
Workforce 
Regular Full-
Time Workers 105.1 45.5 99.7 44.9 
Regular Part-
Time Workers  37.6 16.3 37.3 16.8 
Casual 88.1 38.2 85.1 38.1 
Sources: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Agricultural Labour in England 
and Wales, London: MAFF, 1982, 1984. 
 
The Union was consistent in the deployment of this argument: in 1976 the 
Union had argued that “a move towards casualisation and short-time working in the 
industry” was a development “which no-one concerned about its future well-being 
should welcome. The Union is concentrated to halt this trend and secure the 
recruitment of more full-time workers”84: here, according to the Union’s rhetoric, not 
only were the material interests of full-time workers under threat from casualisation, 
but the efficiency of the industry itself, and hence the material wellbeing of the 
nation. In 1994 the Union again pointed out the transformative effects of the negative 
differentials, and blamed the disparity between casual and full-time hourly rates as the 
cause for farmers to employ an increasingly unskilled workforce on substandard 
conditions, so that between 1978 and 1993 the number of casual and part-time 
workers in the industry remained largely constant while male full-time employment 
dropped by 24%.85 
From the above we can say that, on the AWB, the Union clearly desired to 
exclude casual labour relations from the industry but, discursively at least, sought to 
secure this by enforcing pro rata treatment of non-standard workers. By increasing 
wages, employers would be disincentivised from utilising these non-standard labour 
contracts.86 The key lesson to take from this section then is the fact that cost/benefit 
analyses conducted by the Union throughout our periodisation left it, discursively at 
least, with little doubt that a rejuvenatory, inclusive orientation was needed for the 
long-term interests of all in agriculture, including its own relatively privileged 
members. Therefore, between 1970 and 1997, the Union repeatedly made initial 
demands to the AWB for “regular part-time and seasonal workers” to be “paid the full 
hourly rate” of full-time Ordinary Grade Workers.87 However, for reasons discussed 
in the subsequent section, these demands were soon retracted from each year’s 
negotiating tables.  
 
 
7. The Causal Mechanisms behind the Dominance of the Union’s Subordinatory 
Orientation, 1970-1997. 
                                                
84 National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, Outlook for Agriculture, pg. 5. 
85 The Landworker, May 1993. 
86 National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, Motions and Amendments to be considered by 
the 1980 Biennial Conference, London: NUAAW, 1980, pg. 42; The Landworker, March 1999. 
87 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, RoWiA, 1978-1986, 1988-1989, 1994-1996; The 
Landworker, March 1987. 
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 According to the rhetorical evidence presented in section seven, it appears the 
Union’s negotiators were unlikely architects of the subordinatory tendencies of the 
AWB: yet as demonstrated in section six, its negotiators had been complicit in, rather 
than simply powerless over, the Board’s subordinatory stratification of the workforce. 
In determining why such a disconnection was found between the Union’s discursive 
and practiced orientations towards precarity-prone work, the principle culprit seems 
not to be the Union’s internal structure or historical heritage, but the enforced 
operating arena of the AWB itself, and more so the unequal distribution of power 
resources within the AWB’s framing environment. Structural biases on and around 
the AWB, in the employers’ favour, rendered the privileging of a subordinatory 
orientation the sole rational choice for the Union relatively lacking in both power and 
resources: the Union aspired to inclusivity, albeit for self-motivated reasons, in a 
coherent manner throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s; however, the Union’s 
operating environment forced a gross distortion in this orientation in practice. This 
section explores the reasons for this distortion.  
 
 Problems at least in part germinated from the structure of Board negotiations. 
On the AWB, each side justified their interests to the Appointed Members in 
deference to the narrow and ill-defined remit of the AWB. Over the years, each side’s 
arguments had been repeated to such an extent that one could accurately predict their 
ritualistic deployment at the annual negotiations. The Farmworkers, conscious of the 
AWB’s remit to ensure comfort for the agricultural worker, regularly deployed moral 
arguments when making their wage claims: arguing that farmworkers had 
traditionally held one of the best productive track records of any group of worker, and 
that the resultant rises in farm incomes should be compensated with increased 
wages.88 Accordingly, to do otherwise would betray the workers of this “Cinderella 
industry,89 particularly in light of the sector’s high levels of governmental subsidies.90 
In addition, the Workers ritualistically pointed out the increased and disproportional 
costs of living associated with rural areas,91 and general fluxuations in the cost of 
living in the turbulent 1980s,92 as justifications for increased wages. Responding, 
employers rarely contested the Farmworkers’ productivity claims, but instead argued, 
in apocalyptic tones, that they simply could not afford to pay, on top of their already 
highly priced production inputs, “excessive and overgenerous” wage increases. They 
claimed that to do so they would have to further mechanise and/or chemicalise the 
industry, thereby destroying the comfort of their newly unemployed workers: darkly 
threatening that “one hell of a lot of farmers… would rethink their employment 
policies” if the industrial-gap were to close.93  
Having to navigate between these polar opposite points of views, the 
Appointed Members tried to act in as neutral a manner as they know how. Indeed, 
between 1970 and 1997 the Appointed Members sided with one side over another in 
                                                
88 Trades Union Congress, Report of Congress 1972, London: TUC, 1972, pg. 500; The Landworker, 
February 1985; October 1970; National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, Outlook for 
Agriculture, pg. 1; Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, RoWiA, 1980. 
89 The Landworker, May 1973. 
90 The Landworker, June 1985. 
91 The Landworker, March 1988. 
92 The Landworker, June 1981. 
93 The Landworker, December 1985; cf. February 1981; December 1985; Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food, RoWiA, 1980. 
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settling a final pay settlement a roughly equal number of times.94 However, this does 
not imply that the AWB represented some pluralist arena of contention at this time. 
Sides, included the apparent ‘winner’ of each year’s negotiations, had to make 
compromises in face-to-face negotiations and, more intangibly, when determining 
their annual claim. As demonstrated imminently, the burdens of these compromises 
were disproportionately borne by the Workers’ Side. 
Each year, the Appointed Members had to adjudicate between two parties, 
each claiming to seek the dual ideals of ‘efficiency in agriculture’ and ‘comfortable 
living standards’ for the workforce. Yet, on a higher level, the narrow remit of the 
AWB demanded the continued existence of British agriculture: neither efficiency nor 
comfort could be secured in an industry that no longer existed. While trilateralism 
was legally imposed to create collective bargaining when and where imbalances in the 
power resources of interested parties would have prevented the maintenance of 
voluntary bilateralism, this caveat rendered void the trilateral body’s potential to 
counterbalance the disequilibria in the balance of resources between workers and 
employers: when adjudicating between each sides’ claims, the Appointed Members 
could not simply attempt to balance the degree of satisfaction, or dissatisfaction, felt 
by either Side as the result of a final settlement; they had to attempt an assessment of 
how either Sides’ dissatisfaction would affect the continued existence of the industry.  
The Union regularly attempted to actively sway such assessments. On a near-
annual basis, the under-resourced Union annually claimed that the continued 
existence of worker discomfort endangered the industry, as the industrial-gap caused 
an acceleration in the drift from the land: accordingly, comparatively low-wages 
caused a large scale of abandonment of agriculture by the rural workforce95; in 1972, 
Union President Bert Hazell told the TUC “two hundred thousand workers have gone 
(from agriculture) in the last 10 years, but not through redundancy, they have voted 
with their feet because the wages and the conditions of their employment did not 
enable them to remain”.96 The Union, when making these arguments, attempted to 
adopt a paternalistic tone: not simply representing the interests of agricultural workers 
but the industry as a whole and indeed the entire country, which could, apparently “no 
longer afford any job losses in agriculture”.97 While certainly a pertinent point, the 
Appointed Members only had to observe, particularly from the 1980s onwards, the 
accelerating mechanisation and chemicalisation of agriculture, in combination with 
the growing mass unemployment found in the British economy and wider 
environmental issues, such as a lack of labour mobility and societal pressures which 
tied much of the agricultural workforce to the land, to see that agriculture was 
shedding jobs faster than it was losing employees. Indeed research conducted by 
MAFF in 1982, with the aid of the NFU, found that it was not wage stagnation, but 
increases in the national stock of machinery, that had principally caused the continued 
decline in agricultural employment in the 1970s.98  
Furthermore, as demonstrated in section one of this chapter, the Union’s past 
experiences with militant action left the Union unwilling to attempt to limit the 
agricultural labour supply on a momentary basis via the strategic use of strike action, 
particularly after 1984’s aborted attempt at an overtime ban. Therefore, for an 
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Appointed Member between 1970 and 1997, it would have been clear that, despite 
their dissatisfaction at any settlement, agricultural workers lacked the resources to 
actively disrupt British agricultural production through the withdrawal of labour, both 
on a long- and short-term basis.  
 Alternatively, the employers, through their ability to further mechanise and 
chemicalise agricultural production, held a resource of decisive consequence for 
agriculture: that is, the Employers’ Side was regularly found to have been able to 
jeopardise the continued existence of the agricultural workforce through their ability 
to increase and, vitally, decrease the demand for labour. The Appointed Members 
could not claim to have fulfilled one of their few concrete remits – to ‘secure the 
comfort’ of the agricultural wage force – if, as a result of an overly generous annual 
wage settlements, employers had to replace labour costs with capital investment, as 
they habitually claimed they would be forced to do: as a typical blunt example, the 
NFU’s delegation claimed that the “industry simply (could not) afford” the workers’ 
AWB claim in 1982.99 
 So, the Union’s power resources were too weak to control the labour supply of 
agriculture, the Employers’ ample enough to control labour demand. Such a disparity 
in power unconsciously swayed the AWB’s Appointed Members: while they sought 
to deal with the parties equally, in the main they “accepted the fairly pessimistic 
assessments of the state of the agricultural industry put forward by the NFU”,100 
helping sway the annual negotiations in the Employers’ favour. While government 
imposed tripartism theoretically offered a crux to unionism in industrial enviroments 
that deprived workers of workplace power resources, in agriculture it seemed to offer 
only a distilled version of bilateral industrial negotiations conducted from positions of 
unequal power: ultimately, economic superiority earned through the control of the 
means of production and reproduction won for employers special dispositions from 
the Appointed Members.  
 
 This inherent bias of capitalism, which was implicitly privileged by the 
AWB’s supposedly Independent Members, produced further discrepancies in the 
power resources of the two interested parties. The economic buoyancy of individual 
farmers during our periodisation granted their representative body immense financial 
resources: in 1983 the NFU reported an income of £8 million, raised from basic 
member subscriptions and additional block donations from its wealthier members101; 
with such annual surpluses the NFU made shrewd and extensive capital investments: 
in 1980 the organisation owned a 75% share in the Fatstock Marketing Corporation, a 
commercial empire with an annual turnover of £535 million.102 Such financial 
resources begat the NFU considerable organisational resources – since the 1970s the 
NFU has employed several hundred staff at any one time103 – which in turn produced 
reputational and influential resources: in the mid-to late Twentieth Century the NFU 
was “arguably the best and organisationally strongest Western agricultural interest 
group”,104 and “undoubtedly one of the most successful pressure groups in Britain”.105  
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To give some idea of the political sophistication of the NFU, it is widely 
credited with developing many of the modern technologies of governmental lobbying: 
Britain’s peak employer federation, the CBI, consciously replicated many of the 
NFU’s preexistent and highly successful tactics – such as lobbying across Party lines 
in both Houses of Parliament, taking MP’s and their staff ‘for dinner’ away from the 
hustle and bustle of Westminster, and creating extensive contacts between local 
employer branches and MP’s in their constituencies – when it sought to extend its 
lobbying credentials in 1977.106  
 It was not just organisational resources that the NFU had in droves during our 
curtailed periodisation. In the 1930s and 1940s there had been a number of competing 
agricultural employer organisations, which diluted the effects of the farmers’ 
economic resources.107 However, after a process of mergers and collapses, the NFU 
emerged in the Post-War Era as the near monopolistic employer’s organisation in the 
industry, formally representing over 90% of all farmers in England and Wales by 
1988.108 Resultantly, the NFU, for much of our periodisation, was successful at 
appearing to present a single “farmer’s view”.109 Partially due to this apparent unity 
and representativeness, the NFU was afforded a great deal of governmental access by 
both major political parties during our periodisation. Such was the extent of this 
access, that MAFF and the NFU were often portrayed as being virtually symbiotic, so 
close was their relationship in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s110: Teddy Taylor, a 
Conservative MP, described in 1988 how his contemporary Conservative Minister for 
Agriculture, “like so many of his predecessors – Labour men… as well as 
Conservatives – (had become) a virtual prisoner of NFU interest”.111 
The Farmworkers’ Union, on the other hand, has never enjoyed large 
donations, due to the relative poverty of its members, and has relied entirely on 
diminishing subscriptions and occasional strike support from the wider Movement. In 
the 1970s a funding crisis forced the Union to shed jobs, so that in 1972 the Union 
only had 20 full-time staff members.112 This lack of financial and organisational 
resources, combined with the inconducive operating environment of agriculture, at 
least in part explains the Farmworkers’ Union’s failure to ever organise more than 
40% of the agricultural workforce.  
This disparity in strengths helped bias the AWB further in favour of the 
employers. On an annual basis between 1970 and 1997, the Employers’ side claimed, 
or perhaps threatened, that overly-generous AWB Orders would threaten the 
continued existence of agricultural production in Britain. Of course the continuous 
prosperity of British agriculture’s bottom line, and the industry’s “recession proof” 
nature,113 should have forced the Appointed Members to critically question this 
annually ritualised claim/threat of the employers. However, this appears not to have 
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occurred: the part-time Appointed Members of the Board were traditionally drawn 
from the academic, financial, legal, and commercial sectors, and had little intimate 
knowledge of the agricultural environment114; the NFU’s well-funded lobbying and 
legitimising activities, that occurred in the AWB’s framing environment, left these 
inexpert but decisive Members unable to critically assess the contentious claims that 
the NFU made within the confines of the AWB’s negotiations. 
 Further accentuating this operational bias of the AWB was the fact that the 
ramifications of the resource-discrepancies between the two interested parties not 
only directly influenced the opinions of the Appointed Members, but also indirectly 
influenced wider regulative structures, situated within the AWB and beyond.  
 For instance, for a large part of our curtailed periodisation the Union lacked 
access to the information supplied to, and utilised by, the AWB. Up until the late 
1990s the AWB relied on MAFF’s ‘Annual Reviews of Agriculture’ (ARoR) – 
documents which detail the economic conditions and prospects of British Agriculture 
through the use of farmer compiled surveys – as the database with which to 
statistically interpret and interrogate each sides’ annual claim. The NFU, unlike the 
Farmworkers’ Union, worked closely with the Civil Service when drawing up these 
documents, compiled well beyond the AWB’s purview: therefore, during negotiations 
the NFU’s negotiators had once been privy to vital information unavailable to the 
Workers and, until they themselves disclosed it, the AWB’s Appointed Members; due 
to the fact that, until 1983, annual AWB negotiations were well completed prior to 
the formal publication of the ARoA. 
More damagingly, the NFU/MAFF compiled surveys measured farm incomes 
only in terms of the forecast net profit of the entire industry, in the entirety of the UK; 
from these statistics the Employer’s Side based their annual arguments regarding their 
(in)ability to pay precarity-dampening wages. The Farmworkers’s Union repeatedly 
pointed out this was misleading: while small-scale tenant farmers certainly faced 
financial hardships throughout the Twentieth Century, particularly in Scotland, larger 
farms, where the majority of non-family farmworkers have traditionally been 
employed, continued to enjoy a great deal of economic success, even during times of 
general recession.115 In 1983, 75% of British Farms hired only short-term seasonal or 
family labour116: the Union felt rightly aggrieved that such farms’ incomes were used 
to justify the low-wages offered by the larger, labour hiring farms which were, rather 
ironically, squeezing these tenant farmers out of existence. In reaction, Union 
negotiators pushed for farm income to be measured only from those farms that hired 
regular labour throughout the 1980s117: having no such luck, the Union periodically 
attempted to compile its own statistics on “REAL farm incomes”118; however, its lack 
of financial resources led these reports to appear rather piecemeal and journalistic, 
and therefore worth little in comparison to the perceptively bona fide, ‘government 
compiled’ NFU/MAFF reports. Therefore, through the control of these official 
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statistics, the ultimately economic superiority of the Employers was translated into 
further biases in the informative interface located between the AWB’s internal 
operating system and its wider framing environment, so that the so-called 
Independent Members saw, through the presentation of data, the apparent hardships of 
the farmers better than they could the hardships of the farmworkers: this allowed the 
farmers to keep wages low, maintaining precarity in the industry.  
 From the above analyses it should be clear that the AWB did not create 
imbalances in powers between agricultural employers and workers, it only offered a 
distilled vision of the power differentials that existed in the wider environment that 
framed the AWB: the locus of the political powers of the employers, and the relative 
powerlessness of the workers, never ultimately resided within the AWB, but in the 
socio-environmental hierarchy of Britain, which regularly impinged upon the AWB’s 
operations to create biases. However, one cannot project a simplistic 
base/superstructure model onto our analyses of the AWB. Numerous extra-economic 
institutions could potentially have counterbalanced the Employers’ superiority 
between 1970 and 1997: indeed, such a counterweight is supposedly a key function of 
the liberal democratic state. However, analysis shows that state influence, throughout 
our periodisation but particularly since 1979, prevented the Appointed Members from 
acting in a manner befitting their supposedly independent status. This governmental 
bias is best demonstrated with reference to the events surrounding the 1983 AWB 
negotiations. 
 In 1981 the AWB gained a new Chairperson, Gordon Dickson, an agricultural 
academic. Dickson represented a threat to Employers’ Side: not because of any actual 
wage increases seen in practice – Dickson’s years as Chairperson saw no statistically 
significant increases in wages or decreases in the industrial gap – but because of the 
hypothetical remedies he suggested as treatments for the AWB’s previous 
performances over the years. Without a progressive remit the Appointed Members 
had traditionally sought, on an annual basis, to narrow the gap between the Workers’ 
claims and the Employers’ responses, and presided over the discontentment that 
invariably emerged as a result in a self-identified impartial manner. Dickson, 
alternatively, tried to force a change in the AWB’s modus operandi, and argued that 
the AWB needed to “develop a progressive wages policy instead of being shackled to 
a role of annually fixing a certain pay rise”119: Dickson had recognised the need to 
change the remit of the AWB, on a de facto if not de jure basis, so that instead of 
conducting rudderless annual negotiations with reference only to the vague and 
partially obsolete remit of the 1923 Agricultural (Regulations) Act, the AWB should 
produce 3 or 5 year plans, explicitly aspiring to close the industrial gap. In suggesting 
that long-term planning should become central to the AWB’s operations, the new 
Chairperson had effectively argued, without the blessing of government, against the 
annual biased set-piece battles between the NFU and the Union that had until then 
served the Employers so well. 
 In 1982 the AWB settled the 1983 Order120 with an unremarkable 7.1% raise 
in the Ordinary Grade rate.121 However, as mentioned, this decision was reached 
without the Appointed Members nor Union having access to the as yet unpublished 
ARoA: when the 1983 ARoA was eventually made avaliable it unexpectedly revealed 
                                                
119 Cited in Winyard, Cold Comfort Farm, pg. 13. 
120 Until 1983 wage negotiations occurred in the preceding year, so the 1983 Wage Order was 
discussed and settled in 1982, the 1982 order settled in 1981, and so on.  
121 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, RoWiA, 1983. That is, unremarkable when taking in 
mind that year’s 5.3% rise in inflation. 
 110 
1982’s annual basic rise in gross farm incomes to be 45%, compared to 1981’s 
24%122; the Workers’ Side reacted by demanding an interim pay discussion, to occur 
before the initiation of the 1984 round of negotiations. Controversially, for the 
Employers at least, Dickson agreed that this was reasonable. To show how 
unprecedented this action was, compare this with a decision made in 1981: in 1980 an 
inflation mirroring increase of 10.3% on the Ordinary Worker rate was settled by the 
AWB; yet later that year Britain’s Green Pound123 was devaluated by 5%, granting 
farmers a 19% increase in farm-gate selling prices124; subsequently the Workers Side, 
mindful of precipitous increases in income taxes, petrol duty, and national insurance 
contributions, asked for an interim pay settlement to compensate agricultural workers 
for losses in their social wages125; Charles Miles, the then-Chairperson of the AWB, 
argued that a unanimous decision would have to be made for such a negotiating 
round, or any other change in the operational norms of the AWB, to occur126; this 
granted the Employers’ side an effective veto over any deviation from the status quo, 
under his tenure at least 
Yet, as seen, 1983 proved to be different: at the unprecedented interim 
negotiations an additional 5% was added to the previous settlement of 7.1%. More 
significantly, Dickson directed the Civil Service to move the timing of all subsequent 
annual negotiations to the spring of the year in question, rather than the preceding 
autumn as had been the case up until this point127: this allowed the Union to properly 
access and digest the ARoA before the commencement of negotiations. The Union, 
responded in a rare display of vitality, declaring “the farmers are running scared 
because, for the first time, we shall have exactly the same access to government 
information on farm incomes which they had kept up their sleeves all these years 
when we negotiated and settled before publication”.128 Then, the very next year, 
Dickson revealed on the final day of negotiations that the Minister of Agriculture had 
personally dismissed him as Chairman of the AWB.129  
Dickson subsequently revealed that he had been informed by the Minister that 
he was removed as he “he did not have the confidence of the Employers in the 
industry”,130 that he had been removed by a “direct directive from the Cabinet Office” 
– the control hub of the Conservative Government, and that he had previously been 
asked by the government to conform to Conservative guidelines on wage increases, 
nominally issued with regards to the nationalised industries, throughout his tenure.131 
Dickson’s successor, David Walker, an economics professor, publicly stated he did 
not agree with the principle of the closure of the industrial gap, and told the 
Landworker he would be sacked if he pursued policies to this end.132 It should now be 
clear why this thesis elected to utilise the term Appointed over Independent Member. 
Dickson’s actions on the AWB were not biased towards the interests of the 
farmworkers: the Conservative-backing Telegraph newspaper editorialised at the time 
                                                
122 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Annual Report on Agriculture, London: HMSO, 1983. 
123 The exchange rate used to determine the level of financial support the nation stood to receive from 
the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy 
124 Wynn, Skilled at all Trade, 1993, pg. 244. 
125 The Landworker, March 1981. 
126 The Landworker, June 1981. 
127 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, RoWiA, 1985. 
128 The Landworker, May 1983. 
129 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, RoWiA, 1984. 
130 The Landworker, May 1984. 
131 Cited in Wynn, Skilled at All Trades, pg. 243. 
132 Ibid. 
 111 
that “if Dickson is being accused of partisanship, it didn’t show up at this year's pay 
deal”.133 However, he did act in a truly independent manner: unswayed by Employer 
threats or discursive exclamations. In response, the Employers found allies in the 
AWB’s framing environment to remove this threat to the status quo. For the NFU this 
proved to be far from difficult: in 1979 the Landworker, assessing the new 
government, declared Thatcher had appointed “a cabinet of farmers” due to the high 
number of senior ministers with farming interests.134 Such interests were likewise 
found across Westminster: in 1981 92 MPs, mostly but not exclusively Tory, were 
identified as having a commercial stake in farming.135 Resultantly, Dickson was 
swiftly removed as soon as he was seen to be acting against, or at least not with, the 
interests of farmers. Compare this with the Union: from the 1970s onwards the Union 
had repeatedly voiced a lack in confidence in the AWB’s Appointed Members, but 
never received a scalp for its troubles. So, even when biases of the AWB appeared to 
ebb, for contingent reasons such as the political appointment of a truly Independent 
Member, the NFU was able to rely on institutional support systems in Britain’s 
political-economy to redress the balance.136 
 
 These structural biases on and around the AWB, brought about by economic 
superiority on the part of employers and backed by the farmers’ supporters in the 
political sphere, were key issues that helped determine the Union’s subordinatory 
orientation in practice. The Union had to focus its contentions on the sector of the 
workforce where the biting force of the Employers was lightest, and it cost little for 
the Employers to settle on near-to-Union terms for those workers in the market with 
relatively marketable skill. During our curtailed periodisation, as mentioned, most 
Craft Grade workers, and indeed many Ordinary Grade workers were paid voluntary 
premiums on top of the AMW by their employers as a matter of routine: the Union 
then found it relatively easy to ‘secure’ positive annual wage settlements for these 
grades of workers, which undeniably reduced some precarity in the industry, as 
informal wage premiums were underwritten with legal protections. However, as the 
size of the casual work force increased throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, there 
was a greater material imperative for the Employers’ Side to keep these workers’ 
wage costs low: so while annual ceremonial battles occurred regarding the wage 
claims of the higher rates, the Employers, and their superior power resources, forced 
the issue of the negative differentials into the arena of non-decision making; by 
warning that any increase in these rates would force farmers to replace labour inputs 
with capital inputs, the Employers’ threat of agricultural disruptions prevented deep 
negotiations on these issues. In fact, the resource-deficient Union was only able to 
secure some benefits from the AWB – a lengthening of holiday entitlements or 
increases in overtime rates for example – by conceding to the Employers’ apparently 
legitimately demands for the creation and ingraining of multiple differentials in wages 
and benefits: these differentials stratified the workforce and afforded some relatively 
protected workers a degree of precarity-dampening benefits, but to the detriment of 
the most precarity-prone in the industry, who were denied them.  
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 This subordination was not to the Farmworkers’ Union’s long-term benefit: 
Union negotiators were well aware that the stratification of benefits and wages caused 
an acceleration in farmers hiring workers on precarity-producing contracts; however 
the Union’s powerlessness at negotiations prevented it from pursuing the goals 
intrinsic to its arrested inclusive orientation.  
 This is why the Farmworkers’ Union subscribed to a subordinatory orientation 
in practice between 1970-1997, and quietly dropped its demands for the deletion of 
the negative differentials at the earliest possible moment in each year’s negotiating 
rounds: to do otherwise would have risked seeing Union negotiators coming away 
with nothing. The Union symbolically accepted and committed itself to the AWB’s 
limiting structures and subordinatory orientation when in June 1988 its Trade Group 
Conference passed a motion to the effect that its future AWB claims should be “based 
on the Craftsman Rate of pay, in recognition of the skilled workforce within the 
industry”137: while never actualised in practice, the Union had all but acknowledged 
that the structure of the AWB encouraged the pursuit of differential-producing 
settlements that decreased precarity for a relatively privileged group only at the 
expense of creating precarity for others, despite this being against the long-term 
material interests of the Union and its members. 
 
 The key lesson to take away from this section is the fact that in the 1970s, 
1980s and early 1990s, the Union pursued a subordinatory orientation via a legal 
strategy, as this was the only rational choice afforded to it by various institutional 
structures on and around the AWB, which were in turn primary constructed by the 
socio-economic power discrepancies of the two interested negotiating parties. 
 
8. The Effectiveness of the Union on the Agricultural Wages Board. 
 
 I now turn to assess the effectiveness of the Union’s strategy, with strict 
regard to the goals intrinsic to its subordinatory orientations. It is difficult to assess 
the subordinatory effectiveness of the AWB. The idiosyncratic Board was 
differentiated to a significant degree even from its closest relatives, the Wages 
Councils; furthermore, the AWB has been part of the agricultural environment for a 
considerably long period of time, spanning several relatively discrete economic 
epochs. Lacking comparative cases, it is difficult to say outright whether the AWB 
has been a poor conduit for the Union’s interests: true, the all-economy gap widened 
between 1970-1997, but perhaps without the presence of tripartism the gap may have 
widened to a more significant degree. To address this question satisfactorily I analyse 
the Union’s shifting attitudes towards the AWB itself: historical research can 
ascertain the Union’s satisfaction regarding the effectiveness of this imposed body, 
with narrow regards to the interests of its privileged members. Of course the previous 
section highlighted how the act of complaint actually played a substantially role in the 
Union’s repertoire of contention on the AWB, and therefore caution is exercised in 
the following analysis.  
  Throughout the latter 1970s and early 1980s, the left wing of the Union 
vocally argued, normally against the advice of the EC, for the abolition of the AWB, 
and for its replacement by a Statutory Joint Industrial Council (SJIC). Some 
background: on the recommendations of the Donovan report, the 1974-79 Labour 
government legislatively allowed Wages Councils to be converted into SJICs upon 
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the agreement of an industry’s representative bodies. SJICs were seen as a transitional 
stage, located between the trilateral legal structures of the Councils and the voluntary 
structures found in sectors of the economy with a stronger presence from the 
Movement: SJICs contained no appointed ‘independent members’, and negotiations 
occurred bilaterally between Worker and Employer representatives; however, 
diverging from voluntarism, negotiations were statutorily obligatory and agreements 
were binding for all workers in the economic sector; furthermore, if no agreements 
were met, professional adjudicators were introduced to help close negotiations. As, on 
the recommendation of the Donovan report, the Labour Government made no 
provision for the transformation of the AWB into a SJIC, reformist agricultural 
unionists faced a particularly taxing task in their pursuit of this transformation: 
required to lobby for two discrete and successive pieces of legislation.  
From the reformists, several motions calling for the abolition of the AWB 
made it onto the Union’s 1978 Bienniel agenda: the majority of delegates 
overwhelmingly dismissed these suggestions138; however, that same year the right 
wing President of the Union, Bert Hazel, conceded to the noticeably agitated floor 
that he agreed with the viewpoint that government interference in industrial relations 
“can and does create all sorts of problems”.139 Two years later, motions proclaiming a 
lack in confidence with the AWB’s machinery, and instructing the EC to deliver an 
action plan for SJIC transformation, gained near unanimous support from delegates, 
now thoroughly disenchanted with the AWB’s performances in general, and recently 
perceived employer-placating behaviour on the part of Appointed Members in 
particular.140 For several years after that Bienniel’s decision, every perceptively pro-
employer action by the Appointed Members was reported as an additional “nail” in 
the AWBs “coffin” by the Union’s increasingly powerful left wing voice.141  
 One could argue that the Union’s left had been indoctrinated with the 
voluntaristic rhetoric of the pre-rejuvenatory hegemonic Movement, and had come to 
hold an ultimate objective of establishing the “industrial legality” of totally free, pre-
rejuvenatory, collective bargaining.142 Indeed, many of the complaints regarding the 
AWB focused narrowly on the socio-economic makeup of the Appointed Members,143 
and not without good reason: historically the so-called Independents had been “drawn 
from one stratum of society; between 1945 and 1979 there were 8 successive board 
chairs; all had been male, 3 had been knights, 3 lords and 2 professors”144; working 
class Appointed Members, and indeed rural members, were rarities; a fact recognised 
by an ex-Chair who described himself and his part-time colleagues as “terribly middle 
class” in 1989.145 From such a position, it could appear that very existence of 
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tripartism was the perceived cause for the Board’s failings. However, the left seemed 
convinced that the geographically dispersed workforce of contemporary agriculture 
was inconducive to outright, traditional voluntarism146: the establishment of a SJIC 
was seen a desired end, rather than temporary intermediate point, of a rearrangement 
of the Union’s repertoire of contention; the Union’s left’s campaign for a SJIC only 
superficially represented a desired move towards a pre-rejuvenatory, voluntary 
strategy. In fact, disregarding those that focussed on the demographic background of 
the Appointed Members, many of the left’s arguments regarding this desired strategic 
realignment appear rejuvenatory in hindsight: unionists argued a transition to a SJIC 
would promote greater cooperation between the two negotiating sides, unable to rely 
on the Appointed Members to break ritualised deadlocks147; likewise it was argued 
that a SJIC would enable the development of wider organisational approaches, as 
direct negotiations with the NFU would raise the profile of the Union, spark a 
recruitment snowball, and eventually lead to a lesser reliance on servicing Union 
representatives in the day-to-day organisation of the Union, who were seen to be 
stifling imaginative experimentations in form and function.148  
 Clearly then, many in the Union, for a while at least, desired apparently 
rejuvenatory norms in its industrial relations: seeking the construction of a mechanism 
that encouraged the usage of organisational and partnership approaches, albeit to 
replace the also rejuvenatoryesque legal approach embodied and imposed by the 
AWB. This tells us that many in the Union believed, in the first decade of our 
periodisation, that the AWB was an ineffective mechanism for securing its material 
interests, for reasons similar to those which were concurrently determining the 
Union’s hegemonic subordinatory orientation on the AWB – that is, the existence of 
structurally inherent institutional biases, and an imbalance in mobilisable resources, 
all in the Employers’ Side’s favour. Rejuvenation from legalism was seen as the 
medicine for such ailments. 
 However, the 1980 Biennial was the high-water mark of Union disapproval of 
the AWB: the Union never consciously addressed the fact that the 1980 Biennial 
decision was inadequately pursued, and subsequent conferences failed to instruct the 
EC to further their transitional policies. In practice the Union shifted its operational 
emphasis again, and came to dedicate great resources on protecting the AWB: even 
those that led the abolition campaign fell silent on this previously divisive issue, and 
by the 1986 Biennial no movers continued to call for abolition.149 
 To understand this shift in perceptions regarding the AWB’s effectiveness it is 
necessary to look at events in the wider political environment. Thatcher’s first 
Government was, at the time, instrumentally weakening the powers of the Wages 
Councils. Even before the cascade of decline, the majority of Britain’s low-paid 
workers were not covered by the scopes of the Wages Councils,150 and those 
industries that were covered experienced large-scale underpayments by employers.151 
However, these bodies did previously grant statutorily underpinnings to numerous 
other low-paid industries in Britain. Yet, in the early to mid-1980s, after a series of 
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legislative changes, most prominently the 1986 Wage Act, a large minority of the 40+ 
Wages Councils were abolished. The remaining Councils had their remits curtailed, 
so that workers under the age of 21 were removed from their purviews, and rather 
than setting a variety of differentiated wage rates and protections, the Councils were 
limited to setting a single base rate applicable to all workers covered by their Orders, 
and prohibited from setting minimums regarding holiday and sick pay, as they once 
had been enabled.152 
  Many in the wider Movement had, before 1979, been deeply sceptical of the 
apparent inadequacies of these legally bounded institutions: many unions, including 
the generals such as the TGWU, had traditionally believed that urban wage fixing 
machinery imposed a ceiling on what could be achieved through collective 
bargaining, even in low-paid industries such as those with Wages Councils. Likewise 
a feeling percolated the Movement that legal wage machinery inhibited the growth of 
union memberships and density rates, as the age-old union bogeymen of free-riders 
were presumed to be double empowered, lacking a need to join a union when their 
terms of work were protected by the Councils.153 Resultantly, since the Councils’ 
inception in 1909, the urban unions participating in these tripartite bodies were 
hegemonically of the mind that the first objective of any Council should have been for 
it to “commit suicide”154: in 1973 the TUC’s Regional Trade Councils set a policy 
“for Wages Councils to make annual reports on progress… towards a voluntary 
collective bargaining system… including (the) possibilities of abolition”.155 Clearly, 
for the pre-rejuvenatory Movement, if it was found that an industry was even slightly 
conducive to more standard forms of union activity, there was little doubt that the 
alternative was inherently preferable to legalism.  
Yet the Councils’ staggered abolitions, which resulted in sizeable localised 
recessions and downward wage spirals in the industries concerned,156 caused such 
significant disruptions in labour relationships that the reformist zeal of the wider 
Movement towards voluntarism was replaced by a conservative caution. This 
transition was indeed an aspect of the Movement’s transition towards rejuvenatory 
orientations and strategies: numerous unions came to recognise the legal Wages 
Councils as protectors, however ineffective, of the interests of the unions and 
precarity-prone workers, rather than inhibitors of efficient union action. 
 The Farmworkers’ Union was not blind to these wider developments, 
especially as whispers of AWB abolition, floated in various governmental White and 
Green Papers and informal press briefings, were parcelled together with the “general 
offensive against the Wages Councils” throughout the 1980s.157 In the new political 
paradigm the Union could not imagine how the benefits, however limited, won by the 
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AWB could be secured by means other than in “negotiations whose outcomes (were) 
legally imposed”.158 Any comparable governmental attack on the powers of the AWB 
would then have to be resisted: Conservative led reforms were predicted to be “almost 
as damaging as abolition”, now envisioned uniformly as a negative hypothetical 
development.159 To remove this “statutory protection for many thousands of workers” 
would leave most of them with “no other form of protection”160: this statement, 
written jointly by the Farmworkers’ Union and the TUC’s legal department in 1993, 
clearly demonstrates the Union’s commitment to the legal approach of union action 
and the reason for this, namely a wider lack of Union influence over the labour 
market. 
 So, the Union’s assessments regarding the efficiency on the AWB were 
intimately linked to the decimation of the wider Movement during the cascade of 
decline: the disabling of the Movement’s powers and fortunes in the hostile socio-
political environment of the 1980s caused the Farmworkers’ Union to privilege, in a 
more coherent and less contested manner than it had before, the legally binded 
strategy as its preferred modus operandi. 
 The AWB’s effectiveness was always slight, due to the same structural biases 
and power discrepancies that demanded a subordinatory orientation from the Union. 
Resultantly, at the tail-end of an era of comfort for the wider Movement, optimists in 
the Union did briefly believe that a struggle for a more accommodating legal 
structure, that could have encouraged the fostering of further rejuvenatory strategies, 
was an acceptable course of action bearing in mind the Union’s resources. However, 
this optimism faded away when the wider economy became increasingly ruralised, in 
all manners except for the continuation of AWB-like machinery: the Farmworkers, 
learning from the resultant unfortunately experience of Britain’s other low-waged 
industries, ascertained that some, nay any, form of exceptional wage mechanism was 
desirable and at least partially efficient in the now not-so-idiosyncratic external 
economic environment that continued to typify agriculture; as Barry Leathwood, 
speaking as Union Secretary in the 1990s, said, the AWB was the only mechanism 
which “secure(d) our ability to bargain”.161 Any further attempts for Union-led 
reformation would likely have opened the door for Conservative led abolition, and 
this was clearly an unacceptable risk for all, including the particularly rebellious, 
members of the Union: by the 1990s the AWB was not regarded by the Union as 
being particularly effective, but was seen as ultimately more effective than nothing, 
a.k.a. voluntarism.  
 
9. The Farmworkers’ Union, The Agricultural Wages Board, and the National 
Minimum Wage: 1997-2013. 
 
 In this section I move forward the chapter’s periodisation, to look at the 
AWB’s functions just before and after the imposition of the NMW. As mentioned, the 
creation of the NMW had such a reconfigurative effect on Britain’s low-waged 
industries that it is necessary to assess separately the Union’s actions on and around 
the AWB from the imposition onwards.  
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 The Farmworkers’ Union had, sporadically, called for an all industry national 
wage in the 1970s and 1980s.162 Once legislated for by New Labour in 1998, the 
NMW provided for the first time a singular national minimum wage for all adult 
workers, set initially at £3.60/hour, or 50% of average male earnings at the time163: a 
figure considerably higher than the AWB’s exceptional differentials. Since its 
inception, the NMW rate has been evaluated on an annual basis, with the government 
making an ultimate decision after hearing recommendations from the Low-Pay 
Commission – a statutory tripartite body formed from TUC, CBI and government 
appointed representatives. Until the first rumblings of the long recession of 2008 
onwards were heard on the temporal horizon, the NMW rose on a consistently steep 
upward trajectory, outpacing percentile all-economy average wage increases; 
particularly steep real increases were seen from 2003 onwards. Clearly this was of 
benefit to those groups of workers overly concentrated in NMW jobs – notably 
females and migrant workers,164 and those on non-standard contracts. However, since 
2006 the NMW has risen at a pace slower than inflation, representing wage cuts in 
real terms for those employed at this rate.  
 On course, the imposition of the NMW had a great effect on the AWB 
negotiations.165 Graph Five shows that the basic negative differential between the 
‘Ordinary Grade’ rate and that of the ‘Casual Grade’ closed as a result of the creation 
of the NMW – which effectively became the AWB’s ‘Casual Grade’ minimum – and 
its subsequent annual increases outpacing increases in the former.166 As can be seen, 
                                                
162 National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, Motions and Amendments to be considered by 
the 1980 Biennial Conference, pg. 35. 
163 Under the new NMW legislation, juveniles and apprentices were allowed to be paid negative 
differentials. Cf. Oude Nijhuis, Labor Divided, pg. 40. 
164 8% of all contemporary foreign migrant workers receive no more than the absolute minimum, 
compared to 6% of workers nationwide. Cf. Hatchett et al., The Implications for the National Minimum 
Wage of the Abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board in England and Wales,  
165 Reciprocally, the AWB negotiations of the latter 1990s, when agriculture was the sole industry in 
Britain with a statutory bottom floor, had an influence on the creation of the NMW: academics used 
analysis of the agricultural labour market to dismiss classical economic fears that a NMW would 
reduce labour demands and increase unemployment, for example, cf. Dickens et al., The Effect of 
Minimum Wages on UK Agriculture, for example. 
166 The categorisation of the ‘Casual Grade’ has changed significantly throughout our curtailed 
periodisation of 1997 - 2012: in 2002 a Starter Rate formally replaced this category, at which workers 
could be employed, on a negative differential, for the first four weeks, or 156 hours, of employment 
with a single employer; thereafter they were entitled to take an exam qualifying them for the Ordinary 
Rate; in 2003 this grade was changed again to the Manual Harvest Worker Category, as the previous 
grade was found to be in opposition to the European Union’s imminent Fixed Term Worker and 
Employees Regulations – this new grade allowed farmers to pay negative differentials to workers for 
the first 12 weeks of continuous employment; in 2005 this was changed to a slightly altered Basic 
Trainee Grade, which was changed again to an Initial Grade/Grade 1 (of six) in 2006; with this 
category still in existence, employers can now pay workers a negative differential for the first 30 weeks 
of continuous employment – after this date, employers must provide adequate training for a worker to 
sit the relevant exams needed to attain the Ordinary Rate. What is noteworthy regarding all of these 
‘casual grades’ is the fact that there has never been a limit on the length of time a worker can spend in 
this category of work: if a period of employment is broken, by the worker or by the employer, or if a 
worker changes their firm, the negative differential has been payable regardless of the amount of time 
the worker has spent in the industry; in practice, this has led to a large pool of precarity-prone workers 
remaining ‘stuck’ in these grades for pronged periods of time, as work cycles change according to 
periods of peak production. For the sake of parsimony, these grades will be referred to collectively as 
the ‘Casual Grade’ from here on in. Likewise that category of workers once named the Ordinary Grade 
has also been augmented, albeit not out of recognition, since 1997: being renamed and slightly 
restructured as Grade 2 (of six) or the Standard Grade as of 2006, again, for parsimony I consider this 
grade as the de facto continuation of the ‘Ordinary Grade’. Cf. Department for Environment, Food and 
 118 
the greatest catch up occurred between 1998 and 1999, when the AWB was legally 
obliged to bring the Casual Grade up to the level of the NMW.  
  
 
 
 The Union was nominally happy with this development: the Trade Group’s 
Secretary at the time, Barry Leathwood argued that the resultant closure of the gap 
between the two differentials was an “incentive to not casualise the workforce”.167: 
So, through a nationally applicable statutory wage mechanism, the Union was 
seemingly able to see its rejuvenatory material interests realised, albeit by external 
agencies. Those interests being: movements towards parity between casual and full-
time workers, which would supposedly prevent a wholesale change in the industry’s 
employment contracts, which would otherwise have created contractual forms more 
precarious than those that the Union’s traditional members were used to being 
employed on. 
 However, within a couple of years of the NMW’s imposition, the Union lost 
the practical ability to control the agricultural Casual Grade, which became 
effectively intertwined with the NMW: while perhaps not to the immediate detriment 
of the most precarity-prone workers in the industry, whose interests had previously 
been subordinated by the Union in favour of more privileged workers, this did greatly 
affect the effectiveness of the Union’s strategies, leading to numerous increases in 
precarity across the grading scale. 
 In order to analyse how and why the basic Casual Worker rate was effectively 
removed from the scope of the AWB after 1997, it is necessary to first take a deeper 
look at the Farmworkers’s Union’s, and the NFU’s, actions on the AWB preceding 
the creation of the NMW. Throughout the AWB’s existence the Appointed Members, 
once satisfied that their base function as wardens of the continued future existence of 
agricultural production has been performed, have had to adjudicate between two sides 
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both claiming to seek the duel ideals of efficiency in agriculture and comfortable 
living standards. While biased interpretations regarding the perceived fragility of 
agriculture have unconsciously orientated the AWB’s Appointed Members in favour 
of the Employers, they have consciously strove to treat the two sides with equal 
severity throughout the decades: recognising that they would be unable to satisfy 
either side totally on any given year, the Appointed Members have instead elected to 
deal in dissatisfaction, as opposed to satisfaction.  
  As long as the Appointed Members have sensed, in the post-negotiation 
rhetoric of both sides, a comparable degree of anger and dissatisfaction, they have felt 
safe in the knowledge that they have performed a job well done. Therefore, the annual 
encounters between the Farmworkers’ Union and the NFU on and around the AWB 
between 1970 and 1997 could be thought of as an arms race of dissatisfaction: both 
sides were forced, by the structure of the AWB, to voice post-settlement rhetorical 
disappointment in order to avoid discriminatory settlements the following year. We 
can see this arms race actualised in the fact that during this period, the Union 
regularly demanded wage increases of close to 100% on the previous year’s 
settlement, yet rarely achieved to secure more than 65% of their initial claim168: this 
ritualistic over-ambition is explained by the fact that the Farmworkers’ Union had to 
be able to complain about the “wages robbery”,169 the “miserly rewards”170 afforded 
by the AWB. The NFU had to one-up these rhetoric appeals of injustice, citing 
apparently pro-worker settlements as “black day(s) for agriculture”.171 To underline 
their apparent dissatisfaction, both sides occasionally resorted to walking out of pay 
negotiations altogether, the Workers in 1970172 and 1980, then citing “shameful, 
double dealing” on the part of the farmers,173 the employers in 1979.174 
 Even before the creation of the NMW, the Workers’ Side often found itself 
trailing in these ritualised manoeuvrings. In part this was due to the relative degrees of 
accountability of each side’s negotiating team: while the NFU’s negotiators have 
traditionally been given a free reign on the AWB,175 the Workers’ delegation has been 
bound, in theory at least, by the Biennial (later annual) decisions of Union delegates 
at Conference. So, while compelled to rhetoric voice their dissatisfaction within the 
confines of the AWB, the Workers’ representatives, formed from the Union’s EC, 
have been acutely aware that the Union’s rank-and-file members would be monitoring 
their negotiations closely, and a consistent failure to secure anything close to the 
initial claim may well endanger their continued, elected, employment with the Union. 
Resultantly, a ritualised debate has long occurred with great frequency at the Union’s 
Conferences, between the EC’s Podium and delegates from the more militant and left 
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wing branches of the Union: the EC, “not prepared to stick their necks on the line”,176 
have regularly argued that the negotiators should be tasked with securing a vague 
“substantial” or “significant increase” in wages from the AWB; while certain local 
branches have demanded a high monetary figure, with which the negotiating team’s 
performances can be judged in objective, percentile terms177; throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, as the practical implications of the discursive arms race of dissatisfaction 
became more apparent, the numerical lobby more often than not emerged victorious 
against the Podium, in a turnaround of fortunes from the 1950s and 1960s; however, 
in the years following the occasional victories for the ‘substantial increasers’, the 
Worker’s representatives were rendered less able to declare their dissatisfaction at the 
AWB’s operations, lacking a stark contrast between their initial demands and the final 
settlement178; this would allow the Employers’ negotiators to pull ahead in the arms 
race, as they could unilaterally claim that the odds were stacked in their favour, and 
thereby gain preferential treatment in the following years’ negotiations; the internal 
organisation of the Union then encouraged an at times conciliatory, rather than 
combative, approach to legalism, which negatively affected the Union’s ability to 
secure its desired ends. 
 However, it was the imposition of the NMW that definitively lost the Union 
the arms race, and control of the Casual Grade, even while the Wage won significant 
decreases in worker precarity in its first operational years. After a couple of years of 
experimentation the Employers’ Side began to insist that the Casual Rate be exactly 
equal to the NMW. The Workers’ Side digressed from this opinion, and a new ritual 
emerged on the AWB from the mid-2000s onwards: where the Employers insisted on 
matching the Casual AMW to the NMW, and the Workers insisting that pay should 
diverge.179 The Workers’ side nominally won this apparently superficial contest in 
2008, when Casual Grade agricultural workers were granted a minimum wage of 
£5.81, as opposed to the NMW of £5.80.180 Yet, while formally winning this battle, 
the Union struggled to properly establish a discursively powerful legitimising reason 
as to why the wage level should have been separated. In the first decade of the 
operation of the NMW, this national ground floor acquired a great deal of public 
legitimacy: this can be seen from the fact that the CBI dropped all opposition to its 
operations in the latter 1990s.181 Minimum wage work is arduous, volatile and highly 
precarious: however, after industrial reorganisations grand swathes of the working 
population have shared this wage as a base payment; the Union could not then 
legitimately complain about the Casual/NMW Grade afforded to the lowest paid in 
agriculture during the early 2000s, particularly as the NWM was securing wage 
settlements well in excess of what the Union had ever archived via tripartite 
negotiations. Indeed, if one observes Graph Six one can see that real increases in the 
Casual Grade rose at a considerably greater rate than that of Ordinary Grade workers 
from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s: with this in mind, the Employers’ Side 
questioned why additional premiums were needed on top of this.  
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 Resultantly, by the time the NMW began to rise at a percentile rate lower than 
that afforded to Ordinary Grade workers, the Workers’ Side had lost the practical 
ability to control the Casual Grade. The Employers’ Side had managed to establish a 
de facto link between the NMW and the AMW: while the Union was still seeking a 
symbolic differential, in reality the farmers had managed to firmly associate the two 
bands with one another. While the Union could, and still did, complain about the 
industry gap, payment at the NMW had simply become too widespread and 
standardised for the Union to have any chance in significantly altering the wage rates 
of those paid the Casual AMW: left unable to legitimately compete in a public arms 
race of dissatisfaction, due to the apparent legitimacy of the NMW, the best the Union 
could achieve was a symbolic separation of a single penny. Resultantly, the AWB’s 
apparatuses came to be exclusively used as a vehicle to better the material interests of 
relatively protected workers.  
 However, this vehicle became less responsive to the Union’s actions. From 
having had a subordinatory control over the Casual Rate, these wider environmental 
circumstances had left the Union with no control over the most precarity-prone in 
agriculutre’s wages: this lack of control rendered the Union’s legal strategy, 
dependent on subordinatory tendencies, ineffective at securing the interests of even 
the more privileged workers in the market. During the prolonged period where the 
Causal Rate/NMW outpaced rises in the Ordinary Grade, the Union was forced to 
concede ground over Ordinary Grade workers and those on the Craft Grades: while 
basic wage rises remained steady, many of the ancillary provisions provided by the 
AWB were systematically reduced or limited during the late 1990s and 2000s. This 
was due to the fact that the Union had come to lack the controls needed to offer up 
stalls in the Casual Grade as a subordinatory sacrifice to employers.  
 So, in 1998 the AWB Orders changed from awarding weekly pay deals for 
full-time workers to hourly pay deals: this transition was long resisted by the Union in 
fear that it would prove to be the thin end of a wedge leading to restrictions in 
overtime payments.182 That same year the Landworker revealed an implicit fear of the 
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Union regarding the NMW, when it argued that the above inflation pay deal for 
Causal Workers was “not a generous deal… as (the farmers) have funded this by 
paying less to regular workers”.183 Likewise, in 2006 the farmers managed to redefine 
the formula used to ascertain the level of pay a full-time farmworker was entitled to 
during their holidays, so that only the farmworkers’ standard pay, excluding overtime, 
would be taken into account when determining holiday rates.184 Some post-1997 
decisions regarding ancillary provisions have not entirely benefited the employers185: 
however, a perusal of the RoWiA documents of these years reveals an undeniable 
retreating, or else stagnating, trend in the remits and generosities of provisions which 
had previously principally benefited full-time workers; on-call allowances186; 
travelling time allowances; holiday pay; sick pay; overtime pay; night work 
supplements; dog allowances; and rest break provisions have all retreated in the past 
decade and a half.187  
 This trend proves that, despite discursively acknowledging that it was against 
the Union’s long-term material interests, the Union had pursued wage settlements 
with a subordinatory orientation in the decades preceding the implementation of the 
NMW: once regulative controls in the national economic arena prevented employers 
and workers from freezing and/or stagnating the lowest band of agricultural wages in 
order to ‘pay’ for the concessions afforded to more privileged workers, these 
concessions were gradually withdrawn from the AWB’s Orders.  
 This loss of effectiveness soon caused the Union to consciously address the 
true nature of its underlying orientation towards non-standard forms of work: could it 
support the effects of the NMW, which was closing the gap between the working 
conditions of casually and standardly employed workers, if it meant an erosion of 
remuneration levels for Ordinary Grade workers and above? The Union soon found 
an answer: in 2003, despite the fact that European legislation had proscribed the 
payment of the casualising Starter Rate to workers employed on fixed-term contracts, 
the Employers’ Side managed to create a startlingly similar Manual Harvest Worker 
Rate, which, like its predecessor, paid the NMW; the Union rhetorically resisted the 
implementation and maintenance of this new grade, which was applicable for the first 
twelve, rather than four, weeks of continuous employment.188; however, tellingly, 
once the Order was imposed the Union wrote to the AWB arguing that “the flexibility 
in savings that the industry would achieve from the implementation of the Manual 
Harvest Rate is in excess of that which has been taken into account, and should be 
used to support far greater improvements in other areas”189; that is to say, the 
subordination of precarity-prone workers should result in greater pay for the more 
privileged workers in the market. Well used as it was to subordinating the interests of 
some in the workforce for the betterment of others, the Union failed to react creatively 
to the creation of the NMW, even after the Wage significantly limited the partially 
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efficient effectiveness of its historically divisive manoeuvrings on the Board. Lacking 
a tried and tested substitute, the Union instead clung onto its pre-rejuvenatory modus 
operandi in practice. 
 
 The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that the imposition of the 
NMW limited the effectiveness of the Union’s subordinatory actions on the AWB, 
when it lost the de facto ability to help determine the lowest grades of the AWB’s 
Orders. However, the Union clung to its partially subordinatory, and decidedly pre-
rejuvenationary, tendencies throughout the 2000s, seemingly for lack of an 
alternative. 
 
10. Attempting to Save the Board. 
 
 To complete our analysis, we must look at a stream of union activity not 
directly related to the Farmworkers’ Union’s actions on the AWB, but its wider 
actions regarding the AWB. We saw in section eight that the Union, after witnessing 
the fate of Wages Councils and the mainstream Movement during the cascade of 
decline, came to embrace tighter than it ever had before the continued existence of the 
AWB: however, agriculture, while idiosyncratic, was not immune from the economic 
restructurings that affected the wider economy post-1970. The AWB has come under 
threat on several occasions since then: in this section I analyse what strategies the 
Union has utilised to protect the AWB, and the effectiveness of these said strategies.  
 The AWB has faced two existential crises since the 1970s. The first in 1993, 
concurrent with the final abolition of the Wages Councils, the second in 2010: in both 
instances Conservative led governments sought to abolish totally the AWB.190 The 
first attempt was unsuccessful, and the Union, and other supporters, managed to 
secure the AWB’s continued existence. The latter seems to have been more decisive. 
At the time of writing only a High Court injunction can save the AWB in England, as 
the necessary legislation needed for abolition has passed both Houses of 
Parliament.191 From this we have to ask: why was the Union, committed to the AWB 
in both instances, apparently successful during one existential crisis, and unsuccessful 
for the other? Can this be explained with reference to the Union’s choice of strategy? 
To answer these questions, allow us to look at each crisis in detail.  
 Rhetorically, the Union privileged the interests of precarity-prone workers in 
1993’s first “Battle for the AWB”192: it was a well-established fact that there was an 
overrepresentation of females in lower grades of agricultural work, and a 
                                                
190 In addition to these Conservative led assaults, the AWB faced a lesser, but still significant, threat 
regarding readjustments to its purview under New Labour: a governmental review of its operations 
sought to appraise the AWB’s remit with “no fixed idea about its future” in 1998. Then, the Union 
argued that no limiting of scope should occur, and instead the AWB’s remit should expand to cover a 
greater range of rural workers. Eventually, no significant alternations to the AWB occurred. Quote 
from Agricultural Minister Elliot Morely, cited in The Landworker, October 1998; cf. The Landworker, 
November/December 1999; January/ February 2000; May/June 2000; September/October 2000; 
November/December 2000. 
191 The issue of Wales has caused a relatively sizeable constitutional conflict between Westminster and 
the Welsh Assemble: London claims to hold the authority to abolish the AWB outright, as general 
powers regarding employment policies were never devolved to the Welsh, while Cardiff claims that its 
devolved powers regarding agricultural policy grant it the right to preserve a newly independent Welsh 
Agricultural Wages Board: the issue is currently being considered in the courts. Powers over the 
Scottish and Northern Irish Boards unequivocally reside in their Devolved Parliament and Assembly 
respectively, and therefore their futures remain assured for the time being.  
192 The Landworker, September 1993. 
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disproportionate number of female workers working at or slightly above the AMW in 
each relevant wage bracket; the Union therefore argued that the resultant downward 
wage pressures produced by the abolition of the AWB would disproportionately, and 
illegally, affect female workers’ pay packets.193 From this it should be clear that, 
discursively at least, the Union was seeking to protect the AWB with a rejuvenatory, 
inclusive or perhaps engaging, orientation. While many of the statutory rewards of the 
AWB were in fact reserved for relatively privileged members of the workforce, the 
“end of sick pay… holiday pay… (and) overtime rates” was, perhaps disingenuously, 
being fought against in the name of those who could not secure these otherwise via 
informal premium payments.194 
 Facing the dismantling of its principle arena of contention, the Farmworkers’ 
Union deployed a whole array of strategies in an attempt to protect the AWB in this 
first Battle. Union lawyers incited European and International legislation: the Union, 
with the aid of the TUC, argued that abolition would not only contravene Equal Pay 
legislation, but “would place the UK in breach of its obligation under Article 39 of the 
Treaty of Rome and violate the Council of Europe’s Social Charter”, both of which 
required the state to secure the presence of collective bargaining in agriculture.195 This 
represented the deployment of a legal approach differentiated from that which 
occurred within the confines of the AWB. Additionally, events, rallies, lobbies and 
meetings were held around the country196, and a massive letter writing campaign 
targeting MAFF and MPs was effectively encouraged,197 as was a national petition.198 
Such events in isolation can not be taken to represent a commitment to a campaigning 
approach of Union action: during the high-tide of British voluntarism the hegemonic 
Movement was wont to participate in regular extravagant lobbies and rallies. 
However, an increased focus on cooperation with societal organisations, prominently 
church groups and the Citizens Advice Bureaux, represented a coherent usage of this 
rejuvenatory strategy.  
 From 2010 onwards many of these same strategies were pursued. The 
Farmworkers again used a differentiated legal argument and approach: challenging 
the speed of which the government was acting and the legality of its four week, 
internet-by-default consultative period, seen to be biased in favour of agribusiness and 
discriminatory against isolated rural workers199; in addition, the Union claimed once 
again that abolition would breach various international laws and conventions.200 
Furthermore, the Union argued that abolition would breach national equality laws: as 
abolition would disproportionately affect the casual workforce, who lacked written 
contracts that would secure their current wage level in the medium term at least, and 
this was where female and BME agricultural workers were overly concentrated.201 
                                                
193 The Landworker, June 1993. 
194 Trades Union Congress, Report of Congress 1993, London: TUC, pg. 355. 
195 Trades Union Congress, Submission in Response to the Government’s Consultative Document, pg. 
2, 18. 
196 The Landworker, September 1993. 
197 Trades Union Congress, Report of Congress 1994, London: TUC, 1994; The Landworker, 
September 1993. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Holland of Unite, Response to the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs’ 
Consultation on the Abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board for England and Wales; Matt Draper of 
Unite, Letter to David Heath M.P. of DEFRA, r.e. Announcement of Consultation Abolition of 
Agricultural Wages Board and Associated Structures, London: Unite, 25th October 2012. 
200 Holland of Unite, Response to the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs’ 
Consultation on the Abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board for England and Wales 
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The increased complexity of these legal arguments, similar in form to those raised in 
the 1990s but deeper in content and referencing, reflects the expanded resources the 
Union enjoyed as part of Unite, the super-union. Like in the 1990s, the Union 
organised the lobbying of MPs: Union members were particularly advised to “lobby a 
Lib”202, the minority partners in the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition 
Government who, unlike their Tory colleagues, did not include a commitment of 
abolition in their election manifestos; the Liberals were seen as approachable targets 
due to the fact that many Liberal MPs occupy marginal rural seats potentially 
influenced by farmworker ballots.203 Concurrently, press releases, media interviews 
and cooperation with the wider Movement and other societal groups again represented 
an actualisation of a campaigning approaches to union action204: with the support of 
Unite, the TUC and societal organisations the Union launched an eclectic “Save Rural 
Britain” campaign, that twinned the preservation of the AWB with other issues 
regarding governmental cutbacks in the rural environment205; again, a broad based 
campaign linking the Union with additional societal groups was sought and largely 
secured.  
  Likewise, many of the same rhetoric expressions of orientation seen in 1993 
were espoused again: according to the Union’s own sources, the preservation of the 
AWB was again being sought for the better protection of the most precarity-prone in 
the industry.206 So, there was no fundamental divergence in strategy nor orientation, 
between the two discrete campaigns; more so, after the TGWU had merged with the 
general union Amicus to form Unite, the Farmworkers’ Union (a.k.a. Trade Group) 
had more financial and organisational resources, with which to combat the proposed 
cut this time round. Why then, did one portfolio of strategies appear to succeed and 
another, so similar, fail? 
 To give a short answer: the Union’s apparent success ultimately relied upon 
employer support. In the 1990s the NFU, going against the apparent economic 
paradigm espoused by John Major’s Conservative Government, opposed abolition. 
Despite performing a yearly ritual of contention and dissatisfaction, the farmers, at the 
time, remained loyal to the AWB’s continued existence: despite the government’s 
arguments, directed at employers, that the AWB’s abolition would increase 
productivity and profit through the guise of flexibility, the farmers were cautious 
about exploiting the opportunities afforded by the presence of an anti-union political 
adminstration. This should not be too surprising, as organised capital has been 
repeatedly shown to oppose, for entirely self-interested reasons, the creation and 
maintenance of lasissez faire markets207: indeed, numerous theorists have found that, 
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been shown that, during the Post-War period, numerous employers in Britain supported many of the 
now controversial bastions of union action, such as the presence of the closed shop, which was seen by 
many as a source of efficiency in the workplace, in that it promoted “order, cohesion and a sense of 
authority”. Cf. Robert Taylor, Workers and the New Depression, London: Macmillan, 1982. 
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for an initial period at least, certain employers and managers in Britain and elsewhere 
were relatively cautious in disrupting Post-War status quos of industrial relations, 
despite the new opportunities that the cascade of decline had afforded them.208  
 A Rainbow Coalition of interests had come out in favour of retention: the 
Union accrediting the survival of the AWB to  “employers, workers, councils and 
churches. The entire rural community spoke with one voice”209: 3628 consultations 
were received by the government in 1993, of which just 15 were in favour of 
abolition.210 However, the government did not hear all these voices equally: when the 
TGWU’s General Secretary, Bill Morris, thanked those “who fought side by side with 
(the Union) to retain the AWB”, he was the first to highlight that the NFU, who “were 
prepared to stand up and say, ‘enough is enough. We think there is a value to keeping 
the AWB’”, was not a, but the vital partner in the Union’s coalition.211  
 This employer support was guided by self-interested motivations. Interviewing 
employer representatives in the latter 1980s, Danziger heard from NFU delegates that 
the AWB was ultimately supported by entirety of the agricultural industry as it took 
“all the aggravation out of setting approximate levels of wages away from the average 
employer… and worker so that they are able to work together on very good terms… 
able to vent their feelings on the Wages Board… a group of faceless people”212. 
Enjoying the structural biases of the AWB, and consistently deflating real wage 
increases through the process of wage stratification, the farmers lacked a major 
complaint with the AWB: only the positives were apparent – the ability to depoliticise 
employment relations in an industry typified by close personal contact between 
workers and employers.213 The ideologically driven Conservative Government, which 
by the early 1990s was facing assaults on all fronts, could not afford a showdown 
with the combined self-interested strengths of agricultural labour and capital, and 
subsequently left the AWB in tact as Britain’s sole surviving statutory wage 
mechanism in the post-Wages Councils, pre-NMW era.   
 However, in 2010 37% of responses to the government’s preliminary 
consultation were in favour of outright abolition.214 Employers and the NFU had 
                                                
208 Paul Edwards, “Managing Labour Relations Through the Recession”. In: Employment Relations, 
1986, 7(2), pp. 101-122; Phillip Beaumont, “Structural Change and Industrial Relations: the United 
Kingdom”. In A. Gladstone, H. Wheeler, J. Rojot, F. Eyraud and B. Ben-Israel (eds.), Labour Relations 
in a Changing Environment, Berlin: de Gruyuer, 1992, pp. 203-14; Crouch, Afterword. 
209 The Landworker, March 1995. 
210 Hatchett et al., The Implications for the National Minimum Wage of the Abolition of the 
Agricultural Wages Board in England and Wales, pg. 7. 
211 Trades Union Congress, Report of Congress 1995, pg. 36. 
212 Danziger, Political Powerlessness, pg. 124.  
213 This one-time function of tripartite agricultural industrial relations found its parallel in concurrent 
trends in the wider economy: Marchinton finds similarly that trade union organisation has at times 
suited employers, who have found that the presence of employer and worker representatives simplifies 
a firm’s internal communication and negotiation channels. Cf. Mick Marchington, “Managing Labour 
Relations in a Competitive Environment”. In: A. Sturdy, D. Knights and H. Willmore (eds.), Skill and 
Consent: Contemporary Studies in the Labour Process, London: Routledge, 1992. 
214 Out of a total of 947 responses, 347 were in favour of abolition. 580 Reponses (61%) were in favour 
of complete retention: however, the government, rather ironically in the light of the Union’s correct 
claims that the internet-by-default nature of consultation biased the process in the favour of employers 
at the expense of technology-poor workers, summarily dismissed 242 of the retention-favoured 
consultations, due to the apparently incriminating fact that they were received via the website 
change.co.uk; as a result, outright abolition was the most favoured course of action for the Board, by 
the government’s reckoning at least. Cf. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
Consultation on the Future of the Agricultural Wages Board for England and Wales, and Agricultural 
Wages Committees and Agricultural Dwelling House Advisory Committees in England. 
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previously voiced unease over having to take on the role of pay negotiators while 
working so closely with their employees, having to be aware of all relevant 
employment laws and regulations: yet the NFU now came out in support of abolition 
as its official line, arguing the AWB was “outdated” and “unnecessary” in the light of 
the implementation of the National Minimum Wage in 1999 and the 1998 Working 
Time Directive.215 With ever greater percentages of the agricultural workforce 
employed as causal workers, in receipt of a basic pay rate virtually equal to the 
NMW, employers relied less on the AWB to be their negotiators: discussions on the 
Low-Pay Commission just as easily provided the anonymising influence needed to 
avoid industrial strife. Afforded a new pantomine Straw Man with which to negate the 
potential for workplace conflict, the NFU took away their support of the AWB.  
 The NFU did not receive the full support of its memberships in making this 
claim: indeed trying to highlight the divisions in employer opinion became a key 
plank of the Union’s campaign; the Union conducted “straw polls” of farmers on the 
South Coast and found the majority in favour of retention.216 However the NFU’s 
official support seems to have been enough to facilitate governmental action: despite 
the Union’s and other societal groups best efforts, statutory agricultural wage 
machinery was rapidly deconstructed in one fell swoop – the Union found itself 
powerless when lacking the base support of employers.. 
 
 The key lesson to take from this section is the Union adopted a varied 
portfolio of differentiated rejuvenatory strategies, in a relatively coherent manner, in 
its efforts to protect the AWB in the 1990s and 2010s: however, no strategy seems to 
have been particularly effective, and the strategic actions of employers seem to have 
been more decisive in both campaigns. 
  
Section 11. Summary of the Union on and around the AWB. 
 
 This chapter helps address research sub-questions (vi) through to (viii) with 
regards to the Farmworkers’ Union in the operational domain of worker 
remuneration. To summarise each: 
 
vi)  What orientations and strategies has the Union employed with regards to 
precarity-prone workers? 
 
Despite the meagre offerings the structurally biased Board grants, the 
Farmworkers’ Union has, , throughout our periodisation, been dependent on a legal 
approach to collective bargaining in pursuit of its members’ interests. The Union has 
largely refrained from adopting the usage of strategic strike actions to back its claims 
on their Board, and has felt compelled to adopt a subordinatory orientation towards 
precarity-prone workers, right up to the present day. Additionally, while not regarding 
precarity-prone work per se, the Union adopted a number of complementary 
                                                
215 Hatchett et al., The Implications for the National Minimum Wage of the Abolition of the 
Agricultural Wages Board in England and Wales, pg. 25. 
216 The Union did win the explicit support of a minority of farmers, mostly small in manpower size, 
who had elected to remain apart from the NFU: the Farmers’ Union of Wales, a small-sized 
organisation representing mostly tenant farmers – who largely employ a small number of staff – 
supported retention of the AWB as “an important means of avoiding potential conflict and lengthy 
negotiations with individual staff”; these sentiments were supported by Britain’s small-sized Tenant 
Farmers’ Association. However neither of these two organisations held the organisational or financial 
resources needed to influence the governmental discourses surrounding abolition. Ibid., pg. 25. 
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strategies, embodying distinctly rejuvenatory campaigning and legal approaches, in its 
attempts to save the AWB from the 1990s onwards.  
 
vii) What causal mechanisms have been responsible for producing or inhibiting 
said orientations and strategies? 
 
Successive governments, keen to stabilise agricultural production, ultimately 
imposed the observed legal approach to unionism on the agricultural environment. 
Alternatively, inadequacies in the Union’s power resources in comparison to those of 
employers in the industry explain the Union’s hegemonic lack of strategic strike 
action, and its subordinatory orientation towards precarity-prone workers: both were 
reactions, of an organisation under extreme duress, to the meagre inroads offered by 
these resource discrepancies: rational choices, and path dependencies from earlier 
struggles, helped select the Union’s actions from the 1970s onwards; while the Union 
recognised the theoretical value of an inclusive orientation towards precarity-prone 
workers, structural biases on and around the AWB forced the actualisation of 
subordinatory orientations in practice from the resource deficient union. 
 
viii) How effective have said strategies been in securing the Union’s desired 
orientational goals, and why? 
 
 The effectiveness of the enforced legal approach of the AWB has always been 
slight for the Union, in the face of the disproportionate economic powers of the 
Employer’s  Side and an often hostile political environment: indeed, after the 
imposition of the NMW the Union has even struggled to secure the interests of the 
more privileged workers in the industry, as the Wage removed the Union’s ability to 
control the Casual Grade in a subordinatory manner.217 However, disregarding a brief 
period of reformist tendencies in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Union has embraced 
the legal approach as the proverbial lesser of two evils: according to the Union’s 
perceptions, a high degree of inefficiency did not equate to an absolute 
ineffectiveness.  
 Finally, the strategies of the Union in seeking first save the AWB were not 
ultimately decisive in either of the two campaigns the Union participated in in recent 
decades: instead the orientation of more powerful agricultural employers played a 
greater role in determining the eventual outcome of events. Others have reached 
similar conclusions regarding the ineffectiveness of Union action alone: studying 
farmworkers,218 Newby argued in the 1970s that so slight were the workforces’ own 
resources that the only chance for a “dramatic improvement’ in the farmworkers’ life-
chances lay in “external political action, including legislation” and the “decisive 
intervention of external agencies”.219 At this stage of analysis one must be cautious in 
ascribing to such a pessimistic interpretation: however, one is forced to agree that 
rather than participating in a legally enforced tripartite approximation of voluntarism, 
a more focussed usage of alternative strategies, such as differentiated legal 
approaches, campaigning approaches and perhaps even partnership approaches, 
would better suit the Farmworkers’ Union, and others coming to operate in similar 
economic environments. The following chapter continues analysis by examining the 
                                                
217 Unfortunately for the most precarity-prone workers in the industry, this did not guarantee a 
continuous rise in living standards, as the NMW began to offer real wage cuts from 2006 onwards. 
218 N.B Not directly the Farmworkers’ Union. 
219 Newby, The Deferential Worker, pg. 435-6. 
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orientation and strategies of the Union in additional arenas of contention where such 
approaches were repeatedly deployed throughout our periodisation. 
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Chapter 4: The Farmworkers’ Union and Quality of Life Issues. 
 
 Clearly unions, rejuvenatory and otherwise, do not busy themselves solely 
with issues regarding end-of-week remuneration. A union attends to a whole host of 
further occupational and lifestyle concerns when it addresses the needs of its 
members. The mainstream Movement in the Post-War Era became adept at 
contending many such grievances in arenas of voluntary collective bargaining, having 
let its influence in alternative arenas of contention slacken. Contrarily, the 
Farmworkers’ Union has had to rely on alternative strategies when dealing in 
operational domains not directly related to remuneratory issues, as the AWB’s legal 
remit excludes certain issues from the tripartite body’s negotiating table: this chapter 
shifts the thesis’ narrative to look at the Farmworkers’ Union’s concurrent actions in 
two such domains; one related to worker housing, the other health and safety. In each 
instance the Union has, diverging from the Post-War modus operandi of voluntary 
collective bargaining, sought the aid of societal actors internal, but also external, to 
the Movement when in pursuit of its interests.  
In the first half of the chapter, we explore the Union’s relationship with the 
tied-cottage system. Firstly, a brief descriptive history of this system is presented. 
Sections two and three describe the Union’s strategies utilised against the system, up 
until the passing of a key piece of legislation in 1976. Section four assesses the 
orientations of the Union during the actualisation of these strategic actions, and 
section five analyses the strategies’ effectiveness. Section six determines the causal 
mechanisms the helped select the Union’s orientations and strategies, and section 
seven gives a brief summary of the chapter’s intermediately findings regarding 
research sub-questions (vi) – (viii). 
During the course of analysis an unexpected finding is made regarding the 
effectiveness of rejuvenatory legal approaches to union action. In order to interrogate 
this matter further, the chapter shifts its narrative again to look at a differentiated 
operational domain, related to health and safety issues. Sections eight to twelve 
investigate the actualisation of two discrete sets of union actions in this domain: the 
first regarding pesticide regulations, the second union safety representatives in 
agriculture. Section thirteen summarises these sections’ findings, and relates them to 
those made in section seven. 
 
1. Agriculture’s Precarious Tied-Cottage System. 
 
After giving birth in London, Kay, a farmworker’s wife, returned to her 
Yorkshire home. She found that her landlord, her husband’s employer, had given her 
partner notice to quit, and removed all the family’s possessions from the cottage. Kay 
had been taken ill towards the end of her pregnancy, and her husband took a Saturday 
morning off to attend to her medical needs: this apparent slight caused the family to 
lose both its home and source of income. This is not a Dickensian account of 
Victorian England: Kay and her family were evicted from their ‘tied-cottage’ in 
19741. This section gives a brief introduction to the history and form of the tied-
cottage system, and demonstrates why it is of relevance for this thesis, focussed as it 
is on labour precarity.  
Tied-cottaging is a system where one’s accommodation is provided by one’s 
employer for nominal rent as part of an employment contract. Other areas of Britain’s 
                                                
1 The Landworker, September 1974. 
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economy have developed tied-cottage systems,2 but the then-idiosyncratic 
organisation of British agriculture gave its tied-cottage system a unique character by 
the 1970s. In the nationalised industries, where tied-cottaging was prevalent, 
numerous tenants normally shared a single depersonalised employer/landlord.3 
Contrastingly, in agriculture there were +70,000 potential landlords in the industry in 
the 1970s4: this prohibited the depersonalisation of tenancy agreements. For 
agricultural tied-cottagers, security of employment and tenure depended ultimately in 
the maintenance of good personal relationships with one’s employer.  
In pre-industrial and early Victorian times, the maintenance of the tied-cottage 
system was intimately linked to penetrative and persisting social relations borne under 
feudalism: G.M Trevelyn links the modern tied-cottaging system with feudal 
institutions, where lords ‘provided’ housing to the peasantry in return for labour; due 
to the resultant web of interpersonal dependencies created by this system, “the peasant 
could not strike… neither could the lord evict”. Clearly these prototypical tied-
cottages created employment precarity – overdependence on one’s labour relationship 
– for peasants and lords alike, albeit with an unequal distribution of risks in the lord’s 
favour.5 Existing sporadically since the enclosures, the Victorian agricultural tied-
cottage system expanded extensively as an extra-economic bonding mechanism 
between employees and employers from the passing of the 1867 Agricultural Gang 
Act. This Act problematised pre-existing forms of labour exploitation, thereby 
increasing labour recruitment costs for employers.6 To deal with a resultant shortage 
of cheap labour, farmers began to build housing on their farms, to attract and gain 
controls over agricultural labourers.  
Divergently, agricultural tied-cottaging in the Post-War Era received its 
primary sustenance from the shape of rural housing markets. For numerous reasons, 
not least the traditional Conservative domination of local rural politics, agricultural 
areas had a smaller proportion of council houses than urban centres throughout the 
Twentieth Century, despite comparable levels of demand between these geographies: 
in the late 1970s, 22% of all properties in non-urban areas in the UK were council 
owned, compared to 32% of the national average.7 Moreover, from the end of WWII 
onwards, wealthy urban-dwelling “weekenders” came to place additional pressures on 
rural housing when seeking pastoral hideaways, tightening housing markets further8: 
by the mid-1970s rural properties cost on average 160% of the national average, while 
the average farmworker earned 67% of the all-industry average.9 Such pressures led 
to a Post-War solidification of the tied-cottage system in proportional terms: in 1948 
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34.3% of all farmworkers were tied-cottagers, by 1975 this number had risen to 
53%.10 ‘Modern’ tied-cottaging was a structural imperative of agriculture’s place-
dependent production11: rural areas suffering from a lack of affordable housing were 
prone to bearing labour relations with accommodation ‘deals’ attached, the terms and 
quality of which left to the will of the stronger party – the employer. 
 
 The tied-cottage was, for an average member of the Union at the beginning of 
our periodisation, a more acrimonious and divisive issue then the Union’s annual 
encounters on the Agricultural Wages Board. As seen, a key function of the AWB 
was its tendency to remove industrial tensions from the average farmyard, by 
imposing apparently anonymous decisions on both sides of industry: contrarily, the 
tied-cottage “epitomise(d) the conflict of interest between capital and labour, with 
each side pursuing its legitimate interest to the detriment of the other”.12 Before and 
during the 1970s, farmers and their allies cited numerous operating needs when 
legitimating the system, not in the least claiming that without round-the-clock 
supervision of livestock, national meat and dairy production would collapse. In 1976, 
Gasson found that farmers perceived the need to house foremen and livestock workers 
as highly pressing for this reason, while the housing of other agricultural workers was 
“desirable but not essential”.13 
 While agricultural employers defended the system as essential, much of the 
agricultural workforce “attack(ed) it as demoralising, degrading and unnecessary”.14 
Only a small minority of tied-cottagers ever experienced the ignominy of arbitrary 
eviction, though the Landworker had been full of highly charged, emotive accounts of 
evictions between 1920 and the 1970s15: on average, physical evictions occurred 
around 20 times per year in the Post-War Era16; however, it has to be remembered 
that, annually, hundreds of tied-cottagers, while avoiding the physical interventions of 
bailiffs, were forced to locate temporary shelter after being given notice to quit. More 
than evictions, the Union in the 1970s feared the less photogenic, but “subtle and 
insidious” powers that the threat of such actions gifted to employers17: Joan Maynard, 
a Union sponsored MP, told Parliament in 1976 that “eviction is merely the tip of the 
iceberg. It is not whether a person is evicted; it is whether the power is there to do it. 
That is what counts, that power has hung like the Sword of Damocles over the heads 
of our people for many years”.18 In the same year the Union conducted a 
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15 Cf. The Landworker, September 1946; August 1960; December 1972. 
16 Shelter, The Forgotten Problem, pg. 15; Newby, The Deferential Worker, pg. 96-7. 
17 Maynard, quoted in Mason O’Connor, Joan Maynard, pg. 214.  
18 House of Commons, Record of 4th May 1976, London: Hansard, 1976. 
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questionnaire regarding living conditions and found that while most agricultural 
workers could not afford a mortgage on their wage level, the majority – 60% of tied-
cottagers and non-tied workers alike – would have preferred to be private-home 
owners if possible19: this suggests that the tied-cottage was imposed on agricultural 
workers, for lack of an alternative, in this era. 
 Reliant of the “grace and favour” of one’s employer,20 tied-cottagers were, and 
are, the embodiment of the definition of an employee working in precarious 
conditions. Tied-cottaging, in an unregulated form, heightens risks associated with 
illness, injury and retirement: in fear of the loss of one’s home, workers endanger 
their health and work/life balance by working when hard-labour is qualitatively 
against their material interests. Furthermore, by restricting labour mobility – a tied-
cottager searching for proverbial pastures new would have to look for both work and 
housing – the system mitigates against the improvement of wages and conditions: 
Newby, studying East Anglican agricultural workers in the 1970s, finds that despite 
the poor working conditions in the region there was a low voluntary quit rate in 
agriculture; he attributes this to the “substantial portion of workers who have lacked 
the opportunity to move rather than made a choice to stay”; lacking the resources to 
seek alternative accommodation and work, workers were resultantly unable to use the 
threat of the drift from the land as an effective bargaining tool to raise conditions21. 
Resultantly, unable to ruffle their landlords’ feathers, tied-cottagers’ “housing stock 
(was) of a significantly lower quality than the general populations’” as of 1974.22  
 By welding the domestic and work spheres, tied-cottaging likewise sharpens 
the sense of isolation and insecurity for workers. Looking specifically at agriculture, 
this is not in the least due to the actual physical presence of tied-cottages: Irving and 
Hilgendorf find that in the mid-1970s only 21% of tied agricultural cottagers had to 
travel +½ mile to work, as compared to 64% of non-tied agriculturalists; however, 
71% of tied-cottagers had to travel +½ mile to reach the nearest shop, compared to 
42% of non-tied workers; only 1% of tied-cottagers lived within ½ mile of the nearest 
secondary school, compared to 29% of their non-tied peers, while the mean distance 
of an agricultural tied-cottager to the nearest shopping town was 6.36 miles, 
compared to the 3.8 miles of the non-tied workforce.23 Isolation, physical and mental, 
produces an artificial appearance of acquiesce and passivity on the part of the 
agricultural workforce, in apparent deference to their duel-power wielding 
landlord/employer. 
 To illustrate how this artificial deference works, see the Landworker, which 
reported an anecdote of a sixty-nine year old labourer cutting cabbage in a torrential 
storm in 1966: challenged why she allowed such demands to be made on her labour, 
the worker replied “you know how it is. I am living in a house. If I do not do it (the 
landlord) will want it for someone else”.24 Similarly Wynn, studying jobs 
                                                
19 National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, Outlook for Agriculture, pg. 21. 
20 National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, Abolition of the Tied-cottage System in 
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21 Newby, The Deferential Worker, pg. 162. 
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23 Ibid. 
24 The Landworker, July 1966.  
 135 
advertisements in a farming paper in the 1960s, finds that 19.1% of posted 
agricultural vacancies placed requirements on farmworkers well in excess of the 
applicant’s ability on the farm: it would be difficult to imagine the advertising of 
factory positions in the 1960s which stipulated that applicants had to have a partner 
who would be made available to work in the employer’s home, or on a part-time basis 
at the firm; however, such demands were regularly found in the agricultural labour 
market, in 6.3% and 9.5% of all adverts respectively.25 Wynn, describing the tied-
cottage system’s informal regulative powers in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries, summarises pithily “woe betide any (tied-cottager) who had the terminity 
to put up a liberal… or labour poster”.26  
 While the above quotes and statistics may be interpreted as examples of 
partisan hyperbole, empirical evidence supports such statements: Giles and Cowie, 
interviewing tied-farmworkers in Gloucestershire in 1960, find a number of their 
interviewees “confess(ed) frankly to feeling obliged to be careful in their 
demeanour… experiencing a sense of dependence on their employer’s goodwill. The 
vehemence with which most den(ied) such feelings… suggest(ed) an automatic face-
saving reaction to a question which challenge(d) their self-respect”27: The tied-cottage 
system makes work more precarious for workers, and workers quieter about their 
precarious situations. 
 
The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that tight rural housing 
markets maintained the historic tied-cottage system in the Post-War Era. The system 
produced precarity on the part of the workforce, by personalising employment 
relations between employers and workers, requiring acquiescence on the part of 
employees. Unable to seek alternatives, tied agricultural workers were more reliant 
on the dictates of their employer in comparison to urban worker, and therefore more 
prone to entering precarious labour relations typified by over-employment, a lack of 
agency and poor working conditions 
 
 2. The Farmworkers’ Union and the Tied-cottage: Actions Prior to 1970. 
 
 The following sections examine the Union’s strategies regarding the tied-
cottage. As demonstrated later in this chapter, an apparently decisive piece of 
legislation greatly affected the agricultural tied-cottage system in 1976, only six years 
after the initiation of our periodisation. In order to understand the processes that 
helped bring about this legislation, it is important to view the Union’s actions through 
a slightly wider temporal lens, and first describe and assess the strategies of the Union 
prior to the 1970s.  
 In the earlier Twentieth Century, pre-empting Newby’s assessment of the 
agricultural workforces’ lack of industrial resources,28 the Union sunk most of its 
efforts into trying to influence the orientations, priorities and pace of the PLP, and 
the Labour Party’s extra-parliamentary NEC, in an attempt to legally reregulate the 
tied-cottage system. The Union first requesting political interference over the issue in 
1909, when George Edwards, President of the Eastern Counties Agricultural 
Labourers’ and Smallholder’s Union, explained to the TUC, with PLP delegates in 
                                                
25 Wynn, Skilled at All Trades, pg. 193. 
26 Ibid., pg. 184. 
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156. 
28 Cf. chapter three, footnote 219 of this thesis. 
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attendance, how the system left workers “having to agree to draconian contracts”.29 
At the conference, Edwards called on activists in the Labour Party to “take up at once 
the issue of eviction of workmen and their families from their homes during trade 
disputes… do everything possible to… put an end to this cruel method of warfare”.30  
 Such lobbying occurred both when the Labour Party was in government and in 
opposition: the Union never fancied its chances with the Conservatives, bleakly 
assessing that, save for a “miraculous change of heart by the Gentlemanly Party, it 
would be obviously impossible for us ever to gain our policy objectives in the tied-
cottage under a Conservative Government”.31 There was good reason for such 
pessimism: between 1974-79, out of the 78 MPs who declared a private financial 
interest in agriculture, 65 were Tory, while 7 were labour.32 
 The Labour Party was then seen as the Union’s only hope, by the EC at least: 
in 1970 a minority of Biennial delegates questioned the Union’s continued electoral 
support of the Party, in exasperation of the slow-pace of progress that had been made 
on the tied-cottage issue; Union General Secretary Reg Bottini responded “if we want 
to cut our throats we can cut ourselves off from the Labour Party… you will get 
nothing just by coming here every two years and telling the Executive Committee 
what you want as regards the tied-cottage, because they cannot be done on their own. 
It has to be done by all of us (in the Union and Party) together... we are not organised, 
not politically minded enough” to proceed alone.33  
 One would be misguided in thinking this lobbying-centred legal approach was 
novel in the pre-cascade era: indeed the Webb’s commentated at the fin de siècle that 
“it is probable that no-one who is not familiar with the trade union records has any 
adequate conception of the number and variety of trade regulations which the Unions 
have sought to enforce by Act of Parliament”34: indeed, as we have seen, Britain’s 
Labour Party was borne out of the general and industrial trade unions, which sought 
to establish a legal/political wing to complement and counterbalance the influence of 
the craft societies at the end of the Nineteenth Century. 
 While the Party remained the intuitive fellow traveller of the Movement ever 
since, this child of the Movement has been anything but loyal to its principle 
forebears. In the years preceding the 1970s, the Farmworkers’ Union found itself cast 
as a particularly unappealing, distant relative in the eyes of the Party. The Union, 
throughout its history, actively advocated support for the Party at all levels of 
government and, like most of the Movement, contributed to the Party’s costs,35 not in 
the least because “to abolish the tied-cottage would need a (Labour) Government with 
a comfortable majority and strong backing in the country”.36 Through the sponsoring 
of MPs the Union even at times enjoyed a parliamentary representative within the 
PLP: the earliest was elected in 1923.37 However, such support and membership 
failed to secure the Union its material demands: the PLP consistent failed to act 
decisively on the tied-cottage issue, despite myriad Union and Labour Party 
resolutions calling for redress of the farmworkers’ grievances.  
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31 The Landworker, June 1970.  
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33 The Landworker, July 1970. 
34 Webb and Webb, Industrial Democracy, pg. 252.  
35 The Landworker, May 1970. 
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 The Union did manage to secure much rhetoric commitment from the Party.  
In the mid-1930s the Party, responding to countless resolution from all layers of the 
Union, set up an interdepartmental committee of the PLP to consider the issue: a 
majority of participating MPs concluded that the system’s continued existence could 
not be justified.38 Later, the 1947 Labour Party Conference carried, by an 
overwhelming majority, a resolution calling for the immediate abolition of the 
system39: however, the Union was persuaded not to push the issue publicly in order to 
protect the embattled Labour Government of the day.40 Most concretely, the Union 
orchestrated the insertion of a commitment into the Party’s 1964 election campaign, 
which promised substantial reform to the system so that “there would be no eviction 
from a farm cottage without suitable accommodation first being made available”.41 
 Yet despite these grand resolutions, prior to our periodisation the Union had 
won only a semblance of legislative regulation for the tied-cottage system through its 
eternal internal lobbying of the Party: even the great reformist Attlee government of 
1945-51 avoided practical action on the issue.42 Tied-cottagers did win nominal 
improvements in their tenancy rights from the 1964 Prevention from Eviction Act and 
the 1965 Rent Act: after their passings the owners of tied-accommodation needed a 
court order to precede with eviction,43 whereas before tied-cottages could be evicted 
with effectively zero notice. Additionally, the 1964 Act gave courts the right to 
suspend evictions for 12 months, so as to give tied-cottagers a suitable length of time 
to locate new housing and/or work.44 In principle then, legislation of the 1960s made 
eviction more arduous for the employer, and granted tied-cottagers significant stays of 
execution with which to get their proverbial houses in order. However both acts 
required county courts, usually dominated by landed interests, to consider the effects 
of their judgments on the efficiency of agricultural production when considering 
cases: if the farmer could persuade the court that their buisness would suffer from a 
dely in eviction, the worker’s tenancy rights were legally wavered. Due to this caveat, 
both the Union and Party recognised that neither Act “fulfilled the Party’s (1964 
election) pledge in its original terms”.45 Dispossessions continued to occur on a daily 
basis46; more damagingly, the ‘insidious powers’ of control afforded to employers by 
the system continued to envelop the industry, unabashed.  
 
 The key lesson to take from this section is that due to a self-assessed inability 
to act independently, the Union attempted, for decades before our periodisation, to 
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gently lobby the internal mechanisms of the Labour Party over the issue of the tied-
cottage, seeking to legally re-regulate the system. Prior to 1970, such a legal 
approach found little success, beyond the securing of rhetoric support.  
 
3. Union Activity post-1970: a Continuation of Union Strategy and the Passing of an 
Imperfect Act. 
 
This section continues to describe the Union’s strategies, now focussing at its 
actions between 1970 and the creation of an apparently revolutionary piece of 
legislation in 1976. The effects of this legislation on the tied-cottage system are 
subsequently discussed 
 With the Labour Party defeated in 1970, it was not until 1974 that a return of a 
Labour majority afforded the Union another chance to utilise its time honoured 
strategy on this matter: the lobbying of a Labour Government in an attempt to change 
the legal regulations of the agricultural housing market. Of course this legal approach 
was not the sole strategy employed by the Union at the time: it regularly held public 
demonstrations in an attempt to shore up sympathy for the Union’s cause.47 In 
addition, from the mid-1960s onwards the Union’s legal department regularly fought 
tied-cottager eviction cases in court on behalf of its members48: while this represented 
a differentiated legal approach of the Union, the Landworker conceded that such 
actions were purely defensive and piecemeal in action; “all we can do is to seek extra 
time - months rather than weeks".49 The Union used this approach as a practical 
method of resistance, however it focused its efforts in changing the contemporary 
system on the lobbying of the PLP and NEC. 
 Even before Labour’s return in 1974, the Union lobbied the Party hard,50 and 
succeeded in getting the NEC to include a highly supportive statement in its 1971 
mid-term ‘Programme for Britain’. The statement, authored by the Party’s NEC on 
the advice of the Union, read: “tied-cottages, a problem which has plagued us for so 
long, must be brought, as soon as possible, within the law”.51 This cleared the way for 
the Party to, once again, include a commitment in its 1974 election manifesto: the 
wording of such was stronger than it ever had been before, with the NEC promising to 
“abolish the tied-cottage system” within the Party’s “first period in Office”.52 Such a 
proviso again won unequivocal electoral support from the Union, which urged its 
members to "back Labour! And stop this age-long procession of misery and worry".53 
 After the election of the minority Labour Government of 1974,54 a letter from 
Harold Wilson, the new Prime Minister, was read to the Union’s Biennial, which 
sought to assure the delegates that the government would abide by its manifesto 
promise.55 Many in the Union were not convinced by such a claim, but fortuitously 
Joan Maynard, a Farmworkers’ Union sponsored parliamentary candidate, and 
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previously a member of the Union’s EC and Party’s NEC, was elected to Parliament 
in the same election. Resultantly, the Union enjoyed a direct, if isolated, 
parliamentary representative for the first time in four years.56  
 As a backbencher, Maynard vocally helped ensure the Party did not lose sight 
of its manifesto commitment, which she herself, as a former NEC member, had 
helped to compose. Maynard dedicated much of her Maiden Speech to the issue57: 
arguing that “without (a) labour force, its skill, adaptability and hard work, the 
(agricultural) industry would cease to function. It is high time that the labour force 
was rewarded with food wages and conditions. One way to do that is by the abolition 
of the agricultural tied-cottage”.58 The Union concurrently maintained symbolic 
pressure on the issue external to the Party: in 1975 Farmworker delegates motioned a 
successful resolution at the TUC’s Trades Councils Conference, calling on the TUC 
to press the government to end the system.59  
 In 1976, after an uncomfortably long period of governmental silence, Wilson’s 
Cabinet published a consultative document, which nominally considered how the 
ending of the tied-cottage system could best be achieved: resultant discussions led to 
the finessing of proposals, and a clear route of action emerged. The proposal, while 
stopping short of the actual abolition of the system, put the onus on Local Councils to 
provide alternative accommodation to farmworkers when farmers required them to 
vacate their homes.60  
 Conceding to the organised interests of agricultural employers, the 
government proposed to create regional Agricultural Dwelling House Advisory 
Committees (ADHACs), tripartite three person bodies formed from representatives 
from the Union and the NFU, and a MAFF appointed individual. Rather than taking 
tenants to court, the new system would require farmers to approach a regional 
ADHAC, which would meet and assess a farmer’s claim that repossession was 
essential in order to allow incoming workers to move into. If such agricultural need 
was proven, the ADHAC would instruct the relevant Local Housing Authority to 
provide “suitable alternative accommodation” to the agricultural farmworker and their 
dependents: in practice this would entail moving said worker to the front of the 
relevant local councils’ housing list.61 While initially hostile to the formation of 
ADHACs, the Union’s EC quickly came to embrace the legislation as the apparent de 
facto, if not de jure, dismantling of the tied-cottage system, or at the least the 
insidious powers it afforded to employers: Union President Bert Hazell argued that 
the proposed Rent (Agricultural) Act would “lead to a greater degree of harmony in 
the countryside".62  
 Passed by a narrow majority in the Commons, and forced through the hostile 
Lords by use of the Guillotine Procedure,63 the Union’s leadership was exuberant in 
describing the apparently revolutionary effects of the eventual 1976 Rent 
(Agriculture) Act: Reg Bottini, the Union’s General Secretary, argued that it was “one 
of the most dynamic and beneficial proposals ever put forward on behalf of farm 
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workers in England and Wales”, saying that it secured the security sought by the 
Union since its inception in 1906,64 and that while “the Union has many more battles 
to fight… I am convinced that this particular achievement is the most significant 
development in the Union's history".65 The Union marked its “red letter day” with 
emotional and genuine celebrations the length and breadth of the nation.66 
Concurrently, Big Beasts in the Party gave much credit to the Union in securing the 
Bill’s passage: John Silkin, MAFF’s senior Minister, accredited the Act as being the 
“culmination of many years hard work by the Union, and an intensive bout of skilled 
and detailed work by the EC and Union officials throughout …(the) critical 
parliamentary stages of the Bill”.67 
  
 Farmer attempts at repossessions certainly decreased as a result: MAFF 
recorded 534 ADHAC hearings in 1981, 538 in 1982 and 522 in 1983; compare this 
with the number of court cases recorded by the Union prior to 1976, and one can say 
that repossession attempts decreased by roughly 50% following the Act’s passing.68 
No longer facing the threat of being dragged through the courts, and afforded a bypass 
of council housing waiting lists, agricultural tied-cottagers went, in theory, from being 
among the least, to most, legally protected tied-tenants in the country. Indeed this 
inequality in the farmworkers’ favour was one of the first criticisms to emerge 
regarding the Act, with the Farmworkers’ Union69 and Movement70 arguing that the 
Act’s remit should be expanded to include other tied-cottagers in rural and urban 
environments. However, further glaring issues emerged with the Bill’s provisions 
within a couple of years.  
 The ADHACs were found, in practice, to favour the farmers’ interests, being 
more likely than even the county courts had been to find evidence of the ‘agricultural 
need’ for eviction71: Union researcher Tony Gould analysed MAFF data from 1001 
ADHAC hearings in Southern England in the mid-to-late 1980s and found an 
overwhelming majority of cases found such a need; in 1987 90.3% of cases went in 
the farmers’ favour, 81.9% in 1986, 87.9% in 1985 and 86.3% in 1984.72  
 In part this predisposition stemmed from the remit afforded to ADHACs by 
the Bill: while the NFU and the farmer were each allowed to submit written 
documentation prior to the meeting of an ADHAC, no allowance was made for the 
Union to provide non-verbal evidence in support of their members’ cases.73 
Moreover, the Bill required ADHACs to close cases within 28 days or less: the Union 
saw this rush as working in the employers’ favour, as ADHAC members would 
struggle to properly interrogate a farmer’s claims.74 In equal measure, the ADHACs’ 
predisposition to farmers stemmed from the informal societal institutions of rural 
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areas, with ADHACs often taking the form of “a cosy tea party or wine and dine in 
some quaint country pub”75: with much intermixing between farmers, landowners and 
local authorities, the rulings of many ADHACs seemed to be written in advance; Pye-
Smith and Rose demonstrate that “in 1967… farming was the dominant occupation of 
rural district councillors, with 35% of all rural district council members in England 
and Wales being farmers”76;  less than a decade later, an average ADHAC may well 
have seen a farmer, backed by the NFU, give evidence to a supposedly independent 
local representative of a government department long influenced by the NFU, and 
have its decisions executed by a council whose executive would be dominated by 
farmer interests. It should be little wonder then why agricultural need was found in 
such a high proportion of ADHAC cases. 
Such laxity in oversight allowed many farmers to participate in outright illegal 
behaviour, as still spiralling rural house prices left many farmers desperate to sell 
their tied-cottage stock to weekenders for massive personal profits.77 The Bill’s fine 
print only allowed a farmer to be persecuted for providing false information to an 
ADHAC within six months of an offence: this left farmers free to claim issues of 
agricultural necessity during rushed ADHAC proceedings, keep the home vacant for a 
six month period, citing unforeseen events or delays, before selling the property on, 
further reducing rural workers’ housing stock in the process.78 
 Clearly, the Bill did little to secure the tenancy of tied-cottagers. More so, a 
worsening lack of rural housing problematised Local Housing Authorities’ task of 
locating ‘suitable alternative’ housing when required: the Labour Government of the 
latter 1970s is rightly remembered as a homebuilding government, which encouraged 
rural councils to marginally increase their minimal housing stocks. Opposingly, 
Thatcher’s first government is remembered for the exact opposite: freezing 
construction programmes and conducting lightning sales of council housing stock, the 
government greatly limited rural access to social housing, which had been particularly 
limited to begin with. With “no homes for rural workers”,79 councils were forced to 
lower their standards regarding the definition of reasonable alternatives: in the 1980s, 
Local Housing Authorities were re-housing agriculturalists in substandard and distant 
housing, ripping workers from their local geographies and social networks in the 
process.80 In the worst case scenario, councils housed tenants in euphemistically 
termed ‘Bed and Breakfasts’ when no other alternative was found: in these private 
properties entire families faced, and continue to face, being housed in a single room; 
shared bathrooms are the norm and no legal requirement is made regarding the 
provision of cooking or living facilities.  
 So, while a security of sorts may have been legislated for by the Act – not a 
security of tenure but a security of housing81 – which aimed to reduce the ‘insidious 
powers’ of farming landlords, many farmworkers remained artificially subservient to 
their employers under such conditions, due to legitimate fears of the alternative. Due 
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to a lack of rural housing, farmers were still able to use the offer of tied-housing to 
retain a pacified workforce: tied-cottagers remained dependent on their employer for 
truly suitable accommodation.82 Despite the fact that the Union’s leadership 
victoriously declared that the Rent (Agriculture) Act brought about “the end of a 
vicious system which prevailed throughout generations”,83 the system was far from 
abolished in practice: tied-cottagers remained physically and psychologically isolated 
and over-dependent on their landlord/employer. Indeed, the playing out of the 1984 
overtime ban demonstrated that farmers remained able to use the threat of dismissal to 
artificially acquiesce their workforce: observations of the rubber stamping motions of 
the ADHACs would have done little to remove the figurative “Sword of Damocles” 
hanging over many in the industry.84 
 
 The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that after 1970, the Union 
continued to use the same legal lobbying strategy it had used previously, and was 
apparently able to secure an Act, which, while going further than the various tied-
cottage legislations passed in the 1960s, conservatively reformed, rather than 
abolished, the system. 
 
4. The Union’s Ultimately Subordinatory Orientation. 
  
 Having identified the strategic modus operandi of the Union up to the passing 
of the 1976 Act, this section analyses the orientation held by the Union towards 
precarity-prone work as it legally lobbied for the reform of the tied-cottage system at 
the onset of our periodisation. Tied-cottaging renders many aspects of an agricultural 
workers’ life precarious, and the Union nominally tried to dismantle the tied-cottage 
system: is this an open-and-shut case of a rejuvenatory orientation towards precarity-
prone workers? No.  
 The negative aspects of the system have been well documented, and the 
Union, before and during the 1970s, was sincere in its mission to restructure the 
institutional power structures it created and maintained. Indeed, rhetorically at least, 
the Union had often appeared to press for the total abolition of the system85: frequent 
usage of the term in the Landworker would certainly have given the general 
impression to a lay union member that this was the Union’s prerogative in any case. 
However, when speaking in confidence, the Union’s Executive was wont to argue that 
it was against “eviction of all employed farm and rural workers unless they have 
alternative accommodation to go into”.86 This discrepancy between public and private 
sentiments implies the Union’s EC was more cautious regarding the matter of the 
tied-cottage than its rank-and-file, and pushed for reform in private while giving the 
outward appearance of radically pursuing total abolition.  
 At times, this inconsistency made itself publicly known. Joan Maynard,87 a 
decidedly left-wing member of the Farmworkers’ Union, motioned at the Labour 
Party’s 1965 Conference (as a Local Party representative) for the total abolition of the 
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system, describing the effects the agricultural efficiency clause of the 1965 Rent Bill 
as leaving farmworkers unprotected in practice and the powers of the system 
undiminished. The Union’s EC delegate to Conference, Harold Collison, 
begrudgingly supported this unequivocal motion, but was compelled to publicly state 
that the Union was unhappy with the wording of the motion and that “we (the Union) 
have never sought the abolition of the tied-cottage but a change in the law to prevent 
eviction unless suitable alternative accommodation was available”.88 Responding in 
the local press, Maynard stated that a brief perusal of the Union’s most recent policy 
documents89 proved this not be the case, and that “ever since its formation, this Union 
has consistently demanded the abolition of the tied-cottage”.90 In a way both delegates 
were correct – Maynard on the public pronouncements of the Union, Collison on its 
EC’s backroom dealings 
 So, despite its rhetoric assertions, the Unions’ EC, at the onset of our 
periodisation, never pushed for total the system’s ‘abolition’ according to standard 
definitions of the term, and instead focused its efforts in securing wide reaching 
reforms. Writing in the Party’s 1976 consultative document ‘Abolition of the Tied-
cottage System in Agriculture’, Union General Secretary Reg Bottini certainly pushed 
this reformist, employer-placating logic, arguing “the focus should be on how to 
shape the legalisation on lines that will enable farmers, farmworkers, local authorities 
and other interests concerned effectively to adapt themselves to the changing 
requirements of modern society while maintain of the key contribution which this 
great industry can make to the national economy”.91  
 The otherwise marketable and privileged workers that represented the average 
tied-cottager had much to gain from such a partial reorganisation. To expand: this 
thesis has demonstrated that a greater proportion of the agricultural workforce came 
to inhabit tied-cottages in the Post-War Era. However, levels of tied-cottage 
inhabitation were, in the 1970s and 1980s, highly differentiated according to one’s 
occupational position: in 1982 MAFF found that 67.8% of dairy stockmen in England 
and Wales lived in tied-cottaging, while 51.8% of all other stockmen – those with 
responsibilities for livestock – were tied, as were 56.9% of tractor drivers. However 
only 39% of general farmworkers, and 14% of horticultural workers were tied at the 
time.92 Dairy workers and stockmen have long been regarded as agriculture’s 
aristocracy of labour: those with the best pay and conditions due to their niche labour 
market positions: indeed it was these workers that formed the Appointment Grade II 
workers upon the creation of the AWB’s grading scale.93 It was these same workers, 
alongside other skilled groups, that had become disproportionately accommodated in 
tied-cottages, replete with zero or near-zero rent rates, throughout the Twentieth 
Century. 
 While the limitations of the 1976 Act have been discussed, it is certain that on 
the Act’s passing there was a degree of redistribution of risks and rewards in the 
industry: while not freed entirely from the system’s insidious powers, tied-cottagers 
did experience a significant solidification of their security of housing, if not tenancy; 
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and critically, the Act allowed tied-cottagers to continue enjoying sub-market 
“privileged rents”94 for their tied-cottage. These privileged rents helped assure a 
relatively decent quality of life for those that paid them: when it stipulated that 
farmers were not allowed to charge more than £1.50/week rent for a tied-cottage, the 
1964 Prevention from Eviction Act merely underwrote a pre-existent norm that had 
long seen tied-cottages pay only a nominal rent for their admittedly Spartan 
accommodation.95 Clearly then, the 1976 Act, which secured a right of housing while 
maintaining privileged rents, reduced precarity for otherwise relatively privileged 
workers – that is, tied-cottagers – in the industry. 
 After strengthening and solidifying the relatively privileged position of 
stockmen and other skilled workers, the 1976 Act marked, for the hegemonic majority 
in the Union and the PLP, not a partway battle towards total abolition, but an 
armistice regarding the tied-cottage. Gavin Strong, a TGWU sponsored MP who did 
much to promote the Bills’ passage, argued in 1987 that the Act had “achieved its 
basic purpose”96: this implies that for the Party, the Act was seen at the time and 
henceforth as a final solution, rather than evolutionary waypoint. Meanwhile, the 
Union’s leadership continued to give unequivocal support for the Party in the run up 
to elections97: however, differentiating itself from its earlier actions, the Union no 
longer lobbied the Party to include commitments regarding the further reform of the 
system in their various manifestos. While, in the 1980s, the Union symbolically 
pushed the now Conservative Government to rectify issues regarding ADHAC 
biases,98 and expand the national stock of public housing,99 such a campaign was 
piecemeal and starved of resources and attention, when compared to the Union’s 
performances of the 1970s.100 It seems the Union’s, like the Labour Party’s, organised 
actions against the tied-cottage were completed in 1976. 
 This accepted end-point actually increased precarity for many in the industry. 
Labour ministers, in passing the Act, voiced pleasure at successfully “disengag(ing) 
farmworkers’ conditions of employment from the circumstances in which they were 
housed”101:  unfortunately for non-tied-cottagers, negative ramifications of the Act’s 
reorganisation of the housing market spilled over and affected their labour relations 
after 1976; no disengagement occurred here. Of importance is the fact that non-tied-
cottagers, a slight minority of the agricultural workforce in the 1970s, generally 
occupied less marketable positions in the labour market and could therefore be 
thought of as more, if differently, precarity-prone than tied-cottagers at the time. 
 Before, during and after the 1970s, the Employers’ Side of AWB negotiations 
frequently argued that the presence of tied-cottages, and their privileged rents, 
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justified the depression of wages of the workforce as a whole: not just those higher 
grade workers disproportionately concentrated in tied accommodation.102 The NFU 
regularly pointed to the “myth of a free cottage with the inevitable roses around the 
door, gallons of milk, unlimited free vegetables, dozens of eggs and baskets of 
firewood” when justifying the depression of agricultural minimum wages to the 
relative inexpert Appointed Members of the AWB.103 So, the 1976 Rent (Agricultural) 
Act solidified a system where the worst paid in the industry were required to pay rural 
private rents or mortgage payments well above the national average, while farmers 
provided cheap accommodation to the better paid in the industry in order to secure 
and retain their services, and subsequently used this arrangement to justify the 
continued existence of the lowest pay rates in the industry. The Rent (Agricultural) 
Act reduced some forms of precarity for some in the industry, effectively ending the 
photogenically dreadful evictions that left farmworkers and their dependents homeless 
of the roadside: however the system’s tendency to depress wages for the less 
marketable workers in the industry remained undiminished. In fact, this power of the 
tied-cottage was strengthened, as the system was discursively cleansed of many of its 
negative aspects: rather than having to engage in often contested, protracted and 
publicised legal proceedings, employers could now turn to the sterile mechanisms of 
the ADHACs to vacate their holdings; rather than publicly leaving farmworkers 
destitute at the roadside, farmers could rely on the council to swiftly and discreetly re-
house disposed workers at the public’s expense. 
 The Union leadership, in practice, pushed and dedicated many resources for 
the attainment of such legislation, and then failed to further this development with 
further coherent campaigns for total abolition, which could have deflated the 
precarities created by otherwise marketable workers’ privileged rents. This must then 
be interpreted as an actualisation of a ‘pre-rejuvenatory’, subordinatory 
orientation104: the interests of marketable workers where furthered at the expense of 
the more marginal and precarity-prone workers in the industry.  
 In 1992, Union researcher Patrick Bond found that 45% of adult, full-time 
hired men in the industry were paid below the government’s recognised poverty line, 
up from 41% in 1987, while 72% of full-time female workers were paid poverty 
wages in 1992, up from 68% in 1987105: such hardship was experienced primarily by 
workers paid on or below the Ordinary Grade AMW, which had been kept low by the 
Employers’ use of a slight-of-hand logic, which purposefully confused the living 
arrangements of relatively marketable and unmarketable workers in their submissions 
to the AWB. Yet by 1992, the proportional level of tied-cottagers in the industry had 
fallen, so that only 40% of the workforce was accommodated in such housing: 
spiralling rural house prices continued to encourage farmers to further deplete their 
tied-cottage stock, yet they, through the NFU, continued to use the system’s continued 
existence, now implicitly sanctified by the Union in practice, to justify the deflatation 
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of wages in the industry, to the greatest detriment of the most precarity-prone. While 
producing many well-documented difficulties, tied-cottaging at least allowed 
marketable workers to pay nominal rates of rent, thereby significantly increasing their 
social wage. Yet these benefits were not enjoyed by the most precarity-prone: in 1992 
only a third of the poorest full-time workers in the industry were provided with tied 
accommodation, with the number significantly lower for workers on non-standard 
contracts.106  
 
 Many voices in the Union had long held alternative visions regarding the tied-
cottage. In the 1960s Maynard, and others in the left of the Union and Party, called for 
the nationalisation of the rural housing stock via compulsory governmental purchases 
of farm dwellings107: tied-cottagers then would have had the state as a depersonalised 
landlord. Though the great nationalising zeal of Attlee’s Post-War government 
remained a recent memory at the time, and in spite of the fact that some of the big 
battalions of British industry were nationalised around the same time,108 this proposal 
was dismissed by most in the Union and Party as unrealistic. With this plan rebuffed, 
the left then pushed for a governmental intervention which would have banned the 
tied-cottage system’s privileged rent: “the present system, whereby farmers are 
allowed to charge tenants 50p a week for accommodation under the terms of the 
AWB, would be abandoned and rents would be put on a “fair-rent” bias”.109 It was 
hoped that the abolition of privileged rents would force employers to pay market 
clearing rates for labour, unable to use tied-cottages as incentives to coerce relatively 
privileged workers to accept low basic wages: Maynard, by now an MP, declared to 
Parliament that “if the farmers were not able to offer the bait of a cheap house at the 
time of a housing shortage, they would have to pay the rate for the job. That is why 
the tied-cottage issue is so important to agricultural workers”.110 However, the 
majority of MPs rejected the logic of such a claim, arguing that employers would be 
under no obligation to raise wages, and generally disregarded the plan as non-
pragmatic and hence unrealistic. 
 When the Union settled for the provisions of the 1976 Rent (Agricultural) Act, 
it was not just high profile union rebels that felt aggrieved: amongst all the 
celebratory articles of the Landworker some disparaging letters could be found; one 
writer stating “in my estimation the blackest day in our Union’s history was the day 
(Union) delegates rolled over on their backs to have their tummies tickled by the 
Government and the Union’s top brass, and accepted their own practical version of 
what we all thought was going to mean the abolition of the agricultural tied-cottage, 
and with it the disengagement we have been promised in the Labour Party manifesto 
and the Government’s consultative document”, both of which were peppered with that 
unequivocal term, ‘abolition’.111 So, Maynard, the Union’s left and a minority 
tendency in the PLP recognised then that unless these rents were abolished, the tied-
cottage system would sustain linkages between the agricultural labour and housing 
markets to the benefit of marketable workers and employers, and to the detriment of 
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the most precarity-prone workers in the industry.112 However, such parties seemed 
unable to affect the hegemonic orientation of the Union, and its proffered solution to 
the tied-cottage system. 
 
 The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that the Union 
hegemonically orientated itself in a subordinatory manner towards precarity-prone 
workers when it tried to legislatively restructure the tied-cottage system. Disregarding 
occasional rhetoric claims to the contrary, the Union hegemonically pushed to secure 
the security of housing for tied-cottagers, but did little in practice to end the privileged 
rents that remained a key component of the system. Resultantly, relatively marketable 
workers’ social wages were maintained at a relatively comfortable level: a fact which 
the employers could use to suppress real wage levels, to the greatest detriment of the 
more precarity-prone, less marketable, non-tied-cottagers in the industry.  
 
5. The Effectiveness of the Union’s Legal Strategy. 
 
 This section assesses the effectiveness of the Union’s legal approach, with 
narrow regards to its subordinatory orientation. The Union wanted the reform of tied-
cottaging, and tied-cottage reform occurred: however analysis shows that the Union’s 
formal policies regarding cautious lobbying was not particularly effective in securing 
this desired end. Instead one must put a lot of the credit for the reform of the tied-
cottage at Joan Maynard (MP)’s feet.  
Maynard’s tireless work, inside and outside the Party, and inside and outside 
Parliament, did more than any other’s to secure the 1976 Act; the Act which, 
ironically, Maynard was one of the greatest critics of. Elected onto the NEC of the 
Labour Party in 1972, as a Women’s rather than Union representative, Maynard’s 
persistent advocacy on the Committee was instrumental in securing for the Union the 
two Manifesto promises of 1974: “not because NEC members were unsympathetic, 
but because everybody was fighting for their own bit: foreign policy, civil liberties, 
housing, and I was the only person who had direct knowledge and experience of the 
problem (of tied-cottaging)”.113  
Later, as an MP, Maynard proved invaluable in arranging and facilitating large 
scale lobbies of Parliament, helping Union activists and lay-members track down 
supportive, and unsupportive, MPs to describe their experiences of the system. 
Furthermore, along with Thomas ‘Tim’ Torney, a TGWU sponsored MP, Maynard 
personally compiled 140 MP signatures in 1974, delivering them to Number 10 to 
prove the widespread backbench support for legislative change.114 This bread-and-
butter work proved invaluable in passing the 1976 Act: Jack Bobby, leftist General 
Secretary of the Union in the 1980s, stated that “the eventual success in getting this 
Act must to a substantial degree be laid at Joan’s door”.115 When granted access to 
Parliament as an MP, Maynard waged her guerrilla campaign on behalf of the Union: 
“if it had been left to the politicians nothing would have been done”.116 
This unionist’s active lobbying strategy won the passing of the 1976 Act, 
whereas the Union’s pre-existent and later concurrent strategies – focussed on closed-
door lobbying of the PLP – largely failed. In the course of the previous decade the 
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Union had enjoyed sporadic parliamentary representation in the form of sponsored 
MPs, and dedicated much of its resources in attempting to construct a niche for itself 
as a pressure group with “insider status” within the Party.117 However, as Jordan et al. 
argue, “even if pursuing an insider strategy is a precondition to attaining the status, 
there can be cases where the strategy is not enough”118: the fact that the Union could 
gain a formal foothold in the Party's policy formulation processes did not guarantee it 
any form of success. Until the election of Maynard, the sizeable resources the Union 
expended was hardly justified by the superficially insider, but powerless, status the 
Union secured for itself: Jack Bobby, speaking of the Union’s relationship with the 
Party since WWII, summarizes “we always submitted our policy documents to the 
Labour NEC; to what extent they paid any attention is debateable”119; opinions were 
regularly taken from the Union, but not acted upon. 
Maynard changed this: however, while Maynard was in the Union, and was 
guided by what she interpreted as its ideals, observations of the Shakespearean 
dealings of the upper echelons of the Union in the 1970s reveal she cannot be viewed, 
for the purpose of this thesis, as an instrument of Union strategy; she was not a 
manifestation of the Union’s internal group structure. Maynard was a renegade loose 
cannon, a virtual persona non grata amongst the hegemonic Union leadership, due to 
her perceptively extremist orientation; and all the more successful for it.  
Maynard was introduced to the Union in 1947120 and quickly became popular 
with the rank-and-file, being sent as a delegate to regional and later national 
conferences. A few years later, Maynard was put up, by left wing elements of the her 
county branch, as a nominee to represent Yorkshire on the Union’s central EC: this 
ruffled many feathers at central office, as it entailed her challenging a long-term, right 
wing incumbent.121 Maynard relished this opportunity, sensing that while policy was 
formally determined at Bienniel, “real power resided in this Executive Committee”.122 
As a Union activist, Maynard was deeply suspicious of the ECs of the 1950s and 
1960s, believing that many on the Podium were indoctrinated with a conservatism: 
arguing that “not wanting to go back to the farm”, the EC ended up not pushing 
against agricultural status quos, and came instead to defend the injustices they 
nominally wanted to combat, both on the AWB and in relation to the tied-cottage123; 
in her words, “they really were a load of bastards… what they were doing was against 
the interests if the members”.124 Maynard’s popularity, unsurprisingly, did not extend 
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to the EC: a fellow unionist wrote to Maynard in 1957, warning her that she was 
coming to be regarded as a “bad odour” at Headland House.125  
Maynard lost her first attempts at gaining a seat on the EC. Still pushing to 
upturn the Union from the inside out, she later ran for the office of Vice-President, in 
order to take the position’s reserved seat on the EC.126 Maynard fought for and won 
the ballot in 1966. Her very first act was to attack the EC over its “sordid sell-out of 
our members” regarding the tied-cottage and the 1965 Rent (Agriculture) Act, arguing 
the Union had failed to push hard for abolition, and had “hidden behind the Labour 
Party” for too long.127 There was no love lost from Maynard’s ‘bastards’: on taking 
her seat, Maynard found “they hated the sight of me; they were feeding all sorts of 
lies to the national press about me”. Wilf Page, a fellow leftist that joined her on the 
EC soon after, reported “she’d be howled down and they’d shout at her… they used to 
say, ‘why don’t you go to bloody Russia’”.128 
Knifes began to be drawn. A key confidant of Maynard, the right wing but 
cordial EC member Brocklebank, was sidelined in the Union in the latter 1960s. Joan 
felt this was as punishment for her rocking the boat regarding the tied-cottage: while 
the EC conducted closed door negotiations with the Party, Maynard had thrown down 
a combative gauntlet in the local press, saying the Union “has been incensed about the 
tied-cottage for sixty years. We are not going to throw in the towel now. The system 
is still the curse of the countryside and the Labour Party above all others… know 
that”.129 Things came to a head at the 1970 Biennial. Facing an ever-deeper financial 
crisis, the Union sought answers. The EC wanted to raise subscription fees, Maynard 
wanted to cut the pay roll: branch delegates loyal to the EC used this opportunity to 
usurp Maynard: “they said, right, if we need to cut back we’ll cut back on the vice-
presidency”.130 A delegate moved “that in order to economise in overhead expenses, 
this conference herewith decides that a vice-president is not necessary and that the 
office shall cease to exist”131: the motion was passed by 50 votes to 37, Maynard was 
disposed, and a second emergency motion had to be carried to even let her remain till 
the end of Bienniel, no longer being a Union delegate nor member of the EC.132  
While personalities certainly played their part, Maynard paid this price due to 
the militancy of her orientations and strategies, which diametrically contrasted with 
the caution and conservatism of the dominating right wing men of the Union at the 
time, not in the least President Bert Hazel and General Secretary Reg Bottini133: “her 
removal from the presidency saved about £400 a year, so few in the know believed 
that the saving was the paramount motive for getting rid of her”.134  
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While the Union sponsored her later candidature for Parliament, Maynard’s 
selections to the NEC and PLP were borne from her concurrent and discrete career in 
the Labour Party; where she was functioned first as an activist, and later as a Local 
Councillor and part-time professional staffer. Indeed Maynard said “my Union were 
quite glad to unload me on the Labour Party NEC, anything to get me out of their 
hair”.135 Right up until the passing of the 1976 Act, articles in the Landworker 
scolded Maynard for endangering the government with her public criticisms of the 
PLP’s policy regarding the tied-cottage: anonimous editorials argued “no one in this 
country wished the Labour government keeps afloat more than the tied-cottager”, and 
suggested Maynard’s parliamentary behaviour was jeopardising this.136 The Union’s 
leadership’s hostility was tangible: in December 1976 the Landworker, reporting on 
one of the Movement’s keystone annual events, the Tolpuddle Rally, referred to 
Maynard dismissively as “a celebrated MP who had a go at the Platform Speakers”.137 
Most insultingly of all, the Union failed to invite Maynard to the press conference it 
held in celebration of the passing of the 1976 Rent (Agriculture) Act that she had 
done more than any other to create, to the anger of much of the rank-and-file.138  
From the above evidence, it would be a discourtesy to Maynard’s legacy to suggest 
her actions were a manifestation of Union strategy. 
 
The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that the Union’s 
hegemonically cautious, legal lobbying strategy was ineffective at restructuring the 
housing market as according to the Union’s desire. The reasons for this, and why the 
unionist Maynard’s combative legal strategy appears to have been more effective, are 
discussed in the following section.  
 
6. Why the Union Adopted a Subordinatory Orientation and Maintained an Ineffective 
Strategy. 
 
This section identifies the causal mechanisms that helped determine the 
Union’s subordinatory orientation, and its continued usage of a clearly ineffective 
strategy, with regards to the tied-cottage system.  
The reasons why the Union was keen to reduce the insidious powers of the 
tied-cottage, as felt by its relatively privileged tenants, are clear: the historic 
experience of the urban Movement shows that relatively protected groups in the 
labour market are instrumental in creating and maintaining those forms of unionism 
typical of Britain in the Post-War Era. Under normal operating conditions it would be 
reasonable to expect the stockmen, the skilled and marketable workers, to act as the 
muscle of the agricultural Union. The same conditions that allowed these members of 
the workforce to become the best paid in agriculture should have, if theory, given 
them the greatest leverage over employers in making claims of contention.139  
 However, the tied-cottage system had the effect of anesthetisesing those that 
otherwise would have had the strongest bargaining position in the industry: something 
needed to be done. Indeed, celebrating its “red letter day” the Landworker proclaimed 
                                                
135 Mason O’Connor, Joan Maynard, pg. 134. 
136 The Landworker, June 1976. Indeed EC loyalists at one point suggested the Union publicly 
disassociated itself from Maynard, over her concurrent protestations regarding the Social Contract. Cf. 
Labour Weekly, 3rd December 1976. 
137 The Landworker, December 1976. 
138 Wynn, Skilled at All Trades, pg. 204. 
139 Cf. Tilly and Tilly, Work Under Capitalism. 
 151 
a key effect of the Rent (Agriculture) Act was that it would allow farmworkers to 
“stand up and be counted”140: able to assert their market power through union 
organisation. Likewise, in 1977 the Union declared that that the Act was a significant 
step along the path towards the day where agricultural workers would “see they have 
the right to approach their employers as equals and not as subservient people”141: 
clearly, the tied-cottage was seen as an impediment to the organisation of the 
countryside. Evidently, the apparent incentives offered by reform, which would 
theoretically have allowed for a stronger organisation, motivated the Union in part to 
act in the manner that it did. 
 This self-interested identification of incentives was not solely performed by 
the then hegemonic right wing of the Union. When Maynard was struggling to secure 
a Labour Party Manifesto commitment on the issue, she wrote to all her members on 
the NEC, advising them that “farmworkers cannot fight for decent pay when they are 
bound and gagged in tied housing”142: this reveals that, at least in part, Maynard had 
the same motivation for pursuing the abolition as the EC had for reform – that is the 
hope that legislative change would create the potential for Union organisation in the 
countryside. Indeed, Maynard argued in her pamphlet ‘A Hundred Years of the 
Farmworkers’ Struggle’ that in addition to keeping wages low in the industry the tied-
cottage had “kept them (farmworkers) quiet”: abolition, she hoped, would change 
this.143 
 However, it is clear that additional moral prerogative motivated the Union 
further: it had long argued, disregarding any theoretical or economic arguments, that 
it was simply morally unacceptable “for the employer to have control of a man's job 
and his home”.144 This moral motivation was not accepted by all: farmers in the 
industry, and their supporters, had often accused the Union of whipping up the issue 
of the tied-cottage throughout the Twentieth Century for its own purposes, against the 
material interests of apparently contented tied tenants.145 Clearly a large number of 
tied-cottagers experienced a relatively protected and secure standard of living, 
compared to their non-tied peers left to the mercy of an increasingly tightening 
housing market146: however, one cannot make an empirical case that the Union’s 
resistance to the system was driven by an unaccountable and unrepresentative EC, 
motivated solely by theoretical incentives that promised increased organisational 
resources. A trawl through decades of resolutions at local, regional and national 
Union conferences turns up not a single example of a delegate resolution supportive 
of the tied-cottage from Union, compared to a wealth of motions calling for the 
abolition or reform of the system147: the overrepresentation of skilled workers in tied-
cottaging was not then the sole impetus behind the Union’s orientation, only a 
substantial one.  
 The Union was motivated to act due to a combination of theoretical incentives 
and moral prerogative. However, decisions regarding how to act, and the extent of 
such actions, were determined by considerations of structural conditions outside of 
the Union’s control. It has been argued that the Union, recognising its own economic 
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and resourceful weaknesses, felt compelled to rely on Party support in its attempt to 
secure the abolition/reform of the tied-cottage. However, the Party proved, time and 
again, not to be the good friend the Union so greatly needed. Over-reliance on the 
uncooperative Party bred discourses of pragmatism and practicality: the Union’s 
Executive resultantly proceeded with a softly-softly approach to lobbying and reform, 
which failed to secure regulative change. So, the underlying cause for the Union’s 
adherence to a ineffective lobbying strategy, and the reason why it adopted a 
subordinatory orientation regarding tied-cottage reform, is one and the same and is 
found not in the structural composition of the Union, but the Party: to delve deeper, 
we must ascertain it was so particularly uncooperative with the Farmworkers’ Union 
at the onset of our periodisation.  
 In the 1970s some voices in the Union and Party, additional to Maynard, 
pushed for outright abolition: as mentioned, many advocated compulsory council 
purchases of agricultural housing in the 1960s and early 1970s. However most MPs 
considered such a proposal impractical: the PLP hegemonically failed to explore this 
avenue of possible action for reasons of economic expediency. To unpack this further: 
before the onset of WWII, Britain was only 32% self-sufficient in terms of food 
production; by 1982 this figure had risen to 60%, despite a 20% rise in a largely urban 
population148; throughout this period, both the Conservative and Labour parties strove 
to maximise low-cost domestic food production, seen as it was as a key tenet of both 
the Home Front and the subsequent Post-War economic recovery, and later as a 
counterweight to the threat of balance of payment crises.149 Furthermore, the Labour 
Party, more so than the Conservatives, had a material interest in placating its highly 
urban-concentrated constituents by minimising inflationary pressures on the cost of 
living: Labour resultant commitment to this “cheap food policy” was found by Edwin 
Gooch, the Union’s President in 1950, to have caused “the Minister of 
Agriculture…(to) lean too much towards the farmers”,150 thereby explaining the 
reformist Attlee Government’s failure to tackle the tied-cottage system in the 
immediate Post-War Era. This urban bias was obvious: in 1952 the Party produced a 
policy statement, ‘Our Daily Bread’: while this document made a partial commitment 
to protecting tied-cottagers,151 the majority of the document was concerned with 
encouraging cheap domestic food production. 
The Party’s material interest in the cheap food policy – which helped to fuel 
the expansion of the urban-centred welfare state in the Post-War Era – was in 
diametric opposition to the Union’s material interest. Low-priced food required low 
agricultural wages, which as shown, the tied-cottage system did much to keep 
deflated. So, when explaining the purpose of the 1964 Protection from Eviction Act, 
the Agricultural Minister Richard Crossman stated that the courts, in adjudicating 
cases, “should not forget that women and children might be thrown onto the streets, 
but also that a pedigree herd might be ruined. How one measures between the two I 
don’t know”152: here, we can clearly see that the Party, in government, privileged 
agricultural efficiency as much if not more than it did agricultural living conditions.  
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On this issue the Union found itself isolated from both the Party and the 
hegemonic trade union Movement – itself also representative of an urban-centred 
workforce. In 1970, after the Conservatives had returned to power, food prices rose 
by 40% on the year before. The TUC’s Executive promptly moved a resolution 
demanding national controls in rents, council taxes and food prices. The 
Farmworkers’ Union alone abstained from the vote, fearing the effects that price 
controls would have on “the interests of agriculture and those employed in it”.153 
Later, the Union’s President argued “of course we all like to have cheap food, but we 
have to have some thought for those I represent who produce our food - the farm 
workers… amongst the lowest paid in the country”.154 On the issue of food pricing, 
the Union seems to have had very few natural allies. 
“Insider status”, as Garner argues, “by itself, is not equivalent to influence”155: 
“given the low threshold for entry into consultation lists… most groups who wish 
insider status can, relatively easily, develop the necessary degree of political 
sophistication to attain (it)”.156 To extrapolate these sentiments to our current 
example: due to their shared heritages and rhetoric vocabularies, the Union had much 
reason to place trust in the Labour Party, and was readily able to carve out for itself a 
position of some resonable centrality within the Party’s internal structure; however, 
the NEC and PLP, while wont to afford shows of sympathy and solidarity to the 
Union, were never compelled to act in an essentially altruistic manner, which would 
have redistributed risks in society in the agricultural workers’ favour to the detriment 
of the urban constituents of Labour's heartland. 
 
Where spontaneous and implicit cost/benefit analyses on the part of the 
Labour Party helped disable the Union’s influence, the NFU helped the process along. 
For many Labour MPs at the outset of our periodisation, the rural landscape was 
considered an alien and potentially hostile homogeneity, with landowners, farmers 
and farmworkers seen as alike. This made it difficult for the Union to sell its narrative 
concerning the tied-cottage to the urban centric PLP. Reporting on a lobby of 
Parliament in 1970, the Landworker found that “whilst the majority of Labour MPs 
were extremely sympathetic, some of them did not fully understand the implications 
of the tied-cottage for farm workers157: this was in part due to the fact that agricultural 
farmworkers, whilst prone to voting Labour or Liberal, resided in market-town 
constituencies dominated by Conservative interests; resultantly, the support of the 
Union could not be seen as an electoral assets or item of interest for the PLP or the 
average aspiring parliamentary candidate. Indeed, the Labour MP for Lichfield and 
Tamworth, a partially rural constituency, commented on his abnormal constituency in 
1976 thusly: “on the Labour side of the house it is increasingly rare to represent such 
a constituency, because the division between the Parties is becoming increasingly one 
of urban and rural interests and seats”.158 The NFU, on the other hand, had 
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traditionally been greatly feted by the Party: not being seen as a natural ally, but as 
an instrument through which to feed the Party’s natural allies – the urban working 
classes – at low cost.  
Focussing only on the 1970s, the NFU was able to mobilise its far superior 
financial resources to better convince Labour MPs that the farmers’ interests were 
synonymous with those of the urban working classes: in the run-up to the passing of 
the 1976 Act the NFU sent circulars to all MPs, forecasting the imminent end of 
agricultural efficiency, and therefore low cost food, if and when far reaching reforms 
of the tied-cottage were to occur.159 A few renegade MPs pointed out the over-
simplicity of these claims, drawing parallels to the efficiency of midwifes, arguing 
that if their professional performances were not harmed by their offsite 
accommodation, neither should stockmen’s.160 However, for an MP ill-versed in 
agricultural matters such statements, coming from an organisation apparently highly 
regarded at MAFF, would have seemed compelling: with Labour enjoying only a tiny 
minority in Parliament, the NFU only had to sway a couple of Labour MPs with their 
rhetoric, whereas the Union needed to mobilise the entire PLP.  
Again, like on the AWB, it cannot be downplayed how much the NFU’s 
political superiority over the farmworkers stemmed from its financial superiority: in 
the same year of the passing of the Rent (Agricultural) Act, the NFU’s total 
expenditure exceeded £4 million, with an income of £4.2 million raised from 
subscriptions alone, with further undisclosed revenue streams coming from its 
portfolio of investments: this dwarfed the Union, which that same year had an income 
of £870,000 and an expenditure of £830,000.161 
 
The material interests of the PLP in securing the support of urban working 
classes, and the highly professional, eternal campaign waged by the NFU in equating 
farmers’ material interests with those of the Party, explain why the hegemonic body 
of the PLP consistently refused to honour their traditional pre-electoral lip-service 
made regarding the plight of the tied-cottage, and failed to respond to the soft-touch 
lobbying of the Farmworkers’ Union in the years immediately preceding our 
periodisation. Esping-Anderson argues that “class unity is…difficult to achieve under 
conditions of competition between craft workers, unskilled industrial labourers, and 
the rural proletariat”162: in our study, the PLP was heavily invested in the interests of 
craft workers and unskilled industrial workers; to abolish the tied-cottages would have 
raised the cost of food, effectively representing a redistribution of risks in society to 
the determent of most Labour MPs’ traditional constituents material well-being, and 
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resultantly the security of their elected positions of responsibility. Resultantly, the 
Party consistently made it clear that any tied-cottage reform could not significantly 
threaten the underling structure of agricultural production, for fear of the effect on 
productivity: the Union’s EC’s cautionary legal strategy and subordinatory 
orientation were reactions to this orientation, originally held by the Party. 
It is undeniable that up to the passing of the 1876 Act, the Union regularly  
stated its ultimate goal was for the system’s absolute abolition: however this rhetoric 
goal was always tempered by an acceptance of the Union’s depleted power resources; 
at the 1956 Biennial the Executive Podium declared “we must face the fact that it is 
not possible to abolish the tied-house completely”.163 Likewise, even when, in 1972, 
Union delegates passed a Podium supported motion which deplored “the failure of 
both the Labour and Conservative Governments to abolish the tied-cottage system”,164 
it was accepted that “if you cannot easily say that tied-cottages are to be wiped out, 
then put clauses in the Act which make evictions impossible; if the prospects of being 
evicted from a tied-cottage is removed the farmworker will be safeguarded to a 
reasonable extent".165 Here, the external, political operating environment of the 
Union constrained the apparent commonsensical avenues of action available to it, so 
that the Union adopted a subordinatory orientation as the only seemingly rational 
choice course of action.  
Such a constraining of orientation is very much like that which occurred with 
relation to the AWB, and the Union came to embrace this realist, reforming route 
with little protest beyond rhetoric. The Union recognised that it would always be able 
to win resolutions and motions of support regarding abolition, from the Party and the 
wider trade union Movement, but felt that “bucketful(s) of sympathy gave no 
assistance” to the Union in practice166: this explains not only the subordinatory 
orientation of the Union, but the highly cautious lobbying strategy in developed up 
until the 1970s. It could not lobby too much or too hard, for fear of being dismissed as 
extremist. As early as the 1950 Labour Party Conference, Union delegates informed 
the floor that many farmworkers were losing confidence in the Party as a vehicle of 
change due to their perceived inactivity over the tied-cottage,167 but a lack of apparent 
alternatives prohibited a change in strategy.168  
 
Why then did Maynard, a unionist acting with some support from the Union 
and wider Movement, appear to succeed in winning the Act where the Union alone 
had failed for so long? For a start, the house building policies of the Labour 
Government of the mid-1970s greatly improved the national housing stock169; 
likewise, the sheer persistence of Maynard, and a few fellow travellers in the PLP, has 
to be given much credit. However, it is necessary to take a second critical look at 
Maynard’s apparent success.  
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For the urban centred Labour Party, the interests of urban consumers and 
producers took precedent, and partly due to a deft lobbying campaign of the NFU, 
these interests were seen to coincide with those of farmers. Resultantly, while 
Maynard pushed, through sheer will, the PLP into action after decades of half-
measures, she was wholly unable to secure the remedial action of abolition that she 
sought: one compromise bore another, which bore another. This explains how the 
NFU managed to orchestrate the insertion of ADHACs, and their ability to demand 
the rehousing of workers at the taxpayers’ expense, into the Act. ADHAC provisions 
were inserted during the consultative stages of the Bill’s passage though Parliament, 
“at a meeting between ministers, civil servants and NFU and NUAAW 
rep(resentatives)”170: Maynard and the Union originally opposed the dilution of the 
Act – they believed the courts would better judge farmer claims of agricultural need – 
but by continuously compromising in their stated ambitions of outright abolition a key 
power resource, needed to force through already compromised policy proposals, was 
lacking – that of respect. So, the Union agreed to these new stipulations at later 
meetings with the government, with Maynard handily excluded from negotiations.171 
Again, the role of the NFU’s professional lobbying enterprise cannot be 
emphasized enough here: speaking in the 1980s, a senior officer of the NFU’s 
Westminster staff stated, “getting in early is a very important golden rule. We have a 
sort of intelligence role on behalf of the farmers to keep our ears to the ground to find 
out what new initiatives are being proposed and what legislation may be coming on 
with the object of influencing it from the outset… whatever it is we shall be wanting 
to take an interest from the earliest stage. There is no question that once a piece on 
legislation reaches Parliament you may be able to tinker around the edges, but the 
prospect of getting any significant changes at that stage are very remote indeed. 
Therefore it makes it much more important to try to get it right before it ever enters 
Parliament”.172 Clearly, in our case the NFU did not mind a formal defeat with the 
eventual passage of the Bill, as it had shaped the Bill’s actual form in Parliament’s 
surrounding environment: an environment the Farmworkers’ Union was largely 
excluded from due to a lack of professional and monetary resources.  
Whereas the Farmworkers’s Union emerged formally victorious in the policy 
arena, albeit in a large part due to Maynard’s renegade actions, the NFU had dictated 
the method and extent of the change to occur, so that it coincided with its own 
material interests: Maynard’s more muscular, less cautious approach to lobbying only 
worked because the NFU was able to shape proposed legalisation to its liking. While 
Maynard’s alternative strategies appeared effective, what was really observed in 1976 
was an exercise by the NFU in controlling the political agenda: ADHACs suited the 
NFU, they pacified the potentially explosive issue of eviction while maintaining the 
de facto right of farmers to dispose of their tenants with short to medium term notice. 
The farmers’ economic resources were transmuted into a legislative reaction, which 
was forced to gift the Union subordinatory benefits for relatively privileged 
agricultural workers, but only at the expense of other more precarious workers.   
 
The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that due to the Labour 
Party’s divergent traditional constituents to the Union, it was unwilling to pay more 
than mere lip service to the notion of working class solidarity and allow the Union to 
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adequately pursue its members’ material interests within the confines of the Party’s 
internal structures: cheap food demanded a suppression of agricultural wages. 
Lacking political resources in the forms of substantial MP representation, further 
lacking organisational and economic strengths, and dealing with a PLP with much 
differentiated material interests from itself, the Union was compelled to 
hegemonically, hyper-cautiously and covertly lobby for subordinatory reform, rather 
than the total abolition, of the tied-cottage system. With the Party having conflated its 
interests with those of the NFU, the Union had little chance in radically overhauling 
the agricultural housing market, and any attempt to do so risked the further alienation 
of its strongest theoretical ally.  
 
7. Summary of the Union and the Tied-Cottage. 
  
 This chapter has, up till this point, looked at the Farmworkers’ Union’s actions 
regarding the tied-cottage between 1970-1976, and the ramifications of the legislation 
that these actions helped create. To summarise sub-research questions (vi) to (viii):  
 
vi) What orientations and strategies has the wider Movement employed with 
regards to precarity-prone workers? 
 
 Newby, surveying in the 1970s the state of British agriculture, argues that the 
workforces’ inadequacies in workplace organisation could only be compensated for 
by the Union building alliances with more powerful external agencies173: the Union 
seemed to be aware of such notions, and sought to utilise a highly cautious legal 
approach, seeking to regulate tied-cottaging by focussing its efforts on lobbying the 
Labour Party. The Union displayed an ultimately subordinatory orientation in the 
process: change resultantly emerged in a reformist, rather than abolitionist manner, to 
the benefit of some but to the detriment of an eventually larger group of workers. 
 
vii) What causal mechanisms have been responsible for producing or inhibiting 
said orientations and strategies? 
 
  The Union had many reasons to challenge the tied-cottage system: pressure 
from its rank-and-file, genuine concerns for the wellbeing of its members and the 
wider workforce, all also the envisioned potential of reform leading to greater 
organisational strength in the countryside all provided powerful incentives for the 
Union to push for change.174 However, having to ally itself to a stronger partner with 
diverging material interests regarding food prices, the Union was forced to adopt a 
pre-rejuvenatory and subordinatory orientation regarding certain groups of precarity-
prone workers: that is low-paid non-tied workers in the industry. Likewise, in 
selecting the form of strategy to take, the Union’s lack of electoral, financial or 
organisation leverage over the Party, and the Party’s self-identified divergence in 
material interests, coerced the Union to utilise a soft-touch and discrete legal lobbying 
strategy with the PLP and NEC. 
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viii) How effective have said strategies been in securing the Union’s desired 
orientational goals, and why? 
 
 Ironically, the Union’s preferred lobbying strategy only brought dividends 
once it was seized and altered by a unionist much maligned by the Union’s leadership, 
primarily due to her choice of strategic actions both inside and outside the Union. 
However, even with this augmentation, the Union was only able to achieve its 
apparent partial victory once the NFU had designed a policy solution that satisfied its 
own material interests: the Union’s preferred legal strategy was clearly ineffective at 
securing its own interests. Again, this failure was ultimately caused by the perceived 
discrepancies between the Farmworkers’ Union’s members’ interests and those the 
Labour Party conceptualised regarding urban workers. In sum, rejuvenatory 
collaboration with the Labour Party seemed to bring few dividends, and those only 
came when the Union adopted a pre-rejuvenatory orientation towards precarity-prone 
workers in practice.  
 
 From this evidence, and that of the previous chapter, it seems the Union has 
consistently used rejuvenatoryesque strategies, even at the earliest stages of our 
periodisation: namely, a variety of differentiated legal approaches to union action. 
However, these strategies have been often ineffective in the agricultural environment, 
now reminiscent of the New Economy: for the Farmworkers, we have so far only seen 
rejuvenatory legal strategies coherently utilised in conjunction with pre-rejuvenatory 
orientations towards precarity-prone workers, and even then the effectiveness of these 
strategies have been partial at best. The legally confined arena of the AWB seems to 
have offered the Union minimal rejuvenatory opportunities, and a differentiated legal 
approach, aimed at creating wholly new legalisation regarding the tied-cottage, seems 
to have performed little better.  
 This evidence begs the conclusion that the legal approach is an innately 
ineffective rejuvenatory strategy for a resource poor union operating in a hostile 
economic environment. This would be a bold assertion to make: key tenets of union 
rejuvenation theories suggest unions should closer tessellate their actions with those 
of supportive democratic parties and legal systems. The following sub-sections further 
interrogates this bold suggestion, by analysing the Union’s attempts at changing 
agriculture’s operating environment utilising similar, but also differentiated, channels 
of influence, in an alternative operational domain. This allows for the cross-
referencing and potential validation of this intermediatory finding.  
 
8. Agriculture, Health and Safety and Precarity. 
 
To interrogate the intermediately finding I now shift this chapter’s narrative, 
to focus on the actions of the Union in an operation domain regarding the regulation 
of agriculutural health and safety. Clearly, habitational issues are not the sole 
determinants of a worker’s quality of life. Good health and the protection from danger 
are also minimum requirements. In the Post-War Era the mainstream Movement 
largely sought satisfaction regarding its members’ physical welfare via voluntary 
collective bargaining processes, and other direct relations between workers and 
managers. As seen in the preceding chapter, the Farmworkers’ influence in bipartite 
bodies, or tripartite approximations of such bodies, has long been lacking, due to an 
unequal distribution of resources between itself and its primary adversary, the NFU. 
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Yet, in terms of physical danger agriculture has been a highly precarious industry for 
a prolonged period of time, in part due to the same unequal distribution of industrial 
resources between workers and employers. Therefore the Union has adopted, out to 
necessity, action plans differentiated in strategy from the Post-War modus operandi of 
the mainstream Movement, in its attempts to regulate health and safety in the 
agricultural environment. 
 Agriculture has long been a physically dangerous profession in Britain; such 
danger is considered a key aspect of job precarity.175 With workers working ultra-long 
hours and often alone and in isolation, agricultural work has been a particularly 
dangerous profession for centuries.176 However, whereas over-employment and 
dangers associated with livestock used to provide the trade’s principle threats to 
physical wellbeing, the industrial revolution brought wholly new dangers to the field. 
An acceleration of the mechanisation and chemicalisation of agricultural work 
increased physical precarity for the agricultural workforce in the late Nineteenth and 
Twentieth-Centuries. At the beginning of our periodisation, between 1969-1973, 637 
agricultural workers, farmers and other persons were killed on farms177: only the 
mining and construction industries were more dangerous industrial sectors in these 
decades.178 Looking beyond deadly incidents, in the latter half of the 1970s 4,000 
non-fatal agricultural injuries were reported to government agencies each year, and 
with calculations suggesting agricultural workers reported only 1 in 30 injuries, it is 
not unreasonable to estimate that 120,000 injuries occurred per year: leaving a 
staggering annual injury rate of 1 in 3 for the industry’s workforce as a whole.179 
The Union has dedicated much of its scarce resources on issues of health and 
safety throughout its history: the Landworker has long maintained health-specific 
columns and sections of various guises and, considering the size of the Union, its 
reactive legal department, which principally deals with health and safety related 
incidents, was considerably sophisticated when compared to others in the Movement 
in the 1970s; being one of the first to offer 24 hour legal coverage as an example. The 
sheer number of health and safety related motions emanating from the various 
regional and national conferences of the Union throughout the Twentieth Century 
give some impression of the extent to which the Union desired to secure the physical 
wellbeing of its members and the wider workforce. 
The Union concerned itself with myriad health and safety related issues during 
our periodisation, not all of which we have time to consider in depth: from an 
ultimately successful campaign, conducted primarily in the late 1960s, at ensuring all 
tractors came equipped with safety cabs in case of overturns,180 to a long running 
focus on reducing child deaths and injuries on the farm181; from ensuing all 
agricultural vehicles receive certification of roadworthiness,182 to issues regarding the 
handling of chemical additives in animal feed,183 the Union often involved itself with 
issues of health and safety in the 1970s. Beyond these issues, the Union fought for, 
and won, statuary sick pay from the AWB,184 campaigned to get Brucellosis 
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recognised as an industrial disease,185 and lobbied for the government to investigate 
harvest lung.186 Rabies, electrical installations, effluent storage,187 and the dangers of 
carbon dioxide poisoning in grain silos188 had likewise all been issues of contention 
for the Union in the first decade of our periodisation. In latter years, the Union has 
occupied itself with fears over genetically modified crops,189 and joined a wider trade 
union campaign, spearheaded by the TGWU’s central office, aimed at strengthening 
laws regarding corporate manslaughter.190 All the while the Union has continued to 
maintain that working hours need to be reduced in the industry, in order to improve 
accident and fatality rates.191 Disregarding these numerous campaigns, the remainder 
of this chapter focuses on those health and safety related issues that the Union has 
dedicated the most time, effort and resources into addressing during our periodisation, 
in order to interrogate the chapter’s earlier intermediately finding regarding the 
apparent ineffectiveness of the legal approach. The first issue discussed is 
agriculture’s potential for chemical harm; an issue with which the Union’s attentions 
congealed, in the 1970s and 1980s, around the herbicidal ingredient 2,4,5,T.  
 
9. The Chemicalisation of Agriculture, Precarity, and 2,4,5,T. 
 
This section briefly introduces the reader to the issue of pesticide usage in 
British agriculture, and its connection to physical wellbeing. Synthetic pesticides tell 
the tale of the chemicalisation of British agriculture: in 1944 there were 65 approved 
pesticide products on the market, each one based on a few base ingredients; by 1980, 
agriculture utilised 800 products produced from over 200 synthetic ingredients.192 By 
the commencement of our periodisation much public unease surrounded the 
agrichemical industry: in the 1940s and 1950s, a herbicidal ingredient, DNOC, was 
found to be the culprit of a spate of worldwide fatalities,193 and in 1962 Rachel 
Carson’s seminal Silent Spring underlined the ecological and human dangers posed 
by the insecticide DDT, thrusting environmentalism into the centre of public 
discourses on both sides of the Atlantic.194 
At the onset of our periodisation many concerns were being raised, by a 
number of interested parties, over the usage of one ingredient in particular: 2,4,5-
Trichlorophenoxyacetic. ‘2,4,5,T’ had been produced and used since the 1940s. The 
chemical process that formed this herbicidal ingredient created, as a unavoidable by-
product, trace particles of TCDD, a chemical in the dioxin family; rightly regarded as 
being among the most toxic synthetic structures yet produced, due to their 
carcinogenic and teratogenic properties.195 By the 1970s a scientific consensus existed 
over the fact that contact with pure 2,4,5,T could, due to TCDD impurities, lead to 
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both fatal and non-fatal conditions: cancers; skin diseases; miscarriages; sterility and 
birth defects.196 However there was no agreement, between scientists, nor between 
scientific institutions and those workers charged with handling the product, regarding 
the potential safe dosage of the chemical.197 Regardless, by 1979 Sweden, Norway, 
the Netherlands, Italy and the USA had either banned or suspended use of the 
chemical, while Belgium, Luxemburg and Ireland required producers prove that 
dioxin contamination did not breach 0.01 parts per million. In comparison, the British 
government allowed a far greater level of contamination: specifying that dioxins 
should not surpass 0.1 parts per million in any product.198 
 
10. Chemical Regulation: The Union’s Formal Legal Approach. 
 
This section briefly describes and analyses a further usage of a legal strategy 
by the Union, aimed at restructuring those regulations that determined agricultural 
usage of potentially dangerous chemicals. Throughout the 1970s, due to the 
overriding anecdotal concerns of its rank-and-file, the Union committed itself to push 
for a complete ceaseage in 2,4,5,T’s usage, even if this meant harming the 
productivity records that the Union so often used to justify wage claims on the 
AWB.199 The Union would go on to argue that the government was treating 2,4,5,T 
“like an accused person in the dock ought to be treated: as innocent until proven 
guilty. So if it’s guilty, what then? Hundreds more people will have died agonising 
deaths from malignant soft tissue cancer while ministers sit on their hands and wait 
for evidence”.200 Clearly, the Union felt that the potential dangers posed by the 
chemical were so severe that it was right to act in a highly conservative manner 
regarding its usage, conceding “none of the anti-2,4,5,T campaigners claim to have 
watertight, copper-bottomed scientific evidence” regarding its apparent ill-effects.201 
This caution set the Union at odds with the farmers’ interests in high yield agricultural 
production, and the interests of the agrichemical industry, which by the 1980s 
recorded £542 million pounds worth of annual sales in Britain.202 Farmers and 
agribusiness strove for maximum yields via the use of chemical inputs, whereas 
farmworkers, and their Union, privileged the safety of the workforce.  
 Throughout the 1970s issues related to 2,4,5,T were routinely raised at the 
Union’s conference,203 and after numerous sporadic actions, the Union significantly 
increased the amount of resources it dedicated to the issue of chemical usage at the 
onset of the 1980s. The 1980 and 1982 Biennials demanded Britain ban the 
manufacturing and sale of all chemical products until extensive trials had been carried 
out on individual products, and no employee be allowed to use such products without 
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first completing a Union recognised course of instruction.204 Supplementing these 
demands, the Union sought fundamental changes regarding the formal regulative 
mechanisms that controlled pesticide usage in Britain.  
 Between 1957 and 1985, British pesticide regulation fell under the remit of 
MAFF’s Pesticides Safety Precautions Scheme (PSPS), which operated on a non-
statutory basis: that is to say, producers and sellers of new, untested pesticides were 
not required, only encouraged, to join the scheme. The PSPS was responsible for 
commissioning an Advisory Committee on Pesticides (ACP), a body of academics 
and civil servants, trained in areas such as pharmacology, toxicology and the 
agricultural sciences.205 Participating companies supplied the ACP confidential results 
of in-house tests performed on their own products: the ACP sought to scrutinise these 
results, and requested more company-conducted testing of chemicals if desired. The 
agrichemical industry effectively marked its own homework, before passing their test 
results on to the government’s teacher for review. Perhaps unsurprisingly, in 1979 the 
ACP had concluded, after completing an eighth review, that 2,4,5,T was benign “if 
used in the recommended way”.206 This perceived whitewash caused uproar from the 
Union. It argued that the ACP had an operating bias in the favour of agrichemical 
usage; being under MAFF’s purview, which the Union saw as being rife with NFU 
influence, the ACP was perceived as being dedicated to ensuring high-yield 
agricultural efficiency at any cost.  
In reaction, the Union launched a highly bureaucratic legal campaign, 
focussing on government ministers and insider pressure groups such as the British 
Medical Association, seeking to “wind up the APC”,207 and transfer pesticide 
regulation to the tripartite Health and Safety Executive (HSE),208 which monitored 
and regulated health and safety issues across the economy. Worker representation, in 
addition to the “academic scientists (of the ACP) with no knowledge of what it is like 
to get (one’s) boots dirty”,209 was seen as a vital component of oversight from the 
Union’s point of view.  
Put simply, the Union believed that, even discounting its ideological and 
operational biases, the ACP was unable to understand the health and safety 
implications of 2,4,5,T, or any other chemical, whilst working from offices analysing 
summaries of company-designed tests, themselves conducted in sterile and 
controllable indoor environments. The ACP maintained that workers would remain 
safe if they handled the chemicals in the “correct manner”: the Union argued it was in 
practice impossible to use the chemical according to the manufacturers’ guidelines in 
the field.210 Clearly, the Union felt that the ACP effectively blamed 2,4,5,T’s victims 
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for the harms accrued to them, due to their biases and lack of knowledge regarding 
agriculture’s operating environment.  
This ultimately unsuccessful legal strategy helps reveal the form of the 
Union’s orientation regarding the interconnections between chemical regulation and 
worker well-being: of note is the fact that the Union seemed to be seeking workplace 
protections for all workers, regardless of labour market position; indeed it is difficult 
to imagine how the Union’s regarding chemical regulations even could have been pre-
rejuvenatory; as chemical sprays refuse to recognise societal cleavages in the 
agricultural workforce, so the Union did likewise.211 Likewise, the strength of the 
Union’s orientation is also revealed through these actions: the Union’s first 2,4,5,T 
publications of the early 1980s were not insubstantial pamphlets, but expansively 
researched investigative reports – akin in form and scope to state-funded studies212; 
so, when trying to influence the policy of an ultra-hostile Conservative government, 
the Union sunk scarce resources into a strategy that any observer would sense as 
having little chance of succeeding; from this one gains some idea regarding the depth 
of the Union feelings over the issue. The inclusion seen here was far from tokenistic. 
Unfortunately for the Union, the value it attached to the matter was not met 
with legislative change. Indeed, when assessing the effectiveness of the Union’s legal 
attempts at legislatively outlawing 2,4,5,T and gaining worker representation in the 
regulation of pesticides, one surveys abject failure. The Union failed to convince the 
government that workers were physically unable to follow manufacturers guidelines 
regarding correct usage: Jim Wiggins, the Conservative Parliamentary Secretary for 
MAFF argued in the latter 1970s that the vast majority of 2,4,5,T incidents were 
caused by “sheer carelessness” on the part of the user; a position that was never 
retracted by the MP or the Department in subsequent years.213 Likewise, the ACP, 
agribusiness and the government all publicly besmirched the Union’s apparent 
motivations in pushing for change: the British Agrichemical Association portrayed 
the Union’s campaign as a “witch-hunt”,214 while the Conservative Government 
portrayed it as “biased”, “politically motivated” and “amateur”.215 While the Union’s 
publication of 1982’s ‘Portrait of a Poison’ did help open an advisory Pesticide 
Committee on the tripartite HSE, ultimate authority, and insider access to 
government, still resided with MAFF, the PSPS and the ACP, which maintained their 
exclusions of worker representatives. In sum, the Union’s legal approach, which 
aimed to restructure a formal regulative body dominated by the interests of an 
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ideologically hostile government and the economic resources of the agrichemical 
industry, failed. 
This failure should not be unexpected. As seen with regard to the tied-cottage, 
the Union was unable to translate its relative degree of insider status within Labour 
Party circles into actual influence over legislative matters, and due to changes in the 
wider parliamentary environment in 1979, the Union’s task in the 1980s regarding 
chemical regulation was far greater: with the Conservative Party in government, 
Westminster had become explicitly, rather than implicitly, hostile to the Union’s 
approaches, and with the Union itself acknowledging its desired goal’s capacity for 
harming agricultural production, the usage of the legal approach seems to have been 
destined for failure from the outset. This seems to confirm this chapter’s 
intermediatory conclusion regarding the ineffectiveness of legal approaches in a 
hostile political-economy: such findings will of course be critically revisited when I 
answer this essay’s primary research question, as occurs in chapter seven. However, 
to complete this chapter’s analysis a pertinent point needs to be addressed: despite the 
fact that the Union failed to change the formal legal regulations that controlled 
chemical usage in agriculture, Union actions meant that 2,4,5,T usage effectively 
ceased in Britain by the mid-1980s, reducing precarity in the process. To ascertain 
how and why this occurred, it is necessary to describe some supplementary strategies 
utilised by the Union. 
 
11. 2,4,5,T: The Union’s Informal Campaigning Approach. 
 
Rather than the above-analysed abortive legal approach, aimed at statutorily 
re-regulating the industry, it was a concurrently developed course of Union 
orchestrated-actions that won this precarity-reducing change in industrial norms. In 
the latter 1970s and early 1980s – in the early years of the mainstream Movement’s 
cascade of decline – the Farmworkers’ Union successfully utilised a rejuvenatory 
campaigning approach to union organisation, securing a de facto ban on the 2,4,5,T’s 
continued usage in the process. This campaign emerged organically from the rank-
and-file of the Union, which had begun to regularly contact the Union’s EC in the late 
1960s and early 1970s with concerns over the chemical.216 As mentioned, by the late 
1970s the Union was frequently commenting on the subject, in an attempt to 
counterbalance the findings of the ACP. However, failing to secure any legislative 
change and seeing none on the horizon, the Union took unilateral action in November 
1979. 
The Union instructed its members in the forestry industry – which utilised a 
substantial portion of Britain’s 2,4,5,T – to cease handling the product until further 
notice, and asked its farmworkers to seriously consider their continued usage of the 
product, pledging to support anyone, providing they were a member, who ran into 
difficulties with their employer by abstaining from such tasks.217 This unilateral 
regulation of the market, while a common tactic of the relatively privileged craft 
unions in the Nineteenth Century, had not been a commonly seen industrial strategy 
in Britain’s Post-War decades: the Union was acting in a relatively pioneering manner 
in prescribing such a wide-scale unilateral product ban.  
To vindicate its actions, the Union published widely ‘Not One Minute Longer’ 
in 1980, which included a substantial study on the chemical properties of the 
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chemical, along with a hefty dossier of farmworker anecdotes regarding their contact 
with 2,4,5,T and subsequent ill-health.218 This publication’s intended audience was 
specialist readers in the corridors of legislative power: aimed as it was on seeking an 
insertion of worker representatives into agrichemical regulations. However, the Union 
received a deluge of messages and queries to its central office on the back of these 
two actions: while many of these approaches were from the Union’s own rank-and-
file, a snowballing of interest came from other societal groups. Other unions, MP’s, 
the press,219 and state-employers all sought the Union’s voice as to whether it was 
“just there weeds that (were) dying”.220 Likewise, Doctors, environmental groups, and 
local authorities all solicited the Union’s advice.221 As interest increased, 
Farmworker’s Union delegates to the TUC and TUC Women’s Conferences moved 
successive motions, asking not for the wider Movement to lobby government for 
change, but for the Movement to affect change itself.222 Links were likewise forged 
internationally: in 1980 the Union managed to secure the commitment of the 
European Farmworkers Association, a loosely bound peak confederation representing 
two million European agricultural trade unionists, to instruct their respective members 
to either cease or seriously consider their usage of the chemical.223 
The support of one group quickly begat the support of others: each not 
wishing to find themselves on the wrong side of history, or lawsuits, over the issue. 
1980 saw British Rail, and later the English and Welsh Water Boards, cease use of 
2,4,5,T224: due to the fact that both the TGWU and the General Municipal Workers’ 
Union had imposed similar ‘unilateral’ regulations on their members, on the advice of 
the Farmworkers’ Union.225 Unilateral bans had augmented practice to become 
multilateral dictates, borne from a coalition of interests: at the 1980 Trades Union 
Congress, docking and ship-worker delegates unanimously supported a Farmworkers’ 
Union motion to prevent the importation of 2,4,5,T into Britain,226 and by January 
1981, under pressure from their workers, 74 local authorities in England and Wales 
had banned use of the herbicide on their properties.227 
The Union purposefully fanned the flames of this explosion of interest, 
producing further literature on the subject aimed at as wide an audience as possible: 
such as 1982’s ‘Portrait of a Poison’ and 1984’s ‘How Many More?’ Such 
publications helped privilege the contributions of the Union’s own rank-and-file in the 
unfolding campaign: while they were being written, a questionnaire drawn up by 
Union researchers and allies in the scientific and medical trades was circled to all 
members, seeking any evidence regarding the chemical’s links with health effects.228 
While still formally lobbying for a change in pesticide regulations, much of the 
Union’s activities now revolved around an embrace of a coherent, and distinctly 
rejuventatory, campaigning approach to union activity.  
When the Union’s campaign was gaining momentum in the 1980s, the British 
Agrichemical Association launched a well-funded counter-action, sending highly 
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hostile circulars to all local authorities, amongst the biggest purchasers of the 
chemical. One such read: “we accept that the trade union movement and others are 
free to pursue their objectives of seeking direct influence in the control arrangements 
governing all pesticides. However to… create groundless scare-stories about specific 
products is deplorable”.229 Despite these countervailing pressures, by the mid-1980s 
2,4,5,T sales in Britain were virtually non-existent: similarly to its latter first 
campaign to save the AWB, the Union managed to access and use the critical power 
resource of solidarity with resource-endowed civil-society groups, the wider 
Movement, state employers, church groups, gardener associations, and others in order 
to win de facto changes in the agricultural environment, which undoubtedly reduced 
the occupational precarity of its members. All without legal re-regulation, the Union’s 
spearheading of this approach managed to end large-employee firms’ use of 2,4,5,T 
on a de facto basis by the early 1980s. Ironically, due to the dispersed nature of the 
agricultural workforce, many of the Union’s own members did not immediately 
benefit. However, with the support of international contacts the Union sent a 
delegation to West Germany, the largest remaining manufacturer of the product, and 
managed to win the support of unionists and environmentalists there to help cease 
2,4,5,T’s production in the country. By 1983, all Continental manufacturing of the 
product had ceased, with only a few producers in New Zealand accounting for the 
remaining global production of the product.230 Finally, in 1986, a Farmworker 
delegation travelled to the Antipodes and managed to forge links with civil-society 
groups there, ceasing manufacture of the chemical in this final productive centre.231 
Whereas the Union found its voice silenced in formal governmental and scientific 
channels, it found itself able to directly orchestrate the wider public discourse 
surrounding the chemical, leading to a complete cease in its usage. 
 
12. The Effectiveness of the Union’s Campaigning Approach. 
 
 While interrogating the effectiveness of a third consistent usage of a legal 
strategy, analysis has uncovered a supplementary approach utilised by the Union: in 
the 1980s the Union coherently utilised a rejuvenatory campaigning approach to 
remove 2,4,5,T from the industry; this section critically examines the effectiveness of 
this. 
We have seen how the Union apparently found success in its actions in civil-
society. Walzer describes civil-society as a “space of uncoerced human association”: 
such a space is liable to be dominated by capitalist interests reflected through cultural 
terms, as economic inequality “commonly translate(s)… into domination and radical 
deprivations (through)… socially mediated process(es)”232; however, civil-society, in 
our instance, proved itself to have been intrinsically open and fractured, an 
independently existing entity “juxtaposed… against the state… the economy and the 
private sphere as well”.233 This space offered an arena of contestation and struggle, 
where the Union could secure its material interests despite its lack of power resources 
in comparison to those organised interests of science, business and the state that 
ideologically resisted a change in the status quo regulation of chemicals.  
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However, while the Union discovered a way to resist such interests over the 
narrow issue of 2,4,5,T usage, the following analysis shows that such a campaigning 
approach would serve the Union poorly if used repeatedly to resist the economic and 
political hegemony of its adversaries. Solidarity with other occupational groups 
provided a great power resource for the Union in the 1980s: however, such solidarity 
was only activated under highly contingent circumstances beyond the Union’s 
control. 
The Union formally launched multifaceted actions to end 2,4,5,T usage in 
Britain in 1970: yet it took most of a decade for the Union to successfully, and at the 
outset inadvertently, initiate a high profile campaign aimed at ending the usage of the 
chemical. While in the early 1970s agricultural workers cited plenty of anecdotal 
evidence linking the use of the herbicide with severe health issue, no publicly 
accessible, scientifically corroborative evidence existed: high profile events beyond 
the Union’s control changed this lack. In 1976 an industrial explosion in Seveso, 
Italy, released substantial quantities of TCDD into the atmosphere, causing immediate 
deaths of crops and animals. Soon after a proliferation of human illnesses and birth 
defects was noted by journalists and civil-society groups.234 Subsequently, in 1979, 
attorneys representing US Vietnam War veterans opened a class action lawsuit against 
US chemical manufacturers, seeking compensation for health issues caused by the 
extensive and until then partially declassified use of Agent Orange – a mixture of 
2,4,5,T and 2,4,D235 – in Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia between 1962 and 1970. 
Settled for the sum of $180 million dollars in 1984,236 this then ongoing court case 
significantly increased the general British public’s concerns regarding the herbicide 
more than any other issue. The Union knew this well, and did much to underline the 
connection: the introduction of its 1984 publication ‘How Many More?’ read “the 
cases (of 2,4,5,T related illnesses) we have unearthed are uncannily similar to those 
Vietnam war veterans who have just received a… pay out from American chemical 
companies”.237 While the Union had made sporadic appeals against the use of the 
chemical before this date, it is no coincidence that its major successes were won only 
after the intervention of these contingent politicised events. For this reason, the Union 
could be ill advised to dedicate substantial resources in campaigns regarding other 
issues.  
A brief analysis of a second major series of health and safety related actions, 
that the Union has spearheaded during our periodisation, reveals further details as to 
why this is the case: this is the story of the Union’s largely unsuccessful attempts, 
dating from the mid-1970s through to the present day, at securing a legal basis for 
Union Roving Health and Safety Representatives (URHSRs) in the industry.  
Since the passing of the 1974 Employment Protection Act, workers in firms 
with union recognition agreements have had the right to appoint health and safety 
representatives – unionists empowered to inspect the workplace for hazards, access 
information regarding machinery and chemical usage, and write up legally binding 
codes of practices for employer and employees alike.238 Such posistions have reduced 
precarity across the economy, as workers did not have to depend on employers for the 
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provision of safe workplace environments. However, most agricultural workplaces 
employed too few employees to be eligible for automatic union recognition. 
Therefore, the Union currently has to make individual voluntary agreements with 
each and every employer in the industry if and when it wants to secure the same 
protections long enjoyed by urban industrial workers.239 
In combating this deficit, the Union has consistently pushed for an extension 
of the 1974 Act, to compensate for the isolated nature of agricultural work, seeking 
statutory recognition for URHSRs: union representatives empowered to inspect not 
only one’s own union-recognising firm, but other firms in the industry with no union 
recognition agreements in place.240 The Union has lobbied successive ministers of 
agriculture, and also sought allies in the wider Movement, medicals professions and 
other civil-society groups over the issue, winning rhetoric support from some241: in 
1989 the TUC agreed with the Farmworkers’ proposed scheme in principle,242 and 
vitally the NFU conceded in 1990 that the regulative systems of the day enabled 
farmers to “ignor(e) basic safety rules and indeed break… the law”.243   
While making little progress in the 1970s and 1980s, the Union, with the 
support of the NFU and in receipt of funds from the European Commission, 
international union organisations and the HSE, conducted a series of successful 
independently audited field tests of the system in the 1990s and 2000s. These tests 
found URHSRs to be a cost effective and desirable supplement to governmental 
inspectors in the industry.244 The Union felt that the test was particularly “successful 
to the extent that farmers found it a good source of advice”.245 This farmer support for 
the Union safety rep scheme makes sense on a practical, if not ideological basis: in 
the first decade of the 2000s, while 32% of deaths on farms were of employees, 56% 
were self-employed farmers246; seemingly unable to look after their own physical 
wellbeing, farmers could utilise URHSRs for their own advantage with minimal cost. 
It seemed then in the early 2000s the Union’s hybrid legal, campaigning and 
partnership approach was close to fruition.  
However, disillusionment soon followed: New Labour put the scheme “on the 
back burner”, explicitly due to cost-related fears, in 2005.247 The Union’s arguments – 
that such a project could be funded with less than 1% of the annual state subsidy to 
the industry, and that in mothballing the scheme hundreds of Union, HSE and 
governmental hours would be lost – were met with sympathy but no change in 
policy.248 Ultimately, the creation of URHSRs would have contradicted the 
government’s ideological attachments to a ‘deregulated’ labour market: like with 
2,4,5,T, the Union’s legal approach failed due to the structural power differentials that 
the Union encountered in the governmental arena; despite empirical evidence pointing 
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to the effectiveness of the scheme, a nominally Labour Government failed, like its 
Conservative predecessors, to implement changes to the regulation of the industry that 
would have redistributed regulative powers to the workers’ favour. However, unlike 
the issue 2,4,5,T, no substantial civil societal support snowballed off from the Union’s 
initially legal approach at affecting change. 
Why then did the Union succeed in creating a successful campaign regarding 
2,4,5,T, and not over URHSRs? The answer lies in incentives: not those offered to the 
Union, but other societal actors. The campaigning approach, now well resuscitated by 
rejuvenating unions, seeks to take trade unions beyond the workplace, and build 
contacts with other groups with tessellating material interests: to be successful, a 
“congruence between groups’ demands and… values, beliefs and emotions” needs to 
be in existent.249 While the Union was afforded sympathy en mass over the issue of 
URHSRs in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, other societal groups did not recognise their 
material interests tied up in the issue, and they were therefore disinclined to 
substantially invest their resources into the issue. This logic of self-interested 
motivation ironically meant that the traditionally antagonistic NFU provided the 
greatest amount of material support for the URHSR project in the 1990s and 2000s: 
the farmers’ collective stance was vital in implementing the field trials of the system. 
Wider civil-society groups could not locate a congruence of issues over the narrow 
issue of work-site safety in agriculture: opposingly, local authorities, state employers, 
environmentalists and other societal groups could easily ascertain where their material 
interests lay with regard to an such as 2,4,5,T, once previously discrete information 
had been inadvertently released into the public domain via contingent political events. 
This retroactively explains why no campaign congealed around 2,4,5,T for the bulk of 
the 1970s: it was then regarded as a niche agricultural issue. While the Union of the 
1970s was afforded sympathy in droves from the wider Movement and civil-society 
groups, this solidarity of sympathy was not enough: the eventual international 
response to 2,4,5,T, so well spearheaded by the Farmworkers’ Union in the 1980s, 
was not driven by altruism, but by self-motivated interests. The revelations of Seveso 
and Vietnam250 gave groups – equipped with better power resources than the Union – 
reason to act: larger unions, with the still-existent capability to mobilise militant strike 
action, whipped local authorities into line, once contingent political events gave these 
unions good reason to fear for their members’ welfare. The Union was fortuitous in 
the fact that an issue that so closely affected its members also came to be seen as 
affecting the material wellbeing of more powerful interests in civil-society: therefore 
a successful rejuvenatory union campaign against 2,4,5,T could be launched; the 
Union’s 2,4,5,T campaign was apparently effective, but under higher contingent and 
not easily replicable conditions. 
Furthermore, even when acknowledging the role of contingent events, one 
should not interpret the Union’s actions over 2,4,5,T as an example of an absolutely 
successful campaigning approach to unionism. While the 2,4,5,T campaign ultimately 
led to a reduction in precarity for farmworkers, this reduction was with regards to the 
ultimately narrow issue of a single chemical. Just like its principle legal actions, the 
Union’s campaigning failed to secure the Union’s principle goal of readjusting the 
regulative systems of the sector in order to better protect the wider health interests of 
all agricultural workers on a systematic, long-term basis, and thereby reduce precarity 
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across the industry.251 Only able to mobilise the resources of others if and when 
others’ material interests were at stake: through campaigning, the Union could not 
achieve a wider regulative influence over the pre-emptive control of all pesticides. 
Nor could the Union replicate the apparent success of its campaigning approach with 
regards to URHSRs, leaving agriculture to remain, throughout our periodisation, “still 
the killing fields”.252  
 
The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that while the 
Farmworkers’ campaigning approach was successful with regards to 2,4,5,T, it relied 
on the self-interested support of other societal groups, and could not be replicated 
over more niche agricultural issues. 
 
13: Summary of the Union and Health and Safety. 
 
The past five sections of this chapter have focussed primarily on research sub-
question (vi) and (viii), looking at the Farmworkers’ Union’s actions in the 
operational domain of health and safety. Analysis finds the Union’s attempts, under 
several governments, to legally restructure the formal institutions that regulate 
agriculture’s chemical usage and workplace safety regimes were ineffective: the 
under-resourced Union, whose interests diverged substantially from those represented 
by governmental bodies, brought little positives changes to the industry. 
Alternatively, a campaigning approach proved to be an effective supplement to this 
approach, when restructuring agriculture’s chemical regulations. However, this 
approach’s limitations became quickly apparent: wider societal bodies could not be 
relied upon to provide altruistic support, and therefore the approach could only win 
narrow and relatively shallow benefits for the Union, over only those issues that 
directly and negatively affected better resourced interests in society. Because of 
agriculture’s many idiosyncrasies, such a tessellation of interests has been difficult to 
consistently identify and exploit throughout our periodisation. The ramifications of 
these findings are discussed at length in chapter seven of this thesis.  
This essay has maintained, until now, an uneasy dichotomy: separating the 
Farmworkers’ Union from the urban Movement. We have looked at the Union’s 
actions in several relatively niche operational domains; highly pertinent to the 
agricultural workforce but perceptively disconnected with the wider economy. Now 
we shift this thesis’ thematic narrative to examine the overlaps between the two. 
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Chapter 5: The Farmworkers’ Union, Merging, and the Attempted Imposition of 
Rejuvenation. 
 
 During our periodisation, the Farmworkers’ Union has found itself 
increasingly bound to the mainstream Movement: it is therefore necessary to ask how, 
if at all, this affected the orientations and strategies of the Union towards precarity-
prone workers. This chapter principally examines the events leading up to and 
following the Farmworkers’ merger with the larger TGWU, looking at the Union’s 
actions in an operational domain related to membership recruitment in the process.  
 Mergers have long played a role in trade union histories. Well before the 
cascade of decline, Britain’s TUC recognised that the structural organisation of the 
Movement was noticeably contradictory in places, and argued that some kind of 
conscious reorganisation was called for.1 However, since the international onset of 
multiple cascades of decline there has been an acceleration of merger activities: 
mostly due to merging, there were around 520 unions in the UK in 1970, 440 in 1980, 
270 in 1990, and 220 in 2000.2 Conscious rejuvenation remained, for the most part, a 
validating or secondary concern for merging unions: rather than purposefully 
reorganising itself to secure its continued survival in the New Economy, Britain’s 
merger process left the national Movement’s inter-union system as “uneven (and) 
illogically structured” as always.3 However, contemporary rejuvenation theorists,4 and 
union strategists,5 argue that merging processes have prompted unions once used to 
relatively privileged positions within industrial relations systems to rejuvenate their 
orientations and strategies towards precarity-prone workers, consciously or otherwise. 
Analyses from the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, and the UK identify several 
decidedly similar driving forces which have pushed this trend: economic structural 
changes, membership declines and the privatisation of public services all pushed 
resource deficient unions to pool their resources, attempt to build economies of scale, 
increase their perceived authority and regulative clout, and decrease inter-union 
competition by conglomerating.6  
 The following sections alternatively investigate how the 1982 TGWU merger 
affected the orientations and strategies of the relatively unprivileged Farmworkers’ 
Union, more used to the hostile environmental conditions that were beginning to 
become recognizable in multiple sectors of the then embryonic New Economy. In 
section one I discuss the conditions that led to the merge, and in section two 
demonstrate how this required the Farmworkers’ Union to formally augment its 
orientations and strategies towards precarity-prone workers. In section three I 
investigate the ineffectiveness of this imposed cocktail of orientations and strategies, 
and in section four explain why this was the case. A summary of the chapter is 
presented in section five. 
 
1. Dwindling Finances, a Turn to the Left, and the Merger. 
                                                
1 Trades Union Congress, Report of Congress 1962, London: TUC, pg. 298.  
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 Like the mainstream Movement, the issue of finances, or rather the lack of 
them, greatly affected the Farmworkers at the outset of our periodisation. The Union 
was close to bankrupt: Bottini spoke regularly of the Union’s increasing annual 
spending deficit, up to £50,859 in 1970, and in 1971 the Union was compelled to 
increase membership subscriptions by 2 shillings a month and withdraw heavily from 
its dwindling political reserves, extracting £75,000 that year.7 As mentioned, the 
Union had traditionally offered its members a wider variety of ‘friendly society’ 
services when compared to modern urban unions: a lack of rural independent advice 
bodies, such as the Citizens Advice Bureaux, long compelled the Union to offer 
resource-intensive non-political services to its members.8 In 1972, the Union’s legal 
department fought 3,155 legal cases on behalf of its members.9 This represented an 
increasingly expensive drain on the Union’s resources: the Landworker reported that 
more than anything else, “the friendly society aspect of our Union's work” 
demonstrated how “finance is the life blood of the industry”.10 Yet the EC, while 
affirming the need for efficiency drives, ultimately blamed the Union’s financial state 
of affairs on the dwindling agricultural workforce: from a Post-War peak of over 
500,000 full-time agricultural workers, the industry experienced a 78% decline in its 
full-time workforce between 1950 and 1980.11 While a surge in membership in the 
Allied Industries helped shore up the Union’s finances in the late 1970s, such 
developments proved a double-edged sword for the Union. The militant factory 
workers were prone to expensive strike actions: a 1982 strike at a Bernard Matthews’ 
turkey processing plant removed a further £75,000 from the Union’s strike fund.12  
 Concurrently with its escalating financial crisis, the Union took a significant 
turn to the left. While the Union in the 1920s had decidedly socialist tendencies,13 by 
WWII the Union’s EC was markedly on the right wing of the Labour Movement. This 
trend persisted up to the initiation of our periodisation: in 1971 the Landworker 
published several unchallenged articles authored by the Conservative Minister of 
Agriculture, in a move designed to counterbalance Maynard’s influence as an 
occasional columnist, and the letter-writing tendencies of others in the rank-and-file.14 
However, the election of Jack Bobby as General Secretary in 1978 took the Union the 
furthest left it had been in the Post-War Era. Many other EC Chairs followed suit at 
around the same time: having previously been a minority voice in Headland House, 
the left came to dominate by the end of the 1970s.15 This should be thought of as a 
lay-member reaction to the Union’s performance in the Post-War Era: the 1950s and 
1960s had been a moment of unprecedented bounty for the agricultural industry, but 
under a conciliatory and non-combative leadership the Union failed to secure for its 
members an adequate share of the spoils; disillusioned with the performance of the 
Union’s officials and its apparent allies in the perceptively right wing PLP, the Union 
                                                
7 Wynn, Skilled at all Trades, pg. 94.  
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turned to the left in reaction. This gives us an indication of the form of reparative 
actions that were soon to follow.   
 The idea of a merger had been mooted several times throughout the Union’s 
history,16 but with ever-greater frequency in the 1970s. Many in the Union, especially 
the left, believed that amalgamating with a larger body would bring twinned benefits: 
of a more secure financial position; and a stronger hand on the AWB and in other 
arenas of contention. The EC, until the late 1970s, resisted these calls.17 Their greatest 
fear, shared by many sceptical lay-members, was that the Union’s specific and expert 
agricultural voice would be diluted in a broader general union: many predicted that 
the only thing an “asset stripping trade union”18 would be interested in “would be... 
(monetary) contributions. Services would fall to the wall”.19 Clearly then, those 
opposed to a merger rhetorically voiced the fear that an amalgamation would lead to 
greater levels of precarity in the industry. However, advocates used the same 
discursive logic: arguing that if it were to remain independent, the increasingly 
impoverished Union would only possibly be able to function as a de facto regional 
organisation, operating in the West of England where membership density was 
highest, to the detriment of agricultural workers in other areas.20 
 The calls for merging from the left persisted till the end of the 1970s, as did 
the financial crisis of the Union: in 1980 the Landworkers’ selling price was forced to 
double to 10 Pence an issue, after the Union became unable to cover the paper’s 
already discounted printing costs.21 That same year, only months after Biennial 
narrowly voted against instructing for a merger,22 the EC recalled delegates for an 
emergency Conference, to propose once again raising subscription fees. With 
Thatcher’s storm clouds breaking, the now dominant left wing of the EC came to 
urgently advocate for a radical change in structure. Seeing the Union’s inability to act 
in a decisive manner on insufficient funds, and sensing the illogicality of shoring up 
the Union’s financial situation solely in an industry facing sustained and dramatic job 
decreases, delegates agreed to open discussions “with the major unions… with a view 
to a merger with one or other”.23 Maynard seconded the motion as a regional delegate, 
arguing that “however beautiful small is we just can’t go on as we are… if we go 
under now and don’t merge, there will be nobody looking after the interests of rural 
workers”24: clearly, rhetorically at least, the precarity of the agricultural workforce 
was at the forefront of the amalgamators’ thoughts. 
 While many members were uneasy with the TGWU’s cheap food policy, this 
general union appeared to offer the greatest array of incentives in the minds of the 
EC, particularly as the TGWU already participated on the AWB.25 The Farmworkers’ 
were promised a large degree of freedom within the TGWU’s internal structure, as a 
semi-independent Agricultural and Allied Worker National Trade Group 
(AAWNTG), maintaining a separate delegation to TUC and Labour Party 
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conferences.26 While the TGWU had only a small agricultural presence, with that 
concentrated in Scotland,27 it did have a relatively sizeable rural membership, and 
promised a transfer of 75,000 members to the Trade Group,28 to help stabilise the 
Union’s financial resources. With a deal on the table, the EC went to great lengths to 
convince the Union’s members that the financial benefits of association offered to 
farmworkers – the array of subsidies available to members in cases of redundancy, 
strike, accident or bereavement – would be substantially improved post-merger,29 as 
would the fringe facilities offered by the Union: access to the TGWU’s sophisticated 
educational services, which included courses in shop stewardship and safety 
representation, and the provision of convalescent and holiday centres were touted as 
substantial incentives to merge.30 An additional perceived incentive was the fact that, 
instead of enjoying the legislative clout of one Union sponsored MP, the 20+ TGWU 
sponsored parliamentarians would greatly improve the agriculturalists’ parliamentary 
voice.31 
 Many in the Union remained unconvinced. Previous TGWU mergers had 
promised much independence to soon-to-be utterly enveloped unions. Such a fate 
befell then National Union of Dyers, Bleachers and Textile Workers just as the 
Farmworkers’ were conducting exploratory meetings, offering a “dreadful warning” 
to many lay-members.32 However, in February 1982 the Landworker revealed the 
result of the national ballot it was required to conduct when seeking to merge: by 
29,787 votes to 4,709, respondents voted in favour of amalgamation.  
The fact that only 52% of eligible voters participated revealed an underlying 
antipathy towards such an action: the Union’s President, Jack Bobby, bemoaned 
“sadness at the end of an era”.33 Amalgamation was not a normatively desired result: 
to merge was the lesser of two evils, but it was hoped that the greater financial 
position of the TGWU would grant the Farmworkers’ Union “the stability from which 
we can redouble out efforts to attack the problems which face agriculture and allied 
industry workers - low-pay, poor and unsafe working condition”.34  
 The NUAAW’s EC became the Group Committee of the AAWNTG.35 Joining 
the 13 strong NUAAW EC on this committee were 4 TGWU members, from 
positions of responsibility in the general union’s rural section.36 In another 
augmentation, the Farmworkers’ week-long Biennials were substituted by annual, two 
day National Trade Group Conferences. Conference decisions were, from here on in, 
complemented by the individual actions of the Trade Group’s GC and overarching 
interventions from the national TGWU Conferences, which Trade Group delegates 
attended. Above the AAWNTG, the TGWU was structured thusly: at its pinnacle was 
its all-industry General Executive Council (GEC). Chairing this sat the TGWU’s 
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General Secretary; Moss Evans at the time of the merger. Below this central body 
there was a series of 12 National Industrial Sector Conferences, “each fiercely 
independent… not dictated to any more than the farmworkers would be”.37 It was at 
this level that the AAWNTG joined.  
 
The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that a financial crisis, 
precipitated by a declining agricultural workforce, required the Union to formally 
merge with a larger body, and be held ultimately accountable to its policy decisions.  
 
2. Union Actions under the New Regime: the Imposition of Rejuvenatory Orientations 
and Strategies. 
 
 This section recounts how the merger forced a parital change in orientation 
and strategy from the Farmworkers. At first, the TGWU seemed to recognise that 
then-existent idiosyncrasies of agricultural production demanded differentiated 
methods of unionism from the AAWNTG: in June 1982 Moss Evans assured the 
Union’s members that “we recognise... farming… horticulture and many of the allied 
industries are not like factories and that’s why we appreciate the need for a specialist 
service to these workers.38 However it was not long before the perceived 
“peculiarities” of the Farmworkers’ Union were addressed by restructurings imposed 
by Transport House – the TGWU’s central office.39 AAWNTG Branches of less than 
50 members were merged, and District Committees were replaced with Regional 
Trade Group Committees in regions with low memberships:  here branch delegates 
came to work with brothers and sisters from urban TGWU branches, dealing with 
issues far detached from the NUAAW’s traditional remit.  
This development, confirming many members’ fears regarding the dilution of 
the Farmworkers’ interests, was exacerbated in 1983, when the TUC vetoed the 
policy of the TGWU and denied the AAWNTG its assured right to affiliate separately 
at TUC and Labour Conferences; claiming that the Trade Group was not sufficiently 
independent enough to warrant special consideration. While the trade group could still 
get agricultural issues raised at conferences via the TGWU’s sizeable delegations, the 
Farmworkers’ independent operations were certainly inconvenienced by this 
development.40 Waddington, analysing British mergers in the late Twentieth and early 
Twenty-First Centuries, finds that many of the incentives towards rejuvenation that 
mergers theoretically offer are counterbalanced and inhibited in practice, as much 
post-merger attention and resources are directed towards “the minutiae of internal 
structural changes at the expense of energies spent on renewal”.41 The structural 
adjustments felt by the Farmworkers’ Union following their incorporation into the 
TGWU certainly support this observation.  
 Having said this, the merger also produced centrifugal forces in the Union’s 
structure, running against these above-mentioned trends towards centralisation that 
helped disable membership participation. Many in the Headland House, particular of 
the right wing persuasion, took advantage of the generous pension and redundancy 
packages offered by the TGWU.42 This encouraged, via necessity, a trend towards 
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lay-member participation, which could be described as an organisational approach in 
contemporary parlance. Even while cutting branches, both Headland House and 
Transport House encouraged this development43: a new committee of the TUC, the 
Distribution, Food, Drink, Tobacco and Agriculture Industries Committee – 
dominated by delegates from the AAWNT – used its inaugural meeting to discuss the 
tactics necessary to “identify” and “penetrate” “difficult to unionise areas” in the 
industry; likewise, the 1984 Trade Group Conference emphasized the need for unpaid 
branch secretaries and rank-and-file members to get involved with recruiting, enabled 
by personalised canvassing literature supplied by central office44; furthermore, aided 
by the financial clout of the TGWU, the Landworker was made free as of January 
1984, with it made clear that lay-members were expected to use this resource in 
attracting new members into the Union’s fold.45 Clearly, the recruitment and retention 
of members became pressing concerns for the Farmworkers’ Union, opening the door 
for a growth in organising approaches, which helped to counteract the centralising 
forces imposed on the Union’s internal structures post-merger.46  
 Yet more change soon appeared on the Union’s horizon. The NUAAW was 
but one in a number of unions to join the TGWU in the 1980s. Despite this series of 
mergers, the TGWU experienced massive membership declines in the 1980s, as 
economic restructuring took their tool: between 1981 and 1987, the TGWU’s total 
membership declined by 708,000 persons.47 This decimation soon prompted a 
significant, consciously deployed attempt at changing the multifaceted orientations 
and strategies of the TGWU, and by implication the AAWNTG: explicitly seeking to 
reverse its decline in membership, the TGWU launched its ‘Link Up’ campaign in 
1987. Being the largest union in Britain at the time, this major initiative represented, 
in terms of the dedication of resources, the most significant conscious attempt at 
rejuvenation in the entirety of the Movement at the time.48  
 Launched in February 1987, Link Up aimed to, quite literally, link up the 
interests of the perceived cores and peripheries of the UK’s workforce, and also 
“make links between industrial and political work, (and) between the workplace and 
community”.49 Link Up specifically strove to organise non-standard workers in all 
sections of the economy: the TGWU argued that it had to “come to terms with 
changing nature of the workforce and need(ed) to stop talking about the problems 
these changes have created and do something positive on behalf of the thousands of 
workers suffering the adverse affects”50; rather than blaming or victimising “a 
complex mixture of part-time, temporary and causal workers… (the) majority (of 
whom were) women and youth”,51 Link Up orientated itself to defend their interests, 
by bringing them into the Union’s internal structures. Hyping the extent of this 
intended reorientation, Ron Todd – the TGWU’s General Secretary from 1985 
through to 1992 – argued that Link Up would be the Twentieth Century’s equivalent 
of the New Unionism that revolutionised the British craft tradition at the previous fin 
de siècle: that historic tendency refocused the Movements’ attentions to, and enabled 
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active participation from, “unskilled general workers”; Todd believed that “temporary 
and part time workers are in the equivalent position today”, and that via Link Up the 
resultant new “New Unionism will address itself to the problems and aspirations of 
groups such as temporary workers, women, young people, and members of the ethnic 
minorities, who have, quite frankly, been neglected in the past”.52  
 Under the auspices of the then Deputy General Secretary Bill Morris, a 
coordinatory working party was set up at Transport House to coordinate the 
campaign. Link Up’s formal orientation was codified in a newly drawn up ‘Charter 
for Part Time and Casual Worker’, which promised that the TGWU would strive to 
secure pro rata pay and conditions, the legal rights of job security, and adequate 
health and safety provisions for non-standard workers.53 Clearly, Link Up had more of 
an inclusive, rather that engaging orientation, preoccupied as it was with pro rata 
treatment for non-standard groups of workers, and underplaying any exonerating 
circumstances that could have required differentiated treatment for such groups from 
the TGWU: according to the campaign’s adage, “temporary workers need permanent 
rights, part-time workers need full-time rights”.54  Underwriting this inclusive 
orientation was a self-interested motivation to survive: Bill Morris, speaking to the 
AAWNTG, informed members “we must come to terms (with labour market changes) 
or die”.55 That is to say, while the Link Up campaign was designed to protect and 
stabilise potentially precarity-prone groups of workers, this stabilisation was 
ultimately in the interests of the TGWU’s traditional, relatively protected constituents.  
 Drawing from an extensive repertoire of rejuvenatory strategies, Link Up can 
be better describe by what it tactics it did not embrace, rather than those that it did: in 
contradiction to strategic developments emanating from elsewhere in Transport House 
at the time, Link Up explicitly and stringently disavowed itself from the rejuvenatory 
tendency towards business unionism: employers were envisioned as playing little role 
in the developing campaign.56 Alternatively, Link Up placed emphasis predominantly 
on organising and campaigning approaches to Union action. 
 Link Up unfolded in a series of phases during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
For its launch, an “organisers’ pack” was produced and distributed nationally, which 
included briefings on the “periphery” labour force and the freshly inked Charter for 
Part Time and Casual Worker. Link Up’s first action was to hold a weekend seminar 
for union officers, including delegates from the AAWNTG, to convince its own staff 
of the need to prioritise recruitment over the servicing of pre-existent member.57 After 
its February launch, Link Up formally commenced with a week long Kick Start Week 
in September 1987. Here, Transport House provided suggested activities and 
campaign materials to all Districts, which were required to draw up individually 
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tailored schedules and targets in line with Link Up’s stated ideals.58 Afterwards, the 
campaign’s first phase began by targeting individual sectors, and trade groups, with 
“rolling recruitment campaigns”: first up was the AAWNTG, along with the 
commercial road transport, construction and public service sectors of the TGWU. 
These sectors received increased resources and attention in the first quarter of 2008, 
with central office placing a general emphasis on the need to prioritise recruitment.59  
After all sector’s had participated in Phase One, Phase Two was initiated in 
April 1989: this focussed on the need to deepen penetration rates in pre-existent union 
strongholds, and concurrently still emphasised the need to recruit new groups in 
unorganised sectors of the economy. Likewise, attention was placed on developing 
links with wider societal actors, in a distinctly rejuvenatory manner.60 This 
campaigning aspect of Link Up purposefully drew from previous TGWU actions: the 
TGWU had held in 1987 its ‘Trade Unions in the Community: a TGWU Conference 
for Social Action Groups’, where unionists and other invited participants discussed 
the possibility of building strategic links between unions61 and other societal groups.62  
Phase Three began in 1990, which saw the launch of a two year plan to 
increase and retain membership numbers: new recruitment and publicity materials 
were produced, specifically appealing for greater day-to-day involvement from the 
lay-membership of the TGWU: as an example, in September 1990 the self-descriptive 
“recruit-a-mate” campaign was launched.63 Such lay-member participation was 
supposed to be activated through the use of newly created ‘Lay-membership 
Recruitment Teams’: the content of much of Link Up’s centrally produced literature 
aimed to encourage and empower such groups to recruit within their own workplace 
and in their wider industrial environment.  
Link Up was informally mothballed in 1992. The 1991 TGWU Conference 
had previously instructed the GEC to bring in a managerial consultancy firm to 
examine the Union’s structure and precarious finances. While many of the eventual 
recommendations made by the consultants tessellated with Link Up’s rhetoric aims – 
consultants underlined the importance of recruitment, internal equal opportunities and 
the forging of community bridges – Link Up’s banner ceased to appear in Union 
produced literature soon after the commencement of the audit.64 
 The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that soon after the TGWU 
merger, the Farmworkers’ Union’s internal structures were significantly centralised, 
albeit with some countervailing developments also occurring. Later, the TGWU, 
seeking to reverse its personal cascade of decline, created the self-consciously 
rejuvenatory Link Up campaign. This explicitly required the Farmworkers’ to adopt 
an inclusive orientation towards precarity-prone workers, to be striven for via use of 
an organising approach, incorporating elements of campaigning approaches also. All 
unions, in the voluntarist Post-War Era and beyond, were wont to launch occasional 
ad hoc recruitment campaigns in order to shore up their industrial muscle. The 
TGWU was no exception. However, radically differentiating Link Up at the time was 
the nationally coordinated nature of the campaign, its greater emphasis on lay-
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member participation, and its concurrent emphasis on strengthening the TGWU’s 
extra-industrial community role. 
 
3. Link Up and the Farmworkers’ Union. 
 
 This section looks at how the Farmworkers’ Union responded to the 
imposition of Link Up, principally examining how the Union’s recruitment culture 
was affected. The AAWNTG first responded to Link Up by again calling for lay-
member involvement in recruitment, with Jack Bobby appealing to the membership to 
recruit workers in memory of the Tolpuddle Martyrs.65 Furthermore, the Union’s 
delegation to the 1989 AWB negotiations tailored their annual demand with reference 
to the TGWU’s aforementioned Charter, which must be afforded some credit for that 
year’s raising of the part-time differential from 96% to 97.5% of the full-time rate.66  
 However, we must look to the Lincolnshire, Humberside and Yorkshire 
districts of the Union to see concerted efforts towards Link Up’s ideals that went 
beyond mere rhetorical appeals or highly centralised negotiations on the AWB. Here, 
the Union focussed its efforts on the labour-intensive horticultural industry: indeed, 
the Union specifically targeted individual firms with high numbers of employees. 
Appropriately enough for these operating environments, the Union sought to conduct 
firm level collective bargaining with employers, but placed “negotiat(ions) to improve 
the position of women, part-time and seasonal workers… firmly on the syllabus”.67 In 
a few of these targeted companies a degree of success was achieved: in one medium 
sized horticultural firm the Union negotiated a collective agreement that guaranteed 
pro rata rates for temporary workers, archiving an 80% union density rate of such 
workers in the process.68 To note is the fact that here, the Union used the strategy of 
voluntary collective bargaining, typical of the mainstream Movement in the Post-War 
Era, while being guided by a rejuvenatory, inclusive orientation.  
 A few organisers elsewhere, on their own volition, launched programmes 
designed to complement Link Up’s stated aims. District Officer Alex Russell, of 
Lincolnshire, held a series of meetings intended specifically to recruit part-time and 
casual female labourers.69 Here, Russell augmented the discourse of the Link Up 
campaign and espoused a positively engaging orientation, which sought not only to 
protect the interests of non-standard groups of workers, but also confirm and cement 
such labour relations’ apparently legitimate position in the labour market.70  
 Clearly then, some Union activists eagerly embraced the aims of Link Up, and 
several advances were made under the campaign’s banner in the areas of the 
AAWNTG’s domain most conducive to traditional forms of industrial relations, due 
to high concentrations of workers in large-sized firms. However, Link Up was not 
particularly successful, within the AAWNTG nor the wider TGWU, at achieving its 
most privileged goals: producing organising cultures amongst rank-and-file unionists, 
and shifting the TGWU’s hegemonic strategy towards an organising approach. A 
perusal of the Landworker and the Record71 in the years of Link Up shows full-time 
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union officials achieved the campaign’s greatest successes: while much fanfare was 
made regarding the potential of lay-member recruitment, neither paper reported many 
achievements in this area. As both papers would have been highly interested in such 
developments, it is fair to interpret this silence as evidence of a failure in Link Up’s 
operationalisation.  
 Graph Seven shows the result of this lack of lay-member participation. In the 
early years of Link Up one can observe a slight increase in overall recruitment rates 
across the TGWU, as the campaign’s drives in lightly organised sectors paid off.72 
However, without the creation of organising cultures, full-time union officials needed 
to shift their emphases to achieve such results: this led to a weakening of the services 
that formed the basis of their normal union duties. This was particularly the case, as 
those areas of the economy that the TGWU was hoping to organise proved 
inconducive to low-cost union practices. Resultantly, drop-out rates also increased 
over the same period, leading to an overall continuation in the precipitous loss of 
members the TGWU had been experiencing in the height of the cascade of decline, as 
shown in Graph Eight. Link Up’s organisers soon recognised this pattern, stating that 
due at least in part to the campaign, “recruitment is on a rising curve in the Union but 
so is membership turnover”.73 Resultantly, whereas Link Up had initially been 
designed with a particular emphasis on recruitment, Phase Three, when launched, 
placed a renewed importance on retention: the TGWU codified a ‘Members’ Charter’ 
that promised a “quality assessment” of the resources and services made available to 
all-ready existing members.74 The ‘services’ of full-time officers were back in vogue, 
and membership losses, but also recruitment rates, particularly of traditionally 
difficult to reach precarity-prone workers, dropped accordingly. Key tenets of Link 
Up’s rejuvenatory ideals were jettisoned, to the likely detriment of precarity-prone 
workers still left external to the union and Movement.   
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 The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that Link Up’s imposed 
cocktail of rejuvenatory orientations and strategies was not effectively at achieving its 
desired ends on a coherent and widespread basis. Full-time officials achieved the 
successes that were made, against the spirit of Link Up’s organisational ideals. This 
lesson applies specifically for the AAWNTG, and more generally to the wider 
TGWU.  
 
4. Explaining Link Up’s Ineffectiveness. 
  
 Unlike issues on the AWB, and those regarding tied-cottaging and health and 
safety, it was not features of the Farmworkers’ Union’s proximate environment that 
principally led to such a failure in effectiveness. Instead, the internal group structures 
of the Farmworkers’ Union, and the wider TGWU, were culpable. For a start, from 
the outset of Link Up there was a widespread belief among the TGWU’s traditionally 
left wing and ‘fiercely independent’ regions and branches that the whole project was a 
vehicle designed to shore up Bill Morris’ internal position within Transport House.75 
Morris, then Deputy General Secretary, is notably for being, at the time and 
subsequently, the most senior British unionist of BME heritage. Despite, rather than 
because, of this fact, many in the TGWU were suspicious of Morris, regarding him as 
a right wing reformist: a high profile emissary of a faction within the Movement 
equivalent to the then embryonic New Labour project within the Party. Such 
suspicions helped prohibit Transport House from legitimately sanctioning its own 
activities,76 which prevented the actualisation of Link Up from theory to practical 
actions.77  
 Likewise, the internal structures of the Farmworkers’ Union proved to be 
incompatible, not with organising approaches per se, but with the organising approach 
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as advocated by Transport House. To understand why this was the case, it is 
necessary to look in depth at the earlier history of the Union.  
 From 1906 through to 1911, non-agricultural officials with deep loyalties to 
the Liberal Party dominated the EC of the Union in its earliest guise. This EC 
considered its own Union as little more than a Liberal vote machine, to be activated in 
the run up to national and local elections. It was only the actions of largely 
independent organisers in Norfolk and elsewhere, who often diverged so much from 
official Union policy as to be regarded with outright hostility by the then 
unaccountable, self-selected central office, which kept the Union functioning and 
growing between elections78: Grove’s seminal study of the early history of British 
agricultural unionism is replete with accounts of non-professional organisers 
travelling the length and breadth of their home counties, and further afield, on foot 
and bicycles, establishing new branches and ensuring subscriptions were paid, risking 
their financial and physical wellbeing in the process.79 Clearly, the Farmworkers’ 
Union, like all unions, had to recruit to survive in its formative years, and contrary to 
what the results of Link Up suggest, in the early Nineteenth Century Union lay-
members were responsible for much of the Union’s recruitment and maintenance. 
Only an internal coup, that followed the EC’s disastrous handling of a Lincolnshire 
strike in 1911, allowed representatives from the Union’s often socialist, pseudo-
syndicalist lay-membership to gain controls on the EC.80 
 As the Union matured in the interwar years, this socialist zeal turned to right 
wing pragmatism on the part of the EC. Concurrently, and necessarily for the 
expanding organisation, head office and a relatively small pool of full-time staff came 
to play a growing role in the organisation of the Union: negotiations channelled 
through the AWB are but the clearest example of the centralisation and 
professionalisation that accompanied the Union’s journey rightwards in the interwar 
period and beyond. Just before the onset of our periodisation, this centralisation of 
Union affairs included the formal responsibilities for organising and recruiting: for 
much of the 1960s, the Union supplemented its unpaid branch officers with a number 
of dedicated, full-time, recruitment officers. By 1965 there were 6 recruitment 
officers operating in 24 regional districts across the country.81  
 In terms of raw figures, these officers seemed to serve the Union well: in 
1963, the Union found that the contributions brought in by said officers more than 
covered their combined salaries and travel expenses.82 The geographic remits of the 
recruitment officers were selected with reference to the speed of the drift of the land: 
recruitment officers were sent to work in regions with more precipitous declines in the 
agricultural workforce. Yet despite these environmental disadvantages, those areas 
with a recruitment officer saw average sign-up rates of 128 new recruits per 1,000 
members in 1966, compared to an average of 80 in other districts: resultantly, 
recruitment rates in 1965 were on average 8.8% up from 1959’s rates in these 
professionalised districts, whereas other district were down -13.9% over the same 
period.83  
 However, despite these successes, the lay-membership and delegate base of 
the Union never shared Headland House’s enthusiasm for this professional recruiting 
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culture. It was felt that the involvement of professional staff was an alien imposition 
on the Union: beneath the layers of placidity, brought about from years of servicing, a 
general feeling pervaded the rank-and-file to the effect that the Union was, or should, 
be operated by the lay-membership: consequently, delegates at 1968’s Biennial 
abolished the recruitment officer post, against the Podium’s wishes.84  
 This stimulated the budding re-emergence of a grass-root organising culture 
within the Union. This culture, while never particularly effective at stymieing 
membership losses, could be occasionally glimpsed throughout the 1970s and early 
1980s. It would be disingenuous to claim that the mainstream Movement, while 
focussing on voluntary negotiations, paid no heed to the need to recruit at this time: 
unionists would often push for the idealised ‘100% organised’ status for their firms, 
and the Farmworkers’ Union did much the same in the 1970s.85 However, diverging 
from the pre-rejuvenatory strategies of the urban Movement, which largely left 
recruitment to shop stewards or specific recruitment officers, the Farmworkers’ 
Union, from the very outset of our periodisation, afforded a bigger role for its rank-
and-file members when trying to increase its membership: in 1973 the Union 
launched its ‘10% Campaign’, specifically appealing for the support of “every 
member of the Union... certainly every reader of the Landworker… should pass this 
issue on to a non-member”86; clearly, it was felt that responsibility for recruitment 
extended to the rank-and-file, who were called to use “firm but gentle persuasion” “to 
get the reluctant ones in”.87 Beyond pressuring non-members, lay unionist were urged 
to “get to know your MP (and) see that (they were) well informed of the Union’s aim 
and activities”; “attend political meetings… putting the Union’s case at every 
opportunity”; “do everything you can to get a capable Union member on to your local 
council”; “get to know an editor or journalist on your local paper” and “boycott… 
firms” engaged in anti-union practices.88 While remuneratory and quality of life 
issues had long been advocated for by the Union’s centralised, service orientated 
structures, these above mentioned functions of Union activity were reserved for the 
rank-and-file at the outset of our periodisation, and beyond: this emphasis on lay-
membership involvment could certainly be described as an organising approach 
according to Hyman’s contemporary categorisation. Indeed, in 1980 the Union’s 
President, John Hose, explicitly stated, “we need a greater involvement of our lay-
membership at all levels”.89 The Union continued to rhetorically appeal for such 
action through the 1980s: in 1982 the Landworker published a page sized graphic of 
Jack Bobby, decked up in Lord Kitchener’s classic attire, questioning unionists “have 
you recruited a new member this year?”90  
 In light of this operational heritage, one can say that Transport House, when 
consciously striving to build an organising approach via the Link Up campaign, 
forced too much of a centralised, unaccountable strategy on the AAWNTG. In the 
mid-1980s Maynard, having initially been supportive of the merger, argued that 
“closing small branches has been disastrous, it (has) lengthened the line of 
communications”,91 alienating and pacifying the lay-membership that Link Up was 
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later so rhetorically intent on activating. This earlier action did not lend Link Up an 
air of respectability amongst the Farmworkers’ conservative92 membership base, 
which had been highly suspicious of 1982’s amalgamation largely for fears of 
Transport House negating the agricultural voice by bypassing or subsuming 
traditional avenues of communication. Later, even while Link Up sought to organise 
the agricultural workforce – particularly those otherwise excluded from trade union 
activity – the project remained a highly bureaucratic and centralised affair, out of 
keeping with the idealised form of unionism as subscribed to by the rank-and-file of 
the AAWNTG. Perceptively, what attempts Link Up made at activating the lay-
membership, via Lay-member Recruitment Teams, bypassed the already vandalised, 
traditional branch structure of the Union.93 This meant that most Farmworker activists 
could not embrace Link Up in anyway beyond a mere rhetorical manner, hostile as 
they were to its perceived imposition.  
 Even the most centralised of unions ultimately rely, to some extent, on the 
activity, support and interest of its lay-members: workers participate in union activity 
if and when they are convinced that the union’s desired outcomes matter to 
themselves, that their personal investments in union activity have an instrumental 
value, that other potential union members will join the organisation, and that the 
totality of the union’s members stand a good chance of succeeding.94 Clearly any 
attempts at rejuvenation would have to assure such concerns at the very least. This 
was something that the TGWU failed to do with the Link Up campaign and the events 
surrounding it: in fact, by closing small branches it achieved quite the opposite. 
Satirising Hyman’s vocabulary, one could say that Link Up inadvertently imposed an 
anti-communicative approach unto the Farmworkers’ Union. This led to the 
actualisation of an incoherent, piece-meal, and ineffective mode of rejuvenation, one 
that the wider trade Movement had become well used to by this stage of the cascade 
of decline: only the grand scale of Link Up’s incoherence was novel.  
 Melanie Simmms analyses “organising models” as developed, and often 
normatively advocated, by trade union theorists at the end of the Twentieth and 
beginning of the Twenty-First Centuries, and argues that self-conscious “organising”, 
in the modern British context, is in fact highly differentiated from the Victorian union 
activities that strategists have explicitly linked such actions to. Rejuvenation is often 
touted as the ‘rediscovery’ of Nineteenth Century forms of unionism. However, in 
practice syndicalist notions of worker self-organisation have been abandoned by the 
hegemonic Movement: replaced by a desire for organising that still involves the 
activation of unions’ lay-memberships, but in highly bureaucratic manners with union 
centers still retaining a high degree of influence.95 Only the fuzziness of the term 
‘organising’, and the apparent dichotomy between ‘organising’ and ‘servicing’ 
approaches to unionism, have allowed for a disingenuous construction of connections 
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between actually contradictory forms of union activity.96 The evidence offered up by 
the Link Up campaign, particularly with regards to its overall ineffectiveness within 
the AAWNTG, suggests furthermore that a union with a historic heritage of ‘classical 
organising’ – that is, organising with a close-to-syndicalist form, however ineffective 
– proves incompatible with the conscious imposition of a centralised ‘rejuventory 
organising model’, despite the two sharing a basic aim of activating lay unionists.  
Ironically, there is good reason to suggest that via different methods, an 
effective organising culture could have been developed in the Farmworkers’ Union 
over the same period. Speaking to Wynn in 1993, then Union Secretary Barry 
Leathwood argued that, with the constant rebel rousing and insubordination of 
delegates during the conciliatory Post-War years, “the Biennials demonstrated the 
tremendous talent of many lay-members. Yet it was never encouraged in terms of 
industrial organisation”97: agriculture’s once-idiosyncratic environment produced a 
Union naturally inclined to syndicalist organising tendencies; highly dispersed and 
small-sized branches could not depend on central staff, nor overburdened district 
officers, in the way that urban union members could. However, first a right wing EC, 
and then a cost cutting general union, attempted to standardise the Union’s branch 
structures. If, rather than bypassing these rebels in the name of efficacy and 
standardisation, the TGWU had sought to empower the branches of the Union, a 
dynamic organising model, albeit differentiated from that envisioned by Link Up, 
could have been created and maintained in practice.   
 
The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that the TGWU’s conscious 
attempt at rejuvenation did not have enough sympathy for the historical architecture – 
the traditional operating systems – of the Farmworkers’ Union. Not due to any 
inherent bias against precarity-prone workers, rejuvenatory technologies were 
rendered ineffective when applied against the grain of previous operating norms. 
There had always been an underlying, sometimes deeply underlying, tendency 
towards decentralisation, rather than centralisation, in the Union’s modus operandi, 
and the TGWU’s actions preceding and during Link Up contravened this cultural 
directive. Due to this unsympathetic design of the TGWU’s organisational 
technologies, Link Up’s conscious change in orientation and strategy was rendered 
ineffective. 
 
5. Summary of the Attempted Imposition of Rejuvenation. 
 
 This chapter analyses research questions (vi) to (viii) with regards to the 
Farmworkers’ Union’s interactions with the wider Movement, namely its interactions 
with the TGWU. To summarise each 
 
vi) What orientations and strategies has the Union employed with regards to 
precarity-prone workers? 
 
 From the late 1980s, the Union was, for a number of years, compelled to adopt 
an inclusive orientation towards precarity-prone workers in an operational domain 
related to recruitment, and make use of centrally operationalised organising and 
campaigning approaches to union strategy in the process.  
                                                
96 Cf. Kate Bronfenbrenner, Sheldon Friedman, Richard Hurd, Rudolph Oswald and Ronald Seeber, 
Organizing to Win: New Research on Union Strategies. New York: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
97 Wynn, Skilled at All Trades, pg. 425. 
 186 
 
vii) What causal mechanisms have been responsible for producing said 
orientations and strategies? 
 
 The drift from the land, and the Union’s friendly society functions – which 
were necessitated by then-existent idiosyncrasies of Britain’s agricultural 
environment – compelled the Union to merge with a larger body as a survival 
mechanism. This required the Union to subscribe, in theory at least, to the 
rejuvenatory ideals of Link Up, which were created by the TGWU in an attempt to 
stave off its own cascade of decline.  
 
viii) How effective have said strategies been in securing the Union’s desired 
orientational goals, and why? 
 
 On the whole, actual practical manifestations of Link Up’s orientations and 
strategies were rather thin on the ground within the AAWNTG. Due to the 
campaign’s highly centralised form, and the fact that only years earlier the TGWU 
had reconfigured the Trade Group’s structure in a unilateral manner, it was felt that 
Link Up had little to offer the average member of the Union, who as a result failed to 
offer the material support needed for the TGWU to legitimately sanctify its own 
activities. 
 
 Perhaps on reading this chapter, this thesis’ research question appears to be 
fully answered: in that while the Farmworkers’ Union initially operated in a 
marginally differentiated, and relatively coherent, manner with regards to recruitment 
when compared to the mainstream Movement, a series of mergers and resultant 
submissions of authority meant that the orientations and strategies of the Union 
became ever more convergent with the urban Movement as the cascade of decline 
progressed. Analysis in the next chapter, which looks at the Farmworkers’ Union’s 
relationship with labour providers, disproves this proposal: I demonstrate how 
agriculture’s historic operating environment has led the Farmworkers to actualise, 
albeit while making use of its master-union’s enhanced organisational and financial 
resources, a markedly innovative cocktail of orientations and strategies regarding 
certain forms of precarity-prone work in the industry, with remarkable, and perhaps 
mimicable, success. 
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Chapter 6: The Farmworkers’ Union and the Return of Gangmastery.  
 
 In this thesis we have observed the Union’s actions in a variety of operational 
domains that have directly affected its own membership – a membership that has 
partially resembled the archetypal workforce of the New Economy due to the once 
idiosyncratic nature of agriculture’s framing environment. It is now necessary to 
examine the Union’s actions in an operational domain directly interconnected with the 
archetypal workforce of the New Economy: this chapter looks at the Union’s strategic 
actions regarding triangular employment relations.  
 Section one describes the history of agricultures’ typical triangular 
employment relation, and that relation’s relationship with labour precarity. Section 
two describes the Union’s strategic actions regarding this employment relationship, 
and the resultant effects of said actions. Section three analyses the nature of these 
strategic actions, while section four analyses the orientations that the Union held 
when these actions were performed. Section five critically assesses the effectiveness 
of these strategies, and the reasons for this effectiveness. Section six summarises the 
findings of this chapter.  
 
1. Gangmastery: Two Peaks of Influence. 
 
British agriculture has rarely used a ‘standard’ bilateral employment 
relationship1 between farmer and labourer as its sole modus operandi. Differentiating 
agricultural production from Post-War Fordist norms, third-party labour providers 
have long played a central role in the formation and maintenance of agricultural 
labour relationships. Gangmasters and gangers are the traditional names given to 
labour providers operating in the agricultural sector.2  
Gangmastery developed in the first half of the 1800s, as Britain’s agricultural 
employers were pressurised to reduce their wage costs, particularly after the repeal of 
the Corn Laws in 1846.3 Aiding this wage suppression was the fact that the Poor 
Laws of the 1800s partially bound unemployed rural persons to their parishes of birth, 
helping to arrest otherwise irresistible processes of urban proletarianisation.4 As adult 
male farm work was increasingly irregularised and precariatised, rural households 
were forced to send additional family members into the fields to make ends meet. 
Resultantly a large, infantilised and feminised rural workforce, essentially local in 
nature, was born into existence.5 Perceptually unable to negotiate and form labour 
relationships for themselves, gangs of around fifty women, children and young men 
came to be organised and controlled by local patriarchs, normally working class field 
labourers themselves.  
This relationship came to be concentrated in the rural areas around Norfolk, 
                                                
1 Vosko, Less Than Adequate. 
2 J. Frances, The Role of Gangmasters and Gang Labour in the UK Food Chain Network Past and 
Present: Memorandum Presented to the Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
London: HMSO, 2003 
3 The repeal opened British markets to discounted corn grown in the United States for the first time. Cf. 
Brass, Medieval working practices? 
4 Cf. W.H.R. Curtler, A Short History of English Agriculture, Oxford: Clarendon, 1908; Feldman 2007; 
Hasbach, A History of English Agricultural Labour; Pooley and Jean Turnbull, Migration and Mobility 
in Britain since the 18th Century. 
5 Cf. Hasbach, A History of English Agricultural Labour; Karl Marx, Capital: Volume One, Chicago: 
Charles H. Kerr and Company, 1906, chapter twenty-five. 
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Lincolnshire and Cambridgeshire.6 Gangmasters negotiated a fixed payment from 
farmers for work done, directed the work of their gang and remunerated their workers 
accordingly, extracting surplus value for themselves in the process. Such a labour 
relationship greatly suited farmers and landowners, who were reluctant to employ a 
regularized, full-time workforce7: resultantly, gangmastered labour came to play a 
central role in mid-Nineteenth Century agriculture, with gang-workers performing 
“the work for which (independently organised workers) apply for and are refused”.8  
Victorian gangmastery was highly precarious. The Nineteenth Century gang-
system employed workers at highly intensive piece rates for minimal remuneration: a 
ganged labourer in 1843 would expect to take home 7 or 8 Imperial Pence a day.9 
Likewise, Gangmasters required workers to perform dangerous and strenuous work: 
for an 1800s’ ganged labourer, work chiefly involved “weeding, stone-picking, 
potato-setting and pulling, the spreading of manure, hay-making, and all kinds of 
work connected with turnip-growing”.10 Further producing precarity, ganged workers 
faced uncertain and unsecured employment on a daily basis: workers were paid by the 
quarter day and if poor weather prevented the completion of a full day’s work, 
labourers went unpaid.11 Labourers also had to endure physical violence, embark on 
long and arduous walks to and from work,12 and forsake opportunities for education; 
in the 1840s, over half of the ganged workforce was aged between 7 and 13.13 Not 
only was work precarious in these regards: gangmasters were making lucrative profits 
as “vendor(s) of necessaries to the members of the gangs”; charging excessive rates 
for services, such as the provision of daily meals, under monopoly-like conditions, 
deflating real wages as a result.14 Having said this, it would be a fallacy to presume 
that gangmasters were getting rich from their exploitation: an average gangmaster’s 
income was modest at best, rarely exceeding that of an “ordinary labourer in regular 
work”.15 
 This initial peak of gangmastery was relatively brief, rising in the mid-1820s, 
expanding in the 1840s, and declining with the passing of the Agricultural Gang Act 
in 1867.16 Relatively dismissive of the economic and extra-economic abuses 
committed by gangmasters, the Agricultural Gang Act sought to ‘protect’ the manners 
                                                
6 Hasbach, A History of English Agricultural Labour; Frances, The Role of Gangmasters and Gang 
Labour in the UK Food Chain Network Past and Present. 
7 Parliamentary Papers, Sixth Report of the Children’s Employment Commissioners, London: HMSO, 
1867. 
8 Parliamentary Papers, Reports of the Special Assistant Poor Law Commissioners on the Employment 
of Women and Children in Agriculture, London: HMSO, 1843. 
9 Frances, The Role of Gangmasters and Gang Labour in the UK Food Chain Network Past and 
Present; Parliamentary Papers, Reports of the Special Assistant Poor Law Commissioners on the 
Employment of Women and Children in Agriculture. 
10 Hasbach, A History of English Agricultural Labour. 
11 Frances, The Role of Gangmasters and Gang Labour in the UK Food Chain Network Past and 
Present. 
12 Parliamentary Papers, Reports of the Special Assistant Poor Law Commissioners on the Employment 
of Women and Children in Agriculture. 
13 Hasbach, A History of English Agricultural Labour. 
14 Parliamentary Papers, Reports of the Special Assistant Poor Law Commissioners on the Employment 
of Women and Children in Agriculture. 
15 Parliamentary Papers, Reports of the Special Assistant Poor Law Commissioners on the Employment 
of Women and Children in Agriculture; Frances, The Role of Gangmasters and Gang Labour in the UK 
Food Chain Network Past and Present. 
16 Don Pollard, “The Gangmaster System in the UK: Perspectives of a Trade Unionist”. In: Stephanie 
Barrientos and Charlotte Dolan (eds.), Ethical Sourcing in the Global Food System, London: 
Earthscan, 2006, chapter seven. 
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and morals of women: seen as being degraded by unfettered interactions with males in 
the fields.17 However, the 1867 Act greatly curtailed the gang-system’s continued 
presence in British agriculture: remaining gangers in the industry were required to 
acquire a licence and “prove their good character”, and males and females were 
prevented from working in unsegregated gangs; in addition, the Agricultural Gang 
Act increasingly regularised and problematised the hiring of child labour.18 
Magnifying the effects of the Agricultural Gang Act were the repeals of the Poor 
Laws in 1865/6, and the enacting of various education ordinances in 1870 and 1876.19 
The Royal Commission on Labour, held in 1893, found that due to a combination of 
these acts, gangmastery was only still common in Lincolnshire, and even here it was 
being used less that it had been previously.20 So, while agricultural labour relations 
never became totally decommodified in the early Twentieth Century, when highly 
personalised employment relationships remained a norm, triangular employment 
arrangements were a relative rarity from the 1870s through to the 1970s.  
Gangmastery never truly vanished from Britain, and the system played a 
somewhat sizeable role in British agriculture, particularly in Northern England and 
Scotland, throughout the Twentieth Century.21 However, gangmasters, both legal and 
illegal, returned en mass to British agriculture from the early 1980s onwards, initially 
re-emerging in The Wash of East Anglia, and Lincolnshire.22 In 2002, Parliament’s 
cross-party Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee (EFRA) began 
the state’s first major study of modern gangmastery: its final report, published in 
2003, conservatively estimated that between two and three thousand gangmasters 
operated in the agricultural sector, supplying over half of the 72,000 seasonal workers 
required by British agribusinesses at the time.23 EFRA heard that British gangmasters 
had an estimated combined profit of £50 million per annum at this instant.24 Upon 
their return, gangmasters have taken heterogeneous forms, ranging from small-scale 
field gangers controlling around twelve persons, to large-scale recruitment 
organisations, organising workers by the hundreds during periods of peak 
production.25  
                                                
17 Brass, Medieval working practices? pg. 323; Parliamentary Papers, Sixth Report of the Children’s 
Employment Commissioners; Frances, The Role of Gangmasters and Gang Labour in the UK Food 
Chain Network Past and Present. 
18 Hasbach, A History of English Agricultural Labour; Frances, The Role of Gangmasters and Gang 
Labour in the UK Food Chain Network Past and Present. 
19 The Education Act of 1876 made it illegal for children under the age of ten to be employed in any 
circumstance, and enforced compulsory schooling up to the age of 14. However, children over 10 could 
still formally work, particularly during harvest periods when rural schools often closed their doors for 
the express purpose of providing child labour. Indeed, many a Scot or Northerner, if approaching the 
autumn of their lives, will still be able to recall their ‘tatty (potato) holidays’ in vivid detail; many a 
Londoner, of a certain generation, will likewise recount their experiences of the ‘hop holidays’, when 
schools would break to aid the beer industry. Cf. Hasbach, A History of English Agricultural Labour 
20 Ibid. 
21 Phillip Conford and Jeremy Burchardt, The Return of the Gangmaster, 2011, available online at 
http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-125.html, last accessed 2nd May 2013. 
22 Pollard, The Gangmaster System in the UK. 
23 House of Commons, Gangmaster (Licensing) Bill – White Paper Debate 27th February 2004; 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee, Gangmasters: Fourteenth Report of Session 
2002-3, London: HMSO, 2003. 
24 International Labour Organisation, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: 
Forced Labour Outcomes of Irregular Migration and Human Trafficking in Europe. Geneva: ILO, 
2003. 
25 Frances, The Role of Gangmasters and Gang Labour in the UK Food Chain Network Past and 
Present. 
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The local female workforce that formed the core of Victorian gangs, alongside 
children, initially provided the majority of ganged labour on the system’s return. 
However changes in British food production soon diluted their presence. Over the 
Twentieth Century British growers, using agricapitalist technologies, augmented 
growing seasons so that gangs, previously required on a seasonal basis, came to be 
utilised in a year round capacity. Gangworking went from being a part-time to full-
time occupation, rendering the job less acceptable to rural women, disproportionately 
responsible for unwaged household labour responsibilities.26 Therefore, the 
demographic makeup, and modus operandi, of ‘modern’ labour gangs have become 
significantly differentiated from their Victorian equivalents. While female and male 
native workers continued to work within the system,27 migrant workers formed the 
major component of an average gang in the 1990s and 2000s.28 The majority of 
gangmasters came to form gangs with a mixed, but migrant heavy demographic,29 as a 
previously localised network of asymmetrical employment relations came to be 
internationalised, via the presence of sojourning labour.30  
 As demonstrated in chapter one, precarity-prone migrant labour has long been 
utilised in British agriculture. However, what has changed over the past three decades 
has been the demographic composition of the sector’s migrant workforce, which has 
become increasingly concentrated in labour gangs: Continental European and extra-
European workers have substantially replaced intra-British Isles sojourners in the 
fields and pack-houses of Britain. By 2005, Britain’s agricultural workforce was 
found to contain Portuguese, African, Chinese, Kurdish and Afghanistani workers in 
far greater numbers than had ever been reported before.31 Yet despite the sizes of 
these migrations patterns, flows from Eastern European nations have dwarfed all 
others, particularly after 1989 and the collapse of the U.S.S.R and its strict emigration 
restrictions.32 All in all, by the 2000s the gang-system had largely become “a (foreign) 
migrant worker issue… 82 per cent of gangmasters… employ Polish or some Polish 
workers; only about nine per cent of them employ just British workers”.33   
 This agricultural reconfiguration has broadly mirrored a general increase in 
the employment of foreign nationals, which has been observed from the 1990s 
onwards across Britain’s low-waged sectors34: total recorded migrations to the UK 
increased from 314,000 persons/annum in 1994 to 582,000 persons/annum in 200435; 
with the number of work-permits issued to non-EU nationals increasing from 
40,000/annum to 200,000/annum over the same period.36 Augmenting and further 
accelerating this growth was the relatively unrestricted migration of persons from the 
                                                
26 Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee, Gangmasters. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Rogaly, Intensification of Workplace Regimes in British Horticulture. 
29 Geddes et al., Gangmasters Licensing Authority Evaluation Study – Baseline Report. 
30 Pollard, The Gangmaster System in the UK. 
31 Anderson and Rogaly, Forced Labour and Migration to the UK, pg. 29. 
32 Cf. Matthew Light, “What Does It Mean to Control Migration? Soviet Mobility Policies in 
Comparative Perspective”. In: Law and Social Inquiry, 2012, 37, pp. 395-429.  
33 Paul Whitehouse, quoted in Wilkinson, New Labour, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority and the 
Woefully Inadequate Protection of Migrant Workers in the UK, pg. 5. 
34 Cf. Anderson et al., Fair Enough?; TUC CoVE, Hard Work, Hidden Lives; Ruhs, Greasing the 
Wheels of the Flexible Labour Market. 
35 Martin Ruhs, Greasing the Wheels of the Flexible Labour Market: East European Labour 
Immigration in the UK, Oxford: University of Oxford, 2006, pg. 4. 
36 Wilkinson, New Labour, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority and the Woefully Inadequate 
Protection of Migrant Workers in the UK, pg. 1. 
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EU accession nations37 commencing in May 2004: the period between 2004 and 2006 
represented, in absolute terms, the biggest single wave of migration in British 
history.38 
 The workers of Twentieth- and Twenty-First Century gangmastery have been 
consistently subjected to economic and extra-economic strategies aimed at 
destabilising their employment relations, making them dependent on their employer – 
the gangmaster, and their labour user – the farmer. EFRA’s evidence givers, most 
prominently the TGWU and the Citizens Advice Bureaux, reported that systematic 
pecuniary and extra-pecuniary exploitation of workers existed within these relations39: 
labour providers routinely failed to provide written contracts to workers, infringed 
minimum wage legislation, made substantial wage deductions and employed intra-
gang ‘security personnel’, who bound workers to employers with the threat of 
physical violence.40 Furthermore, gangers deliberately contrived situations of 
perceptual isolation in the 1990s and 2000s, as a means of gaining greater control and 
leverage over employees, who are rendered unable to complain and seek assistance 
regarding labour infractions41: agricultural gangmasters were known to convince EU-
15 workers, with the nominal right to reside and work in Britain without qualification, 
that they were working illegally and accordingly without employment rights. The 
resultant, constructed, fear of deportation led migrant ganged workers to isolate 
themselves from everyone but their precarity-producing employers.42  
 In addition, the element of tied-housing, a method of control previously 
primarily felt by relatively privileged, permanently employed agricultural labourers, 
became an additional tool of gangmasters employing workers with origins far 
removed from the rural workplace.43 Operating largely in the grey economy, gangers 
became adept at bypassing the tied-cottage legalisation afforded by the Rent 
(Agricultural) Act. However, rather than charging privileged rents, to secure the 
services of relatively skilled workers, gangmasters utilised this differentiated system 
of tied-cottaging to extract maximum profits from their workforces: one migrant 
worker informed EFRA that £80 was deducted weekly, from their nominal 
£83.85/week wage, as payment for poor-quality but high-cost accommodation.44 The 
same worker reported that this neo-tied-cottage system, buoyed by the endemic threat 
that workers would have to pay their ganger their supposed ‘costs of recruitment’ if 
they sought work and accommodation elsewhere, effectively bound workers to their 
employers in relationships resembling debt peonage. The system represented a 
deepening of precarity in agricultural production: depriving workers of a safe, private 
and secure environment in which to recuperate after work.45 For instance, many 
                                                
37 Those being, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia, plus Cyprus and Malta, here on in referred to as the A8 Nations. 
38 Ruhs, Greasing the Wheels of the Flexible Labour Market. In the first three months following 
accession, around 21,000 A8 migrants entered Britain each month, with entry numbers fluxuating 
around this figure throughout the remainder of 2004 and 2005. Cf. Home Office, Department for Work 
and Pensions, Inland Revenue and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Accession Monitoring 
Report: May 2004 – September 2005, London: HMSO, 2005. 
39 Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee, Gangmasters. 
40 Ibid., pg. 8; cf. Equality and Human Rights Commission 2010. 
41 Anderson and Rogaly, Forced Labour and Migration to the UK. 
42 House of Commons, Gangmaster (Licensing) Bill – White Paper Debate 27th February 2004. 
43 Wilkinson, New Labour, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority and the Woefully Inadequate 
Protection of Migrant Workers in the UK. 
44 Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee, Gangmasters; Brass, Medieval Working 
Practices?, pg. 321. 
45 Hsiao-Hung Pai, Chinese Whispers: The True Story behind Britain’s Hidden Army of Labour, 
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gangers came to use “hot bedding”, where multiple workers on differentiated shifts 
were required to share a single sleeping space.46 Many of these destabilising strategies 
would have been much familiar to a ganged labourer of the Nineteenth Century, when 
poor wages and unreasonable deductions left many workers bound to their 
gangmasters, unable to build up enough funds to move on to more rewarding 
employment.47  
 By 2003, gangs of intimidated migrant workers, working excessively long 
hours for excessively low-wages, and through periods of sickness and dangerous 
night time conditions,48 could be found across the entirety of the UK.49 Indeed, in the 
mid-2000s many of agriculture’s ganged labour relations were found to meet the 
ILO’s definition of forced labour.50 Such findings have been replicated by three 
independently audited surveys of the industry, conducted in 2007 and 2008, which 
found that a high level of worker precarity has been a structural imperative of 
gangmastery since the 1980s at least.51 Indeed, due to tendencies like those described 
above, the presence of a labour provider in an employment relation has been used by 
many as an express indicator of labour precarity52: labour providers’ ability to horde 
and distort information regarding jobs in both sending and receiving societies, limit 
workers’ access to the market and, particular pertinent to the British countryside, 
provide the sole means of transport to the workplace produces cultures of dependence. 
Such dependence is magnified by the presence of debt accrued by workers in return 
for travel, food, accommodation and the like53: gangmastered labour is precarious 
labour.  
Having said this, the intensity of this precarity changes between gangs, and 
indeed over time. An acceleration of flows within agricultural businesses led gangers 
in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s to demand of their workers perhaps greater levels of 
flexibility/insecurity than their Victorian equivalents54: ganged labour emerged more 
precarious after its partial hiatus, and appeared to be becoming increasing precarious 
and intensive year by year.55 
Gangmastery is not a natural phenomenon, it is a system born out of specific 
socio-economic circumstances. High levels of international economic competition, 
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and an economically squeezed producing class, typified both the 1980s and the early 
Nineteenth Century. Indeed, EFRA found in 2003 that gangmastery was “a direct 
function of greater price pressure which producers are experiencing currently”56: the 
same could easily have been said in the early to mid-Nineteenth Century. At each of 
these historic conjectures the use of gangmastery represented, for agrarian producers, 
a methodology for keeping labour costs lower than that of a directly employed 
workforce,57 and maintaining a high level control over labour.58 Then, the repeal of 
the Corn Laws led employers to turn to gangers and their ultra-precarious labour 
force; now, much blame can ultimately be put at the feet of the supermarkets. The 
following pages develop this point. 
 
One should not vilify gangmasters too much for the precarious labour relations 
they have come to oversee. ‘Modern’ gangmastery has brought with it a whole array 
of incentives for increasingly profit-squeezed farmers. Numerous growers in the early 
2000s readily waxed lyrical about their newly found foreign labour force, able to be 
“turned off” and “turned on” at will, with zero cost to the labour user.59 Such 
enthusiasm is easy to understand: historians and social theorists have shown that, 
internationally, employers benefit greatly from the informal recruitment of labour that 
seems to be an innate feature of British gangmastery, in that the subversion of 
immigration and workplace regulations allows for the maximisation of profit at the 
expense of a degradation of working conditions.60 In addition, triangularity allows 
employers to gain from a lack of information: by not knowing how their workers 
came to the country and gained work on their farms, agrarian employers are granted a 
degree of plausible deniability vis-à-vis any illegal, and precarious, employment 
practices that may occur on their property.61 Farmers’ demand for such perks led to 
the recreation of the gangmaster system. 
 Farmers were likewise complicit in recreating the precarity now intrinsic to 
the labour relation. In 2005, the TUC heard evidence from gangmasters that “it’s 
actually very difficult to be a legal gangmaster”: gangers who paid a real wage 
comparable with the AMW priced themselves out of the market; apparently, farmers 
simply could not afford to pay such a precarity dampening rate.62 Rogaly, 
interviewing British gangmasters in 2007-2008, finds that many gangmasters in the 
early 2000s resultantly relied on semi-legal profits, made from denying workers’ 
holiday and sick pay, in order to keep afloat. Likewise, he found that gangmasters had 
been effectively forced to use the precarity-producing, uncompetitively charged 
provision of ancillary services, such as accommodation and transport, as a principle 
income stream.63  
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  This was certainly true in the 1980s and 1990s, when the supermarkets were 
increasingly squeezing agricultural operators’ profit margins. Like gangmasters, one 
cannot malign labour users too much for the highly precarious and low-waged 
cultures that came to dominate the gang-system. Modern farming is “a far cry from 
orthodox agricultural economics…(with) farmers… in perfect competition with 
themselves… rather, they are sandwiched between huge companies on both the input 
and the output side”.64 Amongst the largest of these companies in recent decades, 
rivalling even the agrichemists in terms of influence, have been the supermarkets. 
These chain stores have greatly reshaped workplace regimes in the agricultural 
sector over the last half-century, to the workforces’ detriment.  
 The abolition of the Retail Price Mechanisms – where producers could 
stipulate to retailers a minimum sale price for goods and services – in 1964 laid the 
groundwork for a wholesale restructuring of British grocery retailing65: the ensuing 
price wars of the 1970s led to a decline in the number of British grocery sellers, as a 
few large retailers began to dominate the market. Global price instabilities, and the 
inflationary pressures of 1975-76, caused surviving retailers to consciously seek 
marginal gains via economies of scale, exacerbating further this trend towards 
oligarchic conditions, which continued into the 1980s and beyond.66 Throughout the 
1980s the major supermarkets increased their total market share of UK grocery sales 
from 25% to 40%67; by 1993 supermarkets retailed 48% of Britain’s fresh produce,68 
with this number rising to 80% in 2000; by 2004, 98.5% of UK consumers purchased 
their main food requirements from a supermarket.69  
Competition between stores kept retail price inflation low – indeed the 
supermarkets discursively defended their oligarchic positions by presenting 
themselves as humble servants serving sovereign customer.70 Resultantly, profit was 
extracted from the supermarkets’ suppliers, reducing their earnings in the process. 
With such oligarchic powers, the supermarkets came to cost their purchases with 
“market-price minus”, rather than “supplier-cost plus”, logics.71 With so few 
alternative end-sellers, British producers were forced to play by the supermarkets’ 
rules, being as they were the sole remaining routes to the mass custom of British 
consumers. This prompted a proliferation of precarious labour relations: as it has been 
noticed, wages form a significant proportion of agricultural production costs, and 
therefore irregularisation, real wage deflation and job intensification came to be key 
tactics utilised by producers when resisting this reduction in profits.72 A supermarket 
buyer conceded in an interview conducted in 2005 that labour costs amounted to 50-
60% of their average suppliers’ costs, and further “efficiency” savings demanded by 
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their supermarket could only be made at the expense of labour.73 Even discounting 
producers’ desire to extract surplus value, the supermarkets ultimately failed to pay 
their growers a price throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s that did not demand the 
usage of precarity-prone labour in order to cover costs: between 1988 and 2003, a UK 
farmers’ share in the value of a basket of supermarket goods fell from 56.8% to 
41.5%.74 Despite, or due to, this fact, by 2006 the profit margins on British 
supermarkets' sales of fresh fruit and vegetables were the highest in Europe.75 
The supermarkets did not solely increase precarity by dampening farm-gate 
selling prices. As mentioned, due to their newly acquired oligarchic powers, profits 
boomed for these end-point sellers: typical operating margins of 1.8% in 1978 inflated 
to between 5-7% by 1989.76 Such conditions set the stage for an extensive 
technological reconfiguration of UK grocery retailing in the 1980s, when high-tech, 
high-cost ICT and accounting technologies allowed multiple-store supermarkets to 
closely integrate themselves with their suppliers.77 The technologies used to secure 
this integration were numerous: however, a key tool was the use of “quick response 
partnerships” – a “harmonisation of order management, inventory replenishment, 
physical handling, transport and the point of sales through electronic interfaces”.78 
These partnerships ensured close coordination between grocers and producers, 
eliminated apparent slacks in supply-chains and allowed the supermarkets to exert 
ever-greater levels of control over their suppliers.  
These “preferred partnerships”79 were highly asymmetric, in that they were 
not legally seen as contracts of employment, but informal transactions sui genesis, 
reproduced, or not, on an ad hoc basis80: if a relationship turned sour, a supermarket 
was, and is, capable of using their oligarchic powers and knowledge to create a new 
contact with relative ease; opposingly, a lost contact could prove fatal for a supplier, 
particularly as the increasingly opened global markets of the 1980s and 1990s allowed 
supermarkets to substitute local producers with global suppliers if unsatisfied with 
performance.81 These threats granted the supermarkets considerable informal 
regulative powers over their supply-chains, which were increased exponentially with 
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the passing of the 1990 Food Safety Act, which legislatively justified “the use of 
private standards to discipline and impose costs on suppliers” in the name of 
“consumer interests”.82 The BSE crisis of 1996 further discursively legitimised 
supermarket control of supply-chains, as supermarkets came to present themselves as 
defenders of the public’s health.83  
In practice, supermarkets became empowered to fully dictate supply 
programmes to ‘their’ growers, down to the most minute of details.84 The 
supermarkets’ buying regimes had the tendency to produce insecure, and therefore 
precarious, employment relations throughout their supply-chains. Preferred 
partnerships usually took, and continue to take, the form of a yearly forecast of 
demand, which were subsequently refined with monthly, weekly and indeed daily 
adjustments in orders85: these place implicit demands on producers to employ an 
ultra-flexible, “just-in-case’ workforce, due to the inherent need to “turn on” and 
“turn off” labour supply at the unpredictable whim of the supermarkets.86 This 
designed unpredictably of buyers demanded an irregularised workforce. It was in this 
murky quagmire that the legal and semi-legal relations of ganged labour bloomed: a 
2000 report by the Britain’s Competition Commission found that by “appropriat(ing) 
ever-greater value from horticultural producers”, the supermarkets were negatively 
affecting the labour markets of Britain87; likewise EFRA found “the dominant 
position of the supermarkets in relation to their suppliers is a significant contributory 
factor in creating an environment where illegal activity can take root”.88 
 
 It was not just the growth of the supermarkets that ushered in the second age 
of gangmastery, earlier legislative restructurings helped facilitate the widespread 
return of the system: the 1960 Local Government Act abolished the apparently 
obsolete licensing system established by the 1867 Act, leaving a regulatory vacuum 
waiting to be filled. Licensing for high-street employment agencies was introduced 
across the British economy with the 1973 Employment Agencies Act: this act came to 
regulate the actions of some gangmasters; if a gangmaster let their gang be controlled 
by the labour user, they required a license; if gangers directed labour themselves they 
were considered self-employed subcontractors and were not required to be licensed.89 
Yet even for those requiring a licences, the criteria for acceptance was lax and 
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enforcement even more so90: during the 21-year period that licensing was in place, 
only 0.1% of new applicantions or licence renewals were rejected. What is more, 
enforcers took a laissez-faire approach to agencies operating without a licence.91 The 
1994 Deregulation and Contraction Out Act dissolved this toothless licensing scheme 
in the name of red tape and bureaucracy.92 In effect, gangmasters were gifted a 
legislative tabula rasa on which to build on from the 1960s onwards, to be used if and 
when economic circumstance demanded their return. 
Indeed, precarity-producing behaviour on the part of gangmasters seemed to 
be tacitly approved of by the state in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s, as it made no 
concerted effort to combat the precarity of these labour relations until the Twenty-
First Century. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, MAFF had generally refused to act 
proactively regarding the system, and instead waited for individual complaints before 
opening investigations. The few Conservative-led governmental actions against the 
system had not been guided by the principle of worker protection, but concerns over 
tax and benefit fraud on the part of gangers and ganged workers alike: in 1988 the 
Benefit Fraud Inspectorate attempted to prosecute 20 gangers and 40 ganged workers 
for offences under social security legislation.93 New Labour inherited this lack of 
interest in agricultural employment protections, and governmental inaction remained 
the order of the day up until the mid-2000s. When Labour did intervene with this 
labour relation, it too appeared to be more concerned with its purse strings rather than 
employment conditions94: in 1997 the Labour Government, concerned with tax 
evasion, launched an Interdepartmental Working Party on Gangmasters, which led to 
the initiation, in 1999, of the inter-body Operation Gangmaster, aimed at combating 
illegal practices in East Anglia. The scheme was later rolled out to other areas of the 
country. However, chronic under funding, a lack of leadership and a confused 
purview led to the abject failure of the scheme, which comprehensively failed to dent 
the tax evading tactics of gangmasters, let alone protect workers from precarious 
employment.95 
 
 The key lesson to take from this section is the fact that the triangular labour 
relationship that is gangmastery has arisen twice in the fields of Britain over the past 
two centuries. This labour relation has been consistently, indeed inherently, 
                                                
90 TUC CoVE, Hard Work, Hidden Lives. 
91 Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee, Gangmasters. 
92 Anderson and Rogaly, Forced Labour and Migration to the UK; House of Commons, Gangmaster 
(Licensing) Bill – White Paper Debate 27th February 2004. 
93 The Union noted “with wry amusement the fact that one governmental department at least (was) 
acknowledging the case that the TGWU has been making against gangmasters". However, Redgate 
argued “the problem will only begin to be redressed if the same dedication is shown by the Wages 
Inspectorate and the Ministry of Agriculture”. Cf. The Landworker, May 1988. 
94 The Landworker, July 1998; Geddes et al., Gangmasters Licensing Authority Evaluation Study – 
Baseline Report; Precision Prospecting, Temporary Workers in UK Agriculture and Horticulture. 
95 It is worth repeating EFRA’s perception of Operation Gangmaster at length: “(it) appears to be little 
more than an umbrella term for a few local enforcement operations in which the various agencies have 
exchanged information. Five years after it was established Operation Gangmaster has had no 
significant resources allocated to it, has no targets and no Minister to take overall responsibility for its 
activities”. The Committee concluded Operation Gangmaster “remains a woefully inadequate response 
to the complex enforcement issues arising from the illegal activities of gangmasters”. In the time 
between the commencement of Operation Gangmaster and the publication of EFRA’s report, only 13 
gangmasters were successfully prosecuted as a result of its actions. Cf. Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs Select Committee, Gangmasters, pg. 37; Geddes et al., Gangmasters Licensing Authority 
Evaluation Study – Baseline Report, pg. 26. 
 198 
precarious, utilising a number of pecuniary and extra-pecuniary control mechanisms 
to exploit the ganged workforce. Farmers resurrected its modern conception as a 
survival mechanism, in the face of the oligarchic supermarkets’ regulative controls of 
agricultural supply-chains.  
 
2. The Farmworkers’ Union, Gangmasters and the GLA. 
 
 This section describes the Union’s ongoing actions regarding gangmastery, 
and the resultant regulative reconfigurations that these actions helped bring about. 
Despite its consistently subordinatory orientation towards casual workers as displayed 
on the AWB, the Farmworkers’ Union has been highly active over issues vis-à-vis 
gangmastery throughout our periodisation. The Union has variously sought the 
complete abolition of the gang-system, and the more conservative target of the 
recreation of an effective licensing and inspection authority for gangmasters.  
 Before any other societal group had publicly acknowledged the return of the 
gangmaster,96 the Union was commenting on the exploitation of Southern European 
workers, who were working massive hours for minimal pay in Britain’s fields,97 and 
reporting its concerns regarding intra-British Isle sojourning “moonlighters”.98 The 
Union went on to officially launch a concerted campaign against gangmastery in 
1983: Paul Redgate, a district organiser in Lincolnshire, coordinated branch 
secretaries to produce a dossier on the system in the area.99 This followed a 
performance by Maynard in the House of Commons, where she had argued for a 
system of licensing to be reintroduced.100 This was not a centrally imposed campaign, 
as Link-Up would later prove to be, despite its similar scope and target: that is, 
unorganised casual workers. It was unionists in South Lincolnshire, Norfolk, 
Cambridgeshire and the Fens who seemed principally concerned by gangmastery at 
this time, when and where it was seen as a “growing problem”101: at the 1983 
National Trade Group Conference, a branch delegate from Lincolnshire moved again 
for a system of licensing to be introduced, “in view of the fact that anyone can set 
themselves up as an agricultural gangmastery, and this can and does lead to 
exploitation of workers”.102 
 At this time, gangmastery was still viewed by the Union as being principally a 
feminised and seasonal phenomenon: “when farmers need temporary labour at peak 
periods… they turn to gangmasters to supply that labour and he engages the 
workers".103 However, even at this time Maynard voiced the Union’s fears that 
gangmastery was becoming a year-round, embedded feature of the agricultural 
geographies of certain areas: in Parliament, Maynard described the situation in Geest, 
Lincolnshire, which “always had 12-week contract workers. Now they were being 
called seasonal workers and paid £1.60 an hour instead of £1.74… the women wait 
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outside their doors in the hope they will be given a job and some pay by one of the 
gangmasters”.104 Clearly, the Union recognised, and was concerned by, the fact that 
female part-time workers were becoming casualised and informalised in these areas, 
via the use of gangmasters, which had the effect of limiting employment protections: 
“the result is that there is a widespread abuse of AWB orders, trade union rates are 
ignored, and there is no security of employment. The system is encouraging 
farmers… to get rid of their regular labour and to bring in gangs instead, so the 
farmers are paying less an hour in wages, no sick pay, no insurance and no holiday 
pay”.105 Unionists were particularly concerned that gangmastery encouraged the 
proliferation of yellow-dog contracts: Maynard, again in Parliament, argued that any 
ganged worker who joined a trade union would, at best, never be called upon for their 
labour again.106 
 A significant development, which demonstrated the uphill task the Union was 
facing, occurred in 1987: Richard Body, the Conservative MP for Holland, 
Lincolnshire, introduced a Private Members’ Bill (PMB)107 seeking to introduce a 
licensing system similar to that desired by the Union. Despite originating from the 
governmental party’s backbenches, MAFF “doubted whether a system of licensing 
would improve the terms and conditions of workers” and found “the regulation of 
gangmasters would run counter to the thrust of Government’s deregulation policy... 
the gang-system is a convenient arrangement which provides the necessity flexibility 
for farmers to meet their short-term needs and for the worker to choose the hours of 
work that fit their personal commitments. The advantages of the system for all 
concerned outweigh the cases of abuse that may arise”108: while the Bill had gained 
cross-party support, the ideological bent of the government blocked legislative action 
on the issue for the foreseeable future, complicating the Union’s actions.  
 The Union hoped that a change in government could affect legislative change 
over the issue,109 and occasionally lobbied the Labour Party over the issue in the 
1980s and 1990s: the system was discussed at particular length by Union delegates at 
the 1988 National Conference for Labour Women.110 Upon the election of New 
Labour in 1997, the Union seemed initially hopeful that the lobbying it had 
participated in with the Party in opposition would pay off: the Union met with the 
new Minister for Agriculture to “discuss… (the) need to regulate the system of causal 
labour that so often exploits vulnerable workers”.111 However, little immediate results 
were seen to follow this meeting.  
 Concurrent to this actualisation of a semi-coherent legal approach, the Union 
clearly believed that an alternative avenue for progression had to be sought. Unionists 
in Lincolnshire attempted, from the summer of 1987, to unilaterally regulate the 
labour market, like the national Union had successfully done over 2,4,5,T, by starting 
its own voluntary register of gangmasters. The Union approached gangmasters, 
requesting they “sign a statement agreeing to minimum standards”. Redgate, at the 
helm of the register, told the Landworker that his members had no confidence in the 
current government halting gangmastery, “so we decided to set up own register. At 
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least people will now be able to check if the employer is registered and hopefully will 
think twice about working for him if he's not”.112 Unfortunately for the Union, by 
October 1987 it had only persuaded one ganger to sign the voluntary contract.113  
 For the remainder of the 1980s and 1990s, the Union continued to experiment 
with a number of strategic techniques: in a further avenue of action, the Union fought, 
in 1992, 1995 and 1997, a number of test cases in county courts and industrial 
tribunals, on behalf of female and migrant workers, dismissed as ‘casual workers’ and 
thereby denied redundancy pay rights. These cases forced the courts, and 
subsequently labour users, to acknowledge implicit, unwritten contracts of service 
under certain conditions.114  
 We have seen that the Union’s branches, when trying to combat the gang-
system, utilised various legal and voluntary approaches in the 1980s and 1990s: 
however, none of these were deployed in a consistent fashion across time, nor 
received substantial investments of money or other resources from the central Union. 
Nonetheless, just at the time that foreign-migrant labour came to replace the 
traditionally settled, female ganged-workforce, a codified, coherent and well-
resourced response began to emerge from the Union. From the mid-1990s onwards, 
the Union, at all levels, committed itself to the actualisation of a campaigning 
approach to union strategy. The Union began to publish numerous reports on the 
gang-system, circulating its finding widely with NGOs, consumer groups, foreign 
migrant populations and journalists. These papers were highly analytical and detailed 
in nature: for example, in 2000 the Union published a paper on the system in Sussex, 
which traced migrant networks from host to receiving nations in order to detail the 
way irregular immigrants were brought into the country and worked by 
gangmasters.115 Many of the reports that the Union produced regarding the system 
were funded by the TGWU’s central office, while other resources came from the 
European Federation of Agricultural Workers’ Unions.116  
 This campaigning approach began to find success when the Union started to 
consistently interact with retailers high up agricultural supply-chains. In 1998, under 
constant pressure from the Union’s regular public statements regarding gangmastery, 
the top supermarkets, along with the NFU, helped establish the British wing of the 
Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI): a state-supported trilateral ‘alliance’ of firms, NGOs 
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and trade unions.117 This domestic wing of the ETI was convened expressly and 
solely in order to address the issue of gangmaster-produced precarity in British 
agriculture. The ETI’s inaugural meeting, held between the NFU, the Fresh Produce 
Consortium (FPC),118 the Farmworkers’ Union and DEFRA Minister Joyce Quinn, 
determined that the supermarkets would set up a private code of practice for their 
suppliers.119 This code would be codified according to recommendations made by the 
NFU and supported, as a perceived first measure, by the Farmworkers’ Union. The 
resultant code expected the supermarkets’ growers to conform to International Labour 
Organisation standards,120 and take responsibility for the actions of their labour 
providers. As an additional measure, the ETI set up a new voluntary register of 
agricultural and horticultural gangmasters. 
 Seemingly, the Union’s campaigning approach to action had borne fruit, in the 
form of the creation of a potentially cooperative arena of contention, where the Union 
could work closely with other key industrial stakeholders. An initial glance at the 
operations of the ETI gives the impression that its early actions inhibited the 
unfettered proliferation of precarious employment relations. UK common law has 
long determined that retailers are without legal responsibility for the employment 
practices of their external suppliers121: the operations of the ETI went well beyond the 
minimum levels of action supermarkets were required to make by law. However, the 
scheme’s self-regulated enforcement mechanisms uncovered very few cases of non-
compliance, from neither gangmasters nor growers. Problematically, from the outset 
of the scheme the supermarkets claimed they could not insist that their farmers and 
producers employed people under the terms of the new code of practice, only 
recommend that they do so: they informed the ETI that this was necessary to avoid 
accusations of restrictive practices.122 Furthermore, despite their oligarchic positions 
in supply-chains, the supermarkets insisted that growers and producers bore the costs 
of the voluntary scheme’s social audits, and steadfastly refused to acknowledge that 
their low prices contributed to the creation of precarious work in the first place.123  
With the supermarkets failing to acknowledge their influential role in the 
proliferation of precarious employment practices, gangmasters and growers came to 
operate within cultures of minimal-compliance and avoidance in the early 2000s.124 
This allowed precarity to remain a fact of life for the average ganged worker: a 2004 
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ETI study, which focused only on those gangmasters that had signed up to the ETI’s 
voluntary protocols and could therefore be presumed to be those with the best 
practices in the industry, found a number of “critical, major and minor” cases of non-
compliance. Such cases included situations where work was not freely chosen, 
workplaces were unsafe and overcrowded, sub-standard accommodation was 
provided, transport to and from work was unsafe and extortionately priced and health 
and safety procedures were lax.125 Clearly, these cases amounted to the further 
propagation of particularly precarious employment relations in the industry.  
 For these reasons, the Union concurrently pushed for a fuller system of 
licensing, overseen by the state, as the minimum required course of action regarding 
the gang-system. Despite reluctance on the part of both major political parties, the 
Union firmly committed itself to a strategy that sought to mobilise the resources of 
the state against gangmastery. Leathwood argued, as early as 1999, that “tough new 
laws” were needed to combat the system, and expressed doubts regarding the 
efficiency of the ETI’s essentially voluntary, partnership approach.126 Such calls 
persisted from the Union up till the mid-2000s127: in early 2004 the Union launched a 
well-supported campaign titled “legislation not exploitation”, specifically focussing 
on the state’s relationship with gangmastery.128 
Using its position on the ETI’s board, the Union eventually managed to get all 
of the ETI’s stakeholders to agree, in 2002, to the principle that the state needed to 
play a greater regulative role in British food production.129 In the spring of that year 
the ETI, with the Union at the helm, ran a series of seminars across England, enlisting 
the participation of 120 organisations from across civil-society, industry and the state: 
packers, growers, retailers, big food companies, governmental bodies, unions and 
gangmasters all participated. While all provided differentiated perspectives on the 
system, a broad consensus advocated the creation of a statutory register of 
gangmasters, in order to shine a light on the hidden industry and enforce pre-existent 
laws that were being systematically broken at the time.130  
 Whereas the Union had once been, in the 1980s, the sole voice advocating 
governmental interference, numerous stakeholders now came out in support: the FPC 
told EFRA “we have gone down the voluntary route for the last three or four years 
and we have used our very best endeavors to make the voluntary system work. Our 
conclusion is that despite the work that we have done, we do need the backing of 
legislation to bring this problem under control”.131 Likewise FarmForce, a self-
identified “respectable” gangmaster company, told EFRA that “with the combination 
of no licensing, no registration, various schemes being chucked in the pot and stirred 
around, supermarkets dictating very low prices, I hate to say it, but at the end of this, 
if we do not do something, there is going to be a large, black hole and it is called 
‘agriculture’”.132 The NFU concurred, submitting a memorandum which “hope(d)… 
to show (EFRA) that we are prepared to make a stand on this issue and make sure that 
proper enforcement is put in place and also ask you to use your influence to have a 
statutory system put into place as quickly as possible”.133 The ETI, as a collective, 
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soon announced that their “good practice guidelines” were insufficient in eliminating 
the illegal working conditions that were negatively affecting temporary workers, in 
particular migrants, at this time.134 
 Subsequently, the ETI proactively set up its Temporary Labour Working 
Group (TLWG), tasked with the stated mission to “establish a set of minimum 
standards for labour providers which could be enforced by new statutory controls”.135 
The TLWG conducted voluntary field trials of a new minimum standards protocol in 
Lincolnshire: the trials were designed to demonstrate to government the feasibility of 
a statutory licensing body. Differing from previous governmental inspection regimes, 
the new protocol focussed on the identification of worker exploitation, rather than tax 
evasion, benefit fraud and illegal workings136: the ETI found that “a worker-focussed 
inspection such as this (was) a necessary part of law enforcement and should be one 
component of a licensing regime”.137 The protocols were organised into four discrete 
categories, with labour providers expected to conform to the minimum standards of 
each. These were: basic business requirements; behaviour when taking on workers; 
conditions of employment; and the treatment of workers.138 While far from perfect, 
the field tests allowed the ETI to finesse its recommendations to government, and 
present a broad basis of support amongst disparate interest groups, so as to provide a 
proof-of-concept demonstration of the benefits of a statutory licensing system. 
 Unfortunately for the Union, and other pro-statutory stakeholders, proposals 
for State licensing flew in the face of the received wisdom of both the Conservative 
and Labour parties. Labour’s governmental submissions to EFRA were highly 
sceptical over the need to legislatively regulate the industry, and this stance remained 
unabashed despite the emerging consensus from key stakeholders: DEFRA argued 
that registration or licensing schemes were “burdensome for business and public 
authorities alike and the burden falls especially heavily on small enterprises”,139 while 
the Department of Trade and Industry had “no plans to re-introduce licensing or bring 
in a form of registration as it is considered that neither would result in an effective 
regime”.140 Like their Conservative predecessors, regulation clearly went against New 
Labour’s ideological underpinnings. This long-term lack of front-bench support left 
EFRA “not convinced that a statutory registration scheme offers a stand-alone 
solution to the problems of illegal gangmasters”, despite the fact that the committee 
had itself found that “it is unrealistic to expect… voluntary codes to prevent 
widespread illegal activity”141: Parliament, it seemed, was intent on accepting the 
illegal precarity inherent to gangmastery. An improvement of ineffective private 
regulations via the injection of public legislation seemed unlikely, despite the support 
of numerous stakeholders from across the political spectrum.  
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 Hope briefly re-emerged in early 2004, when Jim Sherridan, a back-bench 
TGWU sponsored Labour MP, introduced a PMB that sought to secure the Union’s 
and ETI’s aim of creating a governmental licensing scheme. Sherridan saw the 
voluntary codes of the ETI as “well meaning”, but believed they had “failed to tackle 
the problems associated with rogue gangmasters. They have not reduced exploitation 
of workers, nor have they made illegal operators operate within the law”.142 Like the 
Union’s recommended scheme, Sherridan’s proposal gained a broad coalition of 
support from interested parties,143 and won a degree of cross-Party approval on its 
first reading in the House.144 However, lacking governmental sanction, the Bill failed 
to pass Parliament on its first reading.  
 This unfolding narrative was drastically altered by a tragic criminal event. In 
the spring of 2004 disaster struck on the sands of Morecambe Bay, near Liverpool, 
when 23 ganged Chinese migrants drowned in the dead of night while collecting 
cockles.145 Harvesting in the dark of night, poorly trained and lacking safety 
equipment, they were caught out by the Bay’s treacherous tides and quicksands. 
Fifteen individuals survived the incident. This was not the first mass fatality incident 
involving ganged labour: in 2003, three migrant workers travelling to fields outside of 
Birmingham were killed when their van stalled on a level crossing and was struck by 
a train; while in 2002, two Poles were mutilated and killed after becoming entangled 
in a rope reeling machine at a supermarket-supplying strawberry farm.146  However, 
more than any other incident, Morecambe Bay propelled and ingrained the existence 
of gangmastery into the public’s consciousness. The media were quick to construct a 
narrative that presented gangmasters as foreign Others: “triads” or “snakeheads” from 
and of China.147 While this xenophobically charged narrative was highly 
disingenuous, the tabloids’ rage against these apparently foreign criminals led 
gangmasters to become vilified throughout society.148  
 Geraldine Smith, Labour MP for Morecambe and Lunesdale, subsequently 
told the House of Commons that she had informed the Department for Work and 
Pensions, and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, of her concerns regarding 
massive health and safety infringements on the notorious sands as early as 2003, with 
no positive response.149 The government needed to defuse the situation, which was 
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leading to negative reportage of its immigration and workplace regulative regimes.150 
The Farmworkers’ Union seemed to provide the answer: with it assuring the 
government that Sherridan’s ‘Gangmaster Registration and Licensing Bill’ would, if 
enacted, provide “a fitting tribute to those who died tragically at Morecambe”.151 
EFRA reversed its previous policy position, and came out in support of statutory 
licensing in May 2004. Sherridan’s Bill resultantly passed its second reading in the 
House of Commons unopposed, and faced minimal resistance in the Lords.152 
 
 The resultant 2004 Gangmasters (Licensing) Act made it a criminal offence to 
operate as, or utilise, an unlicensed gangmaster within the agricultural, horticultural, 
forestry and fishery sectors. To gain a licence, gangers had to be able to prove that 
reasonable wage payments and non-waged benefits were provided, and charges made 
for transport, accommodation and other workplace services were within reasonable 
market rates.153 The Act took a broad definition of ‘worker’, so that both standard and 
non-standard workers were afforded equal employment protections: making those 
sectors covered by the Act unique to Britain in this regard. Government officers were 
enabled to enter premises and seize assets of illegally operating individuals and 
companies154: on top of monetary fines, unlicensed labour providers, or labour users 
utilising an unlicensed labour provider, faced the threat of imprisonment.155 A stated 
aim of the Act was for it to produce a “paper-trail”, to make it easier to locate, check 
up on, and prosecute labour providers156: rather than a disparate group of 
governmental agencies having to prove AWB underpayments, tax irregularities or 
specific health and safety violations, now, in theory, inspectors only had to ascertain 
whether a gangmaster was in receipt of a license, or not, before shutting down 
potentially exploitative operations.157 A quango, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority 
(GLA), was launched in 2006 to implement the legislation.  
 Several unions gained seats on the Board of the newly formed GLA, with the 
Farmworkers’ Union seen as the Movement’s unofficial figurehead and lead voice.158 
Of the 19 industry-nominated seats, four went to unionists: the TGWU selected the 
Farmworkers’ Chris Kaufman and Martin Smith of GMB,159 while the TUC proposed 
Bill Snel of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, and Nick Cleak of 
the TUC.160 These seats allowed the Union, and Movement, to play a hand in the 
continued shaping of the organisation, its scope and strategies. Indeed, these Board 
members helped develop much of the secondary legislation needed for the GLA to 
operate satisfactorily.161 The Farmworkers’ Union and Movement conceived their 
roles on the Board as that of watchmen: ensuring that the GLA “held to its remit”; 
preventing “governmental watering down” of the legislation; and helping to 
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“reinforce” the Authority on a rolling basis.162 Sitting with the unions were 15 
nominated representatives of labour users, providers and retailers. In addition to these 
industrial reps, nine ex-officio chairs, filled by representatives from associated 
government departments, and an appointed Chairperson rounded off the Board’s 
composition.  
 Licenses, issued from April 2006, were granted on completion of Authority 
conducted audits.163 By the summer of 2008, the Authority had approved 1,186 
licence requests, while 70 applicants had been refused.164 As demanded by the ETI 
and Union, the GLA ensured that its operations were worker orientated: the 
Authority’s first Chairman, Paul Whitehouse, declared that the key mission of the 
Authority was, first and foremost, “to prevent workers being exploited.”165 Indeed, the 
envisioned role of the GLA, as defined by the 2004 Gangmasters (Licensing) Act, 
privileged the protection of workers, with the Act explicitly stating the GLA should 
exist to “safeguard (labourers’) welfare and interests”.166  
This commitment to worker wellbeing can be seen in the selection and 
targeting of GLA goals, and in its actual practices in the fields: during a series of 
operations in 2008, the GLA worked closely with the supermarket Sainsbury’s, so 
that workers affected by the revocation of a ganger’s license were quickly offered 
new jobs and alternative accommodation.167 However, the extent of this particularly 
worker-sympathetic action, and others similar to it, went well beyond the rather vague 
requirements of the Act: no formal support mechanisms for workers affected by 
licensing decisions were statutorily included in Sherridan’s Bill. Instead, adherence to 
worker welfare was advocated for, and defended, on the GLA’s Board, more often 
than not by the Farmworkers’ Union. 
 “Funded on a shoestring”,168 the GLA has had to operate with a minimal 
number of inspectors. In 2007, the GLA regulated the entirety of the UK on a budget 
of £3.4 million169: initially then, then GLA operated with a skeleton staff of 48, with 
ten ‘compliance officers’ and ten ‘enforcement officers’ nationwide.170 Whitehouse 
believed that with such operating restrictions, what was required was “a good 
hanging”171: rather than acting in a low-key, cautious manner, the GLA has 
consciously and consistently striven to make gangmasters, and the public, aware of its 
presence via the use of proactive raids on premises and by forcing non-compliant 
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labour users to pay money due in arrears when rectifying licensing violations,172 to 
the delight of the Union.173 Whitehouse combatively stated “we intend to demonstrate 
that we mean business in a big way, if they don’t follow the rules we will follow 
them”,174 and “we’ve been given Draconian powers and we’re proud of them! And 
when people say ‘you acted in a Draconian fashion’, I say yes, that is what we are 
here for. Thank you, good, job done”.175 As should be expected, the appointment of 
Whitehouse had been seen as appropriate by the Union: a progressive ex-army major 
and county police chief, Whitehouse was well used to enforcing legislation, and was 
experienced at negotiating often hostile corridors of power.176 Many of Whitehouse’s 
actions shaped the eventual structure of the Authority: it was his decision to house the 
GLA’s backroom and enforcement staff in the same office in Nottingham, which 
resultantly ensured a high degree of joint intelligence sharing between departments.177  
Such intelligence sharing has been seen as vital for the operations of the GLA. 
In it operations, the Authority quickly set up a confidential hotline,178 so as to provide 
anonymity that functioned as “an incentive to report informal or illegal gangmaster 
activity”.179 However, there was a general perception within the GLA that ganged 
workers would be unlikely to come forward as informants en mass, due to the very 
precarity that necessitated state action in the first place. Resultantly, enforcements 
have been designed to occur in a proactive, investigative manner, utilising other 
regulative authorities’ pre-existent, but under-utilised, contacts in the field: describing 
itself as an “intelligence-led organisation”, the GLA soon started to collect 
intelligence reports from other government organisations, enforcement agencies, 
labour users, and migrant workers themselves, striving to “always action pieces of 
intelligence” whatever their point of origin180; from its outset then, the GLA was 
designed to provide robust enforcement by acting as “a buckle and belt operation(,) 
pulling together DEFRA, the Department of Work and Pensions, the Home Office, 
police authorities, the HSE and Inland Revenue”.181  
In the autumn of 2008, the GLA launched ‘Operation Ajax’: an 18-month 
period of unannounced raids on suspected violators. The operation involved all 55 
members of the GLA’s staff.182 This represented a shift in the Authority’s operations: 
where it had previously concentrated on getting gangmasters ‘on board’ with 
licensing, it now sought to fully dedicate itself to the upholding of the Act. Hangings 
were sought more than ever. The GLA’s Chief Executive, Ian Livsey, explained to 
the House of Common’s Home Affairs Committee on Human Trafficking that “the 
acid test for (the GLA)... is over the next two to three years when we start to root out 
those who have evaded us, those who are operating illegally; and continue to police 
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the standards so that nobody working in this field should be exploited”.183 This new 
stage of operations led to a spike in regulative interventions: by 2008, 72 labour 
providers had had their licences revoked, only one with immediate affect due to gross 
violations; as of May 2009, 93 gangmasters had had their licences revoked, eight of 
which with immediate effect184; this implies that an intensification of disciplinary 
actions occurred. Further evidence for this can be seen in the fact that by 2010 there 
had been ten successful prosecutions of gangmasters under the Act, whereas only one 
gangmaster had been successfully prosecuted before 2008.185  The TUC’s Deputy 
General Secretary, Frances O’Grady, welcomed this harder-edged operation at Ajax’s 
inauguration.186 
 The GLA has not solely focussed itself on inspections: it soon started to 
produce literature, in an array of languages, aimed at informing workers of their 
employment rights and providing contact information for various civil-minded 
organisations, the Farmworkers’ Union included. However, the biggest development 
in the GLA’s history came in 2009/2010, when the GLA’s Board compiled and 
adopted a formal ‘Supermarket Protocol’, following an extended public 
consultation.187 Although voluntary in nature, the protocol explicitly recognised the 
role of firms further up supply-chains in creating, but also potentially negating, 
precarious labour relations in British agriculture.188  
Whitehouse succinctly summarised the intended purpose of the voluntary 
agreement; stating, “this protocol seeks to take advantage of the supermarkets and 
their supply-chains’ efforts to act in an ethical and socially responsible way”.189 The 
protocol provided mechanisms with which supermarkets could readily exchange 
information on workplace abuse, and encouraged the stores to conduct joint visits, 
with the GLA, to the firms in their supply-chains. Retailers agreed to inform the GLA 
of suspected breaches in licensing standards, and committed themselves to require 
their suppliers share confidential information regarding possible breaches also. In 
drawing up the protocol, the GLA made it clear that the Authority “expect(ed) the 
retailers to be seen making decisive action” if and when the Authority identified 
worker abuse, up to and including suspending or deleting the supplier permanently.190 
Reciprocally, the GLA agreed to give the supermarkets advanced warnings if and 
when it intended to revoke the licence of a gangmaster in their supply-chains. The 
Farmworkers’ Union emphasized that it was happy “for the GLA to meet regularly 
with the supermarkets… using the supermarkets to support the GLA with 
uncooperative workplaces”.191  
 
The GLA has not enjoyed plain sailings throughout its operational lifespan: 
the Union rightly senses that “every year there is an attempt to water down or 
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introduce loopholes into the legislation”.192 An early point of order that the Authority 
had to deal with was whether secondary food processing and packaging firms should 
fall under the remit of the Act, when the increasingly hesitant government believed 
these firms should be excluded from the GLA’s scope.193 The Union argued this 
would deny employment rights to up to 200,000 of the 250,000 precarity-prone 
workers under the Act’s original scope.194 With the backing of the TUC, TGWU, ETI 
and GLA, this insistence that these sectors should be covered by the Authority’s 
scope eventually won out.195  
Soon after this showdown, the Cabinet’s Better Regulation Executive – a 
governmental body set up under the auspices of the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills to moniter, and if possible cut, the costs of new regulation – 
recommended cutting back on pre-licensing checks for gangmasters, so that not every 
ganger, but only those deemed as “risky” by DEFRA, would undergo inspection.196 
Again, a concerted campaign by the Union, and others on the Authority, managed to 
resist this proposal197: Chris Kaufman praised the unlikely coalition of the unions, 
major supermarkets, the NFU and “reputable gangmasters” for standing firm in the 
face of “neo-conservative forces in the Government”.198 At other points in the 
Authority’s short operational lifespan, suggestions have been floated by the Labour 
and subsequent Conservative/Liberal Democrat governments to merge the GLA and 
the HSE, removing all non-health and safety related issues from the Board’s remit in 
the process.199 The Union has consistently resisted these proposals, arguing they 
would “not do what thousands of workers desperately need, and the GLA was set up 
to do”.200  
Further problematising the Authority’s operations, the GLA has faced near 
annual threats, and actualisations, of funding cuts as Morecambe recedes in the 
public’s memory201: in 2011 it was announced that the Authority’s £4.2 million/year 
budget would be reduced to £4 million for 2012-13, going down again to £3.9 million 
in 2014-15.202 The GLA’s lack of financial resources has encouraged many 
gangmaster to continue with their exploitative patterns of work, “on the basis that 
there was no serious risk of inspection”.203  Likewise, the GLA has faced the threats 
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of: the imposition of a “softer touch” to regulation; an enforced reduction in 
inspectors204; and the prospect of the mothballing of the Authority in the name of 
austerity.205 These issues have been hung over the Authority’s staff’s necks, 
endangering the continued success of the project.206  
 Despite these very real threats and obstacles, the Act and Authority have 
dismantled some of the most precarious labour relations offered by British 
agriculture, to a slight but real degree. Cathy Speight, Agricultural Secretary of Unite 
in the latter 2000s,207 has argued the Farmworkers’ Union “feels the GLA has had a 
major impact on raising labour standards through its licensing arrangements... its 
endeavours… protect vulnerable workers by ensuring workers are paid their 
minimum entitlements and aren’t being exploited”. Likewise, Sarah Veale, the TUC’s 
head of Equality and Employment Rights, has stated “the GLA has significantly 
raised standards”: Veale believes the Authoirty has ensured workers are paid the 
AMW, improved the “cramped and squalid conditions” of much worker 
accommodation, and has played a “leading role” in combating human trafficking in 
the UK.208  
 Concurring, an ethical trading officer of a major supermarket has argued that 
the GLA has “got the issue of agency labour very, very much up the agenda and very 
much in the forefront of (supermarket executives’) minds”.209 Additionally, less than 
12 months into licensing, “40% of labour providers felt the GLA had reduced 
business fraud, and… 45% felt that the GLA had improved working conditions”210: 
surveyed gangmasters felt that licensing regime had partially tamed a once chaotic 
industry, forcing down the number of ‘rogue’ gangmasters in the sector. A year later, 
over 60% of surveyed gangmasters believed the GLA had had a positive effect on 
reducing worker exploitation and business fraud in the industry,211 with 79% 
favouring the continuation of licensing and 69% judging the GLA to be performing 
more than satisfactorily.212  
 Outsiders agree: Sheffield University’s independent audit of the Authority, 
conducted in 2007, found that the quango’s tripartite approach, with specialist 
knowledge of business, civil and public sector agencies being drawn on, had “help(ed 
the GLA) to punch above its weight” in an “independently minded” manner, free 
from overt governmental interference.213 Confirming these finding, a 2009 survey 
conducted by the naturally suspicious Better Regulation Executive found the Act and 
Authority had had a “positive impact in improving the working conditions for some 
vulnerable workers”.214 Clearly, the trade unions, supermarkets, civil-society groups, 
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‘reputable gangmasters’ and academics are in agreement over the notion that the 
Agency has had a major effect in reducing precarity and improving working 
conditions, for migrants and natives alike, and that it should remain in existence for 
the foreseeable future.215 
 Precarity has been reduced via a number of specific methods. Since its 
inception, GLA inspectors have spoken directly to workers – often in employees’ 
native tongues and while giving the assurance that immigration offences are beyond 
their purview – to check that workers are in receipt of a promptly paid and itemised 
AMW or better, entitled to sick and holiday pay, not subjected to excessive wage 
deductions,216 are free to leave employment at will and have tax contributions made 
on their behalf.217 In 2007, it was found that due to the Act’s new regulative regimes: 
“contracts and workers’ terms and conditions are now more transparent than was the 
case previously; health and safety at work is now taken more seriously; minor abuses 
of workers (e.g. deductions) have been reduced; transportation to work has been 
improved and sub-standard gangmaster accommodation is no longer so prevalent”.218  
 Of the 1,230 gangmasters who had been licensed as of 2009, over 70% had 
been forced to improve their operating standards in order to secure their licence,219 
reducing precarity in the process. Further evidence of reduced agricultural precarity 
can be found in the GLA’s conditional licences.  The GLA has offered these licenses 
to gangmasters who fail to meet satisfactory standards, but pledge to alter their 
practices in the near future. By 2007, 40% of all licenses had been granted on a 
conditional basis.220 However, between March 2007 and October 2008 there was a 
dramatic decrease in the number of conditional licenses being granted: falling from 
400 to 68 per year, with a corresponding increase in full licenses being granted221; this 
implies the GLA’s operations have stimulated self-improvements on the part of labour 
providers in the industry.  
 
The key lessons to take from this section include the facts that from the 1980s 
onwards, the Union consistently sought to negate the effects of the gangmaster 
system: principally by seeking the creation of a statutory licensing system for the 
labour relationship. Throughout the 1980s and beyond, the Union attempted a legal, 
lobbying approach to union action, with little apparent effect. Concurrently, the Union 
utilised a campaigning approach to Union actions, which at the fin de siècle managed 
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to secure the support of multiple stakeholders in creating a system of private and 
cooperative regulations for the industry. The Union continued to press for a 
mobilisation of state resources and, after a tragic contingent event, saw the creation of 
a legal statutory licensing and inspection body, as it had long desired. This body has 
helped reduce precarity in the industry, by taming some of the worst excesses of 
gangmastery.  
 
3. A Closer Examination of Union Strategy. 
 
 In this section I analyse, in depth, the strategies of the Farmworkers’ Union as 
described above. Initially, we look at the nature of the Union’s campaigning and 
partnership approaches that engaged the attentions of the supermarkets. Next, we look 
at how the Union engaged the attentions of the British public, before we round off the 
section by ascertaining the degree of involvment the Union’s lay-members had in the 
Farmworkers’ multifaceted actions.  
 Many have praised the events leading up to the formation of the GLA, and its 
subsequent maintenance, as a “product of coalition”, not in the least the Union 
itself.222 Whereas the Union sustained such acrimonious relations with the NFU on 
the AWB that they “wouldn’t piss on them if they were on fire”,223 relationships in 
the operating arena of the GLA, “a product of coalition”, appeared to be different: the 
Authority, embattled from outside from various quarters, was perceptively 
“maintained around the table”.224 However, it is difficult to see why the NFU and the 
supermarkets so vocally supported increasing agricultural labour regulations at the 
beginning of the Twenty-First Century, when ganged-labour proved invariably 
cheaper than those on standardised employment contracts. It is necessary to analyse 
why these bodies seemed to act against their material interests when they came to 
push with the Union to regulate gangmastery, not just on a private, self-imposed basis, 
but with the involvement of state actors: an examination of this reveals, conversely, 
much analytical information regarding the underlying nature of the Farmworkers’ 
Union’s strategies. 
In the 1980s, the Farmworkers’ Union identified Thatcherite ideologies and 
the purchasing powers of the supermarkets as the prime movers behind the return of 
the gangmaster: there was little doubt that farmers’ incomes were deflated due to 
oligarchic like conditions, and these losses were passed on down the supply-chain via 
the usage of gangmasters, who used a variety of pecuniary and extra-pecuniary tactics 
to keep costs of production low.225 Rather than simply bemoaning this fact, a key 
component of the Union’s strategic actions focussed on these same supermarkets, 
higher up supply-chains then their traditional adversary of contention, the NFU.  
As early as 1976, the Union had developed a negative orientation towards the 
supermarkets, recognising that “the development of… chain stores has resulted in 
well over one-third of all foodstuffs now being marketed through these monoliths… 
(they) are creaming off large profits at some expense to the agricultural industry”.226 
As the supermarkets rose to ever greater oligarchic positions in the 1980s, the Union 
pushed the issue within the TUC, managing to secure extensive conversations on the 
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body’s Distribution, Food, Drink, Tobacco and Agriculture Industries Committee 
concerning the role of supermarket-led “discounting, sole supplier agreements and the 
growth of the own label produce market”.227 However, as gangmastery became more 
widespread, the Union sought a greater public position when criticising the 
supermarkets: the Farmworkers helped research, and follow up on, televised 
documentaries recorded by undercover journalists for the BBC and Channel 4, 
ensuing the system entered the public’s conscious, at least in part.228 Clearly, over 
years and decades the Union exerted a constant pressure on the supermarkets within 
the civil-society arena, via media campaigning. 
Contributory inputs from other societal groups were minimal throughout the 
1980s and 1990s. Nonetheless, feeling compelled to respond to the Union’s drip-feed 
campaign, which chiefly involved strategic actions in publicly accessible arenas of 
contention, many of the supermarkets began to release statements on gangmastery in 
the 1990s: Tesco’s Public Relation’s department responded to the Union directly, 
declaring that they “work closely with our suppliers to ensure that the whole of our 
supply-chain operates in line with the high employment standards that we set 
ourselves”. However, the supermarkets were not keen to act in a cooperative manner 
at this point, as has so regularly been trumpeted as a defining feature of the ETI, and 
later the GLA: in this same statement Tesco stated that they did “not think a meeting 
between us (and the Union) will achieve anything”.229 The supermarkets were not yet 
proactively sitting down with the Union to help reduce precarity in the industry: only 
a growing public din, while nowhere near the volume heard post-Morecambe Bay, 
assured that this happened.  
 Eventually, the Union-orchestrated din compelled the supermarkets to act. 
Simultaneously surprising and pleasing the Union, it was the supermarket’s front-
organisation, the FPC, which first came out and cautiously backed proposals for 
increased gangmaster regulations in 1998.230 Almost immediately thereafter, the 
supermarkets and the Union, along with other stakeholders on the recently formed 
ETI, set up their first voluntary code of practice under the pretence of uncoerced 
cooperation. Once the ETI had been set up, the Union did not cease in its increasingly 
high profile campaign against the supermarkets’ market powers: by actively picketing 
and collecting signatures outside supermarkets found to be using exploitative 
gangmasters,231 the Union maintained a constant pressure on the stores, preventing 
them from quietly but hegemonically imposing voluntary self-regulation as the end of 
the road regarding the issue of gangmasters. So, while initial press releases of the 
Union, the supermarket, and the ETI explicitly and purposefully gave the impression 
of industrial harmony between stakeholders, there is good reason to suspect that this 
was an artificially imposed congruence of interests. For once, the Union was being the 
imposer of this artificial acquiescence, using the threat of shame, by means of 
mobilisations in the civil societal arena, to dictate the growing discourse on the issue.  
 Freidberg describes how NGOs have, from the 1980s onwards, come to 
participate in the corporate governance of trans-continental fresh-produce supply-
chains between Less Economically Developed Countries and the UK, via the use of 
well-funded and imaginative publicity departments.232 By the late 1990s, numerous 
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NGO-directed campaigns had prompted British supermarkets to undertake ethical 
reforms of their global supply-chains.233 For example, NGOs such as Christian Aid 
were instrumental in setting up various discrete international outposts of the ETI234: 
though these various ETI-offshoots, NGOs managed to greatly improve the labour 
relations of agricultural workers in countries as far flung as Peru and Zambia.235 
Freidberg recounts how, after recognising the importance superstores attached to their 
brands’ profiles, NGOs came to impose an “ethical complex” on the supermarkets. 
This ethical complex allowed non-profit advocacy groups to acquire partial measures 
of power over the supermarkets, despite the stores’ oligarchic market positions236: 
supermarkets started to act in apparent cooperation with these NGOs, which all the 
while used the threat of public denouncement to whip the supermarkets into line; 
demand for supermarket ethicality in international supply-chains originated not from 
consumers directly, but these advocacy groups, which in the words of one 
supermarket public-relations officer became “too shrill to ignore”.237  
 However, while numerous NGOs concerned themselves with labour relations 
in Britain’s supermarkets’ international supply-chains, no NGO in the 1980s or 1990s 
launched high profile campaigns regarding domestic gangmastered labour.238 Yet the 
supermarkets came to act in much the same manner over the issue of domestic 
gangmastery as they did over their international operations once NGOs had injected 
their ethical complex into corporate governance regimes: first they sat down with 
other stakeholders to ‘cooperatively’ discuss the issue; then they partially imposed 
‘voluntary’ protocols on their supply chain, and later then requested governmental 
legislation in recognition of their own apparent powerlessness. When assessing these 
strategic actions of the supermarkets, one sees the Union’s own strategic actions as 
key components of their causal mechanisms: by operating mostly in the arena of 
contention known as civil-society, propagating a recognisably campaigning approach 
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to union action, albeit with little support from other societal groups, the Union created 
its own ethical complex for the supermarkets.   
 Not all the activities of the supermarkets were disingenuous during the 
formative years of the ETI. As part of their ethical complexes, the supermarkets came 
to uniformly employ ‘ethical officers’, and entire ‘ethical departments’ within their 
internal configurations from the 1990s onwards, so as to provide “handy 
smokescreens” for their corporate structures.239 While these staff members’ varying 
levels of internal powers and influence would make the content of a wholly different 
thesis, it is safe to say that they came to enjoy some degree of influence within the 
structures of the stores, and initiated a number of fundamental changes in the 
supermarkets’ hegemonic procurement habits as a result.240 These ethical officers 
proved of particular worth to the Union, as they allowed unionists to negotiate with 
sympathetic parties, rather than the more profit-minded departments within these non-
monolithic institutions. This helped shape emergent private, and then public, 
regulations of gangmastery into forms as advocated for by the Union.241  
 We can see then that highly skilful campaigning and lobbying by the Union 
helped compensate for the massive reserves of resources held by these supermarkets, 
which hegemonically had highly differentiated material interests from the Union.  
These actions were aided by the fact that the Union enjoyed a close relationship with 
the ETI’s sympathetic full-time staff, with whom the Union participating in discrete 
“informal chats” before the commencement of tripartite meetings.242 These meetings 
allowed the Union to gain the upper hand at the negotiating table, which proved 
instrumental in shaping the then private regulative structures that emerged from these 
meetings. Clearly then, beneath the apparently tranquil surface-waters of placidity 
and cooperation that were seen on the ETI, deep undercurrents of purposeful, 
combative and instrumental union actions surged. 
The Union’s campaigning was not the sole pressure placed upon the 
supermarkets over this period, but it was instrumental in shaping the eventual 
outcomes of a number of differentiated processes. Allow us to quickly explore one of 
these additional pressures. At the turn of the 2000s, the supermarkets’ wider public 
legitimacy was in a state of flux: in 2000 the Competition Commission published a 
long-awaited study of the supermarkets’ oligarchic position in Britain, and its highly 
critical report notably commented on the unreasonable transfer of risks, from 
supermarkets to suppliers, which was being caused by the high concentration of end-
produce retail in Britain243: Hence force the supermarkets were, for several years, 
under pressure from a regulatory body that theoretically had the power to actually 
disband their well-crafted business empires. This fed into the issue of gangmastery: 
the supermarkets had to publicly assure the Competition Commission, and by 
implication the ETI and EFRA, that they were doing all in their powers to combat the 
system, acting in a socially responsible manner.244 However, the supermarkets could 
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not admit that their oligarchic positions granted them far-reaching powers to 
effectively combat the system via self-regulation. To do that would have endangered 
their public standings: a demonstration of their regulative controls over their supply-
chains would have amounted to an acknowledgment of the criticisms made by the 
Competition Commission.245 Therefore, under the guise of proactivity, but in actuality 
in a defensive manoeuvre, the supermarkets lent their support to the notion of 
governmental legislation: exactly the policy the Union had been pushing for in the 
civil arena for decades.  
After the passing of the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act, neither the Union’s 
public pressures, nor the supermarkets’ apparent support for tightening statutory 
regulation, let-up. As shown in the following pages, the Union, ‘to shrill to ignore’, 
has helped dictate the supermarkets’ continued perceptive backing of the GLA, and its 
operative agenda. 
 Beneath the superficial image of cooperation that was painted of stakeholders 
on the GLA, fractures in interests exposed themselves intermittently. By interviewing 
labour users and providers during the first year of the GLA’s existence, it was found 
that “there was a perception… that retailers were being two-faced… on the one-hand, 
they wanted to be seen as ethical and expected their suppliers to conform to, and 
invest in, strict codes of conduct; but on the other hand, they were placing immense 
pressure on buyers/managers to squeeze the margins of suppliers, and that this 
pressure was often anything but ethical and left little room for the creation of good 
working environments”.246 Clearly then, the supermarkets were not true converts to 
the cause of ethical procurement practices: only the continued threat of consumer and 
regulative backlash kept them on the ‘straight and narrow’, on board rhetorically with 
the GLA’s policy agenda.  
Again, this threat of backlashes has in a large part been maintained by the 
Union: with its presence on the GLA’s board, it is not surprising that the Authority 
has privileged actions designed to influence public perceptions in its operative 
behaviour. To this day, the GLA’s own online news feed “names and shames” 
gangmasters, operating within the supermarkets’ supply-chains, in breach of 
regulations.247 Likewise, the Union and GLA have produced an ongoing series of 
policy briefs and media engagements that have called for the oligarchic tendencies of 
the supermarkets to be kept in check, in order to avoid further precarity-producing 
price squeezes.248 So, while limited in its capability to inspect a large number of 
workplaces, the Authority’s “effective use of publicity and communications” has 
managed to wrought changes throughout the industry, thanks in a large part due to the 
Union’s imposition of a ethical complex on the supermarkets: “the impact (of 
inspection) is exaggerated by labour users’ and labour providers’ anticipation of the 
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main supermarket buyers’ and ethical auditing/trading teams’ response to such 
negative publicity”.249  
Similarly, the Union has continued to operate in the GLA’s wider operating 
environment. In 2004, in a typically rejuvenatory action, the Union formed an alliance 
with Friends of the Earth, the Small and Family Farmers’ Association and the 
Federation of Women’s Institutes, to push for a strengthening of the supermarkets’ 
voluntary code of practice that continued to exist alongside the GLA’s legal 
regulations.250 Elsewhere the Union, sitting on the European Federation of Food, 
Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions, publicly asserted that “primary contractors” 
should be made responsible for their subcontractors’ hiring and working practices, 
and that for this to be achieved, cooperative actions should be organised between 
trade unions and consumer groups251: that is to say, the proposition of boycotts was 
floated. These actions have helped marshal the supermarkets’ continued support for 
the GLA’s developing legislative regime.  
Clearly then, in creating and then maintaining the GLA, the Union has 
“rel(ied) more on cultural impact than on articulated connections with the political 
system”,252 and has come to resemble, in terms of its campaigning strategic actions, a 
New Social Movement rather than a traditional Post-War trade union. Yet at the same 
time, the Union has engaged in apparent collaboration with employers, a notion that 
would have seemed heretical to much of Britain’s Movement in the Post-War Era: by 
sitting on the ETI and later the GLA, the Union has attempted to warren into 
capitalism to ensure a legitimate distribution of risks and benefits in society253; this 
represents, superficially at least, a partnership approach to unionism according to 
Hyman’s typography. This is a particularly novel combination of rejuvenatory 
strategies: while recognising that rejuvenation is a contested and contradictory 
process, Heery for one emphasises the apparent incompatibility “between an 
aggressive campaigning unionism and attempts to develop social partnership in 
relations with the Government and with employers’ organisations”254; yet the 
Farmworkers’ Union has managed to tessellate these two apparently diametrically 
opposed forms of unionism into a hybrid campaigning/partnership approach. 
Completing a strategic triptych: when strategising against gangmastery the Union all 
the while sought, and eventually won, the creation of a legal approach to gangmaster-
regulation.  
This combination of approaches represents a highly innovative 
methodological toolkit. Having said this, fundamentally uncoerced cooperation does 
not exist, and never has existed, between the supermarkets and the Union: trust is 
minimal. Despite the GLA formally considering itself the result of “industry-wide 
partnership”,255 the Union continues to believe that “that the GLA should have 
enforcement powers over supermarkets that knowingly work with suppliers that break 
licensing standards or are negligent with their contracting. This would put more onus 
on the supermarkets to pay a fair price for products and therefore for suppliers to treat 
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their workers properly”256: alternatively, the proposal for direct public regulation of 
their private affairs remains beyond the pale for the supermarkets. However, the threat 
of tarnishing the public images of firms high up in supply-chains allows for the 
apparent combination of campaigning and partnership forms of unionism in practice. 
The Union has used the threat of shame and embarrassment to mobilise the 
supermarkets’ resources for its own purposes.  
This combination has long been utilised by NGOs operating in a variety of 
contexts: many of whom regularly combine campaigning actions in civil arenas with 
partnership actions in the development of multi-stakeholder initiatives, in order to 
foster corporate social responsibility on the part of transnational corporations.257 The 
Farmworkers’ Union independently developed this tactic into the relatively discrete 
field of industrial relations, and utilised a hybrid strategy highly differentiated from 
those traditional manifestations of union actions typified by the threat of withdrawing 
one’s labour. 
The story of how the NFU came to apparently support such legislation is 
similarly infused with the interconnected strategic actions of the Union. By the 1990s, 
the farmers’ position in public life, once so powerful and perceptively positive, had 
becoming increasingly embattled.258 The salmonella scares of the late 1980s had done 
much to reveal to the public questionable modern farming techniques, and resultantly 
“the power of farmers… started to decline”.259 Socio-demographic changes had also 
taken their toll: farmers were by the 1990s “much less economically important and 
their decline in numbers suggested that any electoral influence they might have had 
has declined… Conservative MPs have less attachment to rural issues than in the past 
and many on the right are critical of state support for agriculture”.260 Needing to 
reaffirm their position in society, massively damaged further by the BSE crisis of the 
late 1990s, the NFU “followed a strategy of damage limitation by accepting the need 
for certain changes within agricultural policy without destroying the policy 
community nor the privileged position of the farmers”.261 In doing so, the farmers 
recognised the utility in identifying a new source of contention in the industry: highly 
pressurised by the supermarkets, it is easy to imagine how the farmers would have 
welcomed the Union’s interjections over the issue of oligarchic supply-chain controls.  
The Union went to great lengths to ensure that, while its statements regarding 
gangmastery reflected the realities of the field, it left enough discursive signifiers to 
gain accreditation from this unlikely ally: at the 2005 TGWU Conference, calls were 
specifically made “to protect local growers” from the supermarkers; it was moved that 
the supermarkets were “choking the life out of local communities… workers, 
consumers and producers” alike.262 In 1962 Self and Storing, when principally 
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analysing the state’s relationship with the agricultural industry, found that an alliance 
with the publicly courted NFU could feasible have benefited the Union263: by the late 
1990s and 2000s, events had turned half-circle, and many farmers, increasingly 
embattled against forces higher up their supply-chains, recognised that an implicit 
alliance with the Union, which had been careful in its discursive statements regarding 
its traditional adversary, could benefit themselves.   
 Further strategic streams of union actions focussed not on the supply-chains of 
gangmastery. Throughout the early 2000s, the Union aimed to shore up public support 
for the prospect and maintenance of statutory licensing. The enthusiasm of Middle 
England was seen as vital if statutory regulations were to be introduced, and not just 
as a whip with which to threaten the supermarkets. The Union had used the threat of 
concentrated public outrage to produce an ethical complex on the part of the 
supermarkets: in addition, and leaving nothing to chance, the Union went to great 
lengths in the civil arena to articulate the self-interested reasons why Mondeo Man 
and Worcester Woman should support licensing for self-interested reasons, repeatedly 
underlined how such regulations could benefit the public’s purses. When touting 
Sherridan’s PMB, the Union was at pains to stress that it believed “the current failure 
of Government to co-ordinate and regulate effectively is costing the Treasury 
potentially many millions of pounds every year… proactive enforcement can help 
claw back large sums of previously unidentified money for the Exchequer”.264 This 
was a language many untypical allies could understand: Mark Simmonds MP, a back-
bench Conservative who proved to be the greatest parliamentary backer of Sheridan’s 
PMB, based much of his supportive arguments around the rhetoric of financial costs 
and benefits.265  
Once up and running, the GLA continued to use the promise of financial 
profits as a strong legitimising purpose, despite the body continuing to privilege 
worker welfare issues in practice: Whitehouse stated that proper taxation of 
gangmasters would “get a lot of schools and hospitals”.266  Clearly moving its rhetoric 
focus beyond narrow workplace issues, the Union positioned itself as the defender of 
the taxpayers’ interests, in another coherent and typically rejuvenatory campaigning 
approach to union action. 
 
 While the aforementioned approaches of the Union required little input from 
actual ganged labour, the Union has for decades required substantial input from its 
lay-members, in and around the fields of Britain, when actualisation the strategies 
described above. Since its formation, the GLA has never been keen on extending its 
duties to include undercover capabilities: stating “going undercover requires training 
which isn’t worth our while doing – much better to go to a police force… Actually, 
we‘ve got quite a lot of journalists who are willing to do that – so let them do it”.267 
Such a comment, while pertinent, ignores the functions that the Union has played both 
prior to, and during, the GLA’s existence: any investigative journalist would go to 
exorbitant lengths to access the information matrix that exists within the Union’s 
membership. The Union’s lay-members, branch secretaries, district organisers and 
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full-time staff, all the way up to central office, can be thought of as an informant 
network, able and willing to penetrate and report back on developments in the field. 
Recognising this resource, the Union has sought to enlist its membership in support of 
the “battle” against “the obnoxious gangmaster system” throughout its campaigns268: 
while holding a persistent belief that it would be unable to organise ganged labour,269 
the Union has information from branches about the spread and growth of the 
system.270 Such information helped bring the re-emergence of gangmastery to the 
public’s attention, resultantly creating ethical complexes on the part of the 
supermarkets.  
Likewise, the TGWU’s traditional branch structures, which penetrated 
working class British-Chinese communities, albeit in a not particularly dense manner, 
allowed the Union to meet the families of Morecambe’s victims. This empowered the 
Union to present the facts of the events that unfolded in a manner that suited both the 
British-Chinese community’s, and the Farmworker’s, tessellated interests.271 Again, 
the Union’s access to informant networks has been of great use, providing 
ammunition with which to recalibrate the industry using methodologies that have 
superficially looked decidedly service centred. While a small number of full-time 
Union officers have sat on the boards of organisations based in London272 and 
Nottingham,273 the Farmworkers’ campaign has in actuality involved the whole body 
of the Union. Clearly, this further muddies the apparent distinction between servicing 
and organising approaches to unionism. 
 
The key lessons to take from this section include the facts that the Union 
sought, and largely succeeded, to create an ethical complex on the part of the 
supermarkets when seeking the regulation of gangmasters: rather than threatening the 
withdrawal of agricultural labour, the Union threatened the brand images of firms 
further up agricultural supply-chains, in order to create first private, and then public, 
regulations of gangmastery. In doing so, the Union bypassed the asymmetries of 
labour and product markets by mobilising in the civil arena, utilising strategies 
common to the NGO movement but relatively novel to British unionism: 
campaigning and partnership approaches to union action were utilised in a 
complementary and coherent manner. The Union also secured the support of the 
British public, by presenting itself as concerned with the perceptively widely relevant 
issue of governmental finances, rather than with the narrow issue of agricultural 
workers’ wellbeing. The sum total of these actions was the creation and maintenance 
of a legal approach to union strategy. Despite superficial appearances, the Union 
required the mobilisation of its lay-members for these strategies to be effective. 
 
4. The Union’s Orientation to Ganged Labour. 
 
Having assessed the various strategies of the Farmworkers’ Union regarding 
the gang-system, it is now necessary to analyse the Union's orientations towards 
precarity-prone workers, as embodied in these strategic actions. Of importance is the 
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fact that the Union maintained a sustained stance against gangmastery in agriculture 
despite systemic demographic alternations to this mode of production’s form: the 
Union campaigned against the use of ganged labour when the average ganged worker 
was a rural-based female worker and when they were a foreign-born labour migrant. 
In both cases common characteristics can be seen: throughout 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s, a gangmember, regardless of their demographic background, was unlikely to 
be a member of the Union.274 Likewise, a ganged worker – female, migrant or both – 
would have worked longer hours for less money than an average agricultural unionist, 
throughout our periodisation.  
Clearly, the Union has long felt genuine sympathy and kinship with 
gangmastered labour: in the 1990 gangmasters were identified as the “real villains” 
and “criminals”275. Indeed, the Union quickly grew weary of the governments’ 
Operation Gangmaster as its actions were “only catching foreign workers”276: the 
Landworker editorialised that “the thing that upsets us about the raids and blitzes so 
far is the only people who have really been affected are the workers”.277 It must be 
pointed out that this intimidating operation was having a pronounced effect on 
precarity-prone labourers in the industry, and a union with a pre-rejuvenatory attitude 
of exclusion could theoretically have welcomed this development, in that it helped 
discourage the entry of further non-union labour into the industry. This was 
comprehensibly not the case here: the Union’s rhetoric appeals were decidedly 
inclusive in this instance. Further evidence of this orientation could be seen in the 
mid-2000s, when the Farmworker’s Union formally codified its orientation towards 
migrant labour, by then gangmastery’s principle demographic group, thusly: “migrant 
workers should be treated no less favourable than indigenous workers… we should 
welcome them into the Union to be part of our organisation”.278  
In fact though, the Union has repeatedly gone beyond this commitment for 
equal treatment, and has recognised the specific needs of ganged workers. This is 
particularly evident with the Union’s decades-long emphasis on creating a licensing 
system for gangmasters: unlikely to be of direct benefit to a ‘regular’ Union member, 
but vital to deal with the specific, precarity-producing issues that affecting ganged 
workers. This implies that the Union’s attitude towards precarity-prone gangmastered 
work has been, hegemonically over time, more one of engagement rather than 
inclusivity.   
This discursive attitude towards migrant labour should not be surprising: even 
in the Post-War Era and before, unions throughout the British Movement rhetorically 
attempted to recruit migrants into unions, as “formal exclusion was not in conformity 
with union ideology”279: rhetoric appeals for solidarity with precarity-prone migrant 
workers can hardly be said to be novel for the British tradition. Having said this, the 
Farmworkers’ concern for migrant workers clearly went beyond discursive 
pleasantries: as documented, a huge amount of resources were sunk into the Union’s 
campaigns regarding gangmastery over a sustained period of time, more than could be 
explained away as a mere lip-service payment to notions of fraternity.  
Knowing then that an engaging orientation was hegemonically displayed, in 
rhetoric and practice, it is necessary to question why this was the case. At least in part, 
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one can credit the historic demographic profile of the Union, particularly with regards 
to its attitude to migrant workers. The first group of migrants to positively join the 
Union en mass were the stay-behind prisoners of war; Germans and Eastern 
Europeans who remained on the land after their imposed penal services lapsed280; 
likewise, from 1983 onwards, the Farmworkers formed part of a larger body which 
had in the past included migrant workers in substantial numbers.281 These contacts 
helped ward off some of the worst excesses of xenophobia found elsewhere in the 
Movement. So, while relatively infrequently, foreign labour has played a historic role 
within the Farmworkers’ Union’s internal structures: resultantly, foreign labour was 
not conceived of as an alien, hostile labour reserve during our periodisation. That is to 
say, the Union’s operational history helped facilitate the strongly engaging orientation 
seen from the Union regarding gangmastery in recent decades.  
 However, this historic interaction cannot exclusively explain the Union’s 
orientation towards ganged workers. It certainly cannot explain why the Union 
mobilised itself to support female ganged workers in the earlier moments of the 
system’s return. In the immediate Post-War Era, women played a very subordinate 
role in Union affairs. In 1948, the Landworker recounted a Union social thusly;  “a 
dance band was engaged and the younger members of the softer sex present displayed 
considerable suppleness and grace”282: it is difficult to locate the females’ humanity in 
such an account, let alone recognition of Union participation. By the time we join our 
periodisation in the 1970s a few females, such as Maynard, held positions of 
reasonability at various levels of the Union: however, many felt marginalised within 
its formal and informal structures. One delegate told her County Committee in 1977 
that “I often feel that our brothers are being patronising and not taking us seriously. 
We are often downtrodden and sometimes just a decorative addition to the group, 
especially in our Union, as few women have ever crossed the path to the plough”.283 
Such feelings are easy to substantiate: as late as August 1972, the Landworker 
dedicated the entirety of its front page to a photo of “Miss. NUAAW”, decked out in 
risqué floral regalia atop a decorated float.284 
 So, in adequately analysing why the Union came to orientate itself the way 
that it did, it becomes clear that, again, self-interested calculations played a major 
role. Gangmastered work accounted for a significant share of the sustained, 
proportional increase in seasonal and casual labour that occurred in agriculture during 
our periodisation: remember, between 1972 and 1984 the full-time hired workforce 
fell by 25%, while the number of seasonal/causal men rose from 34,500 in 1972 to 
48,100 in 1984, representing an increase of 39%; female seasonal/causal labour, 
particularly concentrated in labour gangs, rose from 32,600 to 37,000 over the same 
period285; bringing analysis forwards, by the 2000s “migrant workers in the 
country(side) outnumber(ed) indigenous ones four to one” during periods of peak 
production.286 Clearly, when the gang-system returned to Britain the Union was not in 
a position to restrict non-standard access to the labour market, nor use the position of 
migrants and/or females to further its own members’ privileged interests in a 
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subordinatory manner. In this environment, to act in a pre-rejuvenatory manner would 
have been to write one’s own suicide note: only increasing gangmastery’s ability to 
undermine conventional employment patterns, as a lack of trade union won 
protections would only decrease costs for the labour user.  
 Resultantly, when advocating support for Sheridan’s PMB, the Landworker 
argued that the Farmworkers’ Union needed to appeal to migrant workers for “two 
very good reasons. One is that in an age of globalisation unions need to fight for 
workers’ rights wherever they are… The other is that it is in the interests of 
indigenous workers not to have their pay and conditions threatened by the 
exploitation of migrant workers below the rate"287: time and time again, the Union 
recognised that the discursive vocabulary of unionism necessitated the “morally right” 
defence of precarity-prone ganged workers, but also that advocacy was needed as to 
provide a “defence against undercutting employment conditions (for) those already 
here”.288 Later supplementing this fear of gangmastery’s undercutting potential was 
the hope that ganged labour could “be a source of fresh and enthusiastic blood” for 
the Union.289  
 
 In sum, the rejuvenatory, engaging orientation of the Union, coherently seen 
from the early 1980s onwards, was held for standardly rejuvenatory reasons: a 
recognition that the Union was not in a position to control the labour market; a desire 
to prevent the undercutting of wages; and the hope of increasing the Union’s standing 
in the eyes of previously excluded groups, increasing the industry’s union density in 
the process.  
 
5. The Effectiveness of the Union’s Strategies. 
 
 This section analyses the effectiveness of the Union’s strategies, and the 
reasons for this. Initially, I scrutinise just how determinant the Union’s campaigning 
and partnership approaches were in securing the creation of the GLA. Following this, 
we ascertain exactly how much precarity was reduced by the formation of the GLA, 
and at what cost.  
 First, we turn to look at the instrumentality of the Union’s actions: in order to 
do this, it is useful to compare the establishment of the GLA with a subsequent, 
ineffective Union-led campaign. A massive loophole of the Act meant that only 
gangmasters operating within the fishery, horticultural, agricultural and forestry 
industries were required to obtain a license: other low-waged sectors, where 
gangmastery had an increasing presence, such as construction and cleaning, were 
beyond the Act’s purview.290 This led many of the nation’s worst operating 
gangmasters to simply shift their firms outside of agriculture: while some of the most 
precarious labour relations in agriculture where combated, precarity in other sectors 
remained unchecked and indeed expanded as a direct result. Wilkinson found that by 
the end of the 2000s the ganged mode of production had helped produce and maintain 
systematic labour precarity in the construction, hospitality, catering and care 
sectors.291 Indeed this loophole could cynically be said to be a major factor 
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contributing to the Act’s partial success: far easier was it for poorly-operating gangers 
to switch their focus to other labour intensive industries where legislation was, and is, 
minimal, than to remain in the now regulated agricultural industry.292 Whitehouse 
surmised this logic in 2009: “the chances of getting caught in our sector are mounting. 
The chances of getting caught elsewhere are still zero”.293  
 The Union,294 wider Movement,295 GLA,296 ETI,297 supermarkets, labour users 
and numerous gangmasters298 have all repeatedly stated that the GLA’s truncated 
remit is an illogical state of affairs, and that gangmastery should be regulated equally 
in all areas of the economy. Beyond rhetoric appeals, the Union helped compose, in 
2007, a new PMB seeking such an extension.299 Yet this Bill failed to pass even its 
first reading in Parliament. This is despite the fact that the GLA is a revenue 
producing, lightly budgeted, widely supported body, which has proved highly 
effective at combating precarity in the small sector of the economy where its remit 
falls: without reference to the ideological persuasions of the New Labour and 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat governments, the case for the extension of the GLA’s 
scope is seemingly incontestable and unanswerable. While the Union utilised an array 
of innovative and complementary rejuvenatory strategies in securing the licensing 
system, its subsequent failure when utilising these same strategies demonstrates that, 
ultimately, a contingent political event was needed to win the GLA from the hostile 
political establishment: as Kaufman readily admits, “it couldn’t have happened 
without Morecambe”.300   
 Ostensibly, an analytical reading of the GLA’s formation suggests that the 
Union was reduced to playing the role of a hyena: waiting for contingent events, 
involving terrible suffering on the part of the labour force, before its own strategic 
actions could have their effects felt, and even then only in the contingent events’ 
immediately spatial/temporal surroundings. However, the Union’s strategic actions 
were not irrelevant. Even after the events of Morecambe Bay, on the second 
parliamentary reading of Sherridan’s Act, the Minister for Rural Affairs was still 
adamant that he was “not convinced of the need to set up a new agency… We 
should… consider the possibility of a co-operative approach within the industry”301:  
that is to say, the actual events of Morecambe did not immediately change 
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governmental policy, which still privileged self-regulation. Therefore, it was 
providential that the Union had previously played an instrumental role in creating a 
‘climate’ that pushed the government to reactively respond to this contingent event in 
a legislative manner302: gangmastery and Morecambe had to be made visible – public 
opinions and attitudes had to be groomed – and this was achieved in a large part due 
to the Union’s decades long campaign. Acknowledging this crucial agency, the 
Farmworker’s Union was declared the joint winner of 2004’s annual Trade Union 
Press and PR Awards, which recognised the “sharp, timely (and) influential 
campaign, which reached top gear when contemporary events helped the Union shape 
a clear and successful strategy”: following the contingent, catalytic event that was 
Morecambe Bay, the pre-existent work of the Union was found to have played a 
“direct and almost instant influence” over the unfolding proceedings.303  
 The Farmworkers’ Union rightly felt that amongst the combination of factors 
that led to the development of the Authority, its actions were invaluable, declaring “it 
was the TGWU that won the GLA”,304 and that the Authority represented “a victory 
for Trade Union political action”.305 Sheridan agreed: when thanking the “broad 
coalition” that had helped ensure his Bill’s eventual passage, he was at pains to point 
out that it was “the TGWU at the forefront”.306 This instrumentality came at a cost. 
The Farmworker’s Union’s vanguard position had demanded actions that had taxed 
the its resources immensely: just looking at the latter years of the ETI, the Trade 
Group’s Research Department produced reams of high-specification research, while 
intensive political lobbying managed to secure the support of +100 cross-bench MPs 
for Sheridan’s PMB even before the events of Morecambe Bay.307 To put things 
succinctly, the “old NUAAW couldn’t have done it”308: the greater financial and 
organisational resources of the TGWU were indispensable in providing the legal, 
lobbying and journalistic expertise needed to progress a piece of statutory legislation 
diametrically opposed to the government’s free market ideology. It it were not for the 
Farmworkers’ Union utilising these resources in the civil arena, it is fair to assume the 
Government would have reacted to Morecambe in a less forceful manner. Not by 
design, but the earlier TGWU merger inadvertently ‘won the GLA’. 
 
To round off analysis of the effectiveness of the Union’s strategies, it is now 
necessary to look at an unforeseen consequence of the Act, which recalibrated, rather 
than destroyed, British gangmastery. Post-2004, small-scale, informal operators found 
their profit margins squeezed, as their ability to increase intensity and precarity by 
illegal means was curbed by the Act and Authority. As producers and grocers refused 
to pay higher premiums, many small gangmasters, working without the luxury of 
economies of scale, were simply forced out of business.309 Throughout the 1990s and 
early 2000s, these small-scale operators were once the norm, in terms of turnover and 
employees: preceding the implementation of the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act, 80% 
of gangmasters had a turnover of less than £1 million/year, with less than half having 
more than 100 employees on their books at any one time.310 However, the 
                                                
302 Grant, Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain, pg. 86. 
303 The Landworker, August/September 2004. 
304 The Landworker, February/March 2005. 
305 Tony Woodley, TGWU General Secretary, quoted in The Landworker, August/September 2004. 
306 The Landworker, May 2004. 
307 Kaufman, In Conversation with Robin Hinks. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Rogaly, Intensification of Workplace Regimes in British Horticulture. 
310 Geddes et al., Gangmasters Licensing Authority Evaluation Study – Baseline Report, pg. 10. 
 226 
gangmasters that survived and proliferated after the formation of the GLA have 
tended to be larger, region- or nation-wide operations, bearing more resemblance to 
high-street employment agencies than Victorian field gangers.311 Rather than 
removing labour providers from British agriculture, the GLA standardised 
agriculture’s internal labour provider market, whipping the sector into line with the 
larger labour provider industry that has come, from the 1980s, to play a central role 
across the whole of Britain’s New Economy.312  
This augmentation of British gangmastery did not occur overnight. Following 
the events of Morecambe Bay, gangmasters, recognising the need to influence the 
growing public discourse surrounding their profession, set up the Association of 
Labour Providers (ALP). This representative body – which soon joined the ETI and, 
upon its creation, the GLA – sought to link agricultural gangmasters to the 
burgeoning British employment agency industry, rather than their traditional 
forebears, in order to seek publicly approved legitimacy. Indeed the ALP, in 
discussion with its members in 2006, found that ‘labour provider’ and ‘recruitment 
agency’ were the preferred self-ascribed terms for operators in the industry.313 In fact, 
the gangmaster industry began to embrace the public’s sterilised, professionalised 
perception of employment agencies as far back as the 1990s314: then, keen to escape 
the Victorian ramifications of their profession, “gangmasters operat(ing) inside the 
existing legislative structure… tend(ed) to try to legitimise their businesses by turning 
them into employment agencies, rather than carrying on as what we would all 
understand as traditional gangmasters”.315 The Gangmaster (Licensing) Act and 
Authority merely accelerated a pre-existing trend towards perceptual 
professionalisation. 
 The slick rebranding of labour providers did not lead to a disavowal of illegal, 
precarity-producing practices on the part of the industry. Ultimately, there is little 
qualitative divergence between the gangmasters of proverbial yore and the 
employment agencies found on any British high-street today316: stating that the GLA 
has performed well is not to say that de facto gangmastery has evaporated from 
British agriculture, nor has the precarity within this mode of production. By 2008, the 
GLA had intervened in seven cases that it considered ‘serious’, six of which involved 
activities by employers that matched the ILO’s definition of forced labour317; 
likewise, by 2007 twenty-five applicants had been refused a license due to “critical” 
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issues of non-compliance318; evidentially, highly precarious practices could still be 
found after the creation of the GLA. Overall, the ratio of successful to unsuccessful 
licensing applicants was 74:1 for this period, but by this same date 20 license holders 
had had their permits revoked as a result of subsequent GLA inspections: this tells us 
that the GLA sometimes failed to adequately vet license requests during its first 
operational years.319 Clearly, worker mistreatment remained a widespread 
phenomenon in the industry.  
 Indeed, despite his muscular rhetoric, there is evidence that the GLA was 
marked by an over-leniency towards gangmasters under Whitehouse’s tenure: as of 
2008, of the 39 appeals against revocation that had been lodged to the GLA, only one 
was settled to the appellant’s favour320; this suggests that the GLA was not being 
overly draconian in its regulative approach, potentially allowing perceptively 
respectable but precarity-producing firms through its net in the process. As a result of 
this leniency, a significant number of gangmasters have continued to operate in 
agriculture with little regard to the GLA’s legal regulations: auditors estimating in 
2008 that “approximately 15% of GLA-governed industry is potentially operating 
illegally”321; gangmasters have still been “getting away with it”,322 producing 
insecurity, dependence and ultimately precarity in the agricultural workforce. As 
analysis below shows, the Union has, inadvertently, condoned at least some of this 
continuing precarity. 
One should not presume that all labour providers in Britain have an equal 
tendency to produce precarious labour relations. In the late 2000s, three broad 
categories of agencies could be seen to exist, each defined by their specific, or lack of, 
representative body. The first group, represented by the Recruitment and Employment 
Confederation (REC), operated in all sectors of the economy, but with a diminished 
role in the agricultural sector. This group has had a long established code of ‘good 
practice’ for its members, requiring affiliated agencies to respect “international 
recruitment norms… adhere to the spirit of all applicable human rights, employment 
laws and resolutions” and “treat work seekers, clients and others without prejudice or 
unjustified discrimination” in order to provide equitable work opportunities to natives 
and migrants alike based on “objective business related criteria”.323 In effect, the 
organisation presented itself as the representative organisation for agencies of ‘best 
practice’. The Association of Labour Providers represented the second group, with a 
larger presence in British agriculture. This body ascribed to a much more “minimal 
compliance” doctrine324: ethical issues were seen as pertinent to employers only to the 
extent that falling foul of the law could result in damaged reputations, for the 
individual labour provider and the industry as a whole.325 A third group, without a 
representative body, was composed of the most unscrupulous and/or illegal operators 
in the industry, and it too was heavily involved in agricultural production, and other 
low-waged industries both before and after the formation of the GLA. It is mostly in 
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these second two categories that rural observers have found systematic cases of 
grossly precarity-producing practices, even after the formation of the GLA. 326  
However, all three categories contain agencies that seek to make profits off the 
surplus value of labourers working in relations considerably more precarious than 
permanent workers’: the codes and conventions of the REC and ALP, which 
somewhat arrest the development of precarious labour, represent not the modi 
operandi of individual operators, but only corrective lenses through which profit 
maximisation is vigorously pursued327; the high-road of the REC, low-road of the 
ALP and off-road route of renegade labour providers have all led to the precaritisation 
of the workforce, in agriculture and elsewhere. Yet the Union, while purposefully 
condemning this third group of labour providers/gangmasters, has been forced to lend 
an air of respectability to the ALP, and by implication the REC. While the 
Farmworkers’ Union, and the wider Movement, have campaigned against the 
proliferation of employment agencies in recent decades328: when co-operating on the 
boards of the ETI and GLA, the Union has been forced to keep check of its rhetoric 
statements regarding agency labour, helping to legitimise this mode of production, 
which is typified by high levels of worker precarity for normally unorganised 
workers.  
One would be mistaken to believe that regularised employment agencies have 
always enjoyed the public approval they receive in Britain’s contemporary 
employment environments. The International Labour Organisation’s first ever 
recommendation, issued in 1919, called for the prohibition of profit-making 
employment agencies, which were seen as innately predatory organisations reliant on 
the unwarranted extraction of surplus value.329 While the British government never 
adopted such early conventions, organised labour made a convincing enough 
argument for the state to regulate and license the embryonic high-street employment 
agency industry across the economy, even at the outset of the nation’s economic 
restructurings, with the passing of the previously mentioned 1973 Employment 
Agencies Act.330 The latter normalisation of these firms in the latter stages of the 
Twentieth Century represents the normalisation of precarity across the economy, a 
normalisation that the Farmworkers’ Union can be shown to have been complicit in.  
Focussing on our case study: the Union had once regularly moved to remove 
all ganged and triangular employment from the entirety of the food processing 
industries, sensing that such contracts undermined full-time employees and manning 
levels331; licensing was but the planned first step of a longer term process of 
eradication. Accordingly, gangmasters, as a totality, were once described by the 
Union as “the epitome of Thatcherite values”, rural turncoats requiring only a van, 
some contacts and “a whole-hearted devotion to one’s own interests and a capacity for 
brutality”.332 As late as 1998 the Union believed “pay and conditions for thousands of 
                                                
326 Jayaweera and Anderson, Migrant Workers and Vulnerable Employment; Citizens Advice Bureau, 
Nowhere to Turn. 
327 Forde and Robert MacKenzie, The Ethical Agendas of Employment Agencies Towards Migrant 
Workers in the UK. 
328 Cf. Trades Union Congress, Migrant Workers in the Labour Market, London: TUC, 2007; TUC 
CoVE, Hard Work, Hidden Lives. 
329 McGaughey, Should Agency Workers Be Treated Differently? 
330 Wilkinson et al., New Labour, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority and the Woefully Inadequate 
Protection of Migrant Workers in the UK.  
331 National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, Motions and Amendments to be considered by 
the 1980 Biennial Conference, pg. 36. 
332 The Landworker, February 1988. 
 229 
causal workers will only improve if there is legislation to outlaw gangmasters”.333 
Now however, the Union has come to, rhetorically at least, blame the precarity of 
gangmastery on renegade “cowboys”334: apparently not representative of labour 
providers in general.  
Consultation with labour providers was seen early on as an imperative task of 
the ETI: stakeholders, the Union included, had to act in a relatively positive manner 
towards those willing to get on board with its precarity-dampening, but not 
vanquishing, agenda, and later that of the GLA. Resultantly, in order to secure 
maximum stakeholder support, the ETI was known to state that “legitimate” labour 
providers “provide an essential service to the agriculture and food industries, without 
which much of the food processing industry and food supply-chain in this country 
could not function”.335 Needing to publicly align itself with the ETI, and to an extent 
the neo-liberal New Labour Government that stridently emphasised “there is nothing 
inherently illegal in the activity undertaken by gangmasters”,336 the Union was 
compelled to agree that “labour providers are an undeniable part of modern-day 
agriculture”.337 So, the Union’s nominally partnership approach, which proved of use 
in forcing concessions from the supermarkets, required sacrifices on the part of the 
Farmworkers also. That is to say, the Union’s hybrid campaigning/partnership 
approach was only partially effective, and was only able to mitigate the worst 
excesses of gangmastery by explicitly legitimising the still precarity-producing 
practices of others.  
These sacrifices did not just help maintain some aspects of precarity in the 
agricultural market, but the wider economy as well. As mentioned, by sanctioning the 
low-road of the ALP, the Union implicitly supported the precarity-producing practices 
of the more formalised labour providers throughout the economy. Throughout the 
New Economy, the labour contracts formed from such professionalised triangular 
relations tend to be highly precarious in nature. In 2009 the average wage differential 
between an employee of an agency and a permanently employed worker, once 
corrected for the typical characteristics of temporary job-holders, was 15% to the 
permanent workers’ favour. Additionally, access to employer-provided benefits, 
training and trade union representation had been consistently worse for agency staff 
across the British economy since the 1980s.338 Furthermore, agency staff receive 
limited access to state supplied social benefits and statuary entitlements linked to the 
duration of one’s employment relationships, such as protections from unfair 
dismissal, since their paid working lives are interrupted by periods of unemployment, 
often purposefully manufactured by agencies for this express purpose.339  
Such factors built up during the 1990s and 2000s to the extent that the TUC’s 
Commission on Vulnerable Employment found that “some of the most extreme 
employment rights abuses” in the economy “involv(ed) employment agencies and 
temporary labour providers”.340 Tellingly, the enforced provision of sub-standard but 
high-cost tied accommodation and food, transport and miscellaneous deductions 
today seems to be as real an issue with nation-wide, PR-conscious, REC-represented 
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334 The Landworker, December/January 2004. 
335 ETI TLWG, A Licence to Operate, pg. 20. 
336 Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee, Gangmasters, Evidence Submission 68. 
337 The TUC’s General Secretary, Jack Dromey, quoted in The Landworker, December/January 2004. 
338 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 5th European 
Working Conditions Survey, Dublin: EFILWC, 2010. 
339 Vosko, Less Than Adequate. 
340 TUC CoVE, Hard Work, Hidden Lives, pg. 117. 
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employment agencies as it ever was with field gangers341: a 2008 survey found that 
23% of responsive agency workers, nationwide, were provided accommodation by 
their labour provider; of these only 27% were provided with written, itemised 
information about their associated pay deductions.342 Such providers have, however 
indirectly, been partially legitimised by the Union’s interactions with the ALP on the 
ETI and GLA. As the GLA has consistently attempted, with the Union participating 
on its board, to penalise the gangmasters of worst practice in the industry, one can not 
call this santification a manifestation of a subordiatory orientation, only a inclusive 
orientation typified by pragmatic realism.  
 
 The key lessons to take from this section include the facts that the Union could 
only mobilise its resources to an effective enough degree to win the creation of the 
licensing body that it had desired for decades after the intervention of a contingent 
political event. This was due to the Union’s inhospitable political environment. 
However, once the contingent event unfolded, the Union’s hybrid campaigning and 
partnership actions, buoyed by resources acquired upon merging with the TGWU, 
were instrumental in determining the form of the resultant legal legislation. However, 
by partially relying on a partnership approach to union action – necessary in order to 
create and maintain an ethical complex on the part of the supermarkets – the Union 
was forced to concede some ground to industrial stakeholders with divergent material 
interests from itself, thereby allowing the continuation of gangmastered precarity to a 
significant degree.  
 
6. Summary of the Union and Gangmastery. 
 
 This chapter helps address research sub-questions (vi) through to (viii), with 
regards to the Farmworkers’ Union’s relationship with gangmastery. To summarise 
each: 
 
vi)  What orientations and strategies has the Union employed with regards to 
precarity-prone workers? 
 
 The Union has employed a coherent and engaging orientation towards 
precarity-prone ganged work for a number of decades, seeking state regulations 
tailored specifically in defence of these particularly vulnerable workers. In terms of 
strategy, a hybrid combination of campaigning and partnership actions was invoked, 
which hegemonically focussed neither on labour providers nor the Union’s traditional 
foes – the farmers – but on supermarkets higher up agricultural supply-chains. The 
Union utilised this combination of rejuvenatoryesque non-legal strategies in the hope 
of eventually producing a codified legal approach to gangmastered industrial 
relations. Yet, while always pushing for this system of statutory regulations, the 
Union happily participated in voluntary discussions with multiple stakeholders both 
before and after the creation of the GLA. In actualising these actions, the Union 
afforded an investigative, almost journalistic role to its lay-membership. 
 
vii)  What causal mechanisms have been responsible for producing or inhibiting 
said orientations and strategies? 
                                                
341 Pai, Chinese Whispers; Citizens Advice Bureau, Home from Home?; Citizens Advice Bureau, 
Nowhere to Turn. 
342 TUC CoVE, Hard Work, Hidden Lives, pg. 194. 
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 Self-interested cost/benefit analyses helped select the Union’s rejuvenatory, 
engaging orientation, as the Union intended to prevent the undermining of full-time 
workers in the industry, and was hopeful that traditionally unorganised groups of 
precarity prone workers could reinforce the Union’s ranks. The Union focussed on the 
supermarkets in order to pursue these ends, as it recognised that the oligarchic powers 
of these bodies, which were doing so much to indirectly produce precarity in the 
market, could be used directly to privately regulate agriculture, helping ward off the 
worst excesses of these precarity-producing practices: the Union mobilised its 
resources in the civil arena when seeking to commandeer the de facto regulative 
market powers of these bodies.  
 
vii)  How effective have said strategies been in securing the unions’ desired 
orientational goals, and why? 
  
 Ultimately a contingent and tragic event was needed to secure this final goal: 
an inhospitable political environment was too tough to yield to frontal assaults from 
the Union; however, one cannot underplay the skill and innovation required of the 
Union as it finessed its desired aims. Rather than being relying on pre-existent public 
opinions and attitudes to facilitate its strategic actions, the Union primarily used the 
threat of an augmentation of these public perceptions to force change from the 
industry. A totally effective strategy aimed at the precarity produced by agricultural 
labour providers has not been found: indeed, the Union’s strategic cocktail has helped 
to maintain and formalise certain forms of precarity, in agriculture and other sections 
of the economy. However, multiple stakeholders with differentiated material interests 
have found the GLA’s, and by extension the Union’s, strategies to have been 
instrumental in reducing a large amount of agriculture’s precarity-producing 
practices. 
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Chapter 7: Answering, and Extrapolating from, my Principle Research Question.  
 
 Until this point in the thesis I have utilised a shifting thematic narrative, 
observing first the Movement’s, and then the Union’s, actions by way of analytically 
discrete operational domains. Echoing the TGWU’s strategies of the 1980s, I now 
turn to link up the analyses made in the previous five chapters, to answer this thesis’ 
principle research question, and draw out critical and constructive ramifications from 
this answer.  
 Remember, I seek to ascertain: in terms of form and effectiveness, how 
differentiated were the orientations and strategies of the Farmworkers’ Union, with 
regards to precarity-prone workers, when compared to the wider Trade Union 
Movement, and why? I answer the first part of this question in section one of this 
chapter,1 in section two I analyse the second.2  
 I illustrate some of the various implications of this analysis – those that can 
help guide the Farmworkers’ Union’s continuing operations – in section three. In 
section four I do much the same but on a wider scale, demonstrating how my 
observations of the Farmworkers’ Union’s metaphorical Petri dish can help inform the 
future strategic actions of the British Movement operating in the New Economy. I do 
a similar action in section five, explaining how the experiences of British 
farmworkers can help inform the future operations of the Dutch Trade Union 
Movement, despite its highly differentiated operational heritage and environment. 
Rather than provide a single end-point summary of this series of exploratory sections, 
each individual section of this chapter is summarised in turn.   
 
1. In Terms of Form and Effectiveness, how Differentiated were the Orientations and 
Strategies of the Farmworkers’ Union, with Regards to Precarity-Prone Workers, 
when compared to the Wider Trade Union Movement? 
 
 If one were to focus narrowly on its choice of strategy, the Farmworkers’ 
Union would appear to have acted in a broadly rejuvenatory manner throughout the 
entirety of our periodisation: utilising methodologies now associated with union 
rejuvenation for a prolonged period of time in a generally coherent manner. This 
trend is most clearly demonstrated with reference to the AWB, where the Union has 
utilised, from a date well preceding the onset of our periodisation, a legal approach to 
union action, albeit one partially imposed on the industry and specifically designed to 
provide a verisimilitudinous representation of voluntary collective bargaining. 
Likewise, in the earliest years of the 1970s, the Union was utilising a coherent, if 
differentiated, legal approach when mobilising its resources to win the “abolition” of 
the tied-cottage system3: attempting to activate the resources of its fellow travellers in 
the Labour Party in order to win statutory regulative changes for the industry, via 
direct governmental interference in the housing market. A further legal approach 
could be seen less than a decade later, when the Union again hoped to guide the 
creation of governmental policy, this time with regards to agrichemical control 
regimes.  
                                                
1 That is, in terms of form and effectiveness, how differentiated were the orientations and strategies of 
the Farmworkers’ Union, with regards to precarity-prone workers, when compared to the wider Trade 
Union Movement? 
2 That is, and why? 
3 Cf. The Landworker, December 1972. 
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 These repeated and coherent strategic deployments, used as a principle 
methodology rather than as an occasional supplement to voluntarism, markedly 
differentiated the Union from the mainstream Movement, or at least its craft-wing, in 
the earlier decades of our periodisation. This differentiation was not trivial: as many 
scholars have demonstrated, a hegemonic tendency in the Movement held a 
traditional antipathy to pervasive legal interventions in labour markets until well after 
the commencement of the cascade of decline4; yet, while the mainstream Movement 
hegemonically resisted any and all suggestions for a NMW at the commencement of 
our study, and pushed for a transformation of the tripartite wage councils into 
bipartite bodies, most in the Farmworkers’ Union actively supported the continuation 
of AMW machinery.  
 Not only was the Union’s use of this strategic methodology novel in its early 
and consistent deployment: so too was its early deployment in operational domains 
unassociated with hegemonic forms of Post-War unionism. Until well into the 1980s, 
much of the mainstream Movement shied away from interventions over non-labour 
market issues, seen as they were as secondary in value to the normatively privileged 
issues of worker remuneration and workplace conditions5: so, it was only in the latter 
years of that decade, long after the commencement of the cascade of decline and the 
initiation of conscious union rejuvenations, that the Mainstream movement dedicated 
significant resources to issues regarding the housing of workers; of course, the 
agricultural union long differed, greatly, over the issue of tied-cottaging. 
 Indeed, the multifaceted legal methodology can be defined as the enduring 
modus operandi of the Farmworkers’ Union. As demonstrated in chapter two, the 
mainstream Movement, when it started to seek rejuvenation, began to increase its 
usage of legal approaches soon after the onset of the cascade of decline, albeit neither 
in a particularly coherent nor convincing manner. Concurrently, the Farmworkers’ 
Union continued to utilise this methodology to an almost stubborn degree, on the 
AWB and elsewhere.6 This hegemonic dominance of a single strategy endured until 
relatively late into our time series: the Union argued in 1985 that it still “had to rely 
on political action to resolve (its) industrial and social problems”,7 due to the 
perceptively precarious and powerless position of agricultural workers en mass. 
Indeed, the Union continues to privilege appeals for governmental interference as its 
preferred ‘solution’ to all manner of precarity-producing phenomena – regarding 
triangular employment relations and health and safety protections – right up to the 
present day. Accordingly, I can assert that in its persistent usage of this strategic 
approach, seen as it was in a variety of operational domains, the Union’s actions were 
at first significantly differentiated from, and one could say more rejuvenatory than, 
the mainstream Movement’s. Yet, around a decade after the onset of our 
periodisation, many of the mainstream Movement’s strategic actions began to 
                                                
4 Oude Nijhuis, Labour Devided, pg. 29; cf. Hugh Clegg, The Changing System of Industrial Relations 
in Britain, Oxford: Blackwell, 1979, pg. 43. 
5 Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism, pg.72. 
6 Of course, it has to be remembered that factions within the Union have regularly fought for the 
hegemonic privileging of divergent preferred strategies throughout the decades of our study. 
7 Jack Bobby cited in The Landworker, September 1985, emphasis added. This argument was made 
when the Union’s executive instructed its members to vote ‘yes’ on the ballot the Conservatives 
required all unions to hold in the mid-1980s regarding the continuation of political funds. Like every 
union that balloted on the issue, the TGWU voted overwhelmingly in favour of retention, albeit on a 
51.3% turnout. Cf. The Landworker, November 1985. N.B unfortunately, broken-down statistics are 
not available regarding the votes of individual Trade Groups. 
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converge on, and resemble, those previously seen from the Farmworkers’ Union. This 
observation is entirely consistent with my initial expectations.  
 However, I found unexpected results with regards to the Union’s usage of 
further, differentiated, strategies: I expected the Farmworkers’ Union to utilise an 
identifiably rejuvenatoryesque strategy from the outset of periodisation, and therefore 
implicitly assumed that any strategic modus operandi would remain a relative 
constant throughout our study; however, the previous chapters clearly demonstrate 
that the Union has partially shifted its preferred strategy in recent decades; from a 
dominate privileging of various legal approaches, the Union has come to increasingly 
insert aspects of campaigning and partnership approaches into its repertoire of 
contention. As shown, the Union consciously deployed a campaigning approach to 
Union action in the latter 1970s and early 1980s – with it being only at first utilised as 
a supplementary by-product of its legal manoeuvres – when it sought to regulate 
British pesticide use on a de facto basis. Of note is the fact that it was at around the 
climax of this campaign that other British unions, facing their personal cascades of 
decline, came to embrace this campaigning approach in a manner and extent that had 
not been seen since the Inter-War period, if not before. In the following decades, 
when the mainstream Movement greatly increased its usage of this rejuvenatory mode 
of action, the Farmworkers’ Union continued to increase its usage also, when trying to 
regulate gangmastery for example. So, in the case of its use of campaigning 
approaches to unionism throughout its operational domains, the Farmworkers’ 
Union’s developmental path proves to be, against expectations, consistently 
complementary to that of the mainstream Movement’s, instead of being initially 
differentiated. 
 The Union’s multifaceted actions against gangmastery – which provide us 
with latter examples of the usage of campaigning – are particularly noteworthy, in 
that while the Union utilised a campaigning approach, it sought to create a statutory 
legal approach to agricultural labour regulation, and by implication union action, and 
later actively participated in and around the resultant legislative body in a nominally 
partnership-based manner. While conscious rejuvenation had certainly become the 
accepted aspirational principle of the Movement by the time the Farmworkers’ 
Union’s engagement with gangmastery reached its crescendo, the deployment of this 
strategic triptych was highly innovative, and effective, when compared to the actions 
of the mainstream Movement at the time. Yet further, similar, if less effective, hybrid 
actions were seen from the Farmworkers’s Union both before and after the formation 
of the GLA: most notably with regards to the Union’s various campaigns to secure 
the continued legal existence of the AWB.  
 While perhaps not as effective nor notable as the Farmworkers’ Union’s, 
hybrid actions, significantly differentiated from the Post-War tradition of voluntarism, 
have concurrently emerged elsewhere in the Movement in recent years: for instance, 
many unions now accept that narrow, workplace-centred organising approaches 
appear to be ineffective when used in isolation with certain precarity-prone groups 
with highly specific needs and interests, such as sojourning migrants8; resultantly, 
rejuvenatory strategies aimed at organising migrant labour have come to increasing 
incorporate aspects of ‘community unionism’ – with union activity focussing on 
extra-workplace issues and domains, such as housing and lifelong learning, so as to 
allow the Movement to build links with employers, migrant community networks and 
                                                
8 Cf. Heery and Abbott, The Insecure Workforce; Jane Holgate, “Organizing Migrant Workers: a Case 
Study of Working Conditions and Unionization in a London Sandwich Factory”, Work, Employment 
and Society, 2005, 19 (3), pp. 463—80. 
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other civil society groups9; elsewhere, organising approaches that incorporate an 
emphasis on worker education schemes, designed to increase workers’ human capital, 
have become a recurring theme in the mainstream Movement10; these nominally 
organising approaches have adopted campaigning and servicing tendencies in their 
operationalisation. Clearly then, the Union and Movement have both come to employ 
multifaceted hybrid strategies on a systemic basis.  
 Remember, in this thesis’ introduction I predicted that the mainstream 
Movement’s rejuvenatory strategies would come to resemble the relatively stable 
actions of the Farmworkers’ Union, well versed as has been to agriculture’s 
consistently hostile operating environment: I anticipated a process of convergence 
between the Union and the mainstream Movement, with the latter being the prime 
mover. However, we can see from the above that in practice, as our periodisation 
progressed, the Farmworkers’ Union partially turned away from its traditional 
privileging of legal approaches, and came to utilise a broader array of strategic 
actions, all nominally rejuvenatory according to the ontologies of rejuvenation 
theorists: while a harmonisation of strategies has occurred, this has involved a 
significant move from the Farmworkers’ Union. Convergence has been bilateral: 
from a previous privileging of a single approach – legalism for the Union, 
voluntarism for the Movement – both of our subjects have came to prefer strategic 
cocktails.  
This insight proves to be the thin end of a wedge: a wedge that eventually 
discounts the core premise I outlined in this thesis’ introduction. To demonstrate why 
this is the case, we must look more closely at the Union at the initiation of our 
periodisation. In 1970 the Union was hegemonically utilising legalism in a small-c-
conservative manner11: in much the same manner that the Movement was 
conservatively utilising voluntary collective bargaining. Recognising its lack of 
mobilisable resources, an issue stemming ultimately from the Union’s hostile and 
then-idiosyncratic environment, the Union had to act in a manner differentiated from 
others in the Movement, but not for differentiated purposes: self-interested, 
subordinatory advocacy of one’s own traditional constituents remained the order of 
the day, for both the Farmworkers’ Union and the wider Movement.  
This allows us to make an observation regarding the nature of rejuvenation; 
one that delineates the term to a greater extent than has been seen in this thesis up till 
now. Theorists such as Hyman have defined certain strategies as more rejuvenatory 
than others, often due to their enhanced capacity to represent the interests of 
precarity-prone workers. However, analyses of the Farmworkers’ Union’s actions, 
with regards to the AWB and the tied-cottage, clearly demonstrate that apparently 
rejuvenatory strategies can used in highly divisive manners – the Union has 
repeatedly, throughout time and space, used legalism to divide the agricultural 
workforce, for the purpose of facilitating inequitable distributions of socio-economic 
risks and benefits to the advantage of the Union’s traditional constituents; opposingly, 
apparently pre-rejuvenatory strategies have been used for orientationally rejuvenatory 
purposes, as evidenced by Link Up’s partially realised ability to shift the emphasis of 
horticultural voluntary collective bargainings so as to better protect precarity-prone 
workers in a enhanced manner. It is here where we find a contradiction between this 
                                                
9 Cf. Datta et al., From Coping Strategies to Tactics. 
10 Cf. Trades Union Congress, General Council Report 2004, London: TUC, 2004, pg. 7; Trades Union 
Congress, General Council Report 2008,London: TUC, 2008, pg. 17. 
11 Again, conservative being the antonym of progressive, rather than Conservative being the established 
political ideology and associated political party.  
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thesis’ two chief theoretical texts. To illustrate with a further example: remember, 
orientational change is in no way deterministically assured, and while the recent 
formations of company ‘unions’ – a trend that has occurred in recent years in which 
many niche-representing unions have been observed making their beds with the 
managements of individual firms – are wholly strategically rejuvenatory as according 
to Hyman’s account, in that the unions in question have moved away from the norm 
of voluntary collective bargaining, they are wholly pre-rejuvenatory as according to 
Heery’s, in that the subjugation or exclusion of non-privileged workers is required for 
such strategies to be effective. From this, we can see that the two theorists are clearly 
describing two uncorrelated issues.  
Wanting this thesis’ findings to serve a long-term practical purpose, by being 
of help in identifying avenues of future action that assure the efficacy of unionism, I 
propose that, for the remainder of this thesis, references to strategic and orientational 
rejuvenation should be read as to describe two independently existing phenomena, 
with the latter privileged in analysis: I posit that in order to produce a practically 
valuable academic work, we must normatively emphasise a shift in orientation as the 
defining aspect of union rejuvenation. 
Allow me to dissect this position: because multiple theorists have been 
working, in recent years, under a single rubric – that of union rejuvenation, albeit 
otherwise defined as renewal12 or revitalization13 – there has been a tendency in the 
British academic context to view any action differentiated from the once-hegemony of 
voluntary collective bargaining as being of equal potential value to the Movement in 
desperate need to change. This view is reinforced, inadvertently, by works such as 
Heery’s, which, while going to lengths to highlight the contested and counter-
directional tendencies found within the Movement, ultimately present orientational 
change as that of a Hegalian progression, with unions moving through four bespoke 
and, seemingly, progressively preferable moments: with such a mindset, it would be 
easy to interpret any and all strategic divergences as strategic improvements. Heery, 
and myself, would thoroughly reject the deterministic tinge of this account. However, 
analysis of the Farmworkers’ Union demonstrates that this apparent progression 
should be adopted as an aspirational ambition of the Movement: practicality and 
normativity combine, when we see that rejuvenatory orientations towards precarity-
prone workers – normatively deserving of trade union representation – oft increase in 
practice the long-term efficacy of increasingly resource-deficient unions.  
However, this synthesis of practicality and normatively does not occur with 
regards to strategic rejuvenation. Of course a move away from voluntarism, towards 
any other manifestation of strategy, is rejuvenatory according dictionary definitions of 
the term, but unlike Heery’s account of orientational change, strategists should not 
raise unquestionably all of Hyman’s rejuvenatory strategies unto an aspiration 
pedestal. A rose by any other name is still a rose, and a subordinatory tendency 
towards precarity-prone work is still a subordinatory tendency towards precarity-
prone work, and pre-rejuvenatory according to normative and practical ‘definitions’, 
in that it is likely to simultaneously harm both the long-term survival of the 
Movement and the interests of precarity-prone workers, regardless of the strategies 
utilised to actualise it. According to this account, orientations should be taken as the 
proper signifiers of rejuvenation, strategies are simply the vessels though which these 
orientations are operationalised, or not as the case may be: Heery describes 
                                                
12 Cf. Forrester, The Quiet Revolution?; Carter, Trade Union Organizing and Renewal. 
13 Behrens et al., Conceptualizing Labour Union Revitalization. 
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rejuvenation actual, while Hyman describes phenomena associated, but not directly 
correlated, with rejuvenation.  
Clearly then, we cannot look at the Farmworkers’ Union’s strategies in 
isolation. With our newly defined term, we cannot view the Union’s initial strategic 
divergence from voluntary collective bargaining as straightforward, observational 
evidence of premature rejuvenation: a choice of strategy provides only circumstantial 
data, signifying the presence of associated, and potentially-catalytic, symptoms which 
may, but also may not, indicate rejuvenation, as taken to mean the better 
representation of precarity-prone workers.  
 With this in mind, we must address the fact that there was nothing premature 
or novel about the Union’s orientations towards precarity-prone workers as seen 
throughout our time series. In the earlier years of our periodisation the Union 
actualised strongly subordinatory orientations towards precarity-prone workers in 
diverse arenas of contention, such as those on and around the AWB and regarding the 
tied-cottage. This orientation has proved highly durable: across time, space and 
operational domains, the Union has been known to subsume and sacrifice the interests 
of precarity-prone workers – likely non-unionised workers from traditionally 
subordinated demographic groups employed on non-standard contractual forms – in 
order to further the interests of those workers typical of its core constituents – more 
likely than not white, British and male workers employed on standard contracts and 
paid precarity-dampening wages. Even though recent developments in Britain’s 
political-economy, namely the creation of the NMW, have problematised the efficacy 
of such actions, these tendencies have proved highly persistent, and can still be seen 
in operation in one of the Union’s principle operational domains, that of the AWB.  
 Of course, in some of its actions the Union has displayed a more rejuvenatory 
orientation: but these have mostly come in the latter years of our study. True, when 
the Union campaigned for better health and safety protections in the 1970s one saw a 
generalisable regard for all workers’ welfare, which overrode divisive cleavages in 
the workforce. However, it was only in the 1980s that this inclusive orientation gained 
significant prominence within the Union’s internal structures, when it concerned itself 
with 2,4,5,T. The Union has additionally displayed rejuvenatory orientations, of 
inclusion and occasionally engagement, towards precarity-prone workers in other 
operational domains: at times, such orientations were thrust upon the Union, as was 
the case with Link Up, but they also developed spontaneously from within the 
Union’s internal structures, as was the case when farmworker activists placed 
themselves on the frontline of contentions related to gangmastery. Again, these 
tendencies rose to prominence only a decade or more after the initiation of our 
periodisation: while such orientations could occasionally be glimpsed from the Union 
in the late 1970s, they really exploded in the 1980s and 1990s, as markedly non-
standard relations increasingly penetrated the labour market. So, with the majority of 
the Union’s rejuvenatory orientations being operationalised from the 1980s onwards, 
standard union rejuvenation theorists should not view the emergence of such inclusive 
and occasional engaging orientations as surprising.  
 Indeed, the demographic groups that have ultimately wrought the greatest 
benefits from the Union’s most coherent and effective rejuvenatory operation – the 
Union-aided construction of the GLA – have concurrently been targeted by similar 
operations of the mainstream Movement. Clearly the cascade of decline was well 
underway when feminised labour gangs began to reappear en mass in British 
agriculture, and by the time of the arrival of foreign labour into these gangs the wider 
Movement was consciously seeking rejuvenation, both inclusive and engaging: in 
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these rejuvenations, the self-motivated Movement has particularly emphasised the 
need to shift orientations regarding migrant labour, coming to recognise that if the 
particular extenuating needs of migrants are taken into account, their union density 
rates are often well in excess of native populations.14 So, in the same years that the 
Farmworkers’ Union was ratcheting up its pressure on gangmastery, the mainstream 
Movement was publishing a substantial amount of literature designed to encourage 
the recruitment, servicing and organising of precarity-prone migrants and other 
typically non-standardised workers.15  
 Discrediting this thesis’ prediction then, the Union’s extended heritage of 
working in a hostile operating environment did not result in an earlier realised nor 
more coherent orientationally rejuvenatory persona from the Union. Instead, the 
Farmworkers’ Union’s ‘journey’ towards rejuvenation closely matches that of the 
wider Movement. The mainstream Movement did not move towards the 
Farmworkers’ Union: the two have been fellow travelers. From bring strongly pre-
rejuvenatory at the onset of our periodisation, green-shoots of rejuvenation came to be 
seen in the latter 1970s and early 1980s, which then spread throughout the entirety of 
the body’s institutional structures, though still not in a totally coherent nor hegemonic 
manner, with pre-rejuvenatory counter tendencies surviving to the present day: such a 
narrative perfectly describes both the Union and the wider Movement. Indeed, many 
of the developments variably enacted and experienced by the Farmworkers Union in 
the 1980s and 1990s were relatively standard fare for urban unions at the time: 
merging with a larger union for lack of an alternative and having centralised 
rejuvenatory protocols imposed on local branches being prime examples.   
 What our study does show us is that when a union rejuvenates its orientations, 
and faces the demands of catering to a more heterogeneous pool of worker interests, a 
fractalisation of strategies occurs. No single strategy can be utilised by a union aware 
and receptive to the multiple interests of a workforce: so, not only is a rejuvenating 
union’s repertoire of contention augmented, it is expanded. The mainstream 
Movement went from hegemonically utilising the sole strategy of voluntary collective 
bargaining and came to use cocktails of the apparently rejuvenatory strategic forms as 
described by Hyman for often, but not exclusively, orientationally rejuvenatory 
purposes, as described by Heery; the Farmworkers’ Union did much the same, only 
moving away from a hegemonic usage of legalism. From this, we can see that no 
single strategic form indicates the likely actualisation of orientational rejuvenation: a 
dynamism and variety of strategies does. Looking for such patterns, we can say that 
Farmworkers’ Union was no quicker than the mainstream Movement in adopting a 
dynamic and varied cocktail of sympathetic strategies. The causal mechanics behind 
this mirroring are discussed in the following section, but first we must compare the 
effectiveness of the Union’s actions with those of the wider Movement. 
When analysing effectiveness, one finds that the Union’s cocktail of 
superficially rejuvenatoryesque strategies generally performed underwhelmingly at 
the outset of our periodisation. This analysis holds true even when one assesses those 
strategies with reference to the Union’s normally subordinatory goals. Take the issue 
of remuneration as an example: from the start of our periodisation, the Union has 
attempted to maximise remuneration for a relatively small core group of workers, 
                                                
14 Cf. Gamze Avci and Christopher McDonald, “Chipping away at the Fortress: Unions, Immigration 
and the Transnational Labour Market”. In: International Migration, 2000, 38 (2), pp. 191-213; 
Bronfenbrenner et al., Organizing to Win.  
15 Cf. Trades Union Congress, Report of Congress 1992, London: TUC, 1992, pg. 500; Trades Union 
Congress, Report of Congress 1994, London: TUC, 1994, pg 308.  
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implicitly at the expense of others in the industry; yet we have seen how agricultural 
workers have remained low paid by national standards, a fact that includes the 
relatively better off in the sector; the aristocracy of agricultural labour has remained a 
precarious aristocracy indeed, despite the Union’s best subordinatory efforts. 
Likewise, even if one accepts that in practice the Union sought a subordinatory 
restructuring of the tied-cottage system in the 1970s, rather than its abolition, the 
actual results it managed to achieve were far from spectacular: it is possible to 
imagine a hypothetical restructuring of the system that would have allowed for a 
continuation of its privileged rents, but which also would have secured a right to 
tenancy for normally economically-privileged cottagers, as opposed to the looser 
guarantee of housing that the Union managed to secure. Clearly then, the Union’s 
combinations of rejuvenatoryesque strategies and subordinatory orientations appear to 
have been far from efficient in the earlier years of our periodisation. It was at broadly 
this same moment that the mainstream Movement found its traditional subordinatory 
operations rendered ineffective by the first waves of economic restructurings that 
emerged after the Oil Shocks: again, a temporal mirror image is seen between the 
Movement and Union, this time regarding strategic ineffectiveness in the 1970s.  
 However, when the Union has utilised rejuvenatoryesque strategies – legal and 
otherwise – in combination with rejuvenatory orientations, efficiency seems to have 
been improved. True, the Union’s legal attempts aimed at restructuring agriculture’s 
on-site health and safety regimes, seen from the 1970s onwards, have proved 
consistently ineffective. However, this story is different with regards to 2,4,5,T: in the 
early 1980s the Union successfully operationalised a combination of rejuvenatory 
strategies whilst holding a rejuvenatory, inclusive, orientation, albeit to win rather 
narrow results focused on a single chemical. While the benefits wrought by these 
actions were only partial – the Union was still excluded from regulative controls 
regarding general chemical usage in agriculture – the Union managed to launch an 
even more effective, if slow-burning, operation a couple of years later: from the 1980s 
onwards with regards to gangmastery; with the Union-won formation of the GLA 
providing, arguably, the largest counter-directional trend to the ongoing so-called 
‘deregulation’ of the British economy, it is clear that, in one key instance at least, the 
effectiveness of the Union’s actions have been markedly differentiated from the 
mainstream Movement’s often partial successes. Of course these later successes have 
to be taken with a pinch of salt: contingent political events seemingly beyond the 
Union’s control were needed to win regulative restructurings in both operational 
domains. Yet despite these limitations, it is clear that the Union has often punched 
above its weight,16 and not just with narrow regards to the GLA: not totally effective 
in all moments and manners, the Union has performed impressively when one 
considers its limited resources and hostile framing environment. However, this has 
only been the case in the latter years of our periodisation: the efficiency of the 
Farmworkers’ Union’s actions have improved with each passing decade of our 
periodisation. 
  This evidence again runs against my earlier postulations. In chapter two I 
describe how the mainstream Movement’s cascade of decline problematised the once 
consistently efficient usage of subordinatory collective bargaining, and demonstrate 
how it took several decades of incoherent experimentations for some strategists within 
the Movement to reactively develop some relatively effective combinations of 
orientations and strategies. Going against my predictions, it appears that the 
                                                
16 Cf. chapter 6, footnote 213 of this thesis. 
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Farmworkers’ Union experienced much the same trend, but without an earlier 
moment of relative success to hold on to and bask in. Again, I analyse the causal 
mechanisms behind this trend in the following section. 
 To summarise the above and partially answer this thesis’ principle research 
question: I can say that the Union’s principal strategies were significantly 
differentiated from the mainstream Movement’s at the onset of our periodisation; as 
predicted, the Union hegemonically utilised strategies that would be identified, by 
contemporary theorists, as rejuvenatory at an earlier date than others in the 
Movement. However, this differentiation cannot be taken to represent a truly 
premature rejuvenatory tendency from the Union: when one defines rejuvenation 
through the lens of orientation, the Farmworkers’ Union’s experiences mirror, rather 
than diverge from, the mainstream Movement’s. At the beginning of our 
periodisation, as the first rumbles of the mainstream Movement’s cascade of decline 
broke on the temporal horizon, the Union hegemonically utilised subordinatory 
orientations, just like the wider Movement. Only later did its orientations shift to more 
rejuvenatory ones, and even then this shift has only been partial, occurring in some 
operational domains, such as that related to gangmastery, and not in others, such as 
that on and around the AWB: again, this partial transition likewise typifies the 
mainstream Movement’s experiences. The same story applies to the varying 
effectiveness of the Union’s strategies: from its hegemonically ineffective cocktail of 
strategies of the 1970s, the Union has come to enjoy a degree, but certainly not a total, 
amount of success in more recent years: the one differentiation between the Union 
and mainstream Movement being that the wider Movement continued to enjoy the last 
dregs of its once effective strategy of voluntary collective bargaining in the early 
years of its cascade of decline, while the Farmworkers’ Union never properly enjoyed 
this tattered but still somewhat effective safety net. So, to give a candid answer to the 
component of my research question addressed by this section: in terms of form and 
effectiveness, how differentiated were the orientations and strategies of the 
Farmworkers’ Union, with regards to precarity-prone workers, when compared to the 
wider Trade Union Movement? Not particularly.    
 
2. And Why? 
 
 Much of my hypothesise appears to have been falsified: my analysis describes 
a broad lack of differentiation between the post-1970 histories of the Farmworkers’ 
Union and the mainstream Movement, with similarities particularly accentuated with 
regards to each body’s orientations towards precarity-prone workers. This section 
completes the addressing of my thesis’ principle research question, and ascertains 
what casual mechanisms caused this pattern. 
 First, we briefly assess why the Union acted as according to my initial 
expectations, and consistently utilised strategies that can in hindsight be described as 
typical signifiers of rejuvenation as early as 1970, and indeed before. It is easy to 
establish why the Union rarely utilised the strategy of voluntary collective bargaining 
in the earliest days in our periodisation17: “imagine any industry where a hundred or a 
thousand workers go through the same gate night and morning and in which fifty per 
cent of them had received no contracts of employment”18; with a mind to the wider 
economy in the Post-War Era, this cannot easily be done, as ‘traditional’ Post-War 
                                                
17 Indeed, much of the theoretical content of this brief explanatory analysis has previously been 
sketched out in the introduction of this thesis.  
18 The Landworker, July 1970. 
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forms of industrial production, the heralded decommodification of labour and the 
development of ‘traditional’ forms of industrial relations resided hand-in-hand in a 
symbiotic relationship. Yet as shown, throughout the Twentieth Century the vast 
majority of agricultural labourers worked in small-employer firms, unsuitable for such 
relations: Newby, surveying farmworkers in 1979, found that these environmental 
difficulties produced “problems of recruitment and organisation”, which “inhabited 
the use of the strike weapon” and accordingly disabled the effectiveness of voluntary 
collective bargaining, lacking as the Union was the ability to restrict access to the 
labour market.19 In such an environment, if the Union were to have single-mindedly 
pursued its desired ends via a portfolio of more ‘traditional’ Post-War actions, as it 
briefly considered doing so in the 1980s,20 a vicious feedback loop would have 
developed, with farmworkers growing ever more apathetic in reaction to the probable 
failures of the Union’s actions, this would have in turn harmed membership numbers, 
which would have, in turn, weakened the Union’s actions further. Clearly then, the 
Farmworkers’ Union has long been informally prohibited from utilising those Post-
War methods typical of the mainstream Movement, due to the once-idiosyncratic 
nature of the agricultural sector.  
 An alternative has long been needed. As mentioned, the rejuvenation of the 
mainstream Movement has not entailed a forging of totally new strategies and, even 
before the 1970s, unions, repeatedly across time and space, have held a “readiness to 
resort to the method of legal enactment” if and when “collective bargaining was 
unavailable”.21 This was certainly the case with our case subject. The Farmworkers’ 
Union has, when assessing the nature of its framing environment, repeatedly made a 
strategic choice to utilise a portfolio of actions that, in theory at least, represent a less 
direct conflict of interests between industrial parties with massively unequal power 
resources. The Union’s hegemonic choice of a legal strategy, made in the 1970s and 
1980s, was exactly that: a highly restricted choice, selected by self-motivated Union 
officials assessing the various payoffs afforded by differentiated strategies of 
contention. 
 Now we must address why the Union’s orientational journey towards 
rejuvenation so closely matched, its terms of extent, effectiveness and timing, the 
mainstream Movement’s. 
 For a start, I readily accept that, throughout our periodisation, the relationship 
between the primary, and secondary and tertiary sectors has been far deeper than I 
supposed at the offset of my investigation. Rather than agriculture existing in an 
industrial semi-vacuum, partially detached from developments in the wider economy, 
this thesis’ analysis has repeatedly highlighted how agriculture has been inextricably 
bound with, and influenced by, its meta-environment via extensive feedback 
mechanisms. While the mainstream Movement’s cascade of decline principally 
affected Britain’s urban heartlands, this was not an event that happened only to 
urbanite unions: the cascade happened to the Farmworkers’ Union too.  
 A most striking parallel can be found between the cascade of decline and the 
equally cataclysmic drift from the land: while the onset of the drift certainly predated 
the cascade’s, I underappreciated the overlaps between the two at the beginning of my 
investigations. As shown, when Link Up was imposed on the Union the 
Farmworkers’ distinctive operational heritage led the host to mostly reject this 
transplant. However, it is an undeniable fact that in 1983 the Union consciously 
                                                
19 Newby, The Deferential Worker, pg. 262. 
20 When it flirted with the idea of an overtime ban and over forms of direct militant action. 
21 Flanders, The Tradition of Voluntarism, pg. 358. 
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accepted, and indeed sought, an augmentation of its once proudly independent 
structural modus operandi when it sought to merge with another body, itself suffering 
from the cascade of decline. This desire was caused by a crisis in the Union’s own 
financial resources, which was in turn brought about by a sustained collapse in the 
traditional agricultural workforce.  
 Further interconnecting links can likewise be found. The continuation of the 
drift from the land, which we have observed throughout our periodisation, has not 
simply entailed a further decline in the agricultural workforce, but a wholesale 
restructuring of the workforce’s composition, and the composition of the average 
agricultural contract. To demonstrate: while personalised employment relations 
remained an agricultural norm throughout the Twentieth Century, for relatively 
privileged and more precarity-prone agricultural workers alike, triangular 
employment relations, a key feature of the New Economy, were relatively absent 
from the rural environment from the late Nineteenth Century until the 1970s; then, 
triangularity re-emerged in agriculture at broadly the same moment that triangular 
labour relations exploded in use in the wider economy. In fact, it was the soaring 
nationwide unemployment of the 1980s, brought about by economy-wide 
restructurings, that helped solidify triangularity’s return to agriculture: binding 
workers to precarious agricultural labour relations for lack of an alternative, new 
economic unemployment helped fuel the growth of the gangmaster system, as did the 
neo-liberal deconstructions of rural infrastructure and other aspects of civil society.22  
 So, in this thesis I have talked optimistically about an agricultural Petri dish. 
However, the image of a Petri dish implies sterility, whereas the evidence above 
clearly demonstrates that the agricultural environment, which fundamentally affects 
the Union’s strategic actions, has been grossly and repeatedly contaminated by the 
wider economy throughout our time-series.23 
 Let us analyse this contamination further. It is true that agricultural 
gangmastery, at the turn of the Millennium, was often more precarious than the still-
precarious temporary agency labour that had come to typify much work in other 
sectors. Likewise, it is true that system can be traced back to an earlier agricultural 
norm. However, the fact remains that this system is, when looking discretely at the 
Twentieth Century, a relatively new development in agriculture. While the workers 
who were consigned to the Basic Grade of the AWB soon after the commencement of 
our periodisation were highly precarity-prone, the labour relations of ganged workers, 
often denied access to the AWB’s mechanisms altogether, grew to become more non-
standardised, more non-Fordist, and more precarity-prone with the growth of this 
system: one can say therefore that the agricultural economy of the Post-War Era has 
transitioned to become a ‘New Agricultural Economy’ during our periodisation. This 
transition has been idiosyncratically differentiated from the wider economy’s 
transition into the, still undeniably ruralised, New Economy, it terms of the minutia of 
its form, but it has shared many of the same causal mechanisms, and likewise seems 
to have begged a similar response from the sector’s interested trade union – our 
Farmworkers’ Union. The response being, of course, rejuvenation.  
                                                
22 Cf. The Landworker, March 1982. 
23 The farmworkers experiences in the operational domain associated with health and safety further 
demonstrate the fact that one cannot ghettoise agriculture from the wider economy: we have seen how 
developments in the secondary chemical industries have had a direct and decisive effect on agricultural 
precarity. For better or for worse, the sector has been intimately interconnected with developments in 
the wider economy throughout our time series, and any and all developments that have occurred 
therein. 
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 To expand: in this thesis’ introduction I accepted that agriculture would be a 
far from a static sector during our periodisation. However, I did not acknowledge how 
fundamental some of the changes it has experienced have been, and how inextricably 
intertwined with the wider economy’s fortunes these changes are. The manners in 
which these significant structural reconfigurations have affected the Farmworkers’ 
Union have been legion, with it experiencing: the further decimation of the workforce 
and hence its membership; an ever decreasing ability to control access to the 
agricultural labour market; and ever decreasing financial and organisational resources. 
These developments caused value-rational and self-motivated strategists in the Union 
to appreciate the pull-factors afforded by theoretical shifts in the body’s orientations 
and strategies, and attempt an embrace of modes of action that would theoretically 
reduce costs, buttress member numbers, devalue the potential of under-cutting, and 
increase the Union’s perceived legitimacy, even if this required a gamble on the 
Union’s own core members’ short-term material interests.  
 This conscious and self-interested acceptance of the need to change is most 
clearly vocalised in a Landworker editorial from 1982. Here, the Union’s mouthpiece 
argued that “the group with which the Trade Union Movement could and should be 
most closely associated is the low paid towards the bottom of the wages scale”, and 
that remuneratory “differentials... which have been jealously guarded for years”, by 
many within the Union and wider Movement, were scuppering British unionism’s 
own long-term interests. The editorial went on to argue that self-survival demanded, 
from the Union and Movement, a conscious effort to “instil into the average trade 
union member practical brotherly concern for his less fortunate neighbour”.24 While 
overly defensive in its efforts to blame average union members for the Union and 
Movement’s ills, this opinion piece clearly demonstrate how and why the Union 
pushed for a rejuvenation of its tendencies. Remember, rejuvenation in the wider 
economy was in part a consequence of rational and direct strategic scheming in the 
face of economic restructuring: this was likewise the case with the Farmworker’s 
Union’s transition, when it came to privilege a less divisive array of orientations, and 
an associated fractalisation of its strategies.  
 So, self-interested cost/benefit analyses, highly similar to those that were 
being conducted throughout the mainstream Movement at roughly the same time, 
drove the Farmworkers’ Union’s rejuvenation away from subordinatory legalism. At 
the onset of our periodisation the Union had just enough power over agriculture’s 
internal labour and product markets, primarily derived from its statutory position 
within the AWB and its slight influence over the PLP, to succeed in subsuming the 
interests of some – the lower-waged and more precarity-prone workers in the industry 
– to the advantage of others – normally representative of the Union’s traditional core 
constituents. However, just as economic and political restructurings came to wreak 
havoc on the wider economy, rising unemployment and the continuing collapse of 
technologically-evolving farmers’ labour demands forced a change, of a typical rather 
than divergent form, from the Farmworkers’ Union, left as it was unable to 
subordinate the material interests of others in several of its operational domains.  
This point about operational domains is important, and expanding on it leads 
us to a more refined answer to the question ‘and why?’ than our current answer: that 
currently being, the Movement’s and Union’s operating environments were more 
closely intertwined than expected. Throughout the body of this thesis we viewed the 
Union’s actions through the frame of operational domains: theoretical divisions in the 
                                                
24 The Landworker, August 1982. 
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Union’s actions. In this chapter we have merged these domains together, to reveal a 
picture of apparent, albeit incomplete, Hegelian progression: from pre-rejuvenation 
to rejuvenation. However, by once again allowing some analytical breathing space 
between domains, we are afforded a more nuanced view of the Union’s rejuvenatory 
journey. This recompartmentalised view likewise allows us to appreciate the causal 
mechanism behind the varying effectiveness of the Farmworkers’ strategies; 
rejuvenatoryesque and otherwise.  
 As shown, in the operational domain in which the Union has had the most 
consistent presence throughout our periodisation – that of worker remuneration as 
mediated on and around the AWB – the Union has remained consistently pre-
rejuvenatory in its orientations, right up to the present day. A standard account of 
rejuvenation would expect some partial and incoherent half-measures from any 
rejuvenating body, but the Farmworkers’ Union has continued to display a regressive 
tendency towards precarity-prone workers in the operational domain regarded by 
many as the Union’s operational home terrain.25 This is in spite of the fact that the 
creation of the NMW has seriously problematised the effectiveness of the Union’s 
actions from the late 1990s onwards. Viewing our analysis through too wide a lens 
gives a suggestion that a long-term but linear progression towards rejuvenation has 
occurred throughout our periodistion, albeit away from a hegemonic strategy 
untypical of the Post-War Movement: however, the pre-rejuvenatory ‘stickiness’ of 
the AWB demonstrates that no totalised Hegelian progression, towards rejuvenatory 
synthesis, has occurred with the Union. In fact, this stickiness highlights the 
apparently deterministic power of one’s operational domain in triggering, or stifling, 
rejuvenation.  
 As demonstrated, the long-term benefits wrought by the Union from its 
operations on the AWB were slight at the outset of our periodisation, and these 
becoming all the slighter after the creation of the NMW. However, the fact remained 
that some guaranteed short-term benefits have been consistently assured to the Union, 
or at least its relatively secure core members, by way of this legally bound institution. 
Now remember: it is in this one operational domain that the transition to rejuvenation 
has disabled the most. Contrasting this domain with others, we can see that only when 
and where self-assessments of the Union’s ability to secure any short and/or long-
term benefits, from established institutional configurations, have come up nearly 
wholly negative has the Union’s orientational rejuvenation been near wholly realised: 
this was the case in operational domains regarding health and safety in the anti-
regulative 1980s, and grey economy gangmastery at the turn of the millennium. So, 
rather than spilling over from one domain to another, building up a snowball of 
influence within the Union’s internal operating systems, rejuvenation has only 
occurred discretely, within proverbial last-chance saloons: when guaranteed payoffs, 
no matter how slight or short-term, have been offered by pre-existent patterns of 
union action, something has resisted a change in orientation regarding precarity-prone 
workers.  
 What is this something? As demonstrated in chapter two of this thesis, 
numerous forces have encouraged rejuvenation from the mainstream Movement, but 
with the Farmworkers’ Union rarely relying on voluntary collective bargaining, one 
can safely say that increasing governmental restrictions on this traditional form of 
union action would have affected the Union less than it did others in the Movement; 
and while discourses of human rights were soon utilised as a tool by the Union, when 
                                                
25 As demonstrated by the strength of the protests made by the Union to save the Board.  
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it sought to create an ethical complex on the part of the supermarkets, an 
internalisation of these discourses does not seem to be a driving force of the Union’s 
rejuvenatory tendencies. No: cold hard calculations of incentives were the principle 
driving force that motivated the Union in its rejuvenations, but only in those domains 
where no incentives could be found elsewhere; only absolute desperation and the 
perception of institutional helplessness allowed a change in orientation, from a self-
interested body with nothing to lose.  
 However, pre-existent path dependencies have been difficult to break: when 
incentives that have promised to better the interests of the Union’s traditional 
constituents have been offered from within a stable domain, strategists have 
consistently chosen the perceptively safe bet, and actively participated in the 
reproduction of divisive distributional patterns of risks and benefits. This can be seen 
in the Union’s continued implicit sanctification of the regressive stratification of the 
agricultural workforce on the AWB, and likewise in its commitment to the 
continuation of the tied-cottage system’s privileged rents. Just like multiple other 
trans-global unions experiencing their own rejuvenations, the Farmworkers’ Union 
has had to reach, in each of its operational domains, a nadir of influence so low that 
close to zero incentives are offered by a continuation of pre-existent patterns, for it to 
become “desperate enough” to implement a change.26 Even then, for the most part, 
these changes have been fixed within self-identified boundaries of individual and 
perceptively discrete operational domains. 
 An appreciation for the importance of perceptive domains also helps in 
explaining the varying efficacy of the Union’s actions. In its consistently pre-
rejuvenationary domains, the Union has behaved as a classic “prisoner group”27: self-
perceptively reliant on incentives underwritten and guaranteed by the state or others. 
Identified by itself as being locked into such relations,28 the Union has perceived itself 
as being unable to innovatively strategise for the attainment of the long-term interests 
of its own members and the wider agricultural workforce, and able to make only 
“tokenistic commitments to… (such a) cause”,29 in its annual and soon dropped 
written demands to the AWB for example. Even when afforded a more central 
position, as a classic albeit oft ignored “insider” group, able to influence 
governmental regulations as it was in relation to the tied-cottage, the Union came to 
be directed by a small-c-conservatism, all too aware of its tenuous position within 
agriculture’s regulative mechanisms. This conservatism has meant that when the 
Union has been guaranteed some rewards from acting in a pre-rejuvenatory manner, 
said rewards have always been guaranteed to be minor: midway through chapter four 
of this thesis an intermediatory finding was posited, which observed that legalism 
apparently served the Union poorly regardless of its operational domain, a finding 
that was perceptively supported by observations of the Union’s actions regarding 
health and safety; however, this is a deceptive pattern; in actuality it was not normally 
the Union’s legal actions that meant it secured for itself and its members few material 
rewards from the operational domains under scrutiny; instead, it was the fact that, in 
at least two of the operational domains under consideration, some easily imaginable 
                                                
26 Lowell Turner, “Reviving the Labor movement. A Comparative Perspective”. In: D.B. Cornfield and 
H.J. McCammon (eds.), Labor revitalization: Global Perspectives and New Initiatives, Amsterdam: 
Elsevier, 2003, pg. 40. 
27 As according to Grant’s typography of pressure groups. Cf. Grant, Pressure Groups, Politics and 
Democracy in Britain. 
28 Cf. chapter 4, footnote 33 of this thesis. 
29 Grant, Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain, pg. 145. 
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albeit short-term payoffs were perceptively within grasp of the Union’s strategists; 
however, a deep caution was demanded in return for the guarantee of said rewards, 
and so the Union not only accepted its own participation in pre-rejuvenatory 
divisiveness, but the fact that its reimbursements for such participation would always 
be on the slight side.  
 However, when an operational domain’s framing environment has rendered 
the Union an “outsider group by necessity”, unable to realistically influence formal 
regulative channels due to a lack of political sophistication or for clashes in material 
interests,30 as it was regarding the regulation of agrichemicals and the re-emergence 
of triangular employment patterns, the Union has been forced to develop its own 
strategies, which more often than not have incorporated aspects of orientational 
rejuvenation. This is most clearly demonstrated with reference to the operational 
domain related to gangmastery, the domain in which the Union has enjoyed perhaps 
its greatest successes in recent years: with its ever declining membership density and 
a resultant further loss in its ability to control aspects of the labour market, the Union 
practically acknowledged its lack of formal influence over the system on its return to 
British agriculture, particularly as most gangmastery occurred in the grey economy 
beyond the purview of the AWB31; conversely, this freed the Union from its usual 
deference to the pursuit of ever-decreasing but guaranteed short-term gains, and 
allowed it to instead forge its own strategically and orientationally rejuvenatory path. 
So, it was not the power of agency, nor the passage of time, that determined when and 
where the Union acted in a rejuvenatory manner, but ultimately the nature of its 
operational domains’ distribution structures.  
 This brings us to an apparent contradiction. Since the 1970s the Farmworkers’ 
Union has been unaffected by some of the contingent environmental factors that have 
impinged upon voluntarist, strike-prone unions: the gradual outlawing of the closed 
shop made little practical difference to the Farmworkers’ Union for example. It would 
therefore be reasonable to expect that strategic actions would have had a greater 
influence over the Union’s identity, in comparison to the mainstream Movement’s. 
However, it appears that the natures of the Union’s operational domains have enjoyed 
a highly determinant, albeit covert, influence over the Union’s apparently free-chosen 
strategic actions. Thus, at this stage of analysis it appears that I overvalued the 
influence and importance of strategic actions in my introduction, and that in practice 
these are, in the Union’s case at least, more of a mirage, ultimately dictated by a 
body’s framing environment. This finding is further discussed in the following 
section.  
However, before we move on we must address a further nuanced detail that 
this above finding reveals regarding agricultural employers’, and the state’s, role in 
the Union’s partial rejuvenation. I have shown how continuing guarantees of short-
term incentives have prevented a change from the Union in its principle operating 
domain – that on and around the AWB. Again remember: this was not an organic 
arena; while a wage mechanisms was originally, regularly and consistently demanded 
for by the Union, this regime was ultimately imposed on the industry and maintained 
by the state, largely with the support of agricultural Capital, until very recently at 
least. By creating this approximation of voluntarism, which guaranteed at least some 
benefits for the Union’s traditional constituents, the state was once complicit in the 
causal mechanisms that has maintained the Union’s long-term pre-rejuvenatory 
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31 The Landworker, February 1983.  
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subordination of precarity-prone workers: seeking stability in the industry, the state 
seemed content, nay intent, on safeguarding an environment that implicitly 
encouraged the pacification and subordination of a stratified workforce, for a large 
part of our periodisation at least. Only governmental ideologies explicitly, rabidly, 
hostile to any and all forms of worker-pacifying mediation in industrial relations, 
made visible from the 1980s onwards, have meant that the state’s implicit sanctioning 
of subordination has diminished.  
This demonstrates a significant differentiation between the Union’s and wider 
Movement’s rejuvenations. There, in the wider economy, active governmental 
prohibitions on traditional, voluntarist forms of collective bargaining inadvertently 
helped force the onset of rejuvenatory tendencies, with the Movement moving away 
from a pre-rejuvenatory modus operandi significantly of its own design. 
Alternatively, in agriculture the state helped design, albeit with active Union support, 
the environmental conditions that created the Union’s pre-rejuvenatory Post-War 
modus operandi, and continued to help maintain many of the reward-dispensing 
regulative structures that demanded subordination on the part of the Union, until the 
1980s at any rate.  
Later the state sought, initially unsuccessfully and for its own non-altruistic 
purposes, to dismantle these regulative regimes found on the AWB. From then 
onwards, the Union required the support of employers when it fought, until recently 
successfully, to protect its meagre but guaranteed payoffs from the subordinatory 
AWB: it was the strategic actions of employers that helped maintain this operational 
domain’s institutional structures in the face of state hostility. The agricultural 
employers’ near constant baseline support for the Board, seen until the very last 
decade of our periodisation, suggests a further finding: before the introduction of the 
NMW helped convince agricultural employers that the future of agricultural 
profitability could be secured without direct Union involvement of any sort, farmers 
were among the key protectorates of the Board, despite their vocal participation in the 
arms race of dissatisfaction; supportive, and purposefully protective, of regulatory 
controls that demanded, through the guarantee of rewards, a stabilising and 
subordinatory orientation from the resource-poor Union. One can say therefore that 
employers played a direct role in the continued maintenance and propagation of 
subordination on the part of the Union. This finding matches a trend earlier 
recognised with regard to employers in multiple national economy, who have been 
found to have been hegemonically supportive of their self-created regimes of 
voluntary collective bargaining in the Post-War Era and before: embracers and 
encouragers of the stabilising, or perhaps that should be pacifying via divisive 
subordinating, duties performed by the Movement.32  
So in summary: typical effects of the national but multifaceted cascade of 
decline, which affected agriculture in a similar, if slightly augmented, manner as it did 
the wider economy, forced a rejuvenation of the Farmworkers’ Union in much the 
same manner as it did of the wider Movement. Rising unemployment, contractual 
reconfigurations and declines in membership densities and resources necessitated a 
change from the self-interested Union and Movement alike. However, the guarantee 
of short-term rewards, no matter how slight, prevented the resource-poor and hence 
conservative Union from rejuvenating in several of its key operational domains, often 
to the relief of agricultural employers. Likewise, we can see that the state, before the 
commencement and during the earlier stages of our periodisation, was more complicit 
                                                
32 Cf. Taylor, Workers and the New Depression. 
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in constructing certain regulative arenas that encouraged pre-rejuvenatory orientations 
from the resource-poor Union, in comparison to its lesser role in constructing the 
wider economy’s Post-War industrial environment.  
These issues allow us to locate the direct influence of the state’s, and 
employers’, strategic actions in the causal mechanisms that have helped determine the 
Union’s continually evolving, and sometimes divisive, relationship with precarity-
prone workers. Indeed, we have found some partial culprits in the mystery as to why 
my initial theoretical postulations have been disproven by the historic record: 
agriculture’s once-idiosyncratic environment may have prematurely demanded 
consistently rejuvenatoryesque orientations from the Union, as I predicted, were it not 
for a state once keen in artificially stabilising the sector, and employers appreciative 
of the potentials for profit extraction that such a stabilisation brought.  
 
 Having answered this thesis’ principle research question – that is, the Union’s 
actions were not significantly differentiated from the mainstream Movement’s partial 
and incomplete journey toward rejuvenation, except for its early usage of a legal 
strategy, due to the fact that limited but guaranteed incentives, offered by pre-existent 
but devisive institutional structures, proved too enticing to disconnect from for the 
resource deficient Union – it is now time to study how these findings could be of 
value to the Farmworkers’ Union and its continuing operations. 
 
3. Implications of Analysis for the Farmworkers’ Union. 
  
  A first point to underline is the fact that unless decisive action is made, 
abolition of the AWB could prove disastrous, for the Farmworkers’ Union and 
significant numbers of the agricultural workforce alike. While the Union has 
struggled to secure many of its desired outcomes due to the Board’s operating 
environment, and has been forced to adopt a subordinatory orientation as a rational 
response to the incentives and barriers which this environment has erected, some truly 
important provisions have been secured through the AWB. Abolition will remove 
legal underwritings, disproportionately but certainly not exclusively enjoyed by 
relatively privileged members of the workforce, regarding overtime payments, 
holiday and sick pay, on-call and dog allowances, accommodation offsets and 
bereavement payments. Furthermore, unheralded provisions of the AWB secure the 
legal right to paid time off for training for many farmworkers. While the Union has 
only secured a few of these provisions for the most precarity-prone workers covered 
by the AWB, and even less so for workers in the grey market, such guarantees 
certainly reduce the precarity-levels of others: again, the aristocracy of agricultural 
labour is a precarity-prone aristocracy indeed, and the imminent threat of abolition 
leaves a relatively unorganised workforce facing the demands of the New Agricultural 
Economy unprotected.  
Precarity will likely increase throughout the industry as a result of abolition, 
and there is certainly no conciliatory forecasts of improvements in the remunerations 
of the most precarity-prone in the industry. Antecedents of the Farmworkers’ Union 
campaigned for the establishment of an AWB as early as 1890, figuring that with 
agriculture’s scattered and isolated labour force, standard manifestations of industrial 
relations were never likely to produce significant improvements in wages and 
conditions.33 Judging by the effects of the staggered abolition of the Wages Councils, 
                                                
33 National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, Outlook for Agriculture, pg. 19. 
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and the fortunes of urban unions operating in the New Economy, agricultural 
unionism in the Twenty-First Century’s New Agricultural Economy is going to have 
to again grapple with these very same problems as before.   
 Therefore, for the Farmworkers’ Union facing the imminent extinction of the 
principle arena of contention in which it has operated in for the last nine decades, the 
need for it to assess the effectiveness and value of alternative strategic approaches is 
all the more urgent. However, analysis gives reason for hope. Despite the Union’s 
best attempts on the Board, we have seen how an average farmworker has continued 
to face extreme remunerationary hardships, even in the latter years of our 
periodisation. Accentuating this destitution for many has been the fact that the 
Farmworkers’ Union’s often subordinatory orientation on and around the AWB helps 
produce and maintain large variations within this general poverty, to the immediate 
short-term detriment of the most precarity-prone in the industry, and the long-term 
detriment of all, as employers are encouraged to undercut and replace the contracts of 
relatively protected workers. So, while the AWB has warded off some of the worst 
aspects of precarity for agriculture’s aristocracy of labour, it has hindered the 
development of innovative and novel strategies that could combat precarity for a 
wider pool of workers in a more effective manner. Its abolition could alternatively 
prompt the Union’s understandably conservative strategists to act in a more decisive 
manner. The short-term disruptions caused by the AWB’s abolition could likewise 
elicit fundamental orientational changes from the Union, which may improve the 
efficacy and scope of its actions in the process. 
 Again, new economic deconstructions of societal infrastructures have hit 
working rural communities hard. In many ways “agricultural workers are more 
isolated now than at the time of the 1948 Agricultural Wages Act, when dozens of 
farm workers would have lived in a village, with a pub to call their own and with 
members of their extended families working in the industry… the majority of farm 
workers still live and work in isolated rural areas… (and) urban visitor to a rural area 
is soon conscious of the second-class internet provision and patchy mobile 
coverage”.34 Innovation is needed in such an environment: fortuitously, analysis 
shows that once forced to innovate by exonerating circumstances, the Union has been 
adept at securing far reaching, albeit not cure all, restructurings of agriculture’s 
regulative environment. As the Farmworkers’ Union’s experiences with gangmastery 
demonstrate, the Union has at times been surprisingly agile when backed into a corner 
and forced to act without the benefit of a pre-rejuvenatory script.  
 
 We must now ask how the Union can guarantee such agility on a practical 
basis. I would suggest, for a start, that the Union would be well advised to embrace 
the highly successful role it has come to play in the regulation of gangmastery, and 
further encourage its knowledgeable and experienced lay members to compliment the 
shoestring operations of the GLA with their expertise: to play the role of informants 
in the hybrid public/private regulative institutions that have built up in and around the 
Authority. The successes of the Union’s actions regarding gangmastery, and the 
earlier failure of Link Up, suggest that the Union could facilitate this encouragement 
by reasserting the importance of its earlier incarnations’ hierarchical branch 
structures, so as to better foster a communicative approach to unionism and boost the 
Union’s, and Unite’s, central offices’ perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the rank-
                                                
34 Holland of Unite, Unite’s Response to the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs 
Consultation on the Abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board (AWB) for England and Wales. 
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and-file, ensuring a deep level of participation from all unionists. This would reduce 
precarity in the ganged agricultural workforce, and help deny gangmasters the ability 
to undermine statutorily regulated labour relations in the process,35 thereby 
buttressing agricultural wages for a while at least.  
 
 Further ramifications can be learnt from, and reverberatingly applied to, the 
Union’s experiences with gangmastery. It is possible to accuse the Union’s strategic 
deployments in this domain as running an idealised conception of orientational 
rejuvenation, in that the Union’s actions have until now relied heavily on the input of 
highly professionalised central office staff. While the Union broadly rejected Link 
Up’s imposition of a rejuvenatory augmentation of its orientations for exactly this 
reason, it is undeniable that the Union has been relatively detached from its own 
members in recent years, except for the aforementioned extraction of informational 
resources, but even more so from actual ganged labour. So, on and around the GLA it 
appears that many of the Farmworkers’ Union’s activities have been firmly of the 
servicing approach to unionism, with it failing to emphasise the need to actively bring 
ganged labourers into the Unions’ fold to assure a mutual protection of interests: 
indeed, the creation of the GLA has had no statistically significant national effect on 
the union density rates of ganged and informal agricultural labour.36 While 
undeniably effective in the short- medium-terms, one could perhaps accuse this 
service-heavy strategy of endangering the Union’s continued survival, if one could 
demonstrate that the Union was continuously failing to provide demonstrations to the 
agricultural workforce as to why now-increasingly average ganged farmworkers 
should motivate themselves to engage in collective organisation: an engagement all 
the more important now since the imminent abolition of the AWB indicates the near-
certain decentralisation of wage bargaining.  
 Numerous theoretical arguments, unrelated to the Union’s own strategic 
actions, can be given so as to explain why the Union’s performances regarding 
gangmastery have not resulted in an upsurge in union membership from the principle 
targets of such actions: issues of free-riders or Piorian agency for example.37 
                                                
35 Of course, from here on in this statutorily regulation will likely be conducted by Revenue and 
Customs – responsible as it is for enforcing the less NMW – rather than MAFF – responsible for 
enforcing the soon to be jettisoned AMW. N.B I do not want to give the impression that a worker paid 
at or around the NMW is a worker free from remuneratory precarity: NMW work is precarious work; 
however, grey and black market work is more precarious, and any regulative structures that help ensure 
payment at the former rather than the latter should be cautiously applauded. 
36 Kaufman, In Conversation with Robin Hinks. 
37 Piore argues that a sojourner’s imagined temporariness means a young worker, in the early stages of 
their migratory career, is likely to view work purely instrumentally, and therefore voluntarily enter 
labour relations of sub-standard quality that are unfilled by their native peers. Cf. Piore, Birds of 
Passage. N.B Employers certainly used such an explanation to justify the disproportional 
concentrations of migrants in ganged agriculture in the mid-2000s, and this argument does hold a grain 
of truth: certainly an unmistakably ‘Piorean’ demographic could be discerned in the work force found 
in British agriculture at the end of the 2000s; in 2009, of all first-time A8 migrants registered with the 
mandatory Workers Registration Scheme, 43% were aged between 18-24 years old, an dependent-free 
age-group more likely to voluntarily ‘downgrade’ their labour relations according to Piore’s theory; 
likewise, in a 2008-09 survey of this same migratory group, 83% of respondents cited the Piorian 
opportunity “to work and earn money” as their sole or principal motivatory reason to come to Britain. 
This evidence supports the notion that many A8 migrants in British agriculture have been Piorian in 
nature. Cf. Anderson et al., Fair Enough; Norfolk County Council and YMCA Norfolk, Food on the 
table, Unpublished, 2005, Dench et al., Employers’ Use of Migrant Labour; Anderson, British Jobs for 
British Workers?; Will Somerville and Madeleine Sumption, Immigration in the United Kingdom: The 
Recession and Beyond, London: Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2009, pg. 40; UK Border 
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However, by focusing its actions on seeking niches within governmental and private 
regulative structures, could it be argued that the Union has avoided the responsibility 
of organising migrant workers, and failed to secure its long-term survival in the 
process?  
 Certain isolated developments of the last decade indicate that this question 
should be answered in the negative. Instead, the Union’s initially service-centred 
approach to combating gangmastery has reshaped the industrial environment, slowly 
rendering it more conducive to supplementary organising approaches. Rather than 
sitting on one side of a dichotomous divide between servicing and organising activity, 
the Union has utilised one such approach to develop the other. This developmental 
encouragement has produced some noteworthy, albeit currently localised, results.  
For instance, in 2006, hundreds of migrant strawberry pickers in Herefordshire 
protested against the exploitative living and working conditions at S&A Produce – a 
high-intensity farm – first calling for, and then joining, a Union picket in what proved 
to become the single largest instance of agricultural direct action since the Great 
Norfolk Strike.38 Encouraged by, and in reaction to, this spontaneous picket of 
migrant workers, the Union entered into negotiations with S&A at the bequest of 
community-based migrant advocacy groups, with the Union dangling the offer of aid 
in a planning-permission process regarding the construction of worker 
accommodation as an incentive for participation.39 The injurious ramifications of the 
Great Norfolk Strike and latter Overtime Ban demonstrate the low utility of militant 
industrial action in the agricultural environment when used in isolation: but 
fortuitously for the picketing workers, we have seen that by 2006 the Union had 
opened an alternative channel of contention in the industry; after the growers failed to 
act on a number of their own initial rhetoric commitments, the Union bypassed S&A 
and publicly approached the chief buyers of the firm’s products – the supermarkets 
Sainsbury and Tesco – opening petitions in supermarket car parks to increase pressure 
on the buyers.40 The supermarkets launched their own investigations, which quickly 
brought S&A to the negotiating table once more. There, key issues of overnight 
accommodation, health and safety, bullying and worker harassment were discussed, 
and a far-reaching conciliatory agreement forged between the company and the 
Union.41 Following up on the case two years later, the Landworker found that this 
Union action, initiated by migrant workers and supported by professionalised services 
from the Union’s full-time staff, had led to “massive improvements” within the 
firm.42 Margaret Armstrong, local district organiser, found that “we are not seeing 
the…rogue agencies (and) excessive deductions for overcrowded accommodation 
(seen previously)”. In addition, workers were electing their own Union 
representatives, collective bargaining had been initiated, and key anti-union 
                                                                                                                                      
Agency, Accession Monitoring Report, May 2004-December 2008, London: HMSO, 2009, pg. 10; 
Ruhs, Greasing the Wheels of the Flexible Labour Market, pg. 11; Jayaweera and Anderson, Migrant 
Workers and Vulnerable Employment.  
38 The campaign of industrial action arose soon after several tens of A8 labourers found themselves 
summarily laid-off for the night at 1 a.m. Lacking the provision of transport back to their company-
supplied accommodation, these workers were forced to sleep in local woodland. This event 
exacerbated pre-existent tensions between management and workers within the firm, with the 
substandard caravans offered by the farm as accommodation proving the crux of many complaints. Cf. 
The Landworker, October/November 2006. 
39 Kaufman, In Conversation with Robin Hinks. 
40 The Landworker, December/January 2007. 
41 Ibid. 
42 The Landworker, February/March 2007. 
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managerial staff had been removed. Much of this new intra-firm regulative structure 
was manned by lay members of the Union, rather than full-timers, and central office 
held high hopes that this action would increase its national profile in difficult to reach 
precarity-prone groups, with news radiating out through the pre-existent migrant 
support networks that the Union had accessed, to a degree not seen before, as a result 
of its servicing-based actions: Chris Kaufman told the Landworker that “the message 
will now spread throughout agriculture and horticulture that organisation is the best 
way to ensure fair treatment wherever you come from”.43  
 Despite the fact that an increasing mechanisation and chemicalisation of the 
agricultural industry has further disempowered agricultural workers’ militant power 
resources in the post-1970s era, this spontaneous migrant agricultural worker 
militancy should not be too surprising when viewed from certain theoretical 
standpoints: empirical research shows that A8 migrants have been highly 
subordinated by employers across the British economy in the last few decades, and 
Kelly’s Mobilization Theory argues well that self-generating collective actions often 
stem from such employer actions, which generate consciousnesses of injustice and 
illegitimacy among workers.44 However, Kelly argues that unions, when pursuing co-
operative partnership approaches as the Farmworkers’ Union was perceptively doing 
within the ETI and GLA at the time, inhibit the development of such workplace-based 
industrial actions, as ideologies of common interests between Labour and Capital 
negate the capabilities and willingness of unionised and non-unionised labourers to 
resist employers.45  
Conversely, the action described above points to a different conclusion, one 
that gives the Farmworkers’ Union a reason to be self-congratulatory: by spending 
decades publicly advocating for migrant workers’ interests in its often apparently 
servicing and partnership-based dealings with the supply-chains of gangmastery, as it 
has done on and around the ETI then the GLA, the Union has raised its profile and 
perceived public legitimacy, and has come to give a general impression to the wider 
agricultural workforce that unionism matters for traditionally marginalised, 
unorganised groups of workers. True, the Union has concurrently done much to 
subordinate these same workers’ interests on and around the AWB, but this arena of 
contention is a far more private affair, with news of its dealings rarely reaching the 
non-specialist press.46 So, while most of the affected workers at S&A were employed 
directly with the grower, and therefore fell outside of the remit of the GLA, the Union 
earned credit from its GLA activity, which produced a conducive-to-unionism labour 
force, which in turn became the willing architect of a union action unseen in 
agriculture for numerous decades. So, while strategists “are still struggling at times to 
get (migrants and ganged workers) to buy into the Union”,47 its good practices on the 
GLA have produced an as yet slight but real “degree of success” in recent years.48 
Here, we can counter Kelly with Klanderman’s Resource Mobilization 
Theory, which posits that workers participate in organised activity when and where 
they are adequately convinced that their personal interests are in alignment with the 
                                                
43 Ibid.  
44 Cf. John Kelly, Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and Long Waves, 
London: Routledge, 1998. 
45 John Kelly, “Social Partnership Agreements in Britain: Labor Cooperation and Compliance”. In: 
Industrial Relations, 2004, 43 (1), pp. 267-292. 
46 Indeed, even the planned abolition of Britain’s oldest surviving statutory wage mechanism barely 
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47 The Landworker, January/February 2009. 
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collective organisation’s and are assured that their own participation in activity stands 
the chance of making a difference in achieving the collective body’s desired result49: 
perhaps counter-intuitively, the servicing and perceptively partnership-based 
approaches to national agricultural unionism seen from the Farmworkers’ Union, 
which were reinforced by further campaigning actions, helped convince S&A’s 
workforce of these points. This finding contradicts received wisdom derived from the 
Movement’s obsession with the issue of free-riders, but the Union’s servicing 
approach to unionism, which it used to foster such assurances, allowed for the 
subsequent organisation of precarity-prone groups of workers, and perhaps points to a 
post-AWB modus operandi.  
Such servicing approaches to unionism have certainly not been unique to the 
Farmworkers’ Union in the age of rejuvenation. However, in the operational domain 
of gangmastery the Union’s engagingly-orientated servicing approach to unionism has 
been differentiated from typical manifestations of this approach as seen from the 
mainstream Movement: in that the principle and immediate benefits of the Union’s 
approach were designed to be wrought by precarity-prone workers anticipated to 
hegemonically remain outside of the Union’s formal structures. Ganged workers, who 
gained a regulative body to safeguard their employment rights, directly felt the 
immediate benefits of the Farmworkers’ Union’s actions, while the Union’s 
membership only indirectly benefited, when gangmasters were curtailed from 
participating in their undercutting tendencies. We have seen how this approach had a 
supplementary capacity, in that it encouraged the subsequent organising of once 
unorganised workers. The Farmworkers’ Union could, then, be well advised to 
attempt a replication of such previous actions when continuing to operate in its 
increasingly hostile and still somewhat differentiated environment, rather than be 
tempted to adopt wholesale the now minutely researched rejuvenatory techniques as 
crafted by the mainstream Movement, which are coming to increasing prescribe 
upfront-organising approaches as founding principles in practice.50  
 
This is not the only lesson to be learnt from the Union’s actions regarding 
gangmastery. Clearly, the Union needs to develop strategies to cater for those 
workers, of all hues and backgrounds, who are soon to have the often-pitiful safety 
net of the AWB snatched from beneath their feet. Our analysis suggests that a focus 
on agriculture’s supply-chains, manifested through combinations of campaigning, 
servicing and partnership approaches, would offer an enticing avenue of further action 
for the Union, particularly if it were to snowball to create organising cultures within 
once unorganised groups: the supermarkets can, and should, be used again.  
There is no need for the supermarkets’ Union-imposed ethical complex to bear 
exclusively on perceptively foreign ganged labour. Indeed, the ugly labour-market 
nationalism that is being dredged up by Britain’s long recession of 2008 onwards 
could feasibly be seized by the Union, so as to sow the seeds of a regulative 
reformation that could win benefit’s for all workers in the industry. The Union, acting 
with great caution, could marshal the threat of a nationalist backlash against the 
supermarkets to force an extension of the ethical complex. Imagine: a Union-led 
campaign focussing on how the supermarkets’ oligarchic demands for decreased 
farm-gate costs risk the wholesale restructuring of agricultural labour relations, and 
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Socialogical Review, 1984, 49 (5), pp. 583-600. 
50 Cf. Heery et al., The TUC’s Organising Academy. 
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resultantly an increase in demand for Piorian migrant workers. Such a campaign could 
stand a good chance of igniting in British society, currently infested with discourses 
to the effect of ‘British jobs for British workers’.51  
While any hope of saving the AWB, or statutorily extending the legal purview 
and protections of the GLA, seem minimal in the current political climate, such a 
extension of the complex could allow the Union to enter into only-perceptively 
partnership-based negotiations with the supermarkets, pressing them to extend their 
oligarchic controls of supply-chains so as to privately regulate all agricultural wages, 
migrant and otherwise, in a less precarity-producing manner in the future, 
guaranteeing wage premiums above the legal but still-precarious NMW and those 
sub-rates paid in the New Agricultural Economy’s grey markets. Clearly, this 
suggested campaign would flirt with the proverbial dark side of pre-rejuvenatory 
unionism, with the Union juggling nationalist discourses and interactions with anti-
democratic oligarchic powers in its actions. However, if the experiences of 2,4,5,T 
and the GLA show us anything, it is that when the Union is freed from pre-
rejuvenatory patterns and forced to dare, it often wins. Economic nationalism and 
xenophobia are depressing but undeniable facts of Britain’s political-economy, and as 
long as the Union stands firm with a rejuvenatory orientation, there is no reason why 
these phenomena should not be crafted by the Union into tools, in order to reduce 
precarity for all, migrants and natives alike.  
 
 Further potential avenues of post-AWB engagements can be gleamed for the 
Union from recent developments regarding its own interactions with its traditionally 
chief opponent of contention – agricultural employers as represented by the NFU. The 
Union has a thousand and one fully legitimate complaints regarding this vicious 
standard-bearer of agricapitalism, and the Farmworkers’ Union must be 
understandably weary about its future interactions with the employers’ organisation 
after the climax of its most recent campaign to save the AWB. Numerous British 
unions have sought safety in the New Economy by aligning their interests with those 
of organised Capital, but as demonstrated by the abandonment of the NFU’s 
maintenance of the AWB, employers – theoretically capable of as much strategic 
action as their union counterparts and in receipt of significant financial and 
organisational resources – can easily turn apparent support into antipathy.  
 However, farmers and farmworkers have been brought together to an 
unprecedented degree throughout the course of our periodisation, for a number of 
reasons. For a start, the profits made by farmers from the selling off of agricultural 
housing to urbane weekenders has proved to be a double-edged sword: moneyed 
professionals have placed a new emphasis on preserving a romanticised, ‘unspoilt’ 
countryside; resultantly farmers have found their actions – once so readily sanctioned 
by standardly pro-farming political-economies – increasingly impinged upon, by 
influential outlanders preferring a tranquil, rather than working, environment. This 
shift in rural power-dynamics has, from the very outset of our periodisation, caused 
farmers to forge deeper bonds with their workforce,52 due to an increased awareness 
of a commonality of geographies, interests and feelings.53 Such a tendency has been, 
until recently, slight, and farmers and farmworkers alike still find their chief 
adversary of contention in the other. However these contentious patterns have been 
dissolving more than ever in our most recent decades. 
                                                
51 Cf. Anderson, British Jobs for British Workers? 
52  Cf. Newby et al., Property, Paternalism and Power. 
53 Cf. Doreen Massey, Space, Place and Gender, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994. 
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 Allow me to further detail this partial dissolution. As demonstrated, when the 
Union created an ethical complex on the part of British supermarkets, the NFU was 
quick to lend its support to a system of first private, and then public, regulations of the 
industry. Through the identification and targeting of a common opponent – the 
supermarkets – these two disparate groups came to work in their closest, most cordial 
and most prolonged relationship in living memory.54 Likewise, farmers have come to 
work more closely with the Union in a perceptively differentiated operational domain, 
when a tessellation of common interests prompted the employers’ organisation to lend 
its support to the Union’s failed attempts at creating URHSRs in the industry.  
 These patterns give rise to the idea that the Union could be well advised to 
forge stronger links with employers in the New Agricultural Economy, or at least with 
those in the lower stretches of agricultural supply-chains. This theoretical partnership 
approach could go deeper than the only superficially partnership-based approach that 
the Union has utilised with regards to the supermarkets on the ETI and GLA. There, 
cooperation has been underwritten, ultimately, by way of a mobilisation of a 
campaigning approach, used to threaten the possibility of consumer backlash: instead, 
true partnerships with non-retail agricultural employers could well win dividends for 
all, with our resource-squeezed workers’ organisation finding and identifying points 
of common benefit with an increasingly squeezed and embattled employer class, as 
represented through the NFU.  
 Transitions into new economies, agricultural and otherwise, represent new 
reconfigurations of capitalism. When this mode of production first spread across the 
globe all that was once solid melted into air, and social relations were thrown into a 
state of fundamental flux. Nonetheless, this evaporation was not permanent, and new 
solidities emerged, a principle category being the nature of class antagonisms. Indeed, 
classic Marxists would claim that structural conflicts between working and owning 
classes are among the few certainties of our mode of production. Now, however, 
societal waters are boiling again, and gaseous uncertainties again dominate our lived 
experiences of this mode of production: while the human geographies of agricultural 
production ‘naturally’ produced ingrained antagonisms between agricultural owners 
and workers in the fields of Britain for the bulk of the Twentieth Century, in our 
current epoch of new economic flux it could be possible to locate enduring nodes of 
common interest between these often-hostile parties. 
 Such an approach could particularly benefit the Union in several key regards: 
while the Union has found utility in the threat of mobilising consumer interests when 
imposing an ethical complex on the supermarkets, producer-representing groups, such 
as the NFU, are likely “more effectively organised than those” formal and informal 
groups “which represent consumers”,55 even when they are embattled from forces 
higher up agricultural supply-chains: while the farmers’ increasing powerlessness in 
the face of the supermarkets’ pressures was in fact one of the prime causes for the 
widespread return of gangmastery, the NFU still enjoys substantial power resources,56 
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and a coordinated campaign of concerted actions, organised by the NFU and 
Farmworkers’ Union in conjunction, could benefit farmers and precarity-prone 
workers alike, in an efficient and rejuvenatory manner.  
 This development would certainly go against the general flow of rejuvenatory 
developments as they have unfolded in practice in Britain over the last several 
decades. While partnership has been academically identified as a signifier of one form 
of rejuvenation, joint private regulations of industry, conducted between employers 
and workers, have been markedly weakened and replaced, if at all, by legal 
regulations since the 1970s.57 However, the Union cannot rely exclusively on its 
legal-minded operations in the future; if the cascade of decline has shown us one 
thing, it is that environments created and maintained by the state cannot be expected 
to remain stable over a prolonged period of time; nor should the Union remain forever 
confident in its current unsupported ability to maintain a precarity-reducing ethical 
complex on the part of the supermarkets, particularly in our current era of prolonged 
economic stagnation, which could be seen to affect the probability of consumers 
mobilising in an essentially altruistic manner; instead, and in addition to these 
strategies, the Farmworker’s Union could be well advised to forge deeper connections 
than it ever has before with the NFU.  
 Excepting cases regarding life-long learning opportunities, when and where 
such partnership approaches have emerged in the past four decades they have usually 
been reserved by unions containing relatively marketable workers,58 seeking divisive, 
orientationally pre-rejuvenatory protections against economic restructurings. Yet a 
strengthening of the already-existing, albeit embryonic and contested, cordial 
relationships found between the resource-deficient Farmworkers’ Union and hard-
pressed agricultural employers within the NFU could provide an insurance policy 
against future negative developments in the state’s legal, and supermarkets’ private, 
regulations of the industry, which have previously been secured for orientationally 
rejuvenatory purposes by the Union.  
 There are several imaginable ways in which such a development could occur, 
and several discursive themes with which the two could unite in the name of. Perhaps 
the greatest utility could be wrought from a combined series of actions focussing on 
the matter of food security. Popular academic works, such as Beddington’s “perfect 
storm” hypothesis – which posits that a triptych of energy, food and water shortages 
will be creating problems of unprecedented proportions, for the UK and the world, by 
203059 – are already beginning to brought to the British public’s attentions. One could 
imagine a usurpation of such a narrative, with the NFU and Union propagating a dual-
campaign aimed at increasing the public’s support for front-line employers and 
farmworkers in the industry, for the hypothetical national good: if consumers and 
politicians could be persuaded that the long-term survival of the UK’s agricultural 
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sector was literally a matter of (their own) life or death, the oligarchic tendencies of 
the supermarkets could be kept in check in the name of self-sufficiency.  
 In fact, the Union has, in recent years, been at pains to point out that while 
“food security is a major political issue facing all countries”, “the resilience of the 
UK’s food security is (particularly) poor, as we are so dependent on imports”.60 
Indeed, the lesson laid out in the preceding pages is not really a lesson needed to be 
learnt by the Union at all: in its latest campaign to save both the AWB and the more 
abstract notion of “rural Britain”, the Union was vocally calling for “a broad alliance” 
of rural interests to combat the government’s “senseless vandalism”61; unfortunately 
for the Farmworkers, at that time the NFU turned turncoat and broke ranks with the 
Union, helping to dismantle the AWB in the process; the Union has made the call for 
greater cooperation between the two bodies, and while it could be well advised to 
repeat such calls with frequency, it is now up to the farmers to respond in the positive. 
  
 This brings us to another pertinent point. It is not just employers that the 
Union could develop, and actually has been developing, deeper links with. One of the 
Union’s greatest fears, before the TGWU merger, was that its long-crafted 
agricultural voice would be diluted by less specialist urban voices. However, while it 
is true that the TGWU acted in a poor manner regarding the agricultural voice in 
numerous ways – amalgamating branches prior to the initialisation of Link Up for 
example –the hegemonic core of the Farmworkers’ Union came to regard the merger, 
and its de facto consolidation of union interests, as a positive long-term development 
for agricultural unionism. 
 Perhaps the greatest testament to this acceptance of the widening of the 
Union’s immediate internal structures is seen in the fact that, 25 years after the 
TGWU merger, there was remarkably little opposition from the now renamed Rural, 
Agricultural and Allied Worker national Trade Group regarding the merging of the 
TGWU and the general union Amicus to form the ‘super-union’ Unite.62 Facing a 
financial crisis in the early to mid-2000s, the TGWU sought to amalgamate further in 
order to strengthen itself and the Movement. Many of the vindicatory arguments 
offered by supporters of the move were explicitly rejuvenatory in regards to the 
proposed plan’s anticipated effects on orientations and strategies.63 However, such 
proposals, which required the Farmworkers’ Union become one of 23 highly disparate 
national trade groups, should have produced many the same concerns regarding the 
dilution of the agricultural voice as the planned TGWU merge had done previously. 
Nonetheless, the RAAW TG’s Executive Committee was proactively supportive of 
such a move this time round: Teresa McKay, the RAAW TG’s Secretary at the time, 
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stated unequivocally that the merger would create “a stronger fighting union for all”, 
presenting it as “the opportunity for us to stand together to fight for the socialist 
society”.64  Likewise, a brief perusal of relevant Landworkers’ letter pages reveals a 
far lesser degree of lay member uneasiness in comparison to the run up to the 1983 
merger: most correspondents’ ascribed to the argument put forward by Chris 
Kaufman, in that a radically enlarged union “will give rural workers a stronger voice”, 
while still allowing a large degree of autonomy for the farmworkers.65   
 With this enthusiasm, the Farmworkers’ Union and wider Movement seem to 
have partially adopted a once widely existent mode of union action, most typical of 
the North American tradition, no stranger itself to hostile economic circumstances: we 
are perhaps seeing the groundwork laid for the re-emergence of the concept of ‘One 
Big Union(ism)’. This concept first fully actualised itself when and where the North 
American Movement was dominated by often highly exclusionary craft unions, 
openly hostile towards numerous groups of precarity-prone workers: The Industrial 
Workers of the World Union emerged within and in reaction to this environment, at 
the turn of the Twentieth Century. Avoiding compartmentalisations along 
occupational and industrial lines, the body subscribed to the slogan ‘an injury to one 
is an injury to all’: other groups soon emerged with the same principles in North 
America, and elsewhere, including the UK. The concept of One Big Union was 
purposefully grassroots orientated, militantly focussed and internationalist, and so one 
cannot claim that the Farmworkers’ Union’s acceptance of an ever greater 
interlocking with wider union bodies offers a direct parallel to this earlier strain of 
unionism.66 However, common tendencies exist: rather than fearing other unions and 
workers of the economy, an agreement is seemingly being reached throughout much 
of the British Movement that greater trans-economic cooperation between unions is a 
broadly positive development.  
 This slow move towards super-unionism, if not One Big Unionism, has won 
positive, and orientationally rejuvenatory, developments for the Farmworkers’ Union 
throughout our periodisation. Again, Chris Kaufman, the Union’s Secretary for much 
of the 1990s and 2000s, accepts that the greatest regulative change to have been 
secured by the Union in its recent, if not total, history – the creation and maintenance 
of the GLA – “couldn’t not have happened without the TGWU”, and that the 
Farmworkers’ Union’s operational capacities were improved again after its 
subsequent merger to form Unite.67 Innovation needs to be well supported, and in the 
New Agricultural Economy a formal amalgamation of interests secured vital financial 
and organisational supports for the Farmworkers’ Union.  
 Having said this, such an amalgamation needs not be formal or total in nature. 
This point is again best demonstrated with reference to the GLA: while the 
Farmworkers’ Union was at the helm of the campaign that won this body’s 
construction, multiple union representatives, from across the Movement, have sat on 
its Board; while deferent to the Farmworkers’ Union’s intimate knowledge regarding 
the system, these voices, appearing to represent a united voice of labour, have 
bolstered the Board’s perceived public legitimacy, helping to secure the Authority’s 
                                                
64 The Landworker, Febuary/March 2007. 
65 The Landworker, June/July 2003. 
66 Cf. William Trautmann, One Big Union, Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Company, 1913; Verity 
Bergmann, Revolutionary Industrial Unionism: The Industrial Workers of the World in Australia, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
67 Kaufmann, In Conversation with Robin Hinks. 
 260 
effectiveness.68 Again, the Farmworkers’ Union was no frontrunner down this 
particular rejuvenatory path – one which leads towards a synthesis of interests – but 
the Farmworkers’ initial explorations down it demonstrates the path’s suitability for 
our resource-deficient Union operating in a hostile environment, and potentially other 
bodies also. 
 Of course, certain provisos need to be attached to this finding. When regarding 
gangmastery, the TGWU respected pre-existent intra-union structures, which had 
been long-crafted by the Union in the agricultural environment: Transport House 
made good use of the Farmworkers’ Union’s traditional branch structure, utilising it 
as an investigative feedback mechanism. This is very much unlike the case when the 
Farmworkers’ Union’s foster-parent tried to force internal regulative changes upon it 
just prior to the commencement of Link Up: a campaign which, as we saw, won few 
of its forecast outcomes. So, while institutional change is inevitable after a merger, 
the Farmworkers’ Union has benefited most when such amalgamations have 
reincorporated, rather than dismantled, its pre-existent structures. So, One Big 
Unionism should be regarding as an aspirational end point for the Union, and by 
implication the Movement, but it is this one field where a small-c-conservatism could 
prove prudent for the Farmworkers’ Union, regardless of its orientational outlook.  
 
 It has not just been a closer integration with the wider Movement that has 
brought benefits for the Farmworkers’ Union during our periodisation: as mentioned, 
the Union has recently been successful in integrating itself with extra-Movement 
migrant support networks, such as in its actions with S&A Produce. On a directly 
related note, when imposing an ethical complex on the supermarkets the Union’s 
actions have closely mirrored the strategies of international NGOs: indeed, the first 
ETI – to which the British mission dedicated to issues of gangmastery is a direct 
descendent of – was formed through collaborations between states, multinational 
corporations and NGOs, all wholly external to international unionism. These two 
developments point towards a recommendable future path for the Union: one that has 
again been tentatively explored in recent decades.  
 Numerous rejuvenation theorists have found that one “weapon in the union 
movement’s armoury for reversing decline” to have (re-)emerged in recent decades 
has been that of “reciprocal community unionism”. “Rather than being based in 
communities, or acting for communities”, theorists describe how some unions have 
positioned themselves to act “with communities for social change”.69 This 
development can certainly be located with respect to some of the Farmworkers’ 
Union’s evolving actions: for example, in its campaigning attempts at saving the 
AWB, the Union came to increasingly recognise that a fusing of multiple interests, 
most being located externally to the Movement, “between people with common 
residence, common interests, common attachments or some other shared experience 
generating a sense of belonging”,70 offered at least the hope of securing 
redistributions of risks and benefits in society, to the common benefit of both the 
Union’s own members and the wider community. 
 A united rural voice could theoretically secure benefits for all in the rural 
environment. By working more closely with local groups – including extra-Movement 
worker advocacy bodies, NGOs and, indeed, front-line employers – and focusing on a 
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holistic range of issues, such as “race and gender equality, poverty, transport, regional 
policy, economic development, public services, social exclusion and the 
environment”,71 the Farmworkers’ Union could forge a new industrial position for 
itself in the New Agricultural Economy, “increase(ing) the public and political profile 
of trade unionism” in the process.72 Of course such a development would not be new: 
the Trade Councils of the TUC have tried to represent the Movement in the context of 
wider local affairs since 1868. However, the fostering of common interests could be 
one job that rural environments are, for once, more conductive to in comparison to 
urban geographies; precisely because of their overwhelming inhospitably, which is 
felt similarly by many otherwise disparate groups.  
 The Union has been partially aware of the value of such considerations for 
several decades: indeed, when the AAWNTG changed its name in 1992 to become 
the RAAW TG, it did so for a explicitly communal purpose; as the Union sought to 
discursively relocate itself away from the agricultural workplace, and link its 
struggles with wider civil societal issues.73 While such an action had an undeniable 
symbolic value, the Union’s efforts have not exclusively been confined to 
nomenclatorial introspection. I have mentioned how in trying to save the AWB the 
Union launched its Save Rural Britain campaign, which sought to combine the 
interests of its members – focused on the withdrawal of the AWB – with the interests 
of wider rural populations and local interest groups – focused on fighting government 
cuts in rural funding and hence amenities.74 While it failed to secure the Unions 
principle target, the campaign forged connections that could prove of use in its future 
actions.  
 One in fact saw such a stream of action activated earlier in the Union’s 
history, with its highly effective actions regarding 2,4,5,T: then, a seemingly united 
front formed of unified but disparate forces appeared to win the Union some of the 
greatest prizes in its history. Certainly, when fighting over 2,4,5,T, on behalf of the 
AWB, and indeed in preparation for the GLA, the Union found itself at the forefront 
of fully coherent, radical and sometimes effective social movements, which offered 
idealised visions of the rural environment that foresaw ceases in the exploitation of its 
inhabitants, farmworkers and otherwise. This tells us that the Farmworkers’ Union 
should not seek the support merely of One Big Union, but ‘One Big Society’: the 
mobilisation and support of the entirely of a social fabric that has been repeatedly, and 
savagely, ripped apart, but not destroyed, over centuries, by industrialisation, post-
industrialisation, Thatcherism and the drift from the land. 
 Ironically, such a call finds a mirror, and a bestower of unexpected legitimacy, 
in the most unlikely of quarters. Prescribing how the UK could survive the austerity 
policies it had planned, the Conservative Party idealised a similar notion of a Big 
Society as a flagship policy of their 2010 general election campaign, where societal 
groups are envisioned to play the roles once played by the rapidly withdrawing 
welfare state.75 While disingenuous and tokenistic, such an official governmental 
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ideology could be seized, augmented and realised by the Farmworkers’ Union acting 
in coalition with a whole host of societal groups in the rural environment, including 
and not limited to small-scale farmers, in order to protect the entirety of the rural 
population from the wrath of the economic and political storm currently ravaging the 
UK. 
 If such a development is to occur, the Union cannot expect other groups to 
automatically accept that a mutuality of interests exists between themselves and 
farmworkers. It must be a chief architect of such a readjustment: fortuitously it has 
already laid valuable foundations in its past actions. A perception still exists, among 
many civil societal groups, to the effect that much of the Movement is a self-
interested grouping committed to being “merely workplace-based organisations, 
addressing grievance and disciplinary difficulties”.76 Yet the Farmworkers’ Union has 
done much to disprove this widely made observation: true, many of the Union’s back-
room dealings on and around the AWB and regarding tied-cottaging have been highly 
divisive, but by appearing to act in the pursuit of the totality of the rural populations’ 
wellbeing in a highly publicised manner – as it did regarding the regulation of 2,4,5,T 
– and by appearing to place a particular emphasis on the needs of the most precarity-
prone in agriculture’s workforce – as it has been doing regarding gangmastery – the 
Union has built significant levels of legitimacy in the minds of other civic-minded 
societal organisations.77 Put simply: when it has displayed rejuvenatory orientations 
and strategies, the Union has been able to secure, to an extent, the long-term support 
of better resource-endowed organizations; for the Farmworkers’ Union at least, 
orientational rejuvenation seems to have had an inbuilt, amplifying karmic feedback 
mechanism. This finding provides all the more reasons for the Union to dedicate 
greater resources in the forging of new and innovative actions in the future. 
 
 The preceding pages of advice should increase the academic value of my 
study: however, could they have been a futile exercise in wishful thinking? A key 
finding of section two of this chapter is the implication that rejuvenation, for the 
Farmworkers’ Union at least, appears to be an automatic reaction – occurring 
naturally if and when all guaranteed payoffs are removed from the pre-existent 
structures of an operational domain. What then is the value of discussing how this 
thesis’ findings could help inform the Union’s strategic actions, when we find that the 
actual independence of such actions have been thrown seriously in doubt?  
 In answering this question, we find that while guaranteed payoffs – secured 
and underwritten by the state and employers – have instrumentally hindered 
rejuvenation in some cases, much responsibility for the Union’s continuing 
propagation of pre-rejuvenatory divisiveness has to ultimately be laid at the feet of the 
Union itself: in the following pages, we reinsert the Union’s agency back into our 
calculations. 
I posit that the lenses through which the Union has hegemonically viewed its 
operations have helped to variably encourage, and hinder, the development of fully-
fledged rejuvenation. Indeed, these lenses have produced the partial, incoherent and 
unconvincing patterns that typify both the Union’s and the mainstream Movement’s 
continuing journeys. When acting in a pre-rejuvenatory manner, the Union was, and 
is, prone to unquestionable accept, in its actual practices, the division of its actions 
into the discrete, theoretical operational domains that we have analytically utilised 
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throughout our study.78 So, when negotiating on the AWB for example, the Union has 
often viewed the issue of worker remuneration in isolation, focussing on securing 
settlements within a perceptively discrete operational domain and largely ignoring 
how issues of worker remuneration spill over into and affect aspects of agricultural 
production: as evidence of this trend, observe how, instead of pushing for a statutory 
restructuring of the AWB so that its legal remit could consider the effects of its orders 
on numerous facets of agricultural production and worker welfare, the Union instead 
invested its resources into debating the form of strictly remuneratory agricultural 
wage machinery; we see how the Union considered at great length the merits of, 
variable, the AWB, SIJCs and hypothetical, voluntary bipartite body, all tasked to 
narrowly discuss worker end-of-week wages in all but a few instances. Indeed, in the 
1980s the Union hegemonically rejected the imposition of a logic that sought to 
formally Link Up its remuneration-focussed actions with its other operational 
domains, albeit due to concerns regarding the encroachment of insensitive urban 
unionism into its traditional territories.   
 If the Union had instead accepted the holistic, interlinked nature of 
agricultural production in its entirety, the short-term but guaranteed rewards afforded 
by its subordinatory tendencies on the AWB, secured through pre-existent regulative 
structures, would have appeared to be a lot less enticing. Stratifying the agricultural 
workforce by the way of widening wage differentials – paid for by stallings in the 
most marginal rates – would not perceptively provide the Union guaranteed payoffs if 
it more closely considers how this affects the augmentation and down-grading of 
agricultural labour relations, for example.  
 The Union is in fact in possession of the ability to switch the lenses through 
which it considers agriculture. Indeed, a wide angled lens has been utilised on a 
number of occasions: by no means coincidentally in some of the Union’s most 
orientationally rejuvenatory and successful actions of the past four decades: the Union 
has at times recognised the holistic nature of precarity, seeing structures of control 
bleed across discursive divisions between agricultural domains. 
 An early example of this could be seen when the Union recognised that the 
tied-cottage system, a “millstone around the neck” of agricultures’ “captive labour 
force”, represented the “greatest single factor depressing farm wages”.79 In that 
instance, the Union analytically collapsed two operational domains – that of housing 
and remuneration – when considering its best course of action. Unfortunately for the 
most precarity-prone in the market, the lens the Union came to settle on was still 
rather narrow, and without adequately considering the effects of the continuation of 
privileged rents on other aspects of the agricultural environment, the Union was able 
to find an apparently acceptable, and guaranteed, subordinatory solution to its 
members’ problems. Later, when the Union’s rank-and-file’s fears of 2,4,5,T 
prompted a legal approach from the Union, a holistic interpretation to agricultural 
production prompted an effective, rejuvenatory, response from the Union. Industrial 
contaminants know no respect for the narrow confines of the workplace, and the 
realities of worker health and safety allowed the Union to realise the falseness of 
dichotomies between agricultural workplaces and the wider society: any chemical 
spray utilised in the field would have the potential to harm any rural inhabitant, and so 
it was senseless for the Union to compartmentalise its actions regarding safety at the 
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firm level and the rural quality of life issues. This openness of interpretation, made 
clear in the Union’s publications,80 allowed other societal groups, endowed with 
greater allocations of resources than the Union, to readily identify their stake in the 
Union’s actions, allowing for the successful snowballing of support and the eventual, 
if partial, restructuring of agrichemical regulations. Here, we can see that, beyond its 
normative value, a wide lens seems to win material benefits for the Union when 
utilised. 
 So, the Union is not incapably of seeing agriculture as a single, codified 
domain, in which the apparent incentives offered by subordinatory orientations and 
pre-existent regulative structures are revealed to be phantasmal, if not proactively 
counterproductive to the Union’s self-interested cause. Indeed, when the Labour 
Party’s NEC set up, in 1979, a Working Party on Rural Affairs, the Union’s three 
delegates in attendance actively resisted calls from the Party to produce a dedicated 
Minister, and Ministry, of Rural Affairs: arguing instead, ultimately unsuccessful, for 
a Rural Coordinating Minister, who would comment on how any and all pieces of 
governmental legislation affected the rural worker.81 Then, the Union was at pains to 
point out to others that the agricultural experience could not be boiled down to a 
narrow set of discrete issues.82 While never reaching hegemonic status within the 
Union, this will for holistic interpretation has radiated out from the Union at various 
points throughout our periodisation, and this willingness could certainly return, in a 
more hegemonic form, in the future. It is up to the strategic actions of the Union, its 
strategists and members, to fully embrace this reversal in dominant logics: to 
collective readjust the body’s aesthetics so as to encourage an appreciation of 
panoramic landscapes, rather than self-contained valuables. 
 We can see then that the Union does in fact hold, and has always held, the 
keys to its strategic and orientational rejuvenation. When an apparently discrete 
operational domain appears to offer guaranteed but subordinatory rewards through 
pre-existent regulative channels, rejuvenation has been prohibited, but conversely the 
Union is able to actively view systems of agricultural production without subscribing 
to such a demarcation of territories. If and when this strategic action has been 
performed, the Union’s apparently bona fide guaranteed rewards have oft been 
revealed to by false, and from this perspective rejuvenation – strategic and 
orientational – could be actively courted without restraint. Every cloud has a silver 
lining, and our current temporal moment provides an ideal opportunity for such a 
realignment: as the bright valuables offered by the AWB are forcibly removed from 
the Union’s grasp, it may come to hegemonically view its operating environment in a 
new light.  
 
 To summarise this section: the Farmworkers’ Union has reached a cross-
roads; while the abolition of the AWB could well throw the agricultural economy into 
a state of crisis, potentially increasing precarity for all, it could too prove a catalyst, 
allowing a more fully realised rejuvenation of the Union; this could in turn improve 
the effectiveness and scope of its actions, for the good of many in the industry. In this 
moment of crisis, the Union would do well to remember that it does need not to tie 
itself up in too many circles trying to replicate the normatively preferred, organising-
top-heavy models of rejuvenation found in the New Economy: as long as it enters into 
its contentions with an orientationally rejuvenated persona, and shows a respect for its 
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pre-existent internal institutional configurations, the Union seems to be well advised 
to invest in service-centred approaches to strategic rejuvenation, which can 
subsequently produce organic organising from newly appreciative precarity-prone 
groups. Such service centred action could focus on a oligarchic controllers of 
agricultural supply chains, so as to extend the private ethical complexes found at 
times in the industry already: a further encouragement of the Union’s rank-and-files’ 
journalistic capacities could further enhance this hybrid campaigning/servicing based, 
quasi-partnership approach. Likewise, a forging and deepening of its embraces with 
disempowered employers, the wider Movement and other societal actors, via the 
forging of truly partnership-based and reciprocal community unionism, would seem to 
be prudent for the Union, bearing in mind its current resources and operating 
environment. The preceding pieces of advice of course presume that the Union is 
enabled to act purposefully, despite its external institutional restraints. I believe this 
presumption to be warranted: even if, in the future, one or other of the Union’s 
operational domains appears to offer guaranteed but non-rejuvenatory rewards, the 
Union can, and should, analyse its environment in a more holistic manner, so as to 
reveal these rewards to be phantasmal and thus be freed to act in a novel and decisive 
manner. 
 
4. Implications of Analysis for the wider Movement. 
 
 In the introduction to this thesis I raised the notion that the mainstream 
Movement could treat the Farmworkers’ experiences as a Petri dish experiment, so as 
to assess the potential of various actions in the New Economy. However, during 
analysis I have not seen the earlier-realised but relatively stable approximate image of 
the New Economy that I expected to find in the agricultural environment. Resultantly, 
I found complementary, rather than premonitory, tendencies from the Farmworkers’ 
Union, in comparison to the tendencies of the wider Movement throughout our 
perodisation. As an example, one could certainly see the Union’s successful 2,4,5,T 
campaign mirrored in the wider British Movements’ instrumental role in the anti-Poll 
Tax movement of the only slightly later 1980s: like the issue of 2,4,5,T, this event 
“had the rare advantage of combining strong moral anger with material self-interest”, 
which facilitated the growth of a grand coalition of civil interests, centered around a 
hub of Union-orchestrated actions.83   
However, this discovery of complementary tendencies does not invalidate the 
applicable value of agricultural study. As shown, many of the Union’s experiences 
and actions have been unique – for several years the sector was the sole industry in 
Britain with statutory wage mechanisms, as an example – while its recent activities 
regarding gangmastery have been particularly noteworthy, in terms of their form and 
attained results: the Farmworkers’ Union’s actions have managed to secure and 
maintain one of the sole solid counter-directional resistancies to the ‘de-regulative’ 
flows that have come to typify the New Economy – that is to say the withdrawal of 
the state from proactive regulative structures in the economy.84 Other unions have 
been rejuvenatory, but the Farmworkers’ Union, while struggling in an especially 
hostile framing environment, has managed to operationalise its rejuvenation, in one 
narrow instance at least, in a particularly effective manner. Analysis of these 
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experiences can reveal several lessons that the mainstream Movement would be wise 
to learn.  
 First though, we must ask why these lessons are important. In answer: unions 
have the ability to play normatively positive roles in society; union activity has been 
linked to decreases in low-paid employment, the raising of households out of poverty 
and the compression of wage structures.85 Likewise, unionised British workers, 
particularly traditionally precarity-prone groups such as female workers and ethnic 
minorities,86 have been shown to enjoy substantial wage-premiums over their 
unorganised peers.87 Likewise unionism, if able to resist further wholesale 
reconfigurations of labour relations, could bring benefits for the whole nation: it has 
been well demonstrated that nations with large numbers of non-standard employment 
relations experience a reduction in welfare provisions.88 However, as we have seen, 
these benefits are in no way guaranteed from a Movement with an ignoble heritage 
towards numerous groups of precarity-prone workers.  
By linking lessons from the history of British unionism in general, and the 
Farmworkers’ Union in particular, one can learn what institutional situations and, 
enticingly, what strategic actions have enabled, or could enable, unions to wrought 
such benefits, concurrently for themselves and the most disadvantaged in society. The 
practical and normative value of such a study should be obvious, to those both 
internal and external to the national Movement: by analysing the effectiveness of the 
various strategies employed by the Farmworkers’ Union, strategists in the wider 
Movement could be enabled to make decisions regarding the best use of their 
increasingly limited resources, and “identify… space for realistic yet imaginative 
intervention”.89 This need to learn is intensely pressing in our contemporary period of 
recession and stagnation: it would be all too easy for unions to sacrifice their partially 
rediscovered orientations towards precarity-prone labour in defence, once again, of 
their traditional core constituents; this regression has been observed in other areas and 
periods of economic uncertainly,90 and needs to be avoided in ours.  
 Again, the experiences of the Farmworkers’ Union provide high-quality 
source materials of help in this endeavour. For one, the global recession of 2008 
onwards hit often-ganged sojourners and migrant labourers particularly hard91: 
however the Union’s chosen courses of action regarding gangmastery undoubtedly 
cushioned the impact of this in Britain agriculture; aspects of actions could, in 
principle, be adapted by other unions as part of their rejuvenatory processes. So, what 
can be learnt from the Farmworkers’ Union – from its relations with gangmastery, its 
other notable successes, but also its failures – that is applicable to the wider 
Movement? 
                                                
85 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Employment Outlook 2002, pg. 69-70. 
86 David Metcalf, Kristine Hansen and Andy Charlwood, Unions and the Sword of Justice: Unions and 
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Patterns. 
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Relations System, emphasis added. 
90 Heery, Trade Union Response to Agency Labour in Britain, pg. 441–442; Hazel Conley and Paul 
Stewart, “Representing Fixed-Term Workers: the Anatomy of a Trade Union Campaign”. In: Employee 
Relations, 2008, 30, pp. 515–533. 
91 Michael Fix, Demetrios Papademetriou, Jeanne Batalova, Aaron Terrazas, Serena Yi-Ying Lin and 
Michelle Mittelstadt, Migration and the Global Recession, London: Migration Policy Institute, 2009; 
Somerville and Sumption, Madeleine Immigration in the United Kingdom. 
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 For one, we have seen that the Farmworkers’ Union’s actions regarding 
gangmastery, while reliant on the activation of its members’ intelligence gathering 
skills, largely bypassed interaction with actual migrant labourers, in favour of 
cooperation with often community-based representative groups. Any desire of the 
Farmworkers’ Union to actually engage in direct interactions with ganged workers 
has been systematically curtailed, even while the Union has otherwise come to utilise 
a recognisable form of reciprocal community unionism. In a large part, this has been 
due to the isolation inherent in the agricultural environment, which has affected many 
in the industry: with such a high number of agricultural migrant workers spending the 
entirely of their usually brief sojourns in Britain within the physical confines of their 
workplaces, and isolated from the community at large, migrants have been often 
unable to build expansive personal networks in the rural environment; this 
deincentivised, for the Union, the act of accessing such networks for the purpose of 
migrant protection and advocacy.  
 As demonstrated, large swathes of the New Economy are becoming 
increasingly reminiscent of the agricultural landscape, with many precarity-prone 
workers physically and psychologically isolated from the community at large. For this 
reason the Farmworkers’ Union’s perceptively service-based course of action is 
noteworthy for union strategists seeking to make their body’s rejuvenation processes 
more coherent and effective. While perhaps intuitively going against normative 
conceptions of rejuvenation, this first lesson tells us that organising previously 
excluded groups is not the be all and end all of rejuvenation: investment in other 
actions, such as joint campaigns with representatives groups, could practically secure 
protections for workers still formally external to the Movement. 
A second lesson should clearly demonstrate, to the Movement, that one cannot 
simply ‘build rejuvenation and they will come’. If rejuvenatory ideals are imposed on 
a body in an alien manner, as they were with Link Up, they seem to have little chance 
of affecting long-term changes within the said body. Instead, rejuvenation must 
actively utilise the most useful aspects of a structure’s previous form. If anything this 
highlights the need for strategists specialised in trade union history in the designing of 
future-looking rejuvenatory strategies: rejuvenation does not have to be wholly 
organic and natural phenomena, it can be coaxed and groomed by strategic actions, 
but an appreciation of historic forms is clearly needed. 
 A third lesson, again extracted from the issue of gangmastery, suggests that a 
focus on those firms empowered with substantial private regulative influence over 
economic sectors could prove to be an advisable development for the Movement’s 
selection of sights of contention. As mentioned, much of the New Economy has been 
atomised in recent decades: 80% of employers subcontracted to some extent in 2008, 
with numbers increasing in the agricultural sector, but also other low waged 
industries.92 As these chains lengthen, so too do the opportunities for informality and 
precarity,93 and also invisibility of the part of the employer. Any union would likely 
be overwhelmed if it targeted only end-point individuals in such environments, now 
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93 Anderson and Rogaly 2005, Forced Labour and Migration to the UK. N.B such sub-contracted 
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endemic in the construction, contract cleaning and residential care sectors at the least. 
However, unions need not focus on these end-point labour suppliers and users: if they 
recognise the importance of private regulation, and forge strategies that seek to usurp 
their powers for the Movement’s own purposes – as the Farmworkers’ Union did with 
its creation of the supermarkets’ domestic ethical complex, as likewise did NGOs 
previously over international issues – precarity in these supply-chains could be 
reduced in practice. 
 To expand: while the New Economy has been atomised in theory, firms with 
dominant oligarchic tendencies still dominate many sectors in practice. Field-level 
agricultural employers of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s had very little choice not to 
construct highly precarious labour relations when wishing to operate as profit-
maximising enterprises, due to the pressures that the supermarkets’ private regulations 
were placing on their organisations.94 This narrative can readily been retold, but with 
a substitution of principle actors: so that the subject becomes small firms in the care 
sector, squeezed by oligarchic super-providers and resultantly forced to employ the 
usage of high street labour providers.95 A focus on the practices of those companies 
with oligarchic controls over economic sectors could prove beneficial for unions 
operating in such environments. Such a focus could incorporate elements of 
campaigning and quasi-partnership approaches, just as the Farmworkers’ Union did 
with the construction of the ETI and GLA – by using the emotive push-button issue of 
end-of-life care for old age pensioners, so as to mobilise the threat of public outrage 
in order to produce an ethical complex, for example.  
 To summarise this lesson: the Farmworkers’ Union’s experiences suggest that 
the Movement has to become more proactive in the atomised New Economy, and 
shift still-hegemonic patterns which still see unions focussing on the regulation of its 
own members’ own individual work-sites, so as to seek access points in the mixture 
of private and public regulative structures that shape every sector of the British 
economy.  
 A fourth lesson that could be learnt has been partially laid in the previous 
section of this chapter, when I discussed how the Farmworkers’s Union has been too 
prone to look through too narrow a lens when assessing it self-identified territories, 
treating its operational domains in isolation. As shown, this has overemphasised the 
value of short-term subordinatory benefits that have in reality created long-term 
losses, for the Union and agricultural workforce alike. This finding could well affect 
the wider Movement for the following reasons: one perfectly possible result of the 
cascade of decline may be a further atomisation, not just of the economy but also the 
Movement; the post-Oil Crisis economic restructuring, which have mostly destroyed 
the organised capabilities of those unions that the Post-War industrial economy had 
been inherently biased in favour of, have “render(ed) more transparent those 
differences of interests which were previous suppressed” within, and by, the 
Movement.96 This rendering threatens to rupture British unionism to the point that the 
singular noun, ‘the Movement’, seems anachronistic.  
 Unions may splinter off, following developmental paths leading towards ever 
divergent union types, each reminiscent of previously existent union models seen in 
                                                
94 Of course, and fortuitously for employers, successive governments had constructed a society in 
which it was relatively easy to construct and maintain such relations without penalty. 
95 These super-providers have themselves been buoyed by the Thatcherite ideology of compulsory 
tendering: where councils are forced to auction their services on an open market, awarding long-term 
contracts to the lowest bidder with little questioned asked.  
96 Hyman, Changing Trade Union Identities and Strategies, pg. 113. 
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Britain before the hegemonic dominance of voluntarist organisations in the Post-War 
Era: individual unions may, independently and regardless of others, focus on 
servicing the interests of individual workers as neo-friendly societies, or else embed, 
or entrap, themselves within the interests of the state, in the attempt to produce 
Continental style social-partnerships; alternatively individual unions may re-emerge 
from the milieu of the cascade of decline as campaigning social movements, 
mobilising to achieve mass support over a range of issues; or perhaps by forming 
productive coalitions with managers at the firm level, so as to produce company 
‘unions’.97  
 Judging by the Farmworkers’ Union’s experiences, this radical atomisation 
would likely be in the long-term aggregate disinterest of the economy’s whole 
workforce and Movement, even those unions that would initially wrought substantial 
benefits from creating sweet-heart deals with principle employers in their industry. 
We have seen how short-term subordination in narrowly perceived operational 
domains can secure short-term benefits for unions’ core constituents: see the securing 
of tied-tenants’ right to housing and the concurrent continuation of the privileged 
rents of the tied-cottage system, for example. However, such subordination, and 
purposeful compartmentalisation of activities, appears to ultimately lead to long-term 
pains for unions and their core constituents: see how the continuation of the tied-
cottage system persistently dampened all agricultural wages, to expand upon our 
previous example. A resistance to atomisation and a preference for holistic analysis 
appear then to be of crucial importance for unions operating in new economies, 
agricultural and otherwise.  
 A fostering of such a preference will require constant coaxing from strategists 
and the grass roots of the Movement for it to attain a hegemonic status, as central 
offices may find the apparent rewards offered by more discrete tactics too strong to 
resist. Normatively accepting that this course of action is desirable, one could aid this 
fostering by again prescribing the concept of One Big Union, and indeed One Big 
Society, as an aspiration ideal for the mainstream Movement. In this regard, the trend 
towards super-unions is encouraging, as a merging of the principles of craft and 
industrial unionisms, so as to simultaneously place an emphasis on inter-group 
communality and intra-firm and sectoral specialisms, could better provide for all 
workers in the Movement’s territory, precarity-prone and otherwise. 
 Of course, the construction of One Big Society cannot stop at the Movement’s 
outer limits. If our analysis has shown one thing, it is that the transition to new 
economies, agricultural and otherwise, has vaporised the ingrained positions of all 
manner of social actors, not just the unions. Such actors include small firms. Any 
dealings with such bodies must be performed with great caution – lacking human 
resource departments, such firms have come to practically enact some of the 
economy’s worst practices towards precarity-prone workers98: however, parallels can 
be made between their new economic experiences and that of the NFU’s in relation to 
gangmastery; small and atomised firms, lacking oligarchic powers, are inherently 
unstable and could theoretically welcome the support of the Movement, and curb their 
precarity-producing practices in return. Holistic thinking, on the part of the Movement 
and others, could lead to a forging of interests with these new and unlikely industrial 
allies. 
                                                
97 Ibid., pg. 134.  
98 Cf. TUC CoVE, Hard Work, Hidden Lives. 
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 With voluntarism all but dead, at least within new economic sectors, and with 
a once somewhat bright hope of the rejuvenating Movement – that of legalism – 
tempered by the election of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Government and the 
associated hostile change to the political-economy, such a unionism, combining 
aspects of partnership and campaigning approaches, seems to be a desirable end point 
for the Movement to strive towards. This commonly idealised end point should not 
necessarily lead to common ends in practice – indeed, pragmatic and environmentally 
specific novelties were key in securing the few notable victories of the agriculturalists 
– but it would allow for a continuation of holistic lens wearing by all within the 
Movement’s own borders.  
 
 While Britain’s ever-deeper forays into the New Economy continue to provide 
a near constant stream of reasons to be pessimistic regarding the fate of worker 
influence in industrial relations, some counter-flows can be found. In recent years the 
wider Movement has been making further tentative steps towards rejuvenation, 
particularly in the directions suggested by the third and fourth lessons outlined in this 
section, albeit in not as an effective manner as the Farmworkers’ Union has done so at 
times. For instance, while not organised solely by the Movement, several of the 
general unions, most notable Unison,99 have participated in the Living Wage 
Campaign. Based originally in London before spreading out across other cities, 
‘Citizens UK’, an umbrella organisation of over 30 community groups, including 
representatives from the Movement, have been campaigning since 2001 to guarantee 
low-waged workers premiums on top of, what the campaign identifies as, the 
unsatisfactory and precarity-producing NMW.100 This group’s tactics mirror the 
Farmworkers’ Actions in several ways. Firstly, in this group we can see a form of 
reciprocal community unionism being enacted, with several unions working in close 
proximity with multiple societal actors. Likewise, the campaign seeks to embed 
Citizens UK into the private regulation of the economy, à la the Union on the ETI: 
while lobbying multiple layers of government, the campaign has primarily focused on 
winning raises in wages through the securing the guarantees of employers; 
differentiated from the gentlemanly agreements of voluntarism, these guarantees have 
not been, when they have been, won in closed-door, firm or sectoral level collective 
bargaining, but through the mobilisation of public attentions and interest. This private 
institutional embedding, backed by the threat of consumer mobilisation, has wrought 
some successes: in its ten-years long operational lifespan, Citizen UK believes it has 
won over £70 million of premiums above the NMW, for low-waged workers normally 
external to the Movement and likely to have no collective bargaining agreement 
covering their firm.101 With the Farmworkers’ Union’s similar experiments in the 
New Agricultural Economy’s environment proving to be relatively successful in the 
lead up to and actualisation of the GLA, such a strategy seems to be a particularly 
lucrative avenue of future rejuvenatory actions from the Movement. A proper 
dedication of resources could see such a hybrid partnership/campaigning strategy, 
utilised in conjunction with inclusive and/or engaging orientations, become the 
Movement’s ‘new firm-level voluntarism’ – that is to say, its hegemonic strategy of 
contention, better suited to Britain’s new economic conditions.   
                                                
99 The self-avowed ‘Public Service Union’.  
100 To see a summary of the organisations work and aims, see the campaign’s continuously updating 
webpage, available at http://www.citizensuk.org/campaigns/living-wage-campaign/, last accessed 2nd 
September 2013. 
101 Ibid.  
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 Of course, such a prescription presumes that motivated unions will be 
consistently able to find willing allies in their intra-Movement peers and in the 
multiple, self-interested and strategically enabled actors existent in civil society. 
Again, analysis of the Farmworkers’ Union shows us that the selling of this salve to 
naturally suspicious non-union parties is a job that can be tackled by individual 
unions, the Movement and their combined strategic actions. At first glance, it appears 
that the Farmworkers’ Union was not in fact the best salesperson when it came to this 
job: relying on contingent, and often tragic, political events, such as Seveso and 
Morecambe Bay, to help sell its regulative elixirs. Yet hope is offered: contingent 
events form the basis of our socially constructed reality, mere random occurrences 
unfolding the maelstrom of time; these building blocks only come to hold the catalytic 
potential for change when they are politicised, turned into events of discursive 
importance by the strategic interactions of actors. The Farmworkers’ Union, and its 
actions regarding gangmastery both preceding and following Morecambe Bay, point 
to how the Movement could better invest its resources in future so as to better 
politicise reality. By activating its rank-and-file in an almost journalistic capacity, the 
Farmworkers’ Union was able to assure a constant stream of informational flows 
reached the general public regarding ganged labour relations, so that when a tragic 
event occurred, largely due to the exclusionary immigration policies of successive 
governments, the Union could conduct the following events so as to implement 
regulative regimes of its own design. The Movement could do likewise, embracing 
the importance of social dialogue so as to sell its narratives of the world, advertising 
its salves after pre-politicising events for its own purpose. Practically, this could 
involve the forging of deeper bonds with investigate journalists and informal societal 
information networks. 
 
 So to summarise how the experiences of the Farmworkers’ Union could help 
guide the future actions of the wider Movement. The Movement should change its 
orientations, and in practice its strategies, for the future benefit of itself, precarity-
prone workers and Britain’s wider society alike. Experiences of the Farmworkers’ 
Union tell us that the Movement’s practical strategic realignments could focus on 
finding niches in the private regulations of the economy, so as to acquire controls over 
subcontracting chains. The Farmworkers’ Union’s actions also suggest that an initial 
emphasis on service-based approaches could win practical rewards for the Movement 
and precarity-prone groups alike, despite the fact that they appear to run afoul of 
orientationally idealised notions of rejuvenation which emphasise the need to actively 
and deeply involve previously excluded workers in the Movement’s active affairs: as 
long as a sympathy for pre-existent union structures is shown, an increasing of the 
roles afforded to professionalised union staff is not a development that should be 
instinctively avoided in the future. To actualise these developments, the Movement 
could increase its intra- and extra-unionism bonds, so as to foster an oppositional Big 
Society, committed to resisting, rather than complementing, government-aided 
deconstructions of societal fabrics. The fostering of journalistic tendencies from 
within the Movement could help secure this development.  
 
5. Implications of Analysis for the Dutch Trade Union Movement. 
 
 To close this chapter, we turn now to look at what lessons the Dutch Trade 
Union Movement can take from our analyses of the British Farmworkers’ Union. 
Having demonstrated how closely interlinked the British agricultural sector has been 
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with the wider New Economy, there should be little doubt as to why our preceding 
section was relevant. However, doubts could be raised with regard to the applicability 
of this study’s findings to the Dutch context, when one recognises that radically 
divergent socio-economic institutions and trade union histories have produced an 
industrial environment in the Netherlands much dissimilar to Britain’s. 
 A theoretical school of use in demonstrating why such pressing questions must 
be raised is that of Varieties of Capitalism. This school differentiates modern national 
economies into, at least, two broad camps: the Liberal Market Economies (LMEs), 
such as the UK, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland, are said 
to be typified by notions of governmental non-intervention and neo-liberalism; while 
the Controlled Market Economies (CMEs), such as the Netherlands and many of its 
Continental Western European neighbours, are said to be still typified by closer 
governmental oversights of macro-economic policy.102 Within each idealised camp 
there is said to exist “a set of rules, formal or informal, that actors”, trade unions 
included, “generally follow, whether for normative, cognitive or material reasons”.103 
Accordingly, such rules would have helped structure the forms of reactions made by 
actors in the face of social-political restructurings: unions, along with other societal 
actors, are likely to have been guided, if not directed, to react in differentiated 
manners, due to the “different types of constraints and opportunities” afforded by 
each context.104  
 These differentiations are said to affect every aspect of economic life, 
including organised labour movements’ relationships with traditionally precarity-
prone groups of labourers. To expand: according to a wide body of theorists, 
economic restructurings have caused LMEs to react in a broadly ‘deregulative’ 
manner, with free-markets’ roles in macro and micro-economic policy decision-
making greatly expanded.105 This trend has generally forced unions in LMEs, 
including Britain, to reactively seek out new positions for themselves in radically 
restructured industrial arenas. Such searches have often prompted conscious, albeit 
partial, rejuvenatory contemplations from unions regarding their relations with 
traditionally precarity-prone groups of workers, such as migrant labourers, in the 
process.106 On the other hand, unions in CMEs, such as the Netherlands, have been 
assured relatively solid and continuing access to formal institutions of economic 
control. Seeking to protect their relatively embedded institutional positions against 
threats of disruptions, this has apparently encouraged CME based unions to espouse a 
firmer small-c-conservatism in comparison to their LME based peers.107   
 I must then ask then what, if any, lessons drawn from the Farmworkers’ 
Union’s experiences are relevant for Dutch unions, reacting to similar globalised 
trends,108 but in a highly differentiated institutional environment? To answer this 
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question, I begin by examining the Dutch Movement, and its reaction to post-1970s 
developments, in practice.  
 If one wanted to describe the contemporary Dutch Movement, its industrial 
environment, and its relationship with other societal actors, in a single word, that 
word would be ‘corporatism’. Close, state-sanctioned interactions between the unions 
and employers, often through their peak confederations, play a determinant role in the 
construction of Dutch macro and micro-economic policy. While we have seen how 
Britain had a short, and relatively shallow, corporatist experiment in the Post-War 
Era, this institutional embeddedness significantly differentiates the Dutch economy 
from the British. To illustrate this point: Britain has never had a tri-partite body with 
as central an institutional position as the 1950-established Social and Economic 
Council of the Netherlands (SER), which is legally tasked to advise the government 
on issues of social and economic policy109; likewise, the bipartite and privately 
operated Stichting van de Arbeid (the Dutch Foundation of Labour, or SvdA), 
composed of representatives from the major peak confederations, has, since 1945, 
provided a platform for expansive interactions between employers and unions the 
likes of which has simply never existed in the UK.110 These bodies, key institutional 
components of the Netherlands’ oft idealised “consultative economy”, must be 
viewed as nationally unique institutional arrangements, borne out of the Netherlands’ 
Post-War reconstructions.111 
 While its national arenas of contention are prime examples of the Netherlands’ 
consultative economy, one must recognise the deep and expansive “network of 
institutions”,112 which has been embedded across the Dutch economy for many 
decades, to properly appreciate the degree of differentiation between this industrial 
system and the UK’s. In the Netherlands, at the company and sectoral levels, 
employers and employees regularly, and for the most part non-combatively, interact 
over issues of “social funds, pension funds and training funds” through formal 
representative bodies.113 Such a network has produced an economy still typified by 
expansive collective agreements, but distinguished from the Post-War British 
landscape by the relative absence of voluntarism and the numerous interconnections 
found between collective agreement making processes and the state: unlike ever in the 
British context, the Dutch government, through the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment, has displayed a consistent willingness to extend collective bargaining 
agreements so as to cover the entirety of a industrial sector’s firms and workforce.114 
This has meant that, despite a sustained loss of membership numbers in the Dutch 
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Movement’s own personal cascade of decline, 85% of employees were covered by a 
union negotiated pay packet as of August 2010.115 
 Beyond the enhanced and formalised role of collective bargaining, the 
consultative economy has produced a few other significant features that place the 
Netherlands’ industrial relations system in sharp contrast to others, including the UK. 
For instance, from the 1980s onwards, employers have had to, in most instances, 
obtain a permit to dismiss standardly employed contractors.116 While some employers 
are increasing seeking escapist routes so as to avoid the extension of collective 
agreements, and others have expressed anger at the large macro- and micro-economic 
influence enjoyed by the Dutch Movement, which has always possessed a low-density 
rate by international standards, state investigations consistently find that employers 
are relatively content with such an embedded arrangement.117  
 These institutional arrangements have played their part in producing a 
perceptively placid union movement: between 2005-2009, only 5.7 working days per 
1,000 employees per year lost to strike action, a low figure compared to virtually all 
European nations,118 LME and CME. Other historical tendencies have further 
moulded the Dutch Movement into a rather unique configuration: having 
industrialised at a later date, the Dutch Movement did not inherit Britain’s craft-
heritage, due to the shorter transitional period that occurred between the eclipse of 
older modes of production and the rise industrial-capitalism.119 Resultantly, an 
“intangible concept of solidarity” has long been found between what would likely be 
competing union factions in the UK.120 This solidarity was originally manifested in 
the fact that the Dutch Movement developed as an industrial, rather than occupational 
system, typified by fraternal and egalitarian-orientated interconnections between 
relatively disparate groups of workers within the borders of the Movement.121 With 
privileged groups not organising separately, there has been a greater acceptance, on 
the part of Dutch aristocracies of labour, for far-reaching redistributive strategies 
when compared with the UK.122  
 So, we have ascertained that, due to the timing of the onset of industrial 
capitalism, the Dutch Movement developed with a less divisive orientational persona 
when compared to its British equivalent, at least with regards to its intra-Movement 
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affairs. Then, at least in part due to the fostering of psyches based on the notion of the 
common good after WWII, expansive statutory institutions have continued to 
privileged the Movement’s, and their employing counterparts’, roles in industrial 
policy making arena. We have seen how, theoretically at least, this could mean that 
the Dutch Movement has reacted to its own cascade of decline in a more conservative 
manner than the British.123 With these glaring differentiations, we must again ask how 
any lessons from the British agricultural sector could be applicable in the Dutch 
context.  
 To answer: despite what Varieties of Capitalism’s divergence theory suggests, 
some industrial aspects of the UK and Netherlands have become increasingly drawn 
together in recent decades, in reaction to nation’s cascade of decline. 
 A first parallel can be found in the declining numbers of unionists found in 
each nation. Just like how density rates had been consistently low in British 
agriculture preceding the onset of the cascade of decline, so too were they in the 
Netherlands, albeit for differentiated reasons: in the Netherlands’ due to the 
Movement’s perceived strengths, in British agriculture due to the Farmworkers’ 
Union institutional and resourceful weaknesses. As hinted at, the Dutch Movement’s 
historically ingrained position in industrial arenas perceptively lessened the necessity 
for it to maintain deep union density rates throughout the bulk of the Twentieth 
Century: with the Movement’s nodes of control being located far above individual 
shop floors, it has been historically complacent regarding its density rates124; so, at the 
outset of the 1970s, just 39% non-agricultural Dutch workers were in unions.125  
 This finding becomes a pattern when we observe the fortunes of the two 
movements as their cascades of declines progress. Just as the with our Farmworkers’ 
Union, and indeed the entirety of the British Movement, the Netherlands’ already low 
density rates fell greatly after the onset of the cascade of decline, largely due to 
restructurings and retreatings in the manufacturing sectors.126 Table Two 
demonstrates, the Dutch economy-wide density rate has been consistently lower than 
Britain’s, and has in fact been reliably more comparable to that of Britain’s 
agricultural sector, but the two national movements share a similar precipitous drop 
off rate in absolute terms. Likewise, the Dutch have responded to this collapse in its 
membership in a similar manner to the British Movement, and indeed the 
Farmworkers’ Union: by merging. A number of super-unions, similar in scope and 
size to Unite, such as the Federation Dutch Labour Movement (FNV), have emerged 
in the Netherlands, largely in reaction to sustained membership losses,127 with them 
being seen as a potential solution to the Movement’s multiplying problems of 
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organisational and financial viability, which have been created by the Dutch density 
declines which have been seen from the 1970s onwards.128  
 
Table Two: The UK and the Netherlands’ Declining Density Rates, 1974-1991. 
 
% of Full-Time Equivalent Workforce to be a Member of a 
Union 
Years The UK The Netherlands 
1974-1979 50 37 
1980-1985 48 31 
1986-1991 41 25 
Source: as citied in Visser, Trends in Union Membership.  
 
 Further reactive parallels are also evident, which potentially increase the value 
of cross-national observations, of Britain from the Netherlands. It is not just a decline 
in membership figures, and a trend towards amalgamation, that unite the two 
movement’s recent experiences. While still highly corporatist, a decentralisation of 
industrial relations has occurred in the Netherlands in recent decades, which certainly 
reflects the atomisation of industrial relations that has occurred Britain’s emergent 
New Economy since the 1970s, and which has been found in Britain’s agricultural 
sector for a significant period of time. 
 The 1982 Wassenaar Agreement, forged by the SER and supported by the 
SvdA symbolically initiated processes of decentralisation, by abandoning central state 
controls on wages. Reached in a tri-partite atmosphere of fear – regarding rising 
unemployment, decreasing international competitiveness, peaking industrial strife and 
increasing inflation129 – the agreement is now seen by all parties as an “irreversible” 
development in the Dutch industrial landscape.130 The SvdA’s subsequent New 
Course Agreements of 1993 further prioritised the importance of “tailor-made 
approach(es)” to industrial relations, allowing firm-level deviations from national 
and/or sectoral level collective agreements.131 Employees have likewise been 
encouraged to “mix-and-match”132 their now “à la carte” employment protections133: 
à la carte optioning is actualised via management/worker discussions – participated in 
by a firm’s management and a union, Work Council or individual employee – where 
issues regarding the management of working hours, and policies on absenteeism and 
illness, training and result-dependent remunerations are talked about, with a mind to 
“fine tune” a worker’s collective agreement. Such deviations have come to affect over 
60% of all collective agreements,134 and have implicitly underlined the sovereignty of 
individual workers in the Dutch economy, rather than unions.  
While the practical effects of these developments do not offer an exact parallel 
to the collapse of British voluntarism, this “organised decentralization” of industrial 
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relations,135 which has undoubtedly increased the role of company level industrial 
arenas at the expense of sectoral and national ones, represents a massive 
reorganisation of the Dutch industrial environment.136 This reorganisation certainly 
evokes the decline of multi-firm industrial relations that has been seen in the UK. 
Indeed, while industrial coordination has decreased in numerous CMEs since the 
1970s, albeit in a dynamic and multidirectional manner, when compared with other 
‘classic’ CMEs,137 the Netherlands has emerged from its economic restructurings 
relatively uncoordinated.138  
 This relative lack of coordination has caused a growth of phenomena typical 
of the British New Economy, and indeed the industrial environment of British 
agriculture: non-standard work. Both nations experienced a gradual but marked take-
up of non-standard employment in the 1970s,139 with traditionally precarity-prone 
groups, such as women and migrant workers, being disproportionately represented in 
such contracts.140 Economic crises of the latter 1970s and early 1980s caused further, 
unprecedented and economy-wide growths in numerous forms of non-standard work 
in the Netherlands, as a European wide trend for relaxing contract laws was 
embraced. These continuous growths – nurtured by the Wassenaar Agreement and 
other flexiblising policies agreed upon by the corporatist social partners141 – lasted up 
until the mid-1990s,142 after which a period of stabilisation, and normalisation, of 
non-standard work occurred.143  
 Such trends encompassed changes in the usage of temporary agency work, 
which had come to provide 2.8% of all full-time equivalent jobs by the 2000s144: this 
may seem small by international comparisons, but when one bears in mind that, 
between 1987 and 1996, the use of temporary agency workers increased three-fold, 
the amplified usage of such labour contracts becomes more noteworthy.145 Elsewhere, 
while the Netherlands usage of agency work is low by British standards, the 
Netherlands’ reliance on temporary contracts is particularly high, with 18.2% of full-
time equivalent work being conducted via such contractual forms as of 2008.146 The 
Netherlands is likewise a European leader in its usage of other forms of non-standard 
work: with 47% of the full-time equivalent workforce working on a part-time basis 
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for example, with this number increasing to over 75% of female workers.147 While 
such part-time arrangements suit many workers, over 40% of Dutch part-timers are 
discontent, working on this contract type primarily due to the lack of an alternative; a 
number not too far different from the 50% of British part-time workers in such a 
situation.148 A further non-standard contractual form – self-employment – has also 
increased massively in recent decades: a 67% increase in usage occurred between 
1996-2008 alone, with this growth, just as it has been in the UK, being especially 
pronounced in low-waged industries, such as the construction and care sectors.149 So, 
while preferred modes of non-standard work are differentiated between the UK and 
Netherlands, we can see that both nations are similar in that they have experienced 
significant augmentations of the standard employment contract in recent decades.  
 Such work in the Netherlands has been relatively precarity-prone when 
compared with standard work, with non-standard workers on aggregate earning less 
on pro rata bases,150 often excluded from fringe employment provisions such as 
pensions,151 denied access to training schemes designed to increase human capital,152 
barred from intra- and extra-firm career development opportunities,153 and being more 
likely to suffer in the wider political-economy.154 In sum then: Dutch work has 
become less standardised in recent decades, with often precarity-producing results for 
those workers employed on divergent contractual forms. Clearly, these trends mirror 
developments in the UK: these similarities further enhance the value of transnational 
study, between the Dutch environment, Britain, and its agricultural sector. 
 Just as the consistent precarity of non-standard work offers a reciprocal image 
between our two nations, it is in this area where one can find the most blatant parallels 
between the Dutch and British movements. While the Dutch Movement has been 
historically imbued by notions of solidarity towards workers within its own 
borders,155 its attitudes towards non-standard and precarity-prone workers excluded, 
sometimes purposefully, from the Movement have been far from consistently 
rejuvenatoryesque throughout our periodisation, much like the British Movement in 
fact. Throughout the 1970s most Dutch union officials reacted to the embryonic 
growth of non-standard work – at the time still unsanctified by the social partners – 
with hostility, linking such “workers to a Trojan Horse…(in that they) undermine(d) 
the foundations of long-term industrial relations with regard to rewards, freedom, 
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variety in work, job security, benefits, and other facilities”.156 Likewise, in the case of 
foreign labour, disproportionately represented in such relations, the Movement was 
outright exclusionary at the turn of the 1970s, with it pressing the government to 
restrict inflows of immigrant workers after the recession of 1966-67.157 Even in the 
1980s, when the Dutch started to consciously craft expansive policies regarding BME 
workers for the first time, the major unions, such as the FNV and CNV, spilt little ink 
formulating positions regarding new immigrants’ often precarious positions in the 
labour market, at a time when migrant unemployment was unprecedentedly high.158 
Clearly then, in the early years of our periodisation the Dutch Movement was 
hegemonically exclusionary, and pre-rejuvenatory, in its orientations towards several 
groupings of precarity-prone workers, in much the same manner as the British 
Movement, and indeed the Farmworkers’ Union: a difference in economy type did not 
produce an initial difference in orientations regarding such workers. 
 Such orientations came to have instrumental influence when the Dutch 
Movement came to participate, along with the other social partners, in the post-1970s 
restructurings of the Dutch economy. To expand: across the CMEs of Europe much of 
the recent discourses surrounding continuing economic reorganisations have centered 
around issues of “flexicurity”, with corporatist bodies seeking to balance the demands 
of Capital – for greater flexibility – and Labour – for greater employment 
protections.159 The Netherlands has had one of the most intense of these 
discussions,160 and much of it has congealed around the position of non-standard 
contractors in the labour market. Of course, we have already seen how the Dutch 
Movement soon proved to be a willing draughtsman of the Netherlands’ 
contemporary flexibilised economy, participating as it did as a corporatist partner in 
post-Wassener tripartism. Through a deeper analysis of aspects of this national 
discussion, we can see how, if it all, the Movement has shifted its orientations 
regarding often precarity-prone workers, largely external to its own borders, in recent 
years. 
 (Re)-Regulative negotiations, conducted by the corporatist partners of the SER 
and SvdA, have produced a new flexicurity regime in the Dutch economy.161 Key 
foundations to this new regime are the Placement of Personnel by Intermediaries Act 
of 1998 (WAADI) and the Wet Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid (Flexicurity Act) of 1999. 
The two bills fundamentally restructured the legislative controls that had, since the 
1960s, regulated the Netherlands’ use of temporary contractors, casual labour, and 
employment agency workers.162 The laws, forged in discussions on the SvdA at the 
request of the Dutch Government of the day, actually secured greater protections for 
many temporary workers: for one, the bills clarified that employers had full legal 
responsibility for their workers, even in the absence of a formal contract163; more so, 
temporary workers came to be considered as equal to standardly employed workers 
after a period of 6 months with a single employer, with the principle of equal pay and 
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rights upheld with only a few exceptions164; likewise, if and when an agency-supplied 
worker had spent 18 months with a single labour user, or 3 years with a labour 
supplier, they were newly guaranteed a permanent contract of employment; in 
addition, zero-hour contracts were discouraged economy-wide.165 On the other hand, 
flexibility was also increased: the need for temporary employment agencies to acquire 
licences was practically phased out of existence; and fixed-term workers could now 
be used for up to 36 months of continuous work, when previously a firm would be 
obliged to take on an agency worker full-time if it were to offer said worker two 
fixed-term contracts of employment within a period of 30 days.166 On aggregate, the 
protections offered to non-standard workers are still high by international, and 
certainly British, standards167: however, for the Dutch CME, this restructuring 
represented a significant loosening of contract law and a normalisation, though 
perhaps not a significant precaritisation, of non-standard work. 
 The Dutch unions were highly complicit in constructing this regulative 
regime, further foundations of which can be found in the New Course Agreement of 
1993.168 Investigations of this complicity reveal the self-motivated incentives offered 
to, and accepted by, the unions in return for their participation in such augmentations. 
To expand: as shown, Dutch employment laws allow, and in fact now encourage, the 
corporatist partners to forge agreements at the sectoral and/or firm level. These 
agreements are in fact allowed to run contrary to nationally prescribed statute 
norms.169 The unions have certainly utilised such provisions with regards to non-
standard work: most notably, the major unions – FNV, CNV, De Unie and LBV – 
have forged a series of collective agreements with temporary agency firms that, after 
mandatory extension, cover 94% of workers in such work170; elsewhere, firm level 
collective agreements regularly transgress the standards laid out by nationally 
applicability flexicurity laws.  
 Indeed, one of the principle reasons why the Movement was such an eager 
supporter of the passing of flexicurity laws171 was that the unions’ formal role in the 
negotiating of collective agreements remained unchallenged in practice172; in fact, the 
unions effectively conceded any veto they held over such policies in exchange for a 
strengthening of their positions in newly important shop-floor collective bargaining 
arenas.173 Here, we can see that the Movement accepted that it could not prevent the 
spread of non-standard contractual forms, but believed that it could substantially 
deviate from national employment laws via collective bargaining agreements for its 
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own purpose,174 namely, the preservation of its privileged position within the multi-
leveled mechanics of the corporatist state. 
 These deviations, constructed in tandem by profit-maximising employers and 
not particularly rejuvenated unions, often produce additional degrees of precarity for 
non-standardly, and indeed standardly, employed workers. To give some examples: in 
2010, 23% of long-tenured workers – those who had worked more than 10 continuous 
years for a single employer – had had their notice periods shortened below national 
statute norms by their localised collective agreement, while over 50% of fixed-term 
contract workers had had their probationary period raised above the statutorily 
‘mandatory’ 6 months.175 Overall, recent derivative negotiations show a strong 
tendency for “more flexibility for employers, that is, less security for workers”, 
particularly for the less marketable of the workforce.176 Such a pattern remained a 
constant for much of the 2000s177: the social partners’ precarity-producing usage of 
these provisions seems to be a lasting phenomenon. So, while it is undeniably true 
that the flexicurity regime of the Netherlands renders much precarity-prone work less 
precarious than its UK counterpart,178 Dutch unions have been readily prepared to 
allow the flexicurity debate to fall on the side of flexibility rather than security, in 
return for the maintenance of their internal corporatist position in the Dutch economy. 
With this flexibility most directly and negatively affecting the most precarity-prone 
workers in the industry, it is possible to argue that a subordinatory current of Dutch 
unionism exists, with regards to its orientations towards precarity-prone non-standard 
workers. 
 The unions’ subordinatory collusion in producing this regulative regime has 
not gone unnoticed. Several recent studies have looked at the effects of both the peak 
organisations’ creation of the corporatist flexicurity regime, and lower-level collective 
bargaining deviations, and found that non-standard workers are “very unimpressed” 
regarding the system’s new economic rules, and the “roles trade unions have taken up 
as participants in the social-economic consultation structure and in the organisation of 
social security”.179 As shown: in recent decades much of the Dutch industrial 
discourse has congealed around issues of flexibility and security, and methods with 
which to balance the interests of Capital and Labour180; regarding this discourse, a 
perception, growing in popularity within flexicurity’s new workforce, views the Dutch 
Movement as having been operating from a position of defence, and primarily if not 
exclusively in defence, of its traditional core workforce.181 This perception is not 
unwarranted: while an emphasis on regulation, and a slight but undeniable strain of 
inclusivity,182 have come to be found in the Dutch Movements’ orientation towards 
non-standard work, precarity-prone workers external to the Movement have not been 
a priority; not as a recruitment target nor as an object of unrepresentative 
                                                
174 SER, The Power of Consultancy, pg. 29. 
175 Schils and Houwing, Sectoral Variation in Collectively Agreed Employment Protection, pg. 148. 
176  Ibid.  
177 Ibid.  
178 SER, Industrial Relations and the Adaptability of the Dutch Economy, pg. 9.  
179 Ben Valkenburg and Harry Coenen, “Changing Trade Unionism in the Netherlands: a Critical 
Analysis”. In: Jeremy Waddington and Reiner Hoffmann (eds.), Trade unions in Europe. Facing 
Challenges and Searching for Solutions, Brussels: ETUI, 2000, pg. 402.. 
180 Luc Sels and Geert van Hootegem, “Seeking the Balance between Flexibility and Security: A Rising 
Issue in the Low Countries.” In: Work, Employment & Society, 2001, 15 (2), pp. 327–352. 
181 Richard Croucher and Chris Brewster, “Flexible Working Practices and the Trade Unions.” In: 
Employee Relations, 1998, 20 (5), pp. 443–452. 
182 To be discussed imminently.  
 282 
protection.183 
 The effects of such continuing hostilities, real and perceived, can be glimpsed 
in the membership patterns of the Dutch Movement. Table Three unpacks such 
patterns, so that we can see a large amount of similarities between the two movements 
under consideration: while the Dutch, well used to the trans-economic penetration of 
part-time workers, have maintained a relatively high density of part-time workers in 
comparison to the national density of full-time workers, it still struggles, like the UK 
and in fact more so, with the recruitment and retention of temporary workers. We can 
see then that, in both nations under consideration, orientational and strategic 
rejuvenations have been slight and partial. 
 
Table Three: Union Density Rates for Workers on Particularly Contractual Forms in 
the UK and Netherlands, 1992-2008. 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
The Netherlands          
Part-Time:  
12-20 Hours/Week 11 13 13 12 12 11 12 12 11 
Part-Time:  
20-35 Hours/Week 23 24 24 24 24 23 23 22 20 
Temporary Contract: 
(Full + Part-Time) 11 11 11 10 10 9 11 9 9 
Full-Time: 30 31 31 30 28 27 27 26 24 
The UK          
Part-Time: 22 21 20 20 21 21 21 21 22 
Temporary Contract:  
(Full + Part-Time) 23 21 20 19 19 19 17 17 17 
Full-Time: 40 38 35 33 32 32 32 31 30 
Source: Adapted from Vandaele and Leschke, Following the ‘Organising Model’ of 
British Unions?, pg. 14. 
 
 We must now ask whether this matters for the Dutch Movement: British 
unions, including the Farmworkers’s Union, only turned to better protect precarity-
prone workers when these actions were seen to better protect the core workforces’ 
interests; however, from its corporatist position, the Dutch Movement has helped 
build a system of regulative protections that, like many European economies, the UK 
included, disproportionately secures the interests of regular workers with permanent 
contracts184; if the Dutch have been, and are, able to preserve such a system, and its 
influence within it, perhaps there is no self-interested reason to better protect 
precarity-prone workers. It is in answer to this postulation where lessons from the 
Farmworkers’ Union, finally, come in useful.  
 The Dutch Movement, formally inclusive but with an underlying 
subordinatory tendency toward non-standard and precarity-prone work, has not been 
totally successful in its recent operations, even according to entirely non-normative 
and self-interested calculations. The Dutch Movement’s attempts at balancing 
increasing flexibility with a protection of all, but particularly core-, workers’ rights 
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have only had limited success.185 In part this has been due to a widening of the power 
deficit between the social partners,186 which has increased to the point that it could be 
said to partially resemble that found between the Farmworkers’ Union and NFU on 
the AWB. We can add that an inadequacy in the Movement’s internal structures has 
helped accentuate this differentiation: while the social partners, the unions included, 
have enacted a decentralisation of corporatist management regimes in recent decades, 
the internal structure of the Dutch Movement has not reacted in turn; the strongly 
service-orientated and centralised nature of previous union negotiations, seen 
manifested in the power of the Dutch peak confederations over their affiliated 
unions,187 have bred a passivity on the part of its members, rendering Dutch unionism 
inconducive to the now atomised scale of collective bargaining seen in the economy.  
 Furthermore, the Movement’s lack of density has started to bite into its power 
reserves, so as to endanger its ingrained position in society. The state’s enthusiasm for 
the mandatory extension of collective bargaining, highly regarded and valued by 
unions, has been repeatedly and with more frequency discussed in Parliament since 
the early 1990s, with many Dutch parliamentarians questioning the apparent 
democratic deficit found in allowing ‘unrepresentative’ worker organisations to veto 
national employment laws.188 Likewise, with a massively increasing total number of 
collective agreements found in the economy, inter-union competitions have partially 
schismed open the once notably fraternal Movement,189 threatening to create the 
fractured national structure that has long hindered the British Movement’s activities. 
This development has allowed firms to adopt supportive pocket-unions, permitting 
them to undermine previously existing collective understandings via the forging of 
further deviating agreements.190  
 Such developments, along with the Dutch economic slowdown and the 
tightening of its labour market, both seen since 2001,191 have hindered the 
Movement’s ability to secure satisfactory payoffs for itself and its members from its 
apparently conserved industrial position. To illustrate this: in 2002, nationally agreed 
wage ceilings were reintroduced into the economy for the first time in a decade, with 
firms’ pay rises limited to +2.5% of a firm’s cost increases becoming an economy-
wide norm. Then, in 2005, the social partners recommended their most conservatively 
fiscal plan for 20 years to government, prescribing nation wide pay freezes, or else 
only minimal increases, in worker remuneration192: the unions expected a precarity-
reducing relaxation of governmental austerity policies, and the dropping of various 
proposals regarding changes to the Dutch pension structure, in return for their support 
for such conservatism, yet the measures were considered so extreme, by many within 
the Movement, that the FNV held an unprecedented referendum on the matter, to 
which the majority of its member’s begrudgingly lent their support; despite this ballot, 
the plans hit a subsequent reef when no tripartite agreement could be met regarding 
retirement provisions; with the unions threatening to break ranks and seek 
unrestrained pay increases, the government threatened to desist from its practice of 
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extending collective agreements, and thereby encourage the undercutting of Union 
members.193 From this tale, we can see how the unions’ institutional niche has been 
compromised, and a greater degree of compulsion has entered into the corporatist 
dynamic: rather like Britain’s Farmworkers’ Union in some of its operational 
domains, the Dutch Movement risks becoming a prisoner to governmental actions. 
 So, the social partners have long justified the existence of the Netherlands’ 
corporatist structures, and their positions therein, due to their role in “creat(ing) 
economic stability” and “increase(ing) social prosperity”.194 However, the Movement, 
as it currently operates – uninviting to workers outside of its own borders and 
hegemonically focussed on formal consultation, not courting the activation of lay 
unionists, precarity-prone and otherwise195 – has inadvertently endangered this 
purpose.  
 It is here that lessons from the Farmworkers’ Union are applicable, though it 
must be pointed out that due to the Netherlands’ differentiated political-economy, the 
lessons it could take away from our case study is different from those applicable to 
the British. Heery and Adler argue that, historically, union movements have been 
more prone to invest their resources in organising activities in areas, or periods, 
typified by governmental policies of “union exclusion”: lacking internal access to 
systems of influence, excluded unions develop organising strategies as a counter to 
governmentally sanctified and codified powers.196 While the British Movement did 
enjoy a period of prolonged “insider status” in the Post-War Era,197 Britain never 
experienced the fully-fledged systems of social partnership as found in the 
Netherlands or elsewhere in Continental Europe: therefore it is not surprising that, 
compared with its Continental peers, the rejuvenating British Movement was a 
relatively early adopter of, and experimenter in, rejuvenatory organising 
approaches.198 Conversely, the Netherlands lags behind with such developments. So, 
while I found from the Farmworkers’ Union and the wider British Movement, when 
seeking to attract previously excluded groups of precarity-prone workers, should not 
be overly concerned with developing organising approaches as a first priority, as 
organising cultures, while clearly needed, were slowly being produced as a result of 
changes in union orientations and the resultant growths of perceived legitimacy, I 
would prescribe such actions as being of a more immediate, pressing concerns for the 
Dutch: further complacently would be dangerous here. 
 Again, I am not denying that, as it stands, numerous overlapping groups of 
non-standard and precarity-prone workers are better protected in the Dutch CME than 
they are in the British LME, but one can certainly accuse the Dutch Movement of not 
being dynamic enough in responding to the wider economic restructurings that have 
occurred in recent decades, and being too centralised in its continuing actions. When 
the Dutch Movement has realised that it needs to act beyond the confines of peak 
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negotiating arenas, the Movement has mostly sought to increase its strengths on 
individual shop floors, allowing for gross deviations from industrial standards, and 
therefore an atomisation of the workforce, in the process. While a decentralisation is 
needed, the Farmworkers’ Union’s successes, in a environment not too dissimilar 
from the Dutch industrial landscape, tell us that great benefits could be made from 
seeking to partially move Dutch unionism beyond these workplace based arena, and 
into the wider community. Such a relocation into the realm of reciprocal community 
unionism could help foster organising cultures within previously excluded groups, 
with workers being assured that the Movement’s interests were in alignment with 
their own, which would in turn increase Dutch unionisms power resources in its 
traditional operating arenas: a move into non-workplace arenas should not necessitate 
an abandonment of the Movement’s traditional terrain.  
 Suggesting that the Dutch Movement should behave in the manners described 
above is not simple an exercise in wishful thinking. Earlier I alluded to the fact that 
the Dutch Movement has contained an undeniable, albeit non-hegemonic, inclusive 
orientation towards precarity-prone workers in recent years.199 To give examples of 
this tendency: in the late 1990s the FNV enacted a series of special measures, 
designed to improve the status of immigrant unionists within the body’s internal 
structure. This policy lead to an increased, though still not proportional, 
representation of such workers in positions of responsibility within the union.200 
Elsewhere, emergent “islands of organising” have started to surface in the Dutch “sea 
of union services”.201 To expand: explicitly influenced by models developed in the 
UK and elsewhere, non-standard contractors have been identified as specific target 
groups by several unions in the last decade,202 with unions such as the FNV 
experimenting in cyber unionism and other techniques in an attempt to reach these 
often difficult to reach groups.203 While many of these outreach programmes have 
placed an overt emphasis on the array of services imparted to workers by way of their 
membership to a union,204 the FNV has recently increased its number of professional 
organisers, and visited its counterparts in the British and US movements seeking 
advice as to how to foster reciprocal community unionism in the cleaning sector.205 
Other green buds, indicating the development of organising cultures, include the 
FNV’s contemporary actions regarding seasonal agricultural workers of mostly 
migrant backgrounds.206 Such developments have disrupted several norms long found 
in the Dutch industrial landscape: a 2010 cleaners’ campaign organised by the FNV, 
having been directly influenced by Citizen UK’s usage of reciprocal union relations 
with community-based and religious groups,207 organically produced the largest 
Dutch strike since the 1930s, which affected sanitary services in the railways and 
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airports.208  
 These developments are encouraging: evidence from the Farmworkers’ Union 
suggests that such a fractalisation of strategy implies the growing presence of 
orientational change from within the Movement, with it widening its repertoire so as 
to better cater to the multifaceted needs of a diverse workforce. Again, evidence from 
the Farmworkers’ Union suggests that if this is the case, the Dutch Movement’s 
strategic actions’ efficiency could well be improved, so as to better serve itself and 
precarity-prone workers alike.  
 However, novelty brings risks, and many in the Dutch Movement are as yet 
unconvinced regarding the efficiency of such divergent forms of action, particularly 
as corporatism seems to offer such guaranteed rewards for the Movement’s core 
constituents: one of the lead organisers for the FNV admitted to Gumbrell-
McCormick in 2011 that the perceived risks of investing in the organising of 
previously excluded workers – seen to be liable to leave their job and/or union with 
little notice – were high, and resultantly it remained to be seen how much resources 
the unions would dedicate to such relatively high-cost strategies for members who 
“do not then remain in the union”.209  
 Again the lessons of the Farmworkers’ Union could come in useful here. For 
one, the Union’s relationship with gangmastery demonstrates how utility can be 
wrought by workers internal to a union from actions whose primary purposes are 
designed to be felt by workers anticipated to remain external to formal union borders.  
 However, a deeper lesson can likewise be drawn. Investigations through a 
certain lens, tinted with short-termism and discretism, would certainly view the logic 
of the above quoted FNV organiser to be valid: through such a lens, a shift in 
investments away from national, sectoral and firm level bureaucratic arenas into more 
intangible ones located within civil-society, and away from the direct servicing of 
relatively privileged and passive workers so as to encourage the organising of groups 
often external to the Movement, would certainly appear to represent a reduction in 
rewards for the self-interested and strategically enabled workers located close to the 
heart of the Dutch Movement. However, the Farmworkers’ Union’s (often negative) 
experiences highlight the pressing need for the Dutch Movement to holistically 
realign unionisms’ perceptions of the Dutch economy, so that perceptive divisions 
and territories – those between intra- and extra-workplace actions for example – 
collapse unto themselves. Such a change in lenses would allow those strategists intent 
on pushing through the orientational rejuvenation of the Dutch Movement to gain 
perceived legitimacy from other strategically enabled actors, increasing the likelihood 
of their already unfolding actions succeeding and multiplying in the future.  
 So to summarise this section: the Dutch economy is heavily differentiated 
from the British, with the former being a CME and the latter a LME; as is the 
institutional position of the Dutch Movement, which is deeply embedded into the 
corporatist regimes of the nation. However, the Dutch can extract some valuable 
lessons from the British Farmworkers. The Dutch Movement does not face plain 
sailings ahead: its institutional position is under threat from widening power 
discrepancies in society, a trend not helped by the collapse in its membership figures 
and its failure to decentralise its internal actions so as to complement the new 
economic norms it has itself helped create. In this environment, the Dutch could use 
all the allies it can get, but unfortunately, in trying to conserve its institutional 
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position, the Dutch Movement has subjugated the interests of precarity-prone groups 
of workers, damaging its perceived legitimacy and attractively in the process. So, for 
practical rather than normative purposes, the Dutch should reorietnate itself towards 
non-standard and precarity-prone workers. The experiences of the Farmworkers’ 
Union suggests that this could best occur in arenas found in civil society, via the 
forging of extra-Movement bonds. Likewise, readings of our case study reveals that 
the Dutch Movement should not overly worry itself if it were to propagate actions 
designed primarily with the interests of workers external to its borders in mind: 
analysis of the Farmworkers’ Union hints that internal workers could end up 
indirectly benefiting from such campaigns in due course. A final lesson again 
concerns perceptive lenses: in order to sell such an orientation change to sceptical 
factions, within itself and other actors in society, the Dutch Movement should 
collapse theoretically divisions in operational domains, so as to render divisions 
between the workplace and wider society irrelevant in the minds of still sceptical 
agents.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion. 
 
 In this final chapter, a brief summary of the preceding thesis is given, after 
which I raise a few suggestions regarding potential avenues of future research, which 
could help bolster this thesis’ academic validity and practical usage. Finally, I give a 
few personal words on the topics that, until now, I have been discussing in a relatively 
detached manner.  
 
1. Executive Summary. 
 
 This thesis first posited the idea that the historic operating environment of 
British agriculture seemed to offer a relatively stable and premonitory image of the 
New Economy, which has developed in wider British society as a result of post-1970s 
economic and political restructurings. From this observation, I proposed that trade 
unionism in that sector would likely have long held and utilised many of the same 
orientations and strategies that the wider British Trade Union Movement has recently 
adopted regarding precarity-prone workers; a repositioning initiated largely in 
reaction to the Movement’s loss of institutional positioning within the restructured 
economy.  
 To test this hypothesise, I described the hegemonic tendencies of the 
mainstream Movement, both before and after the onset of this study’s perioidisation; 
that being, 1970. I described how, largely due to increasing political-economic 
prohibitions on its once preferred modus operandi, the mainstream Movement had 
partially moved away from a hegemonic privileging of the strategy of voluntary 
collective bargaining, so as to come to use a cocktail to differentiated strategies, all 
known to the Movement previously but underused. Likewise, and for self-interested 
reasons, the Movement had incompletely realigned its orientations, so as to better 
welcome and cater to precarity-prone groups of workers, oft excluded from, or 
actively subordinated by, the Movement before this time.  
 I went on to compare these tendencies with those of unionism in British 
agriculture. Analyses of the Farmworkers’ Union actions located many continualities 
and many divergences from these patterns, but ultimately it was decided that my 
thesis’ predictions were unfounded. While the Farmworkers’ Union had frequently 
utilised strategies differentiated from the norm of voluntary collective bargaining, 
throughout our periodisation and indeed its operational lifespan, its orientational 
journey closely matched, rather than preceded, that of the wider Movement, and the 
partial and often ineffective actualisations of rejuvenation that have been found in the 
wider economy have likewise been seen in British agriculture.  
 In explaining this unexpected non-differentiation, I found that the agricultural 
economy’s fortunes were a lot more intertwined with those of the wider economy than 
I had first allowed for. Likewise, I concluded that the Farmworkers’ Union had only 
experienced a rejuvenation of its orientations in those operational domains that 
offered close to zero incentives through pre-existent regulative distribution channels: 
where rewards were guaranteed, no matter how slight or short-term, the Union’s 
rejuvenation had been indefinitely arrested. Differentiating agriculture from the wider 
economy, it was found that employers and the state had been active constructors of 
these regulative regimes that regularly arrested the Union’s rejuvenations, whereas in 
the wider economy the Movement had played a more determinant hand in designing 
its own pre-rejuvenatory structures and tendencies.  
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 In extrapolating value from these findings, I hypothetically explored the 
effectiveness of a number of theoretical policy ideas variably applicable to the 
Farmworkers’ Union and the British and Dutch movements, all with reference to the 
Farmworkers’ Union’s prior experiences,   
 
2. Avenues of Future Enquiry. 
 
 I hope that the preceding thesis includes a close to comprehensive descriptive 
account of the Farmworkers’ Union’s strategic actions over the past four decades, and 
has applied a number of complementary and insightful analytical models unto this 
description. This is not to say, however, that I consider this project to be the final 
word on modern era agricultural trade unionism, and its relationship to its immediate 
and wider industrial environments.  
 An obvious point of further enquiry would be to assess the strategic actions of 
the Farmworkers’ Union with direct reference to that industrial shadow of itself: that 
which has impinged upon its actions in virtually every arena it has been active in 
during the past half century. Being once among the most powerful lobby groups in the 
nation, and certainly still in ownership of substantial power reserves, the NFU makes 
for an obvious point of academic interest, and numerous theses and monographs have 
been dedicated to this agent as an object of study.1 However, its relationship with its 
union counterpart has been lesser examined, perhaps due to the perceived irrelevance 
of the Farmworkers’ Union. Yet detailed observations of this often taut relationship 
could well be of value: we have already seen how the strategic actions of this 
strategically enabled body have had a almost determinant influence over at least some 
of the perceptively independent actions of the Farmworkers’ Union, in that it once 
helped design operational domains which steered the Union towards pre-rejuvenatory 
norms; with an ever greater number of British unions coming to inhabit similarly 
disenfranchised institutional positions within their sectors of interest – being 
massively out-resourced by their opposite employer organisations – and with so many 
modern studies of unionism focussing on how unions could better improve their 
strategic actions, a case study focussing on the potentially deterministic 
interconnections between agricultural employer and worker agency could help 
highlight the possible limitations of the strategic reconfigurations being designed by 
strategists within the Movement.   
 A further avenue of enquiry has likewise been foreshadowed, albeit in passing, 
in the body of this thesis. We have seen how, in several otherwise unconnected 
moments, the Farmworkers’ Union accessed and utilised power resources residing 
within international union organisations, as it did in its campaign to secure the de 
facto prohibition of 2,4,5,T and in seeking funding for its field trials of URHSRs. 
Likewise, we saw how the FNV, when seeking to develop organising cultures within 
its own rank-and-files, enlisted the help of the British Movement. These 
developments are noteworthy, and can be related to my prescriptive observations 
made in chapter seven. For both national movements under consideration, I 
suggested, from my observations of the Farmworkers’ Unions’ experiences, that the 
building of stronger fraternal links – between individual unions and between each 
movement and wider societal actors – would be recommendable courses of action. 
While my prescriptive hypothesising stopped at the physical border of each nation, 
transnational unionism is a logical future waypoint along this road: there is no 
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practical or ideological reason why practical manifestations of One Big Unionism 
and/or One Big Society should be curtailed by the borders of nation states; indeed, we 
saw how much of the literature selling the TGWU/Amicus merger foresaw this 
development as a future end-point of such embryonic tendencies.2  
 There is a relative lack of academic literature on the subject of transnational 
unionism in the European context, reflecting the relative lack of transnational 
unionisms that currently exists in actuality – with international confederations often 
functioning largely symbolically rather than with instrumental effect3 – but a growing 
number of historical studies, and more forward-looking exploratory policy studies, 
have started to focus on the issue.4 However, perhaps representing the driving forces 
behind transnational unionism in the few cases in which it currently occurs in 
practice, much of this literature has been boosterist, and has looked at interactions 
between peak confederations and relative powerful unions within transnational 
bodies.5 The aid that the Farmworkers’ Union received with regards to 2,4,5,T, which 
helped it to secure an effective and orientationally rejuvenatory regime change in 
agriculture, points to an alternative kind of study. By looking at how transnational 
movements have historical improved, or else hindered, the efficacy of relatively 
powerless unions, and their dealing with precarity-prone workers, strategists operating 
in multiple new economies, often from similar positions of weakness, could locate 
potential avenues of effective action at the international level, for the benefit of 
multinational worker organisations and precarity-prone workers alike. Such an 
analysis could again use Heery and Hyman’s descriptive models of rejuvenation, and 
track how the agency of transnational union organisations has affected the 
operationalisation of rejuvenation within participating bodies. 
 This point about transnationalism points to a final further avenue of study, one 
that is as much linked to analytical techniques as it is to the selection of subjects for 
study. In this thesis, I adopted a single nation case-study approach, so as to allow for 
deep and rich descriptive insight. However, this single country approach does contain 
a number of weaknesses. Namely, without the benefit of comparative data, there is 
currently no method to falsify the findings of this study: while I am confident that this 
thesis’ findings are of value to historians and of use to strategists, this value and use 
could be improved by subsequent investigations of further unions, in multiple national 
economies, inhabiting similar institutional positions and facing similar institutional 
change. A principle perceived purpose of me writing this thesis was that it would be 
of use to strategists in identifying inventive but realistic avenues of future actions. 
This function I believe has been secured, but multi-case, transnational studies of 
numerous unions could enhance this further: a work which identified the repetition of 
precarity-producing and decreasing trends across international, and institutional, 
boundaries would decrease the perceived odds of what will always ultimately be the 
strategic gambles of union strategists, potentially helping to coax out further 
rejuvenations from multiple movements. Such a study could likewise, if drawing its 
net wide and deep enough, negate the Eurocentrism that has implicitly underwritten 
this thesis: the identification of sources of continuality and change between diverse 
national systems could upgrade the value of works such as these to the truly global 
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scale. Such suggested work would not have to be completed by a single author: 
analytical literature reviews, of studies such as this one and others similar, could 
prove of equal value to original historical research. 
 
3. Infertile Soils: Trade Unionism in New Economic Paradigms. 
 
 I wrote this thesis believing that trade unionism has, can, and indeed does, act 
as a force for good for numerous groups of working people, in Britain and globally. 
While union histories could be accused of being soiled with exclusionary and 
subjugatory attitudes, international unionism has, for centuries, defended the interests 
of working persons: perhaps never has every worker of the world united and had their 
interests commonly catered for, but it has certainly not just been exclusive and elite 
aristocracies of labour who have benefited from unionism. The construction of 
welfare states, the overthrowing of colonial yolks, and numerous transglobal 
resistancies to economic and social exploitation can be credited as being among the 
noble successes of international union movements and, more intrinsically, 
international unionists, who have suffered and sacrificed greatly in the name of 
worker welfare. 
 Yet such justifiably applauded victories have been won via the way of a 
historical concession, which has seen the protections of some brought with the 
degradations of others. Precarity-producing and maintaining tendencies have been 
structural modi operandi of numerous trade union movements, at least those of the 
European tradition, since their earliest inceptions. Not that this can be attributed to 
conspiratorial dealings, nor conscious decision making processes, on the part of 
international unionists. Just as one cannot project capitalism’s exploitative practices 
unto the decision-making processes of individual capitalists, one cannot blame 
individual unionists for unionism’s many forays into exploitative terrain. No, 
precarity-producing practices are often close-to-invisible for those actualising them, 
existing in the rational choices of actors with no perceptual alternative in sight.  
 To delve a layer deeper: this rationality is a social construct, a manifestation of 
the ideologies inherent to our and other societies’ modes of production as projected 
unto and internalised by social actors acting within this mode. The ‘rational choice’ 
for unions to partake in precarity-producing practices – most obviously evident in, but 
not limited to, the exclusion and subjugation of at-risk workers in defence of core 
union constituents – cannot be taken as being a guiding principle inherent to 
international unionism, but as an inherent characteristic of capitalism: the imperative 
of the extraction of surplus value as interpreted by worker organisations. As many 
theorists from across the leftist spectrum – Lenin and Luxemburg to name but a few – 
argue, unions, or at least models hegemonic in the Western Hemisphere, are 
manifestations of capitalism.6 We have seen how early unions of the Western 
Hemispheric variety – borne or else maturing under capitalism and formed from the 
workforces of capitalism – accepted many of the same principles of divisive self-
interest as which the craft societies of earlier modes of production held: however, we 
can expand on this point, and say these early unionists, and the craft societies, also 
came to accept, albeit after some definitely revolutionary experiments,7 the 
fundamental principles of their employers, or at least, on a wider scale, their 
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productive system; recognising the positive benefits such a system brought, and often 
oblivious to the hardships it wrought for others.  
 Again, I would never want to besmirch the life changing, indeed live saving, 
victories unions have won from this position of acceptance. In Britain and across 
Europe, it would not be hyperbolic to claim that it was principally the unions that won 
the taming of Dickensian capitalist exploitation, and helped decommodify labour 
through the founding and forging of expansive, penetrative welfare states, securing 
decreases in otherwise deadly precarity for such movements’ own workers, and wider 
societies, alike. However, due to their ideologically capitalist orientations, the by-
products and social-economic pollutants that such victories produced were often made 
invisible: as the unions’ rising tide rose their own boats, they often failed to see those 
workers whose crafts were less buoyant in, and in fact were capsized by, unionisms’ 
wake, and left to fend for themselves in the depths of the ocean of capitalist 
production. In Britain, from their pre-1970 niches, unionised workers had won great 
benefits for themselves and others, but failed to appreciate the blood and the sweat of 
the labour reserves that such victories were partially built on: these reserves included 
precarity-prone groups of economic workers within the national economy, transglobal 
workers within enduring systems of colonialism and neo-colonialism left unprotected 
and uncared for by Eurocentric worker bodies, and of course often-unpaid female 
workers, kept excluded from labour markets but certainly not labour, by systems of 
control at least in part built and maintained by union movements.  
 Allow me to switch from this maritime metaphor to one more befitting this 
thesis’ chief object of study. Unionisms grew, in the Victorian era and beyond, to 
produce grand and shady foliage, of protection and value to innumerable workers. 
However, the infertile soils from which movements grew – the nutrient deficient peat 
bog that is capitalism – demanded the evolution of carnivorous species, reliant on the 
principle of the extraction of surplus value, so that the shade unions created for some 
could only be maintained through the consumption of the interests of others. These 
infertile soils produced occasional viciousness on the part of union movements, but 
one can no more blame the proactive strategic actions of unionist for this, as one can 
blame Venus flytraps for their insecticidal ways: both have been forced to adapt to 
their hostile environments in order to survive. 
 However, not even this stable pattern of union-complicit divisiveness could 
remain solid forever within capitalist societies. To change metaphor again: for 
varying lengths of time, often in excess of a century, workers – not every worker but 
many workers – had managed to snipe and outflank the theoretically better equipped 
resources of Capital in the set piece battles that were fought on, and from, these soils, 
so as to enjoy a considerable amount of comfort in their barracks, albeit by 
continuously and unthinking sacrificing the interests of precarity-prone 
infantrypersons – not unloved, but simply invisible to the minds of the generals of 
union movements’ Big Battalions. Transitions into new economies have changed this. 
These transitions do not offer total and radical breaks from pre-1970s modes of 
production: they only represent a turbo charging of capitalism,8 where organised 
Capital, gouged on the degradation of transglobal environmental resources, both 
physical and human, has re-emerged as the unassailable dominant party in the battles 
raging within the industrial arenas of global capitalism. The working peoples best 
represented by unions lost their internal influence, and accordingly lost their 
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decommodifications of labour – their spoils of intra-capitalist war – to new onslaughts 
of Capital, often working in collusion with now hostile states. In pre-1970 eras, 
countless workers never got a chance to forget that capitalism was a system innately 
built on exploitation: now, the working classes that did momentarily get this 
opportunity – skilled manual workers, public sector workers and other somewhat 
aristocratic proletariats – have been forcibly reminded of this fact, as the frontlines of 
industrial conflicts have been brought forward to their once fortified barracks.  
 A normative silver lining can be found in these forced realisations: with their 
fortunes in eclipse, movements could better see the misfortunes of less fortunate 
workers, their own complicity in the structures of controls that helped produce these 
misfortunes and, vitally, the fact that the misfortunes of others were of long-term 
harm to one’s core constituents. What is more, the empirical evidence that has 
beggared these realisations could, and I say should, prompt another, more radical, 
one.  
 Look at the Farmworkers’ Union. In the self-identified territory of agricultural 
unionism, organised workers never enjoyed enough power resources to ever 
substantially outflank the might of capitalists, and accordingly never properly 
decommodified their own labour. As it has been in agricapitalism, so it is, or will be, 
in ‘standard’ capitalism: workers can occasionally outflank capital, but the historic 
positioning of farmworkers is close to the ‘natural’ position of all capitalist workers; 
in ownership of the means of production, Capital will always eventually triumph in 
industrial arenas and, uncontrollably requiring surplus value, produce monopole and 
precarious industrial terrains in the long-(long-)term, as long as the capitalist rules of 
the game are stuck to. Agricultural economies, and new economies, are, or are 
approaching, the true economies of capitalist production.  
 What hope is there for unions in such environments? Analysis of the 
Farmworkers’ Unions actions – those of the pre-1970s, the early years, and certainly 
the latter years, of our periodisation – reveals that no combination of union 
orientation and strategy can negate precarity for all in our mode of production, even 
when unionists with the best of intentions have attempted orientational rejuvenation. 
The infertile capitalist soils of British agriculture, of the wider New Economy, indeed 
of any capitalist society, cannot physically nurture such theoretical techniques. Even 
the Farmworkers’ Union’s most effective actions, such as those which won the GLA 
– a legislative body which represented a massive and inclusive redistribution of risks 
and benefits in society, to the benefit of some of the most precarity–prone workers in 
the industry –normalised and legitimised other aspect of precarity-producing wealth 
extraction, such as when high-street employment agencies found their institutional 
positions, and precarity-producing strategies, implicitly sanctioned by their 
interactions with the Movement. From this account, unionisms’ abyss seems to be 
deepening. Again, what hope is there for unions is such environments? 
 In grappling with this question, on the back of this thesis’s analytical 
investigations, I prescribed a number of strategic elixirs to help combat unionisms’ 
ills. These prescriptions were pragmatic: I offered solutions which I believe will serve 
movements and precarity-prone workers well in what I define as the long-term; but 
even if such policy decisions were made, precarity – institutional, structural and 
penetrative precarity – will still exist, and will still be maintained by unionisms, still 
rooted in the capitalist mode of production. Maybe not exclusionary, maybe not 
subordinatory, but movements still tied to capitalism will always function as 
purveyors of precarity, participating in the distribution of benefits, but also risks, and 
plenty of risks at that, among capitalism’s workforces.  
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 Still though, normative solutions are possible to find, even when staring into 
this abyss. Trade unions of the modern hegemonic European variety may be 
inseparable from capitalist production techniques, but this has not always been the 
case. The last time British labour was commodified to the extent it is now was also 
the then-young labour Movement’s first revolutionary period.9 Numerous groups of 
workers attempted to not merely subvert the yolk of capitalism, but to actively 
overthrow it. Soon, in much of the economy, decommodifications tamed these storms, 
while in British agriculture the dictates of employers and the state helped build 
regulative structures that pacified potentially empowered sections of the workforce 
through the mechanics of divisive, union-driven redistributions. But now Labour, in 
agriculture and the wider economy, is losing its redistributive and protective 
mechanisms and finding itself in direct and overt conflict with Capital again, and 
despite some localised union successes, Capital is undoubtedly winning. The British 
Movement had a radical streak in its teenage years: in this restructured terrain, 
perhaps we might welcome a rebellious mid-life crisis from movements; Western 
unionism in its hegemonic form is bound to the captialist mode of capitalist 
production, but with unionists in ownership of human agency, this hegemonic for is 
open to further change. 
 From this hypothesising, we draw the final lesson of this thesis. If, season 
after season, farmers find their fields to be unproductive, they may instruct their 
workers to rotate their crop: likewise, if, year after year, unions find their regulative 
environments unable to yield precarity-reducing rewards for all, they may try to 
change their orientations and strategies. But it would be a foolish farmer to blame 
one’s choice of crop if their soil were to fail decade after decade: new nutrients would 
be spread on the deficient fields, a totally new basis to the field’s system of 
production trialed. To continue the analogy: union strategists can spend all the time in 
the world debating the form and function of their strategic actions, but we are perhaps 
reaching a point when we may realise that we need to actively, nay revolutionarily, 
replace British agriculture’s, and the wider economy’s, infertile, capitalist, soils.  
 
 
 
                                                
9 Again, cf. Chapter 2, footnote 28 of this thesis.  
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